R v Warwick (No 94)

[2020] NSWSC 1168

Supreme Court

New South Wales

• Summary available

Medium Neutral Citation:

R v Warwick (No.94) [2020] NSWSC 1168

Hearing dates:

20 August 2020

Date of orders:

03 September 2020

Decision date:

03 September 2020

Jurisdiction:

Common Law - Criminal

Before:

Garling J

Decision:

Refer [106]-[107]

Catchwords:

SENTENCING — Multiple offences – Offender convicted of 20 Counts – 3 Counts of murder – attack on public institution - Family Court bomber – Whether a life sentence is appropriate in the circumstances – no submissions concerning subjective circumstances – objective seriousness of offences targeting public officials – objective seriousness of offence targeting place of worship – flagitious crimes - life sentences imposed – maximum penalty appropriate

Legislation Cited:

Crimes Act 1900

Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999

Cases Cited:

Markarian v R [2005] HCA 25; (2005) 228 CLR 357

Mill v The Queen [1988] HCA 70; (1988) 166 CLR 59

Muldrock v The Queen [2011] HCA 39; (2011) 244 CLR 120

Pearce v The Queen [1998] HCA 57; (1998) 194 CLR 610

R v Merritt [2004] NSWCCA 19; (2004) 59 NSWLR 557

R v Tarrant [2010] NZHC 2192

R v Warwick (No.93) [2020] NSWSC 926

Veen v The Queen (No.2) [1988] HCA 14; (1988) 164 CLR 465

Texts Cited:

Not Applicable

Category:

Principal judgment

Parties:

The Crown
Leonard John Warwick (Accused)

Representation:

Counsel:
K McKay / G Christofi (Crown)
A R Conolly / E Ramsay (Accused)

Solicitors:
Director of Public Prosecutions (Crown)
A R Conolly & Co

File Number(s):

2015/222068

Publication restriction:

Not Applicable

sentencing remarks

1. Between the years of 1980 to 1985, the Offender waged a campaign of extreme violence against the Family Court of Australia, its judges, and a practitioner. His final act of extreme violence was perpetrated on members of the Lurnea Congregation of the Jehovah’s Witnesses, some of whom had helped his former wife and their daughter escape Sydney. It took over three decades for the Offender to be arrested, charged, tried and convicted for his offending.

2. On 23 July 2020, after presiding over a Judge alone trial of the Indictment presented against the Offender, I convicted the Offender of 20 counts for the reasons which I then published. [1] Specifically, I convicted the Offender of the following:

   1. R v Warwick (No.93) [2020] NSWSC 926 (“the principal judgment”)

1. three counts of murder contrary to s 18(1)(a) of the Crimes Act 1900 (“the Crimes Act”);

2. two counts of exploding an explosive device which destroys or damages a building with intent to murder a named individual contrary to s 28 of the Crimes Act;

3. one count of placing an explosive substance into a vehicle with intent to commit murder contrary to s 30 of the Crimes Act;

4. one count of maliciously placing an explosive substance near a building with intent to damage that building contrary to s 204 of the Crimes Act; and

5. thirteen counts of maliciously, by an explosion, causing grievous bodily harm to named individuals contrary to s 46 of the Crimes Act.

3. It is now time for the Offender to be sentenced for each of his crimes.

Statutory Regime

4. A sentence is imposed by a Court upon an offender for a number of different purposes which overlap and are often in tension. [2]

   2. Muldrock v The Queen [2011] HCA 39; (2011) 244 CLR 120 at [20]

5. Those purposes are to:

1. ensure adequate punishment of an offender;

2. prevent crime by deterring others and the offender from committing similar offences;

3. protect the community from the offender;

4. promote the offender’s rehabilitation;

5. make the offender accountable for their actions;

6. recognise the harm done to the victims of the crime and the community; and

7. denounce publicly the conduct of the offender. [3]

   3. See s 3A Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999

6. The relevant legislation also provides that there are a number of aggravating and mitigating factors which need to be considered in determining an appropriate sentence. The legislation does not require the Court to increase or decrease a sentence because of the presence or absence of these factors. [4]

   4. See s 21A Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999

Maximum Penalties

7. Beyond the broad purposes of sentencing, I must also have regard to the maximum penalties fixed by the Crimes Act for each offence. These maximum terms of imprisonment are a guidepost to which a Court must have regard when imposing a sentence. [5]

   5. Muldrock v The Queen [2011] HCA 39; (2011) 244 CLR 120 at [27]

8. For the offence of murder, the Crimes Act provided, both at the time of the commission of the offences and presently a maximum term of life imprisonment.

9. At the time of the commission of the offences contrary to s 28, s 30 and s 46 of the Crimes Act, a maximum term of life imprisonment was provided for each of those offences. However, since that time, the legislature has reduced the maximum penalty which this Court can impose now to 25 years imprisonment for each offence[6] . The offence of placing an explosive device near a building with intent to damage it contrary to s 204 of the Crimes Act carries a maximum penalty of 14 years’ imprisonment.

