SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Civil: Application)
RAGLESS v IPA HOLDINGS PTY LTD (IN LIQUIDATION) & CARNIE (NON PARTY)
[2012] SASC 203
Reasons for Decision of The Honourable Justice White
6 November 2012
CORPORATIONS - MEMBERSHIP, RIGHTS AND REMEDIES - MEMBERS' REMEDIES AND INTERNAL DISPUTES - PROCEEDINGS ON BEHALF OF COMPANY BY MEMBER - STATUTORY DERIVATIVE ACTION
The plaintiff was granted leave under s 237 of the Corporations Act 2011 (Cth) to bring proceedings on behalf of the defendant - the grant of leave was confirmed on appeal - the plaintiff commenced proceedings in the name of the defendant against the applicant and his company ("the 2009 Action") - the applicant and his company then issued a third party notice to the plaintiff and his company.
The applicant now seeks an order revoking the grant of leave, contending that the plaintiff is not acting in good faith or in the best intersts of the company, as required by s 237.
He contends the plaintiff has now caused the defendant to make claims of a materially different kind from those contemplated by him when seeking leave; that the plaintiff is conducting the 2009 Action in a partisan way and in pursuit of interests other than his interest as a shareholder; and that the plaintiff is conducting the 2009 Action for an ulterior motive based on personal animus and malice.
Held (dismissing the application):
(1) the present application is not an occasion to re-agitate complaints about the Master's decision to grant leave, nor to determine issues of construction of a deed which are at the heart of the issues to be determined in the 2009 Action (at [13]-[16], [41], [53]-[54]);
(2) the plaintiff obtained leave as a shareholder of the defendant, in accordance with s 236(1) of the Act, and the plaintiff retains standing in that capacity (at [44]);
(3) the claim which the defendant may have against the plaintiff and his company can be heard and determined in the third party action (at [51]-[52]);
(4) when derivative proceedings are to be brought for a proper purpose, the fact that the applicant for leave may be motivated by some personal animus is not decisive (at [57]);
(5) it has not been shown that the plaintiff is not acting in good faith nor in the best interests of the defendant in the 2009 Action (at [61]).
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 236, s 237, s 241; Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA) r 242, referred to.
BP Chemicals ANZ Pty Ltd v Manildra Starches Pty Ltd [1997] FCA 1189; Chahwan v Euphoric Pty Ltd (2008) 227 FLR 43; Fiduciary Ltd v Morningstar Research Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 442; Iliopoulos v BM 2008 Pty Ltd (in liq) [2010] FCA 787; Maher v Honeysett & Maher Electrical Contractors [2005] NSWSC 859; Pearl Coast Divers Pty Ltd (in liq) v Cossack Pearls Pty Ltd [2008] FCA 927; Ragless v IPA Holdings Pty Ltd (in liq) (2008) 254 LSJS 225; Swansson…
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- Case
- [2012] SASC 203
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
Mr. Carnie argued that the proceedings were not in the best interests of IPA Holdings Pty Ltd, a company in liquidation, and that Mr. Ragless did not act in good faith. He also raised the issue that Section 237 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) might not apply to companies in liquidation. The court examined these arguments and assessed whether there was sufficient evidence to support Mr. Carnie's claims.
The court found that Mr. Carnie had not substantiated his claims that Mr. Ragless was not acting in good faith or that the derivative action was not in the best interests of the company. The evidence provided by Mr. Carnie did not convincingly indicate that Mr. Ragless had ulterior motives or lacked a genuine belief in the merits of the case. Consequently, the court dismissed Mr. Carnie's application for revocation of the grant of leave under Section 237 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). The decision affirmed that the original grant of leave was valid and that Mr. Ragless was entitled to proceed with the derivative action on behalf of IPA Holdings Pty Ltd.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Mr Carnie seeks an order revoking the grant of leave made on 2 July 2007. He contends that Mr Ragless is not acting in good faith nor in the best interests of Holdings as was required by s 237(2)(b) and (c) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) for the grant of leave. Mr Carnie points in addition to decisions since that of the Full Court in 2008 to the effect that s 237 is not applicable in the case of companies in liquidation, as is the case with Holdings. He accepts that this is not an independent ground for revocation of the grant of leave but contends that it is a matter to be taken into account if the Court is satisfied that one or other of his two principal grounds is made out.Preliminary Considerations Mr Carnie’s submissions were made primarily on the basis that the grant of leave by the Master on 2 July 2007 was an interlocutory decision, so that the principles relating to the revocation by the Court of one of its earlier interlocutory decisions are pertinent. In retrospect, this issue should have received more attention at the hearing as it is by no means plain that the Master’s decision and order should be characterised as interlocutory in nature. In New South Wales the contrary view is taken: Swansson v Pratt;[2] Fiduciary Ltd v Morningstar Research Pty Ltd;[3] and Maher v Honeysett & Maher Electrical Contractors.[4] On the other hand, the power vested in the Court by s 237(1) is to grant leave to bring proceedings or to intervene in proceedings. A decision concerning intervention is more obviously of an interlocutory kind than the former. If it is interlocutory, then a decision in the exercise of the same statutory power granting leave to bring proceedings may also be interlocutory. It may also be pertinent that s 237(1)(d) incorporates the standard for interlocutory injunctions.[2] [2002] NSWSC 583 at [24].[3] [2005] NSWSC 442 at [15].[4] [2005] NSWSC 859 at [12]. Counsel for Mr Carnie adverted, albeit briefly, to r 242 of the Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 which permits this Court, in limited circumstances, to vary or set aside a final judgment. His submissions did not indicate, however, a circumstance in which r 242 could be invoked in the present circumstances. As the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) applies nationally, the courts in the various States and Territories should apply a consistent approach to its construction and application. That indicates that this Court should follow the approach taken in the New South Wales cases. On the other hand, Mr Ragless did not contest the view that the Court was being asked to revoke one of its own previous interlocutory decisions nor the view that the principles relating to such a revocation are appropriate. I consider that it is not necessary for me to reach a concluded view about the matter because, on the view most favourable to Mr Carnie, I am satisfied that his present application should fail. I will accordingly address his submissions on the basis that the Master’s original decision granting leave under s 237 was interlocutory in nature but without thereby implying that that is the proper view of the matter.