Idameneo (No 123) Pty Ltd v Suszko

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Full Court)

IDAMENEO (NO 123) PTY LTD v SUSZKO

[2015] SASCFC 77

Judgment of The Full Court

(The Honourable Justice Vanstone, The Honourable Justice Kelly and The Honourable Justice Blue)

28 May 2015

PROCEDURE - SUPREME COURT PROCEDURE - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - PROCEDURE UNDER RULES OF COURT - PLEADINGS

PROCEDURE - JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS - AMENDING, VARYING AND SETTING ASIDE - ACTIONS TO REVIEW OR SET ASIDE JUDGMENT - IN GENERAL

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL - PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - WHEN APPEAL LIES - BY LEAVE OF COURT - INTERLOCUTORY ORDERS AND JUDGMENTS

Application for permission to appeal against dismissal of successive applications to amend defence and introduce counterclaim.

The applicant entered into interlocking agreements with the respondent under which he was paid $575,000 and agreed to provide medical services at the respondent’s medical centre, pay 50 per cent of his income for services and facilities provided by the respondent and not to render medical services within 10 kilometres for three years after termination of the agreement to provide medical services at the respondent’s medical centre.  The interlocking agreements provided that the applicant would transfer his practice including goodwill to the respondent.

In April 2013, following termination of the agreement to provide medical services at the respondent’s medical centre, the respondent instituted an action against the applicant for breach of the restraint clause. The applicant filed a defence alleging that there was no transfer of goodwill under the agreements and the restraint clause was void.  The action was listed for trial to commence on 2 March 20015.

A few weeks before trial, the applicant applied for permission to amend his defence and introduce a counterclaim to plead that he was induced to enter into the agreements by misrepresentations that his goodwill would be transferred under the agreements to the respondent and this would result in tax concessions and exemptions.  A Judge dismissed the application because granting it would entail adjournment of the trial and there was no satisfactory explanation for delay by the applicant. The applicant renewed his application based on fresh evidence.  The Judge dismissed the renewed application on the same grounds.  In each case, the Judge ordered that the applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the application in any event. 

On 2 March 2015, the respondent discontinued its action and submitted to an order that it pay the applicant’s costs of action excluding costs awarded in any event. 

The applicant seeks permission to appeal against the dismissal of his interlocutory applications and the costs orders on grounds that the Judge erred in refusing the applications and alternatively that, if the Judge had known that the respondent was going to discontinue the action, the applications would not have been dismissed.

Held per Blue J (Vanstone and Kelly JJ agreeing) dismissing the application for permission:

1.       The Judge was correct in his assessment that the applicant had not adequately explained the reasons for the delay and the applications were properly…

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Details
Case
[2015] SASCFC 77
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter comes before the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia on an application by Dr Suszko for permission to appeal against orders made by a single judge on 13 and 27 February 2015. Dr Suszko seeks to appeal the dismissal of his applications, contending that the judge erred in his reasons for dismissal based on the materials before him, and alternatively, that the judge would not have dismissed the applications had he been aware of Dr Suszko's assertion that Idameneo intended to discontinue its action at the commencement of trial.

The primary legal issue before the Full Court was whether the single judge had erred in exercising his discretion to refuse Dr Suszko's applications to amend his defence. Specifically, the court was required to consider whether the judge's findings regarding the lack of an adequate explanation for the delay in seeking the amendments and the prejudice Idameneo would suffer from an adjournment were sufficient grounds to refuse the amendments, and whether this refusal constituted a miscarriage of discretion.

The Full Court noted that an appeal against the exercise of a discretion requires the appellant to demonstrate a miscarriage of that discretion, as per the principles established in *House v The King*. The judge had refused the application to amend on the basis that it would necessitate an adjournment of the trial, causing prejudice to Idameneo due to the impending expiry of a restraint period and the unlikelihood of obtaining injunctive relief. Furthermore, the judge found Dr Suszko's solicitor's affidavit to be "opaque and unsatisfactory" in explaining the delay, lacking specificity regarding when relevant information was obtained and failing to identify professional advisors. The judge concluded that, given the inadequate explanation for delay and the prejudice to Idameneo, the discretion should be exercised to refuse the amendment.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

VANSTONE J KELLY J BLUE J
On 6 March 2015, Dr Suszko filed an application for permission to appeal against the orders made on 13 and 27 February 2015. Dr Suszko seeks, if permission is granted, to advance two different contentions on appeal. First, the Judge made specific errors in his reasons for dismissing each application on the materials before his Honour. Secondly, assuming that the Judge’s dismissals were rightly made on the materials before his Honour, they would not have been made if the Judge had known what Dr Suszko contends was the true position at the time, namely that Idameneo intended to discontinue its action at the commencement of trial.Decisions said to be wrongly made on the materials The first application In his reasons for judgment, the Judge referred to the approach to applications to amend that, if granted, would result in an adjournment of trial articulated by the High Court in Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University[3] and the relevant factors to be considered identified by Bleby J (with whom White J agreed) in Channel Seven Adelaide Pty Ltd v Manock.[4][3] [2009] HCA 27, (2009) 239 CLR 175.[4] [2010] SASCFC 59 at [46]. The Judge noted that Dr Suszko did not contest the submission that the grant of permission to amend would necessitate an adjournment of the trial. The Judge said that he was satisfied in any event that, if the amendment were permitted, the trial would have to be adjourned. The Judge found that, if the trial were adjourned, it would cause prejudice to Idameneo, not only in time and cost, but also because the restraint period would expire in February 2016 and it would be unlikely that Idameneo would obtain judgment and injunctive relief before that time. The Judge found that Dr Suszko’s solicitor’s affidavit did not explain the delay in making the application. The Judge said:The affidavit is opaque and unsatisfactory. It lacks the necessary specificity to be expected in explaining the reason for the delay in bringing the application to amend. In particular, it fails to identify precise times when it has said that the defendant either personally or by his solicitors learned of matters alleged to be relevant to the need to amend the defence and establish a right to a set-off and counterclaim. Further, the affidavit refers to advice obtained from a solicitor and a chartered accountant without identifying either of them, when the advice was obtained or exhibiting such advice.[5][5] [2015] SASC 29 at [12]. The Judge concluded that, given the lack of an adequate explanation for the delay and the prejudice Idameneo would suffer if the amendments were permitted, the discretion should be exercised to refuse the application. Dr Suszko is seeking to challenge on appeal the exercise of a discretion by the Judge. It follows that Dr Suszko must first establish that the exercise of the discretion miscarried in accordance with the principles articulated by the High Court in House v The King.[6][6] (1936) 55 CLR 499 at 504-505 per Dixon Evatt and McTiernan JJ.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: VANSTONE J, KELLY J, BLUE J

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