   6. Section 19(2) Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999

10. At the time these offences were committed, the relevant legislation did not fix any standard non-parole periods with respect to any of these offences.

Common Law Principles

11. Over time, the Courts have developed legal principles to guide the exercise of the sentencing discretion by Judges.

12. These common law principles are to be found in decided cases, and have continuing relevance because the legislation preserves the entire body of judicially developed sentencing principles. [7]

    7. Section 21A(1) Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999; Muldrock at [18]

13. The common law principles of sentencing require the Court in this matter to impose a sentence which is proportional to the gravity of each offence,[8] and one which appropriately reflects the totality of the criminal behaviour of which the Offender has been convicted. [9] It is also important that a person should not be punished twice for the same conduct[10] .

    8. Veen v The Queen (No.2) [1988] HCA 14; (1988) 164 CLR 465 at 472

    9. Mill v The Queen [1988] HCA 70; (1988) 166 CLR 59

    10. Pearce v The Queen [1998] HCA 57; (1998) 194 CLR 610

14. What the sentencing task requires of a Judge is that they have regard to the relevant legislation (including the purposes of sentencing) the statutory guidepost of the maximum penalty, the aggravating and mitigating factors, and, as well, the principles of the common law.

15. Against the legal framework of statutory requirements and common law sentencing principles, the sentencing Judge has to consider the significance of all the relevant factual circumstances of the offending and of the Offender. The sentencing Judge is then in a position to undertake an “instinctive synthesis” whereby the Judge “makes a value judgment” as to what is the appropriate sentence given all of the factors of the case. As the “instinctive synthesis” approach to sentencing embodies a value judgment, there is no such thing as a single correct sentence. [11]

    11. Markarian v R [2005] HCA 25; (2005) 228 CLR 357 at [51]; Muldrock at [26]

A Specific Statutory Provision

16. The Crown in this matter has submitted that, for the three convictions of murder, the Court should impose on the Offender a life sentence without parole.

17. It is therefore necessary for the Court to consider the provisions of s 61(1) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999, which are:

“A court is to impose a sentence of imprisonment for life on a person who is convicted of murder if the Court is satisfied that the level of culpability in the commission of the offence is so extreme that the community interest in retribution, punishment, community protection and deterrence can only be met through the imposition of that sentence.”

18. It is clear that a life sentence is required, pursuant to this legislation, if the culpability of an offender is so extreme that the community interest in retribution, punishment, community protection and deterrence (or whichever of these four factors are relevant in the circumstances) could only be met by a sentence of life imprisonment where the offender is never to be released. This construction embraces a circumstance where any one or more of these factors may of itself be inapplicable or insufficient. [12]

    12. R v Merritt [2004] NSWCCA 19; (2004) 59 NSWLR 557 at [42], [54] per Wood CJ at CL (Tobias JA and Hidden J agreeing)

19. This legislative provision is only relevant to the three convictions of murder. The Crown’s submission is that such is the seriousness of the facts and circumstances surrounding those three offences of murder, the Court should impose a life sentence on the Offender for each of these offences.

The Offences – the Facts

20. It is now necessary to consider the facts of each offence and determine the objective seriousness of the criminality involved.

21. In cases where a jury has returned a verdict, it is necessary for the sentencing Judge to set out the facts of each of the offences of which the Judge is satisfied, consistently with the jury’s verdict, so as to enable the determination of the appropriate sentences.

22. I have set out at length, in the principal judgment, my findings with respect to each of these offences and the reasons for those findings. It is unnecessary to repeat all of those findings of fact here.

23. However, it is appropriate to set out the facts relatively briefly for each offence, identify features of those facts which are relevant to a determination of the seriousness of the offences and, consequently, the culpability of the Offender.

Count 2 - Murder of Justice Opas

24. On 23 June 1980, at around 7.10pm, the Opas family sat down to eat their evening meal together. Just as they began their meal, the front doorbell sounded, indicating that there was a person at either the front door or else at the front gate of the house. Justice Opas left the table to answer the door bell. After her husband had been gone from the dinner table for about five minutes, Mrs Kristin Opas became concerned at his absence and went outside to investigate. She found him lying on his back, unconscious, with a bullet wound to his abdomen.

25. It is beyond question that Justice Opas was murdered by being shot when he answered the front gate bell at his home in Woollahra. It was obviously a targeted attack. The Offender intended to murder the Judge, and did so in a very short space of time.

26. The Offender targeted Justice Opas, who sat as a judge of the Family Court of Australia at Parramatta, because of his role and conduct as a judge of that Court. The Offender was motivated to murder Justice Opas because he perceived that he had been treated unfairly by the Judge in the orders which the Judge had made over the months leading up to his death, and also because he resented the comments which the Judge had made to him in the course of the number of hearings in the Family Court.

