R v Warwick (No.93)

[2020] NSWSC 926

Supreme Court

New South Wales

• Summary available
• Amendment notes

Medium Neutral Citation:

R v Warwick (No.93) [2020] NSWSC 926

Hearing dates:

2018:
May 15;
July 16, 17, 18, 19, 20; 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 30, 31 July;
August 1, 2, 3,6, 7, 8, 9, 10; 13, 14, 15, 16, 17; 20, 21, 22, 23, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31;
September 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28;
October 2, 3, 4, 15, 16, 17, 18, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 29, 30 31;
November 1, 2; 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30;
December 3, 4, 5, 6, 11, 12, 13, 14, 17, 18, 20.

2019:
January 29; 30; 31;
February 1; 18; 19; 20; 21; 28;
March 6; 8; 15;
April 10;
June 14; 21;
July 29;
August 1; 20; 26; 27; 28; 29;
September 2; 3; 4; 5; 9; 10; 11; 12; 16; 17; 18; 19;
October 15, 16; 17; 21; 22; 23; 24; 28; 29; 30; 31.
November 4; 7; 11; 12; 13; 14; 21; 25; 26; 27; 28;
December 2; 3; 4; 5; 9; 10; 11; 12; 16; 17; 18; 19.

2020:
January 20, 21, 22, 23; 28; 29; 30; 31.
February 3; 4; 6; 10; 11; 12; 24;
March 2; 3; 4; 5; 9; 10; 11; 12; 16;17; 18; 19; 20; 23; 24; 25; 26; 27; 30; 31.
April 1; 2; 3; 6

Date of orders:

23 July 2020

Decision date:

23 July 2020

Jurisdiction:

Common Law - Criminal

Before:

Garling J

Decision:

See [2283]

Catchwords:

CRIME — Murder — trial by judge alone – verdicts – complex circumstantial case – Family Court bomber – whether the Accused was the perpetrator - historical charges – 35 to 40 years since acts occurred – grievous bodily harm – shootings and bombings –-coincidence reasoning – tendency evidence – DNA evidence – intermediate fact – convictions entered

Legislation Cited:

Crimes Act 1900

Criminal Procedure Act 1986

Evidence Act 1995

Family Law Act 1974 (Cth)

Cases Cited:

R v Warwick (No.21) [2018] NSWSC 654

R v Warwick (No.69) [2019] NSWSC 1059

Texts Cited:

Not Applicable

Category:

Principal judgment

Parties:

The Crown
Leonard John Warwick (Accused)

Representation:

Counsel:
K McKay / G Christofi (Crown)
A R Conolly / I Benson (Accused)

Solicitors:
Director of Public Prosecutions (Crown)
A R Conolly & Co

File Number(s):

2015/222068

Publication restriction:

Not Applicable

CONTENTS		Paragraph
INTRODUCTION		[1]
Indictment	[2]
Elements of the Offences	[7]
The Trial – A General Description	[18]
Some Features of this Judgment	[26]
Crown Case Description	[31]
Case for the Accused	[36]
Police Investigation	[38]
Chronology of Arrest, Committal and Trial	[45]
Records of the Police	[49]
Lengthy Period between Events and Trial	[62]
Directions of Law	[68]
Judgment Architecture	[117]
EVENT 7 – KINGDOM HALL BOMBING		[125]
Counts on the Indictment	[126]
Crown Case in Summary	[130]
Accused Case in Summary	[135]
Kingdom Hall – General Layout	[145]
Kingdom Hall – General Use	[163]
First Break-In at Kingdom Hall – 13/14 July 1985	[165]
Second Break-In and the Explosion at the Kingdom Hall – 21 July 1985	[171]
Were the Two Break-Ins a Coincidence?	[188]
Was the Intruder the Accused?	[192]
Opportunity	[196]
Motive – Event 7	[229]
Was the Blood Deposited on the Cardboard and Carpet at the Kingdom Hall on 13/14 July 1984 that of the Accused?	[327]
Second Transfer Hypothesis	[496]
Discrepancies	[551]
Further Testing	[557]
Alternative Reasonable Hypothesis: BAJ	[587]
Quantity of Blood in the Kingdom Hall and Absence of Injury to the Accused	[607]
Alternative Perpetrators	[656]
Knowledge of and Familiarity with Explosives	[692]
Summary	[717]
Count 11 – Murder of Graham Wykes	[729]
Counts 12 to 24 - Maliciously Causing Grievous Bodily Injury by Explosion	[731]
Summary	[799]
COINCIDENCE AND TENDENCY REASONING		[804]
Outline of Crown Case on Coincidence and Tendency Reasoning]
The Submissions for the Accused	[815]
Directions of Law	[822]
Coincidence – Facts, Matters and Circumstances	[826]
Nature of the Conduct in Each Event	[878]
No Other Violent Attacks	[886]
Factual Similarity – .22 Calibre Firearm	[897]
Factual Similarity - Detonator	[904]
Similarity – High Explosive	[968]
Other Circumstances	[1041]
Submissions of the Accused	[1048]
Established Circumstances	[1079]
Event 1 – Murder of Stephen Blanchard	[1081]
Coincidence Conclusion	[1124]
Tendency Evidence	[1127]
EVENT 2 – MURDER OF JUSTICE OPAS		[1139]
Crown Case	[1142]
The Case for the Accused	[1151]
Events of Monday 23 June 1980	[1155]
Observations	[1167]
Crown Case Circumstances	[1172]
Opportunity	[1175]
Familiarity	[1184]
Motive	[1187]
A Prophetic Prediction	[1259]
Experience	[1279]
Coincidence	[1287]
Tendency	[1290]
No Other Reasonable Hypothesis Exists	[1296]
Summary	[1390]
EVENT 6 - BOMB IN MR TALL’S MOTOR VEHICLE		[1424]
Counts on the Indictment	[1427]
Crown Case	[1432]
Submissions of the Accused	[1440]
Events of 9 and 10 February 1985	[1446]
The Tenants	[1471]
The Owners	[1489]
Observations	[1499]
Crown Case Circumstances	[1506]
Opportunity	[1509]
Motive	[1511]
Intended Target	[1573]
Coincidence	[1588]
Tendency	[1598]
No Other Reasonable Hypothesis	[1608]
Summary and Conclusion	[1613]
EVENT 3 – BOMBING OF JUSTICE GEE’S HOME		[1620]
Counts on the Indictment	[1623]
Crown Case	[1627]
Accused’s Submissions	[1632]
The Events of 6 March 1984	[1644]
Observations	[1659]
Crown Case Circumstances	[1675]
Opportunity	[1678]
Motive	[1683]
Coincidence	[1734]
Tendency	[1738]
No Other Reasonable Hypothesis	[1740]
Circumstances Identified by the Accused	[1744]
Summary and Conclusion	[1750]
EVENT 4 – BOMBING OF THE FAMILY COURT		[1761]
Crown Case	[1765]
Submissions for the Accused	[1776]
Events of 15 April 1984	[1788]
Crown Case Circumstances	[1812]
Opportunity	[1814]
Motive	[1817]
Tendency Evidence and Coincidence Reasoning	[1825]
No Other Reasonable Hypothesis Consistent with the Innocence of the Accused	[1829]
Summary and Conclusion	[1840]
EVENT 5 – BOMBING AT THE HOME OF JUSTICE WATSON		[1847]
Counts on the Indictment	[1850]
Crown Case	[1853]
Submissions of the Accused	[1858]
Events of 3 and 4 July 1984	[1865]
Observations	[1887]
Crown Case Circumstances	[1904]
Coincidence	[1939]
Tendency	[1942]
No Other Reasonable Hypothesis Consistent with the Innocence of the Accused	[1946]
Summary and Conclusion	[1958]
ALTERNATIVE SUSPECTS		[1967]
Dr Silvano Mariti	[1971]
Mr Shoukat Abroo	[2100]
Family Law Action Group	[2139]
Conclusion	[2164]
EVENT 1 – MURDER OF STEPHEN BLANCHARD		[2165]
Crown Case	[2168]
Submissions for the Accused	[2181]
Events of 21 February 1980 – 27 February 1980	[2198]
Discovery of Mr Blanchard’s Body	[2213]
The Police Investigations of Mr Blanchard’s Bedroom	[2225]
Search Warrant at the Home of the Accused	[2231]
Other Police Investigations	[2235]
Drug Dealing	[2237]
Opportunity and Qualities	[2248]
Family Court Proceedings	[2253]
Family Relations	[2264]
Conclusions	[2272]
RETURN OF VERDICTS		[2282]
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (Annexure A)
LIST OF ALL INTERLOCUTORY JUDGMENTS (Annexure B)

Introduction

1. Between 1980 and 1985, the Family Court of Australia, its judges and a practitioner were the targets of a number of episodes of extreme violence, each of which were well publicised and many of which had tragic consequences. These episodes, alongside two others not apparently connected to the Family Court of Australia at that time, are the seven distinct Events which make up the subject of this trial.

