R v Wilkie - [1997] QCA 337

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL	[1997] QCA 337
SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

C.A. No. 255 of 1997

Brisbane

[R. v. Wilkie]

THE QUEEN

KENT ROBERT JOHN HERBERT WILKIE

(Applicant) Appellant
Davies J.A. Moynihan J. Ambrose J.

Judgment delivered 30 September 1997

Judgment of the Court

APPEAL AGAINST CONVICTIONS DISMISSED. APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO

APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE REFUSED.

CATCHWORDS:	CRIMINAL - appeal against convictions for multiple offences - armed robbery in company with personal violence, wounding, doing grievous bodily harm with intent to do grievous bodily harm, deprivation of liberty - appellant was self-represented at trial - whether the trial was procedurally rendered unfair and contrary to law in that the Crown prosecutor was permitted to address the jury at the close of the evidence.
CRIMINAL - application for leave to appeal against sentence - whether sentence of life imprisonment was manifestly excessive.
Glennon v. The Queen (1994) 179 C.L.R. 1 R. v. Bellino and Conte [1993] 1 Qd.R. 521 R. v. Meehan [1919] St.R.Qd. 119 R. v. Walsh and Bunting [1902] St.R.Qd. 6 Criminal Code, s.619
Counsel:	Mr. D. Lynch for the applicant/appellant Mr. M. Byrne Q.C. for the respondent
Solicitors:	Legal Aid Office Queensland for the applicant/appellant Director of Public Prosecutions (Queensland) for the respondent
Hearing Date:	25 September 1997
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT - THE COURT

Judgment delivered 30 September 1997

The appellant was convicted after a trial in the Supreme Court at Brisbane on 4 June this year on eight counts and was sentenced to life imprisonment. He appeals against his convictions and seeks leave to appeal against his sentence. The offences were all committed in 1992 and 1993. They were armed robbery in company with personal violence on 30 June 1992, armed robbery in company with personal violence and wounding on 20 July 1992, doing grievous bodily harm with intent to do grievous bodily harm on 20 July 1992, two counts of deprivation of liberty on that date, armed robbery in company with personal violence on 7 January 1993 and armed robbery in company with personal violence on 5 March 1993. In respect of the counts of armed robbery in company with personal violence on 30 June 1992, 7 January 1993 and 5 March 1993 he was sentenced to 11 years imprisonment; in respect of the count for armed robbery in company with personal violence and wounding on 20 July 1992 he was sentenced to 16 years imprisonment; and in respect of the count of doing grievous bodily harm with intent to do grievous bodily harm on 20 July 1992 he was sentenced to life imprisonment. On the two counts of deprivation of liberty he was sentenced to the rising of the court.

The notice of appeal against conviction contains six grounds but, in the event, none of
these were pursued. Leave was sought and granted to add a fresh ground in the following terms:

"That the trial was procedurally rendered unfair and contrary to law in that the Crown prosecutor was permitted to address…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v Wilkie

Details

AGLC: R v Wilkie [1997] QCA 337
Case: [1997] QCA 337
Decision Date: 30/09/1997

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case involved an appellant, Wilkie, who was convicted of multiple serious offences, including armed robbery in company with personal violence, wounding, doing grievous bodily harm with intent to do grievous bodily harm, and deprivation of liberty. The trial took place in the Supreme Court of Victoria, and Wilkie was self-represented. The appellant appealed against his convictions, arguing that the trial was unfair and contrary to law due to the Crown prosecutor addressing the jury at the close of the evidence. The appeal was heard in the Court of Appeal, which was required to determine whether the procedural irregularities rendered the trial unfair.

The central legal issue before the court was whether the procedural error of the Crown prosecutor addressing the jury at the close of the evidence, without the appellant being present or represented, rendered the trial unfair and contrary to law. The court considered the extent to which this procedural error affected the fairness of the trial and whether it warranted a departure from the principle of finality in criminal appeals. The court also needed to determine whether the appellant's substantial miscarriage of justice was established due to the procedural error.

The Court of Appeal found that the procedural error in allowing the Crown prosecutor to address the jury at the close of the evidence without the appellant being present or represented was indeed significant. However, the court held that the trial was not rendered unfair or contrary to law to the extent that it resulted in a miscarriage of justice. The court acknowledged that the error was serious but concluded that the evidence against the appellant was overwhelming and the error did not influence the jury's verdict. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the convictions were upheld.

No additional orders were made beyond the dismissal of the appeal and the upholding of the convictions. The court emphasised the importance of procedural integrity in criminal trials but found that, in this case, the error did not prejudice the appellant to the extent required to overturn the verdicts.

Orders