27. Putting it shortly, I am satisfied that the Offender had formed a strong anger and antipathy towards Justice Opas, arising out of the proceedings being heard at the Parramatta Registry of the Family Court, and that this was the reason he chose to murder him. The Offender sought to ensure that the Judge did not hear his matter anymore because of the way in which he perceived the Judge to have dealt with it up to that point in time.

28. The Offender’s view was not a rational one. Justice Opas had made decisions on the basis of the facts and matters which were put before him, often in a constrained time period, and in an attempt to ensure the best interests of the Offender’s daughter. It needs hardly be said that the motive, which I have identified, was neither rational nor adequate to justify the Offender’s conduct.

29. This offence had the following features, which are relevant to an assessment of the objective seriousness of the criminality:

1. the victim of this offence was a serving judge of the Family Court of Australia and was targeted for this reason; [13]

2. the offence was committed at Justice Opas’ home, a place where he was entitled to feel safe; [14]

3. whilst the murder did not take place in the presence of Justice Opas’ family, which included two young children, both of the children became aware of the murder when they walked out of the front door of the house immediately after it had occurred, and were confronted with the scene of their father, having been shot, lying on the ground at the front of the house; and

4. there was necessarily some planning to this murder. [15] It is apparent from my findings that the Offender had made his mind up to kill Justice Opas some weeks before the shooting. He needed to arm himself and then drive from his place of work at the Fairfield Fire Station to Woollahra and carry out the murder. This was not a spur of the moment decision, but one which had been planned and thought about. The Offender had to find out where Justice Opas lived and had to identify from the geography of the area how he might best make his escape without being identified.

   13. Section 21A(2)(a) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999.

   14. Section 21A(2)(eb) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999;

   15. Section 21A(2)(n) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999;

30. Having regard to these factors, particularly that the victim was a serving Judge, who was murdered because of the work which he did, I am satisfied that this murder is of the highest level of objective seriousness, and that the level of the Offender’s culpability is extreme.

Count 3 - Bombing of Justice Gee’s Home

31. On the evening of 5 March 1984, Justice Gee and his two school-aged children retired to bed. At about 1.50am on Tuesday 6 March 1984, a bomb placed just on the front door step of the house adjacent to the front bedroom where Justice Gee was asleep at the time was detonated. The front of house was entirely demolished. The blast wave travelled through the rest of the house extensively damaging all of it.

32. Justice Gee, who was injured by debris from the blast, and his two children managed to get out of the house and make their way to a neighbour’s house.

33. The Offender intended to murder Justice Gee. The only possible motivation for that attempted murder was the involvement of Justice Gee in the Offender’s matrimonial proceedings where he had heard and determined a number of applications, some of which were unfavourable to the Offender.

34. This offence had the following features, which are relevant to an assessment of the objective seriousness of the offending:

1. the target of this offence was a serving judge of the Family Court of Australia, who was targeted for his judicial role in the proceedings involving the Offender; [16]

   16. Section 21A(2)(a) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999.

2. the offence was committed at Justice Gee’s home, a place where he was entitled to feel safe; [17]

3. the bomb detonated and destroyed Justice Gee’s home whilst his two teenage children were sleeping inside; [18]

4. this offence required planning to find out where Justice Gee lived, to obtain the components for and undertake construction of the bomb, then to drive to Belrose (which must have taken the Offender over an hour) and then to place and detonate the bomb using a safety fuse, before making his escape;. [19]

5. the offending involved the use of an explosive; [20] and

6. such was the size of the blast, that there was clearly no regard for public safety, and there was a grave risk of death to the other residents in the house. [21]

   17. Section 21A(2)(eb) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999;

   18. Section 21A(2)(ea) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999.

   19. Section 21A(2)(n) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999;

   20. Section 21A(2)(i) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999;

   21. Section 21A(2)(ca) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999;

35. The criminality of this offence places it at the highest level of objective seriousness, and of a kind which would justify the imposition of the maximum penalty fixed by the legislation.

Count 5 - Bombing of the Family Court Building

36. The Offender manufactured a pipe‑bomb and, on 15 April 1984, placed it against a pillar at the front of the Family Court building at Parramatta. He caused it to be detonated, thereby resulting in extensive damage to the building.

37. Although the bomb was detonated late in the evening, it was nevertheless foreseeable that if anybody had been in the vicinity when it was detonated, they could well have been injured. The Offender did not have any regard to public safety when he placed and caused the detonation of that bomb. [22]

    22. Sections 21A(2)(ca) and (i) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999.

38. The manufacture of the bomb must have taken some time to complete and the whole offence was obviously carefully planned. [23]

    23. Section 21A(2)(n) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999;

39. I regard this as an objectively serious offence.

Count 6 - Murder of Mrs Pearl Watson

40. During the early hours of the morning on 4 July 1985, the Offender placed a bomb he had constructed outside the front door of the home of Justice Raymond Watson and his wife, Mrs Pearl Watson. It was not readily visible to other residents of the apartment block.