Indictment

2. Leonard John Warwick was arraigned before me on 15 May 2018 on an Indictment dated 21 August 2017.

3. The Accused was charged with, and pleaded to the offences on the Indictment as follows:

CHARGE:

PLEA:

LEONARD JOHN WARWICK

1.   Between 21 February 1980 and 28 February 1980 at Sydney in the State of New South Wales, did murder Stephen Blanchard.

S 18(1)(a) Crimes Act 1900 Law part code 2

NOT GUILTY

AND the Director of Public Prosecutions FURTHER CHARGES that

LEONARD JOHN WARWICK

2.   On 23 June 1980 at Woollahra in the State of New South Wales, did murder David Opas.

S 18(1)(a) Crimes Act 1900 Law part code 2

NOT GUILTY

AND the Director of Public Prosecutions FURTHER CHARGES that

LEONARD JOHN WARWICK

3.   On 6 March 1984 at Belrose in the State of New South Wales, did by the explosion of an explosive substance destroy a building at 42 Neridah Avenue with intent to murder Richard Gee.

S 18(1)(a) Crimes Act 1900 Law part code 16

NOT GUILTY

AND the Director of Public Prosecutions FURTHER CHARGES in the ALTERNATIVE to count 3 that

LEONARD JOHN WARWICK

4.   On 6 March 1984 at Belrose in the State of New South Wales maliciously caused an explosive substance to explode with intent to do grievous bodily harm to Richard Gee.

S 47 Crimes Act 1900 Law part code 106

NOT GUILTY

AND the Director of Public Prosecutions FURTHER CHARGES that

LEONARD JOHN WARWICK

5.   On 15 April 1984 at Parramatta in the State of New South Wales maliciously placed an explosive substance near a building, namely the Family Law Court of Australia at 34-36 Charles Street, with intent to damage the said building.

S 204 Crimes Act 1900 Law part code 860

NOT GUILTY

AND the Director of Public Prosecutions FURTHER CHARGES that

LEONARD JOHN WARWICK

6.   On 4 July 1984 at Greenwich in the State of New South Wales, did murder Pearl Watson.

S 18(1)(a) Crimes Act 1900 Law part code 2

NOT GUILTY

AND the Director of Public Prosecutions FURTHER CHARGES that

LEONARD JOHN WARWICK

7.   On 4 July 1984 at Greenwich in the State of New South Wales, did by the explosion of an explosive substance, damage a building at 175 Greenwich Road, with intent to murder Raymond Watson.

S 28 Crimes Act 1900 Law part code 16

NOT GUILTY

AND the Director of Public Prosecutions FURTHER CHARGES in the ALTERNATIVE to count 7 that

LEONARD JOHN WARWICK

8.   On 4 July 1984 at Greenwich in the State of New South Wales, maliciously caused an explosive substance to explode with intent to do grievous bodily harm to Raymond Watson.

S 47 Crimes Act 1900 Law part code 106

NOT GUILTY

AND the Director of Public Prosecutions FURTHER CHARGES that

LEONARD JOHN WARWICK

9.   On or about 10 February 1985 at Northmead in the State of New South Wales, placed an explosive substance into a vehicle parked at 12 Kira Avenue, with intent to commit murder.

S 30 Crimes Act 1900 Law part code 23

NOT GUILTY

AND the Director of Public Prosecutions FURTHER CHARGES in the ALTERNATIVE to count 9 that

LEONARD JOHN WARWICK

10.   On or about 10 February 1985 at Northmead in the State of New South Wales, maliciously placed an explosive substance near a building at 12 Kira Avenue with intent to do bodily injury to a person.

S 48 Crimes Act 1900 Law part code 106

NOT GUILTY

AND the Director of Public Prosecutions FURTHER CHARGES that

LEONARD JOHN WARWICK

11.   On 21 July 1985 at Casula in the State of New South Wales, did murder Graham Wykes.

S 18(1)(a) Crimes Act 1900 Law part code 2

NOT GUILTY

AND the Director of Public Prosecutions FURTHER CHARGES that

LEONARD JOHN WARWICK

12.   On 21 July 1985 at Casula in the State of New South Wales, maliciously by the explosion of Molanite, caused grievous bodily harm to Joy Wykes.

S 46 Crimes Act 1900 Law part code 92

NOT GUILTY

AND the Director of Public Prosecutions FURTHER CHARGES that

LEONARD JOHN WARWICK

13.   On 21 July 1985 at Casula in the State of New South Wales, maliciously by the explosion of Molanite, caused grievous bodily harm to Miranda Wykes.

S 46 Crimes Act 1900 Law part code 92

NOT GUILTY

AND the Director of Public Prosecutions FURTHER CHARGES that

LEONARD JOHN WARWICK

14.   On 21 July 1985 at Casula in the State of New South Wales, maliciously by the explosion of Molanite, caused grievous bodily harm to Alaine Wykes.

S 46 Crimes Act 1900 Law part code 92

NOT GUILTY

AND the Director of Public Prosecutions FURTHER CHARGES that

LEONARD JOHN WARWICK

15.   On 21 July 1985 at Casula in the State of New South Wales, maliciously by the explosion of Molanite, caused grievous bodily harm to Sue Schultz.

S 46 Crimes Act 1900 Law part code 92

NOT GUILTY

AND the Director of Public Prosecutions FURTHER CHARGES that

LEONARD JOHN WARWICK

16.   On 21 July 1985 at Casula in the State of New South Wales, maliciously by the explosion of Molanite, caused grievous bodily harm to Peter Schultz.

S 46 Crimes Act 190 Law part code 92

NOT GUILTY

AND the Director of Public Prosecutions FURTHER CHARGES that

LEONARD JOHN WARWICK

17.   On 21 July 1985 at Casula in the State of New South Wales, maliciously by the explosion of Molanite, caused grievous bodily harm to Jodie Edwards.

S 46 Crimes Act 1900 Law part code 92

NOT GUILTY

AND the Director of Public Prosecutions FURTHER CHARGES that

LEONARD JOHN WARWICK

18.   On 21 July 1985 at Casula in the State of New South Wales, maliciously by the explosion of Molanite, caused grievous bodily harm to Jesse Mazzotta.

S 46 Crimes Act 1900 Law part code 92

NOT GUILTY

AND the Director of Public Prosecutions FURTHER CHARGES that

LEONARD JOHN WARWICK

19.   On 21 July 1985 at Casula in the State of New South Wales, maliciously by the explosion of Molanite, caused grievous bodily harm to Susan Rushan.

S 46 Crimes Act 1900 Law part code 92

NOT GUILTY

AND the Director of Public Prosecutions FURTHER CHARGES that

LEONARD JOHN WARWICK

20.   On 21 July 1985 at Casula in the State of New South Wales, maliciously by the explosion of Molanite, caused grievous bodily harm to Paul Hahn.

S 46 Crimes Act 1900 Law part code 92

NOT GUILTY

AND the Director of Public Prosecutions FURTHER CHARGES that

LEONARD JOHN WARWICK

21.   On 21 July 1985 at Casula in the State of New South Wales, maliciously by the explosion of Molanite, caused grievous bodily harm to Rita Ridikas.

S 46 Crimes Act 1900 Law part code 92

NOT GUILTY

AND the Director of Public Prosecutions FURTHER CHARGES that

LEONARD JOHN WARWICK

22.   On 21 July 1985 at Casula in the State of New South Wales, maliciously by the explosion of Molanite, caused grievous bodily harm to Ioan Toplicescu.

S 46 Crimes Act 1900 Law part code 92

NOT GUILTY

AND the Director of Public Prosecutions FURTHER CHARGES that

LEONARD JOHN WARWICK

23.   On 21 July 1985 at Casula in the State of New South Wales, maliciously by the explosion of Molanite, caused grievous bodily harm to Lillian Hinds.

