SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
R v WCC [2024] QCA 88
PARTIES:
R
v
WCC
(appellant)FILE NO/S:
CA No 250 of 2023
DC No 629 of 2023DIVISION:
Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING:
Appeal against Conviction
ORIGINATING COURT:
District Court at Brisbane – Date of Conviction: 16 November 2023 (Jarro DCJ)
DELIVERED ON:
21 May 2024
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
8 April 2024
JUDGES:
Morrison and Boddice JJA and Cooper J
ORDERS:
1. The appeal be allowed.
2. The verdicts of guilty below be set aside.
3. There be a re-trial.
CATCHWORDS:
CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE – PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCES AMOUNTING TO MISCARRIAGE – MISDIRECTION OR NON-DIRECTION – where the appellant was convicted of one count of sexual assault and three counts of rape – where a pre-text telephone call between the complainant and the appellant was admitted into evidence – where the appellant’s account to his partner XYZ was admitted into evidence – where there was no case made that the pre-text call contained admissions as to the charged acts – where the trial judge made directions substantially in accord with a Liberato style direction – where the direction only dealt with the evidence given by XYZ – where the trial judge failed to direct the jury to give consideration to the contents of the pre-text call – whether the failure to specifically direct the jury gave rise to a real risk that the jury may have the impression that disbelief of the appellant’s evidence, or preference for the complainant’s evidence over that evidence, meant that guilt had been proven beyond reasonable doubt – whether a miscarriage of justice occurred
CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – PARTICULAR GROUNDS OF APPEAL – INCONSISTENT VERDICTS – where the appellant had been charged on an indictment with five counts – where the appellant was acquitted of one count of rape by penetrating the complainant’s mouth with his penis (count 4) – where there were inconsistencies between the complainant’s evidence and the other evidence in relation to count 4 – where there was other evidence that supported the complainant’s evidence in relation to counts 3 and 5 – whether the verdicts on counts 3 and 5 are inconsistent with the acquittal on count 4 – whether the verdicts on counts 3 and 5 were irrational
CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – VERDICT UNREASONABLE OR INSUPPORTABLE HAVING REGARD TO EVIDENCE – where the appellant was convicted of one count of sexual assault and three counts of rape – where the appellant submits the complainant’s description of count 5 (rape by penetrating the complainant’s vagina with his penis) was inadequate and lacking in probative force – where the complainant’s memory was affected by her inebriation – whether it was improbable that an act of penile penetration occurred in the circumstances – whether a jury, acting rationally, ought to have entertained a reasonable doubt about proof of the element of penetration and therefore proof of…
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- AGLC
- R v WCC [2024] QCA 88
- Case
- [2024] QCA 88
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the trial judge gave directions, substantially in accord with a Liberato style direction, but the direction given by the trial judge only dealt with the evidence given by XYZ. The court held that the failure of the trial judge to direct the jury in respect of the use of the appellant's account in the pre-text telephone call resulted in a miscarriage of justice. The court further found that the verdicts on counts 3 and 5 were not inconsistent with the acquittal on count 4 and that the verdict on count 5 was not unreasonable.
The appeal was allowed, the verdicts of guilty were set aside, and a re-trial was ordered.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be allowed.
2. The verdicts of guilty below be set aside.
3. There be a re-trial.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The trial judge then moved away from the pre-text call onto another topic, that concerned with one thing said by the appellant to XYZ, namely that he touched the complainant down there. As will be seen this evidence was referred to by the trial judge as “what he said to [XYZ] about his conduct”. His Honour said:[104]“Evidence was also given yesterday by [XYZ] that when she confronted [the appellant] about what she discussed with the complainant, she recalled [the appellant] telling her that he ‘touched her down there’. Now, there is nothing to do with penetration or anything of the sort. Reasonably, if you accept the defendant’s version given in the pretext call and/or what he said to [XYZ] about his conduct, then you would find him not guilty of the relevant charge.”[104]AB 57 lines 33-37. Emphasis added. The highlighted words made it clear that what was said as to the touching had nothing to do with counts 2-5, each of which had an element of penetration. It was in that context that the trial judge said the last sentence. In those circumstances, could it be said that there was a real risk, as opposed to fanciful risk, that the jury might have been under be the impression that the evidence on which the appellant relied on, would only give rise to a reasonable doubt if they believed it to be truthful. In my view, for several reasons that must be answered in the negative. First, the directions contained a Liberato direction which referred to “[XYZ’s] evidence”. XYZ’s evidence was as to her oral conversation with the appellant as well as the text messages. Both categories were included in the phrase “the evidence given by [XYZ]” in the passages quote in paragraph [54] above. Secondly, the Liberato direction was given only a short time before the impugned passage. And, the impugned passage was surrounded by directions that the appellant’s touching had nothing to do with the charged acts. I do not consider that the jury were likely to understand that as displacing what they had just been told about how to deal with the appellant’s evidence. Rather, it was likely that they understood it as referring to the Liberato direction just given. Thirdly, the passage referred to was dealing with one aspect of the evidence in particular. That is, it was referring to the fact that the appellant accepted he had touched the complainant on her vagina, something which was not a charged act. He had told XYZ that in the phone call and had said that in the pre-text call. The last sentence of the passage in paragraphs [63] and [80] above was, in context, an observation only on that aspect of the evidence. That this is so, is evident from the next part of the summing up, where the trial judge gave a specific direction as to how that evidence could be used as revealing the appellant’s sexual interest in the complainant.[105][105]AB 57 line 39 to AB 58 line 14. Fourthly, the earlier direction expressly told the jury that the burden of proof did not shift to the defence, and that the question of guilt had to be assessed upon the whole of the evidence, including that from the appellant. Then, just before the impugned passage the jury were reminded that the burden of proof did not shift to the defence.[106] That part of the summing up concluded shortly thereafter with this:[107]“You must still decide whether, having regard to the whole of the evidence, the offences charged have been proved to your satisfaction beyond reasonable doubt.”[106]AB 57 lines 1-3.[107]AB 58 lines 17-19.