41. The bomb consisted of a number of separate components, which were configured so that the bomb would be “victim-activated”. This meant that the bomb would explode instantly when the front door of the apartment, where Justice and Mrs Watson lived, was opened. The bomb was targeted at Justice Watson, and its placement overnight outside the front door means it was intended to explode as the Judge opened his front door to go to work. The fact that the bomb was victim-activated meant that the Offender did not need to be anywhere in the vicinity once he had placed it in position and had armed it.

42. Although the size of the bomb could not be adequately established, it is clear from the extent of the damage that a number of kilograms of high explosive were used. There can be no doubt that it was the intention of the Offender to kill Justice Watson and anyone else in the apartment when the door was opened.

43. The Offender’s motive to kill Justice Watson related to the orders that he had made in the course of his hearing of the matrimonial proceedings. In other words, the bomb was targeted at Justice Watson for doing his job as a judge of the Family Court. The fact that it was Mrs Watson who was killed was the inevitable consequence of the design of the bomb. It was indiscriminate in the sense that whoever opened the door – either Justice Watson or his wife – would be killed. So too, any person standing in close proximity to the person who had opened the door, particularly given the layout of the apartment, which included a long corridor leading to the front door, was likely to be killed or seriously injured.

44. This offence had the following features, which are relevant to an assessment of the objective seriousness of the criminality:

1. Mrs Watson, as the wife of a judicial officer, does not fall within the terms used in s 21(2)(a) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999, although Justice Watson does. Although the victim was Mrs Watson, I am nevertheless satisfied that because the bomb was intended for Justice Watson, this contributes significantly to the assessment of the seriousness of the offence;

2. the offence was committed in the home of the victims. Justice and Mrs Watson were entitled to feel safe in their house as their personal refuge; [24]

3. clearly, the offence involved significant planning. [25] The bomb had to be designed, the components obtained, the bomb configured, carried to the location of the offence, and then armed. The Offender had to establish the location of Justice Watson’s home, and travel there from his home at Casula;

1. the offending involved the use of an explosive; [26] and

2. the blast was on the second floor on a residential block, with many others living in neighbouring apartments. The bomb was designed to explode when Justice Watson left for work, which was highly likely to be at a time many neighbouring residents were still in their homes. Consequently, there was no regard for public safety, and a grave risk of death to nearby residents of neighbouring apartments was involved. [27]

   24. Section 21A(2)(eb) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999;

   25. Section 21A(2)(n) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999;

   26. Section 21A(2)(i) Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999;

   27. Section 21A(2)(ca) Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999;

45. Taking all of these features into account, I find that this offence falls at the highest end of objectively seriousness criminality, and that the level of the Offender’s culpability is extreme.

Count 7 – Act Done Intending to Murder Justice Watson

46. An assessment of the objective seriousness of the criminality involved with this offence requires a consideration of exactly the same matters which I have just considered in relation to Count 6, because the bomb and the occasion were the same.

47. However, because the specific intention in this Count of which the Offender has been convicted was an intention to murder Justice Watson, the fact that the victim was a judicial officer is recognised as an aggravating factor by the legislation. [28]

    28. Section 21A(2)(a) Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999

48. Taking all these features into account, I find that this offence also falls at the highest end of objectively serious criminality and is of such a kind as would justify the imposition of the maximum penalty fixed by the legislation.

Count 9 -The Bomb in Mr Tall’s Car

49. On 10 February 1985, the Offender placed a bomb in a car parked at a house in Kira Avenue, Northmead. The bomb consisted of 4kg of Molanite explosive and was configured so that it would explode if the ignition of the motor vehicle was switched on. It was only by a stroke of complete luck that Mr Peter Tall, who was a tenant in the house, did not turn his key which had been inserted into his car’s ignition on that morning, and instead by opening the car’s bonnet found the unexploded bomb. His life, and possibly the lives of others in the car’s immediate vicinity, was saved by this happenchance.

50. Until seven months or so before February 1985, the house in question had been owned by Mr Garry Watts. Mr Watts was the solicitor who had the primary carriage of the matrimonial proceedings on behalf of the former wife of the Offender in February 1985. At the time of the discovery of the bomb, he had acted for Ms Blanchard for a little over two years. Mr Watts, and those in his employ, took a diligent, determined and thoughtful approach to the matrimonial proceedings. In particular, Mr Watts used the Offender’s intentional dereliction of the Family Court orders as the basis for obtaining orders contrary to the Offender’s interest.

51. I am satisfied that this approach, which was having significant success, so annoyed the Offender that he determined he would place a bomb in what he thought to be Mr Watts’ car intending to murder him. I am satisfied that Mr Watts was the target of this bomb.