S 46 Crimes Act 1900 Law part code 92

NOT GUILTY

AND the Director of Public Prosecutions FURTHER CHARGES that

LEONARD JOHN WARWICK

24.   On 21 July 1985 at Casula in the State of New South Wales, maliciously by the explosion of Molanite, caused grievous bodily harm to David Winder

S 46 Crimes Act 1900 Law part code 92

NOT GUILTY

4. It can be seen from the Indictment that the Accused is charged with the following offences:

1. four counts of murder, contrary to s 18(1)(a) of the Crimes Act 1900 (the “Crimes Act”);

2. two counts of exploding an explosive device which destroys or damages a building with intent to murder a named individual, contrary to s 28 of the Crimes Act;

3. one count of placing an explosive substance into a vehicle with intent to commit murder, contrary to s 30 of the Crimes Act;

4. one count of maliciously placing an explosive substance near a building with intent to damage that building, contrary to s 204 of the Crimes Act; and

5. thirteen counts of maliciously, by an explosion, causing grievous bodily harm to named individuals, contrary to s 46 of the Crimes Act.

5. In addition to these 21 Counts, there are three further Counts charged in the alternative. No further description of those charges is presently required.

6. As noted, upon arraignment, the Accused pleaded not guilty to each of the Counts on the Indictment.

Elements of the Offences

7. It is necessary to set out the necessary elements of each of the offences charged so that from the outset it is clear what the Crown must prove beyond reasonable doubt before the Accused can be convicted of any of the offences.

Counts 1 and 2: Murder

8. The Crown must prove beyond reasonable doubt each of the following elements, at the time and place specified:

1. the death of the deceased as named respectively in Counts 1 and 2;

2. an act of the offender caused the death of each of the deceased;

3. the act of the offender was in each case voluntary;

4. the act of the offender was done with either:

1. an intention to kill the deceased; or else

2. an intention to inflict grievous bodily harm on the deceased;

5. the offender was the Accused.

Counts 6 and 11: Murder

9. The Crown must prove beyond reasonable doubt each of the following elements, at the time and place specified:

1. the death of the deceased as named respectively in Counts 6 and 11;

2. an act of the offender caused the death of each of the deceased;

3. the act of the offender was in each case voluntary;

4. the act of the offender was done with:

1. an intention to kill the deceased; or else

2. an intention to inflict grievous bodily harm on the deceased; or else

3. with reckless indifference to human life, that is to say, the act was done with the foresight of the probability of death arising from the act; and

5. the offender was the Accused.

Counts 3 and 7: Act Done to Property with Intent to Murder

10. The Crown must prove beyond reasonable doubt each of the following elements at the time and place specified:

1. there was an explosion of an explosive substance;

2. the explosion destroyed a building at the address as respectively nominated in Counts 3 and 7;

3. the explosion was caused by an act of the offender;

4. at the time the offender committed the act, he intended to murder the individual named respectively in each count; and

5. the offender was the Accused.

Counts 4 and 8: Alternative Counts (to Counts 3 and 7) – Using Explosive Substance with Intent to Cause Grievous Bodily Harm.

11. The Crown must prove beyond reasonable doubt each of the following elements at the time and place specified:

1. there was an explosion of an explosive substance at the address nominated respectively in Counts 4 and 8;

2. the explosion was caused by an act of the offender;

3. at the time of causing the explosion, the offender intended to do grievous bodily harm to the individual named in each Count;

4. the offender acted maliciously; and

5. the offender was the Accused.

Count 5: Attempting to Destroy a Building with Gunpowder or other Explosive Substance

12. The Crown must prove beyond reasonable doubt each of the following elements at the time and place specified:

1. the offender placed an explosive substance near the building at 34-36 Charles Street, Parramatta;

2. at the time the offender placed the explosive substance near the building he intended to damage the building;

3. at the time the offender placed the explosive device against the building, the offender was acting maliciously; and

4. the offender was the Accused.

Count 9: Attempt to Murder

13. The Crown must prove beyond reasonable doubt each of the following elements at the time and place specified:

1. the offender placed an explosive substance into a vehicle;

2. that at the time the explosive substance was placed into the vehicle, the offender intended to commit murder; and

1. the offender was the Accused.

Count 10: Alternative Count (to Count 9) - Placing Gunpowder Near a Building

14. The Crown must prove beyond reasonable doubt each of the following elements at the time and place specified:

1. The offender placed an explosive substance was placed near a building at 12 Kira Avenue, Northmead;

2. at the time of that act, the offender intended to do bodily injury to a person;

3. the offender was acting maliciously; and

4. the offender was the Accused.

Counts 12 – 24: Causing Bodily Injury by Explosive Substance

15. The Crown must prove beyond reasonable doubt each of the following elements at the time and place specified:

1. there was an explosion of an explosive substance at the Kingdom Hall;

2. the explosion was caused by the act of an offender;

3. that the offender acted maliciously in causing the explosion;

4. the explosion caused grievous bodily harm to the persons named respectively in Counts 12 to 24; and

5. the offender was the Accused.

16. In each of Counts 4, 5, 8, 10 and 12 to 24, the Crown is required to prove that the offender acted maliciously. To prove that the offender acted maliciously, the Crown must prove that relevant act was:

1. done of malice; or

2. done with intent to injure a person or persons, whether in person or in property, and without lawful cause or excuse.

17. In Counts 1, 2, 4, 6, 8 and 12 to 24, the phrase “grievous bodily harm” is used as a part of the element of the each of the offences charged. Grievous bodily harm means really serious bodily injury and includes any permanent or serious disfiguring of a person.

The Trial – A General Description

18. On 11 May 2018, I made an order pursuant to s 132(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986, that the Accused be tried before a judge alone and without a jury. This order was made at the request of the Accused. It was consented to by the Crown. [1]

    1. R v Warwick (No.21) [2018] NSWSC 654

19. The trial commenced before me with the Crown opening on 15 May 2018. It then proceeded (although not on a continuous basis) until the last day of submissions on 6 April 2020. This was the 207^th day of trial. I then retired to consider my verdict.

20. At the request of the Accused, and without opposition from the Crown, the Accused attended and was present at his trial by audio-visual link (“AVL”) from the institution where he is being held in custody.

21. After the Accused first appeared before me on 3 March 2017, when he was first arraigned, I heard and decided 32 separate pre-trial applications. This was prior to the commencement of the taking of evidence on 16 July 2018.

22. During the course of the trial, I heard and decided a further 59 applications, including rulings on evidence. A list of all of my judgments is contained in Annexure B.

23. At the direction of the Chief Justice of New South Wales, Fullerton J heard and determined an application by the Accused for a permanent stay of the trial. That application was heard between 5 August 2019 and 14 August 2019. Fullerton J, for the reasons which she published on 16 August 2019, dismissed that application. [2]

    2. R v Warwick (No.69) [2019] NSWSC 1059

24. The Crown called 193 witnesses to give oral evidence. Some were recalled to give further evidence or for further cross-examination. The Accused did not give evidence but called 11 witnesses to give oral evidence in answer to the Crown case.

25. I directed that the submissions of the Crown and Accused be delivered orally. Both the Crown and the Accused provided written material containing their submissions to supplement their oral submissions and to assist the Court in following them. All of the written submissions have been marked for identification, and have been referred to when necessary to gain a comprehensive understanding of the submissions of each of the Crown and the Accused.

Some Features of this Judgment

26. It is appropriate to describe my approach to this judgment at the outset. The oral evidence in the trial was very lengthy and the documentary exhibits are contained in over 36 lever-arch A4 folders. The submissions, as set out in the documents provided, occupy at least 800 pages. It is neither possible nor necessary in this judgment to comment upon the evidence of every witness, nor to comment upon every exhibit which was tendered. However, the evidence of every witness has been considered and every exhibit has been carefully read, or if it is a physical exhibit – carefully examined by me in the course of my deliberations. No submission has been overlooked.

27. In the course of this judgment, through the use of footnotes, I have included references to evidence which is the source of various findings. These footnotes do not refer to every piece of evidence which may be relevant to the findings, but are a guide to where evidence is to be found which is relevant.

28. This judgment is required by s 133 of the Criminal Procedure Act to include the principles of law applied by me, and the findings of fact upon which I have relied. Where I would have been required to give a warning to a jury, I must take such a warning into account in dealing with any particular matter.

29. I will, in this initial part of my judgment, set out the principles of law which are applicable and by which I am bound. They will be repeated as appropriate at different times in the judgment. For ease of reading and understanding the judgment, such repetition of these principles of law will be made by me by reference to a short description of the principle. Although only a short description of the principle is used, that carries with it the entirety of the principle as it is set out in this Introduction.