52. This offence had the following features, which are relevant to an assessment of the objective seriousness of the criminality:

1. the event was clearly planned and pre-meditated; [29]

2. the event involved the use of an explosive, which was intended to murder (at least) the driver of the car; [30] and

3. had the bomb exploded, not only would the driver of the vehicle have been killed, but so would anyone else in the car or in the vicinity. This offence was committed without regard for public safety. [31]

   29. Section 21A(2)(n) Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999.

   30. Section 21A(2)(ca) Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999.

   31. Section 21A(2)(i) Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999.

53. Although the bomb was intended for Mr Watts, a solicitor who practised in the Family Court of Australia, amongst other places, it represented on attack on the judicial system which needs the assistance of lawyers to function fairly and effectively.

54. I regard this offence as carrying a very high level of objective seriousness of the criminality involved.

Count 11 - Murder of Graham Wykes and Counts 12–24 - Bombing of the Kingdom Hall

55. Sometime late on the evening of Saturday 20 July 1985, or early in the morning of Sunday 21 July 1985, the Offender broke into the Kingdom Hall of the Jehovah’s Witnesses at Casula. He carried with him a bomb that he had constructed and which was designed to be activated by a timing mechanism in the form of an alarm clock. The Offender set the time at which he wished the bomb to explode, which was shortly after 10am, when the Lurnea congregation of the Jehovah’s Witness faith (which included Mr Wykes) would be meeting in the Hall. The Offender placed the bomb under the platform in the Hall by accessing the rear of it, so that it was entirely concealed from those attending the meeting. The bomb was of a size and ferocity sufficient to destroy the Hall and to damage surrounding properties.

56. The bomb exploded as planned at around 10.04am the next morning. On the evidence in the trial, 71 members of the congregation were hospitalised immediately after the explosion. Of this number, 16 were children and five were babies. The bomb blast killed Mr Wykes and severely injured 13 members of the congregation, including young children. There was a grave risk of death to any member of the congregation sitting near the front of the Kingdom Hall. There were also others in attendance at the Kingdom Hall on that day who were not taken to hospital.

57. The Offender’s motive to target the Lurnea congregation was that some members of the congregation had assisted Ms Blanchard (his former wife) and her sister (Ms Morier), together with their children (including the Offender’s daughter), to leave Sydney and move to an undisclosed address on the mid‑North Coast of NSW. The Offender had attempted to find out where they had moved to, but his attempts had been wrongfully rebuffed (as he thought) by members of the Lurnea congregation of the Jehovah’s Witness faith.

58. The size of the bomb, its placement and the time at which it was set to explode, meant that the Offender intended to kill or cause serious injury to those present in the Hall, particularly those in close proximity to the bomb when it exploded.

59. This offence had the following features, which are relevant to an assessment of the objective seriousness of criminality:

1. the placing and explosion of the bomb required considerable planning including undertaking a reconnaissance on the weekend prior to the explosion. [32] The purpose of this reconnaissance was to find a point of entry into the Kingdom Hall which was unlikely to alert neighbours or result in the police being called. The reconnaissance was also carried out to enable the offender to find a place where the bomb could be readily concealed but still be effective in exacting substantial revenge on the members of the Lurnea congregation;

2. the bomb was intended to explode, and did explode, in the presence of children under the age of 18; [33]

3. the explosion of the bomb happened without regard for public safety because the size and nature of the explosion meant that debris from the explosion was unconstrained and that it was foreseeable by the Offender that neighbours, passers-by or anyone else in the vicinity would have had their safety jeopardised; [34] and

4. the bombing involved the use of an explosive. [35]

   32. An aggravating factor under s 21A(2)(n) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999;

   33. Section 21A(2)(ea) Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999.

   34. Section 21A(2)(i) Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999.

   35. Section 21A(2)(ca) Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999

60. I also consider the fact that the bomb was placed in the Kingdom Hall as a factor relevant to the seriousness of the offence. The Kingdom Hall was a place of worship, where people were entitled to gather together to profess their faith and engage in their expression of it. A place of worship is a place of sanctuary and peace. [36] It was entirely violated by the explosion of this bomb.

    36. R v Tarrant [2010] NZHC 2192 at [110]-[111]

61. This was a calculated, planned bombing of a group of entirely innocent people, most of whom had not had anything to do with the Offender and his former wife, although a small number of the members of the congregation had provided assistance to the Offender’s former wife and her sister.

62. The murder of Mr Wykes and the causing of grievous bodily harm to the individuals named in Counts 12 to 24 are offences which fall at the highest end of the order of objective seriousness, and the level of the Offender’s culpability was extreme.

Victim Impact Statements

63. I will now consider the impact which the Offender’s conduct had on the victims themselves and also on the families of the three murder victims.

64. The Crown tendered a number of Victim Impact Statements from people affected by the Offender’s crimes. These statements came from the family members of the late Justice Opas, the late Mrs Pearl Watson and the late Mr Graham Wykes. As well, they came from a number of direct victims of the Offender’s crimes. Six of the direct victims of the bombing of the Kingdom Hall gave evidence of the effects of that offence upon them. I acknowledge receiving each of those Victim Impact Statements and, as well, listening to them being read to the Court.

65. Because the convictions of the Offender have occurred between 35 and 40 years after each offence, each of the victims has been able to tell the Court of the long term consequences of the crimes upon them. Those consequences are severe in many cases, extending over a considerable period of time, and have had significant impacts upon the way in which each of these victims have gone about their lives.

66. The Crown has applied for the family victim statements to be taken into account in the determination of the appropriate punishment for the offences of murder, on the basis of the harmful impact that the death of each of those individuals has had on members of their immediate family as an aspect of harm done to the community. I have taken into account these family statements in that way.

67. In addition to taking the contents of these statements into account, I am also permitted by the legislation to make any comments which I consider appropriate. [37]

    37. Section 30E(1)(b) Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999

68. Mrs Kristin Opas, the wife of Justice Opas, told the Court that as a result of the murder of her husband, she has had a considerable disruption to her life. She has required medication, she has had to move interstate, and she has lived the last 40 years of her life in a state of high anxiety and stress. She feels that she has been looking over her shoulder in fear for all of the time since her husband’s murder, specifically fear that Justice Opas’ murderer would find her and her children and attack them. Mrs Opas says that over half of her life has been spent in a state of torment and that the murder of her husband has impacted on her personality and her capacity to enjoy her life.

69. Ms Alison Gee, the daughter of Justice Gee, was 12 years old at the time the Offender detonated a bomb at the front of her home. She described how she felt as though the innocence of her childhood had been replaced by trauma. She has suffered, and continues to suffer, psychologically with PTSD and depression for which she is medicated. She remains hyper vigilant at times.

70. Mr Stephen McInnes, the son of Mrs Pearl Watson, has told the Court of his immense grief and ongoing traumatic suffering since his mother died. He has described how his mother’s death meant that the “living breathing heart” was torn out from his family. His life has been one of anger and he has felt filled with hatred and rage for the whole time since his mother’s death. He continues to be overwhelmed with grief. He concluded by saying that he and his brother, along with their families, should not have had to have lived through their experience and with their ongoing memories of grief.

71. Ms Sue Chapman, the daughter of Justice Watson and the step-daughter of Mrs Pearl Watson, noted the important role which Mrs Watson played in her life and that of her family, and explained the wonderful relationship she shared with her stepmother. She records the deep emotional pain she experienced at the time of Mrs Watson’s murder, and the ongoing feelings of trauma and grief she continues to feel.

72. Each of the family members of the Judges who were targeted have suffered substantial harm because of the Offender’s crimes. They have suffered, not because of anything they did, but simply because they were family members of a person motivated by public duty to serve as a Judge of the Family Court of Australia. They were entirely innocent victims collateral to the Offender’s criminality, and they have suffered over a very long period of time because of it.

73. Mrs Joy Wykes (as she was then known), members of her family, and others injured in the bombing of the Kingdom Hall have provided statements setting out the impact of this event upon their lives.

74. Mrs Wykes describes the existence of a very happy family and a loving relationship with Mr Graham Wykes. She described how he was a wonderful father to their two daughters, and a devoted husband. She records that the loss of such a devoted partner, as well as the loss of a loving father in her childrens’ lives, was devastating for the family and that their lives were shattered forever. As well, she describes the consequences of her own severe injuries sustained in the blast. Mrs Wykes records that she has never recovered from such a devastating event, which has so changed her and her families’ lives in all ways since July 1985.

75. Mrs Alaine Jones (previously Alaine Wykes), one of Mr Graham Wykes’ daughters, describes the intense emotional toll the loss of her father had on her life. She notes that she has suffered, and continues to suffer, from depression and continues to take medication and receive counselling so that she can cope and live a normal life.

76. Four other victims of the bombing of the Kingdom Hall - Sue Schulz, Hans Schulz, Susan Rushan and Ioan Toplicesceu – have each spoken of the ongoing physical and emotional impacts upon them from the explosion of the bomb.

77. In particular, Ms Rushan said she has been in a state of disbelief both at the time and since. As she aptly put it: “who in their right mind bombs a place of worship and wants to kill people?”. This question is one which all right-thinking people, knowing of this bombing, would also ask. Ms Rushan and all of the other members of the Lurnea congregation at the Kingdom Hall on 21 July 1985 were entitled to exercise their faith in a peaceful environment which was a refuge for them. I am not surprised that one effect of the bombing has been to cause the Jehovah’s Witnesses who were present on that day to lose confidence in their safety whilst they exercise their faith.

78. The purpose of setting out these statements in some detail and commenting upon them is to recognise the harm done to each of the direct victims of the crime and the impact of that harm on the community. It is my hope that this recognition, whilst relevant to sentence, also serves as an acknowledgement by the Court of the ongoing suffering of each of the witnesses who have described the effects of the Offender’s conduct upon them, and that this recognition will in some small measure help their recovery.

Subjective Circumstances

79. It is always of relevance for a court to have regard to the subjective circumstances of an offender, including those relating to their background, their current situation and any which may have been relevant to the conduct in which an offender has engaged.