30. There will also be times during this judgment where it is necessary to refer to findings of fact, matters or circumstances which have elsewhere been referred to. Sometimes, the most convenient course has been simply to repeat what has earlier been written. Sometimes it has been sufficient to refer to that material without repeating it. This depends upon the context and circumstances.

Crown Case Description

31. The Crown’s case is that the Accused was responsible for each of seven Events, which have given rise to the charges in the Indictment.

32. The seven Events can be described in the following way:

Event No.	Description	Count on the Indictment
1.	The murder of Stephen Blanchard at Revesby on or about 22 February 1980 (“the Stephen Blanchard murder”)	Count 1
2.	The murder of Justice David Opas at Woollahra on 23 June 1980 (“the Opas murder”)	Count 2
3.	The bombing of Justice Richard Gee’s home in Belrose on 6 March 1984 (“the Gee bombing”)	Counts 3-4
4.	The bombing of the Family Law Court building at Parramatta on 15 April 1984 (“the Family Court bombing”)	Count 5
5.	The bombing of Justice Raymond Watson’s home at Greenwich on 4 July 1984 (“the Watson bombing”)	Counts 6-8
6.	The bomb found in a vehicle at the home of Peter Tall on 10 February 1985 (“the Tall car bombing”)	Counts 9-10
7.	The bombing of the Kingdom Hall of the Jehovah’s Witness church at Casula on 21 July 1985 (“the Kingdom Hall bombing”).	Counts 11-24

33. The Crown submitted that over the years when each of these Events occurred, there were proceedings in the Parramatta Registry of the Family Court of Australia between the Accused and his wife, Ms Blanchard. These proceedings concerned the custody of, and access arrangements with respect to, their daughter Trudi, who was born in June 1978. As well, the proceedings included claims with respect to the division of property and, in particular, the sale of the former matrimonial home in which the Accused lived. The Accused and Ms Blanchard were married on 19 October 1974. They separated on 17 March 1979.

34. The Crown’s case is that each of the seven Events was connected to, or arose out of, the course of the Family Court proceedings.

35. It will be seen that the first two Events occurred about four months apart in 1980. The other five Events occurred over a period of about 15 months in 1984 and 1985. The two Events in 1980 were carried out with the use of a .22 calibre firearm. In 1984 and 1985, all Events involved the use of what has been various described as an improvised explosive device (“IED”) or else a bomb. These terms are interchangeable.

Case for the Accused

36. The Accused denies that he was the offender responsible for each of the seven Events. He denies that he is guilty of any of the offences charged in the Indictment.

37. In respect of all Counts on the Indictment, other than Counts 12 to 24, the Accused accepts that the evidence called by, and tendered by, the Crown adequately establishes every element of every offence, save for the element which identifies the Accused as the offender. In relation to Counts 12 to 24, the Accused also puts the Crown to proof of whether the injuries sustained by each of the named individuals constituted grievous bodily harm. The Accused does not concede that the Crown has established this element, but he does not make any submissions which suggest that it is not open to the Court to conclude that the element has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.

Police Investigation

38. In order to provide context for the evidence, and the factual findings, it is appropriate to comment upon the way in which the Police went about their investigations. Each Event was investigated by the Police. Immediately following Event 5, the Watson bombing, a joint task force was formed which consisted of members of the Australian Federal Police (“AFP”) and members of various units of the NSW Police. It was called the Joint Bomb Task Force (“JBTF”). The JBTF was assisted by other government agencies from time to time. The JBTF became responsible for investigating each of the seven Events.

39. During the period of the investigation carried out by the JBTF, Inquests were held by the NSW Coroner into the deaths of Mr Stephen Blanchard, Justice Opas, Mrs Pearl Watson and Mr Graham Wykes. The Inquests into the death of Mr Blanchard and Justice Opas were heard and completed in 1982. The Accused was represented by senior counsel at these Inquests. The Inquest into the death of Mrs Pearl Watson was held at various times between December 1984 and 27 May 1987. The Inquest into the death of Mr Graham Wykes was held in April 1986. The Accused was represented at each of these Inquests by counsel. [3]

    3. Exh.321

40. The Police investigations, in the state they were in at that time, were put before the Coroner in each Inquest.

41. The JBTF continued its investigations until the conclusion of the final day of all of the Inquests in May 1987. The JBTF wound down its operations leading up to that final day and was finally disbanded by July 1987.

42. From time to time, it seems that there are reviews or further paper investigations conducted by the NSW Police about homicide crimes which are unsolved. As part of this process, the Events the subject of this trial were reviewed from time to time. No further substantive investigations occurred until July 2013, when a decision was made by the Officer in Charge of the Unsolved Homicide team to commence a further investigation of the Events. A task force was assembled and given the name Reddan. The work that Task Force Reddan did was often referred to in the trial as “Operation Reddan”. Over time, the terms came to be used interchangeably.

43. The work of Task Force Reddan commenced with locating and identifying the documents and records of the previous investigations, including the JBTF, and also the identification and location of physical exhibits. [4] As part of its work, Task Force Reddan also set out about interviewing a wide range of individuals, including police who had been part of the JBTF, and undertaking a range of further enquiries. Additional scientific tests were undertaken.

    4. T.2291

44. Detective Mathieu Russell became the Officer in Charge of Task Force Reddan in December 2013. [5] Detective Matthew Heffernan was the second in command. He had commenced in July 2013 when the Task Force started.

    5. T.2287

Chronology of Arrest, Committal and Trial

45. On 29 July 2015, the Accused was arrested and charged with the offences which are contained on the Indictment.

46. As was required by order of the Local Court, a very extensive Police Brief was served on the lawyers for the Accused in the course of 2015. The Brief was in separate parts. Documents contained within that Brief were identified by a footer which noted the words “Police Brief” and a date when the document was served, including in which part of the Brief. It comprised at least 8,500 pages.

47. The Accused was committed for trial on 14 December 2016. Orders were made by me on 3 March 2017 which provided for service by the Crown of all relevant documents which comprised the Crown Brief. In February 2018, the Crown was ordered to serve the entirety of the Crown Brief in electronic form. That was done. It consisted of 19,146 numbered pages. Documents were referred to from time to time in the course of the trial by reference to the page numbers on the electronic Crown Brief.

48. The purpose of this chronology is to give context to the evidence in the trial which consisted of the results of enquiries and investigations undertaken in two distinct time periods, 1980 to 1987 and then from July 2013 until the trial. The officers of Task Force Reddan did not include any of the officers who had been involved in the investigation in the 1980s.

Records of the Police

49. The way in which the members of the JBTF went about their duties was described in evidence by Detective Woods, a member of the JBTF, as follows:

“Detective Sergeant Gersbach allocated duties to be performed, persons to be interviewed. The detectives who did the interviews, who took statements, records of interview, prepared running sheets of their enquiries. And Detective Sergeant Gersbach and Detective Superintendent Noonan were in the daily routine of checking every statement, record of interview, exhibit and running sheet that came in.” [6]

6. T.4542.28-33

50. Detective Inkster, a member of the JBTF, described the running sheet as being like notes, and as being an aide-memoire for the investigator which would be followed by a formal statement where appropriate. [7]

    7. T.6563.30-.46

51. The JBTF had up to 130 police officers working on the investigation, at least in the initial stages. [8]

    8. T.4542; T.4644.35

52. Two NSW police officers were responsible for maintaining the records of the JBTF. Those officers were Detective Helen Curtin and Detective Vivienne Crawford. The paper copies of the running sheets were filed by those two detectives. They were also responsible for creating and maintaining a computer database. The JBTF was the first police enquiry to use a computer database to store information. The details of the running sheets were typed into the computer database, which could then be searched by a keyword search. [9] All records created by officers of the JBTF were entered into this database. [10]

    9. T.4678-4680; T.4641.10

    10. T.4641.11

53. The Crown tendered what was, I am satisfied, a printout from a part of the computer database used by the JBTF. [11] The format which can be seen there supports the earlier description to which I have just referred about the record system. The evidence of Detective Russell, which I accept, was that Task Force Reddan had access to many thousands of running sheets recording investigations undertaken by the JBTF.

    11. Exh.664

54. The Accused tendered the report of an expert, Mr Warwick Tate, [12] to give evidence about the nature and type of computer databases which he said would be likely to have been maintained by the NSW Police in the 1980s. Mr Tate made no reference to the evidence to which I have just referred which provided a reasonable description of what was in fact in use in the JBTF officers. It was unclear if it was drawn to his attention. For that reason alone, I am not satisfied that Mr Tate’s opinions are soundly based or at all relevant.