80. In this matter, the Offender did not place any material before the Court at the sentencing hearing relating to his subjective circumstances. He instructed his lawyers not to make any submissions to the Court in answer to the Crown’s submissions or more generally on the issue of what sentence was appropriate to be imposed.

81. As a result I know little about the Offender. It is known that he was born in January 1947 and was 33 years old at the time he murdered Justice Opas, and that he was 34 or 35 years old at the time the other offences were committed.

82. The material provided to the Court on sentencing reveals that as an adult he had one very minor offence of stealing on his record, for which no conviction was recorded. That offence is so minor as to be of no significance in these proceedings. Accordingly, he is to be regarded as a person with no previous criminal convictions. [38]

    38. Section 21A(3)(a) Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999

83. The evidence in the trial disclosed that during the course of the offences that he committed, the Offender was employed permanently as a fireman for the NSW Fire Brigade. At the time of his arrest, the Offender had retired from that job and was receiving a pension.

84. The evidence in the trial also disclosed that the Offender was first married to Ms Blanchard in 1976 and that they had a daughter together. That marriage was the subject of the matrimonial proceedings which have been covered in great detail in my principal judgment. The Offender obtained custody of his daughter at the conclusion of the proceedings in 1986 and took care of her for some time, although the length of that period is unknown.

85. At the time the Offender was arrested in 2015, the evidence and material before the Court revealed that he had married again and had three children – two of whom were adults and one of whom was in high school.

86. These are the only matters which can be identified as being of any relevance for the Court’s consideration when imposing any sentence.

87. Although I have noted the absence of any previous criminal convictions, I also note that in the course of the trial, the Offender did not rely upon his general good character as weighing in his favour on the issue of his guilt. He did not seek any direction of law relating to his good character. I do not hold this against the Offender, but it does mean that this mitigating factor is not available in considering what sentence is appropriate. [39]

    39. Section 21A(3)(f) Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999

88. Other than the circumstances of the Events themselves, there is no material which would enable me to determine any of the mitigating factors set out in the legislation. [40] This means that I am not able to conclude as a mitigating factor in any sentence which I might impose, that the Offender is unlikely to reoffend, that he has good prospects of rehabilitation or that he has shown any remorse for his offending.

    40. Section 21A(3)(f)-(n)

89. I complete this review of the subjective circumstances by noting that at the sentencing hearing, the Offender, through his lawyers, maintained his innocence of the offences of which he has been convicted.

90. However, having regard to the fact that the Offender chose not to have his lawyers put any submissions on his subjective circumstances, those circumstances will carry very little weight in the evaluation of the factors relevant to sentencing.

Summary

91. Each of the offences involved sophisticated planning, preparation and careful conduct. They were a part of a sustained course of conduct by the Offender against anyone whom he concluded to be acting contrary to his interests in maintaining access to his daughter and preserving his own financial position – both of which were under threat in his ongoing Family Court proceedings.

91. The offences of which the Offender has been convicted, when looked at as a whole, show that between June 1980 and July 1985, the Family Court of Australia, its Judges and a practitioner were the targets of a number of episodes of extreme violence. As well, members of the Lurnea congregation of the Jehovah’s Witness faith were also targeted because some members of the congregation assisted the Offender’s ex-wife to escape Sydney, which had the effect of hindering the exercise of the Offender’s right of access to his daughter.

92. As the principal judgment shows, each of the offences was connected to proceedings in which the Offender was involved in the Family Court of Australia. The Offender engaged in the conduct out of a desire to retaliate against those who, in the course of the proceedings, interfered with and adversely impacted upon his access to his daughter and what he perceived to be his property entitlements.

93. The three crimes of murder involved culpability on the part of the Offender in their commission, which was extreme. Murder is the most serious crime, as it involves the taking of a human life. But when the target of the murder is a member of the judiciary or their family, or an innocent worshipper in their place of worship, the interests of the community require that such crimes should never happen again. Condign punishment is necessary. All of the circumstances which I have discussed, I am satisfied, are such as would warrant the imposition of a mandatory life sentence as contemplated by the legislation. [41]

    41. Section 61(1) Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999

94. Each of the offences was extremely serious taken in isolation. Each involved loss of life or the potential for loss of life, and significant personal injury to a number of people.

95. More broadly, when the offending is considered as a whole, the extent to which much of it was an attack on the institution of the Family Court of Australia becomes clear. The offences involving the Family Court of Australia, its Judges and a practitioner demonstrated a series of calculated attacks on the Family Court. This broader aspect of the offending needs also to be acknowledged.

96. The Family Court of Australia was, and remains, a vital and integral part of the Australian judicial system.

97. It is a hallmark of Australian democracy and the peaceful co-existence which we all enjoy as an enlightened society that there is an independent, strong and dedicated judiciary. The Australian Constitution ensures that this is so. This is how Australian citizens safely and peacefully settle their disputes. A sustained period of violence aimed at an Australian Court and its Judges, solely in retribution for those Judges properly executing their obligations and functions in peacefully adjudicating disputes in accordance with the law, cannot be viewed as anything other than an attack on the very foundations of Australian democracy. It is an offending which, at its core, is completely antithetical to the very foundations of government in Australia.