    12. Exh.730

55. There is a second reason why Mr Tate’s opinions are of no weight in this trial and that is because he had no relevant experience, knowledge or understanding of what databases did in fact exist in the NSW Police, or any other NSW government department or agency, in the 1980s. His Curriculum Vitae [13] does not disclose that he had any experience of working in or else working with any NSW government agency, including the NSW Police, or any other government agency of any kind which would enable him to have a sufficient knowledge of, or experience about, computer databases in these organisations. He therefore lacks a sound basis upon which to express a relevant opinion about the nature and type of databases relevant to the investigation in the 1980s by the JBTF.

    13. Exh.731

56. It is clear that the Accused, during this trial, did not have access to the electronic database of the investigation of the JBTF in the 1980s (because it no longer existed by the time of his arrest). However, I am not satisfied that this is a significant disadvantage to him, because I am satisfied that the paper records of the JBTF, where relevant, were in existence.

57. For the investigations conducted by Task Force Reddan, all statements, records of interview and other relevant documents were stored on an electronic database called [email protected]. The entirety of that database remained in existence at the time of the trial.

58. The evidence in the trial contained reference to other standard police documents. The evidence established that detectives kept what was called a “Duty Book”, which they were obliged to complete for each day spent on duty. I am satisfied that a Duty Book was in effect a daily diary in which each detective recorded their start and finish times, the time they took their meal break, the location from which they were working (including if it changed to any other location), and a very broad or general description of the work they were doing. I am satisfied that the Duty Book did not contain any note of the content of any interview or note of the content of any investigation or document. It simply recorded the duty upon which each detective was engaged. Some of the Duty Books of Detective King were tendered. They demonstrate the typical use by a detective of a Duty Book. [14]

    14. Exh.309

59. The Accused also cross-examined many of the detectives who had been members of the JBTF regarding the existence and availability of their standard issue police notebooks. It cannot be doubted that, as a matter of course in the 1980s, all police officers were issued with a police notebook. The evidence in this trial satisfies me that detectives did not use those notebooks to record the results of any of their investigations. Rather, they used a variety of forms of note-taking, which then made their way into running sheets which were regarded as the accurate records of the investigation. Some of the original notes, particularly those made on A4 paper by members of the Ballistics Unit after the information was transferred into running sheets, were placed into a file kept by the Ballistics Unit. However, that was not necessarily a universal practice. I am satisfied that in the organisation and running of the JBTF, it was the running sheets which formed the central, original police records of the JBTF investigations.

60. Submissions were made by the lawyer for the Accused on a number of occasions which were critical, indeed trenchantly so, of the quality of the Police investigations. In particular, the lawyer for the Accused made extensive criticism concerning the asserted absence of police records, both those from investigations carried out in the 1980s (including at the scene of each of the Events) and those from investigations carried out by Task Force Reddan. However, it is necessary to note that it is no part of my role in this trial to undertake an enquiry of the kind seen in Royal Commissions into the overall performance of the whole of the police investigations into these crimes. My role in this trial is to decide whether on the evidence proved in the trial, the Crown has satisfied me beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the Accused.

50. To the extent appropriate I will consider the evidence, including any gaps in the evidence when considering, with respect to each Event, whether the Crown has discharged its onus of proof.

Lengthy Period between Events and Trial

62. As is obvious, this trial was heard between 35 and 40 years after each of these Events occurred. It is notorious that evidence today of an event, fact or circumstance which occurred in the 1980s will not be of the same quality as evidence of that event, fact or circumstance given a short time after the occurrence of that event, fact or circumstance.

63. A contemporaneous statement of observations, taken shortly after the fact in a formal way, is likely to be more accurate than an unrefreshed recollection of that event taken at a time which is between 35 and 40 years after the event. This does not mean, by itself and without more, that a particular present day recollection is unable to be regarded as truthful or accurate. However, in considering the weight to be given to any evidence, I need to be, and I am, conscious of the extent the delay between the subject of the evidence and the time when it is given can impact the quality of the recollection. I am also conscious that whether the evidence has been given in circumstances where the witness has been able to refresh their recollection from a contemporaneous or reasonably contemporaneous document which is a record of the earlier event can impact the quality of the recollection.

64. A question arises as to whether it is either necessary or appropriate to give a specific direction of law with respect to the delay which has occurred. Section 165B of the Evidence Act 1995 is, in my view, applicable to a judge alone trial, and it enables a direction to be given where the Court is satisfied that an accused has suffered a significant forensic disadvantage because of the consequences of delay.

65. Both the Crown and the Accused submitted, and I accept, that it is appropriate for the Court to give itself a direction in respect of all exhibits which consist of statements, records of interview or coronial evidence which have been tendered because the witness in question has died or alternatively is unable to give evidence. Both the Crown and the Accused submitted this direction ought cover the significant forensic disadvantage suffered by the Accused from the inability of the Accused, through his lawyers, to cross-examine those witnesses in this trial or to otherwise challenge the accounts which they give directly. I am conscious, and will keep in mind, that significant forensic disadvantage when considering any evidence of any witness who falls into the category just described.

66. Both the Crown and the Accused agreed that this direction could be given in a general form, as I have just done, and be applicable to each witness falling within the description noted above, rather than giving such a direction with respect to the evidence of each witness separately.

67. Ultimately, at the conclusion of the addresses of the Crown and the Accused, in accordance with an earlier request, an opportunity was provided to the Accused to seek any specific direction under s 165B of the Evidence Act. This opportunity was to enable the Accused to seek any specific directions under s 165B of the Evidence Act if he had identified any particular area in the evidence about which he wished to submit that there was a significant forensic disadvantage, as opposed to the more general warning and direction just given. The Accused made no such application for any specific direction of law with respect to significant forensic disadvantage. Accordingly, no additional direction is given pursuant to s 165B of the Evidence Act.

Directions of Law

68. It is appropriate now to set out the directions of law which are given as part of this judgment. These directions set out the principles of law which are to be applied and which I will apply where appropriate in this judgment: s 133(2) Criminal Procedure Act.

Overall Duty and Responsibility

69. It is the Court’s duty and responsibility to consider whether the Accused is guilty or not guilty of each of the charges and to return a verdict according to the evidence which has been admitted in the trial.

Publicity and Pre-trial Proceedings

70. The Court is to disregard any publicity about any of the events either before the trial commenced or during it. The Court is to disregard what it has heard during pre-trial proceedings, or motions heard during the trial, unless some part of those proceedings has become evidence in the trial. The case is to be decided solely on the evidence admitted in the trial, which consists of the evidence given orally by witnesses, and the contents of any document, or any physical item, tendered by the Crown or the Accused and which has been marked as an Exhibit.

Obligation to Apply the Law

71. I am bound to apply the principles of law contained in these directions to the facts of the case as I find them to be.

Impartiality

72. In considering my verdict, I must act impartially and dispassionately. I must not let emotion sway my judgment. Neither prejudice nor sympathy has any role to play in the determination of the Counts on the Indictment. My task must be undertaken free of prejudice or sympathy in any of its forms.

Burden of Proof

73. The burden of proof of the guilt of the Accused wholly rests on the Crown. That onus rests upon the Crown in respect of every element of each of the offences with which the Accused is charged. It is for the Crown to prove the guilt of the Accused and to prove it beyond reasonable doubt.

74. There is no onus of proof on the Accused, who is presumed to be innocent unless and until he is proved guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

75. The words “beyond reasonable doubt” are words of ancient origin in the law and are plain words which do not require elaboration. If I have a reasonable doubt about the guilt of the Accused on any one or more of the offences, he is entitled to be acquitted on that offence or for those offences.

76. The Accused has called witnesses and tendered documents in answer to the Crown case. By so doing, the Accused does not assume any onus of proof. The onus of proof remains upon the Crown throughout the trial.

77. The fact that some or all of the evidence put before the Court by the Accused may not be accepted does not affect the Crown’s onus of proof, and it does not relieve the Crown from proving the guilt of the Accused beyond reasonable doubt.

78. The onus which rests on the Crown is to prove the elements of the offences beyond reasonable doubt. The Crown does not have to prove every single fact in the trial beyond reasonable doubt, unless the fact is deemed an intermediate fact.

Evidence of Witnesses

79. I am obliged to consider and assess the evidence given by various witnesses and decide whether they are telling the truth, or are reliable, and whether I accept their evidence. My ultimate decision as to what evidence I accept, and what evidence I reject, may be based on a range of matters, including the content and the context of what the witness had to say, the manner in which the witness said it and the general impression which any witness made upon me in giving evidence.

80. In considering whether to accept the evidence of a witness, I am not obliged to accept the whole of the evidence of any one witness. I may, if I think fit, accept part, and reject part, of the evidence of the same witness. In other words, the fact that I do not accept a portion of the evidence of the witness does not mean that I must necessarily reject the whole of the witness’ evidence. I can accept part of the evidence of a witness if I think it is worthy of acceptance.

Silence of the Accused

81. The Accused on a number of occasions chose not to participate in interviews with police officers, chose not to answer questions asked of him by police officers and chose not to answer any questions which might have been asked of him during a number of coronial inquests. In so doing, the Accused was exercising his right to silence, which he has in common with all Australians.

82. The silence of the Accused on any of these occasions cannot be used against the Accused in any way at all. That is because the Accused was simply acting in accordance with his right to silence in respect of which he had received legal advice from a number of lawyers.

83. The Accused has not, in the course of this trial, given any explanation himself in response to the Crown’s case by giving evidence from the witness box. Although an accused may give evidence in relation to the whole or any part of the Crown’s case, an accused may equally elect to give no such explanation. There is no obligation on an accused to give evidence in trial. The Accused is entitled to say nothing and make the Crown prove his guilt.

84. The silence in Court of the Accused cannot be used against him. The election of the Accused not to offer an explanation for the whole or any part of the Crown’s case by giving evidence himself does not constitute any form of admission by the Accused and no such inference can be drawn. Nor must an election by the Accused not to give evidence be used to fill in any gaps in the evidence tendered by the Crown. It must not be used in any way in assessing whether the Crown has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. In particular, I must not speculate about what might have been said in evidence if the Accused had himself given evidence.

Expert Evidence

85. An expert witness is a person who has specialised knowledge based on their training, study or experience. Because they have such knowledge, they may express an opinion on relevant matters that fall within their expertise.

86. To the extent that there is any conflict within the evidence of an expert, or else between experts, it is for me to decide which part or parts of the evidence of the experts I accept, and which part or parts I reject. I must remember that any expert evidence relates only to part of the case and that whilst it may be of assistance to me in reaching a verdict, I must reach my verdict having considered all of the evidence which is applicable.

87. If, having given the matter careful consideration, I do not accept the evidence of any of the experts, then I do not have to act upon the evidence of the expert in question. I do not have to accept even the unchallenged evidence of an expert.

Circumstantial Case

88. The Crown case against the Accused is a circumstantial one. Because of this, I cannot return a verdict of guilty upon any of the charges unless the circumstances are such as to be inconsistent with any reasonable hypotheses other than the guilt of the Accused. To enable me to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the Accused on any one or more of the offences, it is necessary that the Crown persuade me beyond reasonable doubt, that the guilt of the Accused is a rational inference, and that it is the only rational inference that the circumstances would enable me to draw.

89. This means that the Crown must exclude all reasonable hypotheses consistent with the innocence of the Accused.

90. For a hypothesis to be a reasonable one, it must rest upon something more than mere conjecture or supposition, and for an inference to be rational it must rest on something more than mere conjecture or supposition. A bare possibility of innocence does not prevent a conclusion that the Accused is guilty of the offence, so long as the inference of guilt is the only inference open to a reasonable person upon a consideration of all of the facts in evidence.

91. In deciding whether there is a hypothesis reasonably open on the evidence that is consistent with the Accused’s innocence in the Crown case, all of the circumstances established by the evidence are to be considered and weighed. The evidence is not to be looked at in a piecemeal fashion, but is to be considered as a whole.

92. I remind myself that in a circumstantial case, each fact can inform an understanding of the significance of other facts. Therefore, it is the understanding of the combined significance of all of the facts which informs the issue of whether the Crown has proved beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the Accused in respect of each of the offences.

93. I will refer, for convenience, to the directions of law in the previous five paragraphs as the circumstantial evidence direction.

Intermediate Fact

94. The Crown accepts that in the proof of Event 7, which is the bombing of the Kingdom Hall at Casula (being the offences in Counts 11 to 24 on the Indictment), the fact that it was the Accused who broke into the Kingdom Hall on the evening of 13 July 1985, or else in the early hours of 14 July 1985, is an intermediate fact which is an indispensable link in the chain of reasoning which points to the guilt of the Accused on those Counts. Although this fact is not an element of any of the offences, it is necessary for the Crown to establish this fact beyond reasonable doubt.

95. In seeking to prove beyond reasonable doubt this intermediate fact, namely, that the Accused was the intruder into the Kingdom Hall on 13 or 14 July 1985, the Crown primarily relied on two circumstances. The first circumstance was that the DNA profile of the Accused is present on two items, a piece of cardboard and a piece of carpet, each of which were stained by blood shed during the break-in on 13 or 14 July 1985. The second circumstance was that this blood shed was the same blood group as that of the Accused.

96. The Crown accepted that these two circumstances were central to the proof of the intermediate fact. Consequently, the Accused submitted and I accept that I could not be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt about the intermediate fact unless I was also satisfied by the Crown beyond reasonable doubt of the following matters:

1. that the bloodstains on the cardboard and the carpet left by the intruder were the same blood group as the Accused;

2. that the DNA profile found on the cardboard and the carpet was that of the Accused; and

3. that the DNA profile found on the cardboard and the carpet was sourced from the bloodstains on the items, and not from some other source.

97. The Accused submitted that if there remains a reasonable possibility that his DNA was not recovered from the bloodstains on either or both of the cardboard or carpet and therefore not deposited on these items at the time of the first break-in, then he is entitled to be acquitted.

98. In my view, each of those circumstances is of central importance in the proof of the intermediate fact. I therefore must be satisfied of each of them, beyond reasonable doubt, by the Crown before the Crown can prove that the intermediate fact as a circumstance in the chain of reasoning is proof of the guilt of the Accused beyond reasonable doubt.

Tendency

99. The Crown has led evidence for the purpose of establishing that the Accused has a tendency to act in a particular way and to have a particular state of mind. Each of these tendencies is relied upon as a circumstance relevant to the guilt of the Accused of each of the offences.

100. I direct myself that any evidence that the Accused has either or both of the suggested tendencies cannot be considered as a relevant circumstance in the Crown’s case unless I make several findings. First, I must find that one or more of the acts relied upon by the Crown as tendency evidence actually occurred as an act of the Accused. In making that finding, I do not consider each of the acts in isolation, but consider all of the evidence to determine whether the act relied upon actually took place.

101. Secondly, I must find that these acts which I am satisfied occurred prove that the Accused had the particular tendencies alleged by the Crown.

102. If I am satisfied both that the acts relied upon have been proved and that either or both of the tendencies posited have been proved, then I am entitled to take the proved tendency or tendencies into account in determining whether the Crown has proved the guilt of the Accused beyond reasonable doubt.

103. In so considering, I must bear in mind that the fact that a person has a tendency to have a particular state of mind or to act in a particular way does not mean that he must have had that state of mind or must have acted in that way on the occasion in issue. It is also necessary to keep in mind that I should not underestimate the number of individuals who may have the tendency proved by the Crown, and therefore I must avoid giving disproportionate weight to the tendency evidence.

Coincidence Reasoning

104. In this trial, the Crown relies upon coincidence reasoning. This means that the Crown argues coincidence is not an explanation for the Events which occurred, rather that the Events are causally linked.

105. If established, such evidence is available to provide a foundation from which I can draw an inference that the Accused did a particular act. I direct myself that in conducting the process of reasoning from which such an inference may be drawn, I must be satisfied that:

1. the two or more events relied upon by the Crown actually occurred;

2. the guilt of the Accused is proved beyond a reasonable doubt (without reliance on coincidence reasoning) for at least one of the events.

3. there were strong similarities in those events, or there were strong similarities in the circumstances in which those events occurred, or there were strong similarities in both the events and the circumstances in which they occurred;

4. having regard to those strong similarities, it is highly improbable that the two events occurred coincidentally (i.e. by chance or randomly); and

5. therefore the two or more events were carried out by the same offender.

106. I direct myself that I cannot reason that because the Accused may have committed one or more of the offences, he is the type of person who will commit criminal activity generally, or that he is a person who is likely to have committed the offences charged.