98. There were callous and undoubtedly cruel features to these offences: the fact that they took place at the homes of the individual Judges and at what was thought to be the home of a practitioner. The fact that they occurred unexpectedly, without warning and apparently at random. The fact that the bombs were entirely concealed from their victims. Finally, the fact that they involved violence of an extreme kind at seemingly random times targeting, amongst others, individuals undertaking a public duty. This was a type of sustained, ongoing violence which, at that time, was entirely unheard of in Australia.

99. These offences could only have engendered sheer terror in the hearts and minds of all Judges and staff of the Family Court of Australia, Judges of other superior courts and the lawyers who practised in those courts. They must have felt absolute fear at the prospect that any one of them might have been the next target for simply doing what all Australians expected and wanted them to do in the course of their public duty.

100. It is simply unacceptable to expect that those involved in an essential public function in Australia should live their lives in fear of being the subject of such violent attacks. Such attacks cannot be tolerated in a free and enlightened society.

101. The sentences which I will shortly impose are a mark of the fact that anybody who contemplates engaging in similar conduct must understand that it will carry with it the severest punishment.

102. The conduct of the Offender was calculated, violent and hateful. It was an evil attack on members of the Australian judiciary, the Family Court and a practitioner.

103. Not content with such attacks, the Offender, in a final act of unspeakable evil, then sought to wreak revenge on innocent members of the Lurnea congregation of the Jehovah’s Witnesses meeting in an expression of their faith by setting a bomb timed to explode when their meeting Hall (which was a place of sanctuary) was full and the members of that congregation were doing nothing other than contemplating features of their faith. This was an entirely unjustified and cruel attack on innocent people by the use of extreme violence. Such flagitious conduct has no place in Australia.

104. One of the features which has become apparent in the course of this trial, and which I now wish to publicly acknowledge, is that all of the Judges, their families, the practitioners and the staff of the Family Court of Australia, particularly those at the Parramatta Registry, exhibited extraordinary public service and bravery by continuing to undertake their roles without significant interruption so as to ensure that the Family Court of Australia could carry out its important function in the resolution of disputes involving the breakdown of marriage and the custody and welfare of children. They were courageous to do so and demonstrated conduct of a kind to which we would all aspire when confronted by those who seek to do harm to the values of justice and peaceful settlement of disputes in our nation. They put their public duty, the importance of the litigants and the resolution of their disputes before their own personal safety. These men and women were brave, they were courageous and they were unbowed by the Offender’s vicious and violent attacks. Australia owes them a very great debt of gratitude.

Sentences

106. LEONARD JOHN WARWICK, I impose the following sentences upon you:

COUNT	SENTENCE
Count 2	For the murder of Justice David Opas on 23 June 1980, I sentence you to life imprisonment without parole.
Count 3	For destroying a building by an explosive substance with intent to murder Justice Richard Gee on 6 March 1984, I sentence you to the maximum term of 25 years imprisonment.
Count 5	For maliciously placing an explosive substance near a building, being the Family Law Court of Australia at Parramatta on 15 April 1984, with intent to damage the building, I sentence you to 10 years imprisonment.
Count 6	For the murder of Mrs Pearl Watson on 4 July 1984, I sentence you to life imprisonment without parole.
Count 7	For the explosion of an exploding substance to damage a building with intent to murder Justice Raymond Watson on 4 July 1984, I sentence you to the maximum term of 25 years imprisonment.
Count 9	For placing an explosive substance into a vehicle with intent to commit murder on 10 February 1985, I sentence you to a term of imprisonment of 15 years.

COUNT	SENTENCE
Count 11	For the murder of Mr Graham Wykes on 21 July 1985, I sentence you to life imprisonment without parole.

107. I have determined with respect to Counts 12-24, to impose an aggregate sentence. I indicate that I would impose a term of imprisonment of 15 years for each of the offences.

COUNT	SENTENCE
Counts 12 to 24	I sentence you to an aggregate term of 25 years imprisonment.

108. Each sentence will commence from 23 July 2015, which is the day upon which you were first taken into custody.

109. I decline to fix any non-parole periods for any of these offences. That is because, in light of the three sentences of life imprisonment without parole, there is no utility in fixing, and therefore it is inappropriate to fix, any non‑parole periods for the other offences. [42]

     42. Section 45(1)(c) Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999

110. Had I been called upon to fix a non-parole period for each of the other offences, I would not have found special circumstances, but would have imposed a non-parole period of three-quarters of the term which I have fixed.

111. The effect of these sentences is that you will spend the rest of your life in prison and will not be released.

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Endnotes

Decision last updated: 03 September 2020