Voice Identification Warning

107. I warn myself that a voice identification, which is a part of the evidence in the Crown case, may be unreliable and has been shown to be so in the past. The experience of the criminal courts over the years, both in Australia and overseas, has demonstrated that identification evidence, of whatever kind, may turn out to be mistaken. There have been some notorious cases in which witnesses have given evidence of identification which has later been demonstrated to be wrong after innocent people have been convicted.

108. Evidence that the Accused’s voice has been identified must be approached with special caution before I accept it as reliable. Even if I think the relevant witness was entirely honest, I must still approach the task of assessing the reliability of this evidence with special caution. The identification of a voice is notoriously liable to be mistaken.

Accusatory Statements in the Presence of the Accused

109. I must bear in mind that, where an accusatory statement is made in the presence of the Accused, it is not evidence against the Accused of the facts stated, except insofar as the Accused accepts it. It will only be evidence of the facts stated if I find that the Accused’s response or lack of response amounts to an admission that those facts are true.

Disputed Admissions Warning

110. Evidence was given during the trial that the Accused made certain oral admissions to police officers. I direct myself that I must approach the evidence of the police officers with caution. This is because the circumstances in which it is alleged that the admissions were made may make the evidence unreliable.

111. There are a number of reasons why the evidence may be unreliable. Generally, they indicate that it is easier for police officers to fabricate their evidence than it is for the Accused to have evidence available to challenge what they have said.

112. First, although police did have available to them equipment and facilities to record interviews with suspects, in this case there was no electronic recording made. Even if I accept any explanation that was given for no electronic recording being made, the fact remains that there is no confirmation that those admissions were made independent of the police who say that they were made by the Accused.

110. Secondly, there was no-one present during the conversation except the Accused and the police officers. That state of affairs is not improper. The police officers were perfectly entitled to interview the Accused alone. What this means, however, is that there was no independent person present who might have been able to support the Accused’s challenge to the police evidence.

111. Another matter I must take into account is that the Accused had no opportunity to make any note of his conversation with the police officers at the time of that conversation. A note made by the Accused at the time might have enabled him to challenge the evidence of the police officers more persuasively.

112. I must also take into account that police officers are generally experienced in giving evidence in court. It is not an easy task to decide whether a practised witness is telling the truth or not. If a witness appears to be confident and self-assured, it does not necessarily follow that the witness is giving honest evidence.

Multiple Counts on the Indictment

116. It is necessary, although there are multiple counts on the Indictment, that I give consideration to the counts individually, and that I bear in mind that the mere fact that the Accused may be guilty of one of the counts of the Indictment, does not mean that he is thereby guilty of all counts on the Indictment. It is necessary to consider the evidence with respect to each count and reach a conclusion with respect to each count.

Judgment Architecture

117. In this judgment I have not considered the Crown case by following the Events in chronological order. I am not obliged to consider it in that way. It is open to me to analyse the evidence in any sequence which I choose.

118. I have commenced with an analysis of the last Event in time, Event 7 – the bombing of the Kingdom Hall.

119. A significant part of the Crown case relies upon coincidence reasoning and tendency evidence. As the directions which I have just given demonstrate, before I can engage in coincidence reasoning or rely on any tendency evidence, I need to be satisfied that the guilt of the Accused has been demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt in respect of at least one Event.

120. Accordingly, my analysis concerning Event 7 does not rely on either tendency or coincidence reasoning. I have followed my conclusions on Event 7 by turning to consider the Crown case insofar as it relies upon coincidence reasoning and tendency evidence.

121. I have followed that by considering the Events in an order which seemed to me to be logical and appropriate.

122. Where the Accused has made submissions in relation to a particular Event that the Crown has failed to exclude a hypothesis reasonably open on the evidence which is consistent with the innocence of the Accused, as the Crown is obliged to do with a circumstantial case, I have dealt with that submission insofar as it relates to the particular Event.

123. However, the Accused submitted that with respect to Dr Silvano Mariti, Mr Shoukat Abroo and the members of an organisation known as the Family Law Action Group (“FLAG”), the Crown has not excluded these alternatives with respect to a number of Events. I have considered each of these three potential hypotheses in a separate part of my judgment, because it is more convenient to do so separately from each Event.

124. I have at all times kept in mind that the Crown’s case is a circumstantial one and that I must comply with the circumstantial evidence direction. I have also kept in mind that all times the onus of proof of the guilt of the Accused rests upon the Crown, and that onus is beyond reasonable doubt. Each of these directions has been in the forefront of my mind in all of the considerations which follow.

Event 7 – KINGDOM HALL BOMBING

125. At approximately 10.04am on Sunday 21 July 1985, device bomb detonated at the Kingdom Hall of Jehovah’s Witnesses, in Verbena Avenue, Casula, resulting in the death of Graham Wykes and serious physical injuries to a number of other members of the Lurnea Congregation which was meeting at the Kingdom Hall at that time.

Counts on the Indictment

126. The murder of Graham Wykes is Count 11 on the Indictment. Counts 12 – 24 concern the alleged grievous bodily harm suffered by 13 members of the congregation who were present in the Kingdom Hall. Those individuals are: Joy Wykes (Count 12), Miranda Wykes (Count 13), Alaine Wykes (Count 14), Sue Schultz (Count 15), Peter Schultz (Count 16), Jodie Edwards (Count 17), Jesse Mazzotta (Count 18), Susan Rushan (Count 19), Paul Hahn (Count 20), Rita Ridikas (Count 21), Ioan Toplicescu (Count 22), Lillian Hinds (Count 23) and David Winder (Count 24).

127. It is not in issue that the person who placed and caused the explosion murdered Graham Wykes.

128. I have found in [803] that I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the physical injuries suffered by each of these named individuals amounted to grievous bodily harm. It is accepted and not contentious that the explosion caused injuries to the individuals named on the Indictment and that, given the nature of the explosion, the perpetrator of the explosion would have intended to cause such harm.

129. The only outstanding issue requiring a determination for Counts 11 to 24 on the Indictment is whether the Crown has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused was the person who placed the bomb, and caused the explosion at the Kingdom Hall on Sunday 21 July 1985.

Crown Case in Summary

130. The Crown case is that the Accused constructed the bomb using a high explosive, which was Molanite, and then placed the bomb under the platform at the Kingdom Hall at some time on the night of Saturday 20 July 1985 or early in the morning of Sunday 21 July 1985. The bomb, which was activated by a timing mechanism, detonated at 10.04am during the Sunday meeting of the Lurnea congregation, which had commenced at about 9.30am.

131. The Crown alleged that the Accused was acting in retaliation against the Lurnea congregation for the role some members of that congregation played in assisting his ex-wife, Andrea Blanchard, and their daughter, Trudi, to move from Sydney to a place on the mid-North Coast of NSW without his knowledge or consent. This had the effect of preventing the Accused from exercising his Court-ordered access rights to Trudi. The context for these events was the ongoing Family Court proceedings between the Accused and Ms Blanchard. The Family Court proceedings involved two primary disputes: a custody and access dispute which continued to control the Accused’s access to Trudi and a property dispute concerning primarily whether the former matrimonial home (in which the Accused lived) ought to be sold.

132. It is an essential part of the Crown Case that a break-in occurred at the Kingdom Hall a week before the explosion, namely at some time on the night of Saturday 13 July 1985 or early in the morning of Sunday 14 July 1985. The Crown alleged that the intruder on this occasion was the Accused, and that he was undertaking a reconnaissance to find out how the Kingdom Hall could be entered covertly and where a bomb may be placed without being discovered. The Crown noted that the same window was observed as broken in the same manner a week later by members of the Lurnea Congregation, right before the explosion on 21 July 1985.

133. The Crown case that the Accused was the intruder of the first break-in relies upon DNA profiles which were developed from blood stains observed at different locations on 14 July 1985 including on the carpet inside the Kingdom Hall and on a piece of cardboard which was originally a part of a pile of cardboard cartons stacked in a storage area behind the raised platform in the Kingdom Hall. Those items were retrieved during the investigation after the bomb exploded on 21 July 1985. It is the Crown’s case that the DNA profiles obtained from those bloodstains are of the Accused.

134. The Crown’s case relied on tendency and coincidence reasoning to link the two break-ins to the Kingdom Hall one week apart as being the work of the same person, namely the Accused.

Accused Case in Summary

135. The Accused denied constructing, planting or detonating the bomb at the Kingdom Hall. The Accused submitted that a reasonable hypothesis consistent with his innocence was that another individual was responsible for those acts, with the result that the Crown case against him was not proved beyond reasonable doubt.

Issues with the DNA Evidence

136. The Accused submitted that because it is accepted by the Crown that his presence in the Kingdom Hall on 13/14 July 1984 (or his identity as the intruder at the first break-in on 13/14 July) is an intermediate fact in a chain of reasoning in proof of his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the Crown is obliged to prove that his DNA is sourced from the bloodstains on the cardboard and carpet found in the Kingdom Hall, also beyond reasonable doubt. The Accused submitted that if there remains a reasonable possibility that his DNA was not recovered from either or both of the bloodstains on the cardboard or carpet, and therefore not deposited on these items at the time of the first break-in, he is entitled to be acquitted.

137. Put differently, the Accused raised the reasonable possibility that his DNA was deposited on the carpet and cardboard at a later time and not when the intruder’s blood was shed as a hypothesis consistent with his innocence.

Continuity of Exhibits

138. The Accused submitted that there were issues with the continuity of the two exhibits containing the bloodstains (the carpet and the cardboard).

139. The Accused raised questions about the evidence of Detective Sheather and Constable Constable, and alleged inconsistency in their accounts of when the carpet and cardboard was handed from Sheather to Constable. The Accused relied on the lack of contemporaneous notes or records corroborating the accounts of Detective Sheather and Constable Constable to support a submission that the continuity of handling of these items may have been broken.

140. The Accused further submitted that the Crown cannot exclude the reasonable possibility that the bloodstains on the carpet and cardboard were from one of the number of victims of the bombing, given the two items were collected after the bombing and not after the first break-in.

141. Finally, the Accused submitted that the Crown is unable to establish that the storage of the items was sufficient to preserve their integrity or that they were not tampered with over the decades that they were held in police custody.

Lack of Wounds on the Accused

142. The Accused noted that various members from the Lurnea Congregation gave evidence in the trial that there was a substantial amount of blood found in the Kingdom Hall after the first break-in. When the Accused was detained by Detectives Wood and Gersbach on 30 July 1985, neither Detective observed any injury to his body.

143. In the Accused’s submission, the fact that no injury was observed raises a reasonable doubt in the Crown’s case. The Accused submitted that a wound or scarring would have been visible on his body 16 days later if he were the intruder and had sustained an injury which caused him to lose a substantial amount of blood, as the witnesses had described.

Alternative Suspects

144. The Accused pointed to evidence that an unidentified man went to the surgery of Dr Ewan Watson on Monday 15 July 1985 with a deep laceration on his right hand. The Accused submitted that having regard to all of the circumstances surrounding this surgery visit, the Crown could not exclude this unidentified individual from carrying out the bombing at the Kingdom Hall.

Kingdom Hall – General Layout

145. Before considering the substantive Crown case, it is first appropriate to consider the layout of the Kingdom Hall as established by the evidence in the trial.

146. The building, which was generally rectangular in shape, fronted Verbena Avenue, Casula. It was aligned in a generally east-west direction. The main entrance was at the western end, nearest to Verbena Avenue. After going through the main entrance, access to the main Hall could be obtained by going through the lobby area. The main Hall had a wooden parquetry floor when it was constructed. By the time of the explosion, the floor had been fully carpeted.

147. At the far, or eastern, end of the Hall was a raised platform area. Behind the platform were two small storage areas. These areas were located respectively on the north-eastern corner and south-eastern corner of the Kingdom Hall. They were connected by a narrow passageway, about half a metre in width, along which an adult could pass. [15] The north-eastern storage area had a door which permitted access back into the Hall.

     15. T.970-971

148. Adjacent to this north-eastern storage room were a set of double doors which opened from the main Hall to the outside of the building. These doors opened to a driveway and rear area which, via three or four steps, led up to an area used as a carpark. [16] The double doors were fitted with a lock and ordinarily were kept locked at all times (unless in use). The door could be opened from the inside without a key, but a key was required to gain entry from the outside. [17]

     16. T.970-971

     17. Exh.49, Exh.27, Exh.28, Exh.29, Exh.30, Exh.31, Exh.32

149. The platform area did not extend fully across the width of the Hall and was similar in shape to a half hexagon when viewed from the centre of the Hall. The rear of the platform, being the other half of the hexagon shape, was concealed by side and rear curtains. Above the platform was a timber canopy which largely replicated the shape of the platform.

150. Two doors led from the platform to the rear areas used for storage: one to the north-eastern storage area and the other to the south-eastern storage area.

151. The platform was constructed with timber frames and supports. The floor of the platform was timber with carpet laid over it. The carpet was the same type and pattern as that in the main part of the Hall. The front or external part of the platform was finished with decorative wood panelling in the space between the floor of the Hall and the floor of the platform. The stage appeared to be a solid structure with no points of access when viewed from the main Hall. Mr Redfern, who together with his father assisted in the construction of the platform, confirmed that beneath the platform was a flat bare concrete floor which was smooth. This concrete slab was the base of the entire building, [18] but the part under the stage had not been covered with either timber or carpet. The height between the concrete floor and the platform was about 30cm or perhaps a little more. An adult male could slide their body, on their stomach or back, into the space between concrete floor and the platform. [19]

     18. T.980.40

     19. T.968.45-.50

152. Exhibit 32, which is a series of (not to scale) sketches drawn by Mr Redfern of the typical construction of a platform in a Kingdom Hal which was replicated in Casula, indicated that the stage was supported by timber beams which were about 4 inches x 2 inches in size. [20] The beams were supported by noggins which were spaced vertically between an upper beam (immediately under the stage floor) and a lower beam, which rested on the concrete floor. The beams ran in an east-west direction and were connected immediately under the platform floor by joists. At the rear of the platform a similar beam ran in a perpendicular direction to the other beams. It was supported by noggins which did not rest on a large beam, but rather rested directly on the concrete slab.

     20. T.1010.25

153. The consequence of this was that access could readily be gained to the space underneath the platform from the rear of the platform. This rear access point was the only way to gain access to the area under the platform, as there was no access point from the main Hall in front of the platform. [21] Access from the rear of the platform was limited only by the horizontal distance between the beams which ran in an east-west direction, which was about 1 metre. [22] Generally speaking, the platform was not of particularly heavy construction. [23]

     21. T.971.45

     22. T.1013.3

     23. T.1009.45

154. The only things of value kept in the Kingdom Hall were the electrical sound system and a piano. [24] No records were kept in the Hall. [25]

     24. T.971.45

     25. T.973

155. Along each outside wall of the building, which faced respectively north and south, were a series of windows which were each of an identical design and construction. There were two sets of windows with a set of double doors on the northern wall of the building. There were five identical windows on the southern wall of the building, four of which opened into the main Hall. [26]

     26. Exh.49

156. The design of each window had three components. There was a fixed pane of glass at the top and bottom of the window. The centre and largest pane, which was hinged at the top, could open outwards at the bottom. The opening of this window was achieved through a winder mechanism which was mounted on the horizontal piece of timber which separated the lower fixed pane and the hinged pane. According to Mr Redfern’s evidence, the maximum opening of the hinged window was about 12 inches, which he thought was a sufficient space to enable a person to climb through if they wished. [27] Mr Clapp, another member of the Lurnea congregation had opened the windows over the years prior to July 1985. He estimated that the windows could be opened for a distance of 30‑40cm. [28] Mr Biddle, another member of the congregation, said that the windows opened about a foot, [29] which is consistent with the previous estimates.

     27. T.1036.33

     28. T.1228.13

     29. T.1099.11

157. These three witnesses were doing their best to give an accurate estimate of the distance which the window could open. It is not possible to make a precise factual finding about this distance. It is not essential to do so. I am satisfied that the window pane could be wound open to at least 30cm and up to a maximum of 40cm. There may have been a variation within this range depending on the state of maintenance and repair of any particular window.

158. In cross-examination, Detective Russell agreed with the proposition put to him by the lawyer for the Accused, that the distance the window would wind out to was about 30-45cm (12-18 inches approximately). He also expressed the opinion that a person could fit through the open window with a gap in the range he identified whilst the winder was still attached. [30] In re-examination, Detective Russell explained the basis of his opinion, which included his observation of a male climbing through a replica window which was open to a distance of about 30cm. The replica window had been produced by a manufacturer based upon information provided by the Police. I am satisfied that the replica window was a reasonably accurate reproduction of the windows in the Kingdom Hall. I am also satisfied from both the evidence of Mr Redfern and Mr Clapp, which I accept, and the opinion of Detective Russell, which I accept was soundly based on a reconstruction with the replica window, that it was possible for an adult male to climb through the hinged window into the Hall when it was opened to about 30cm.

     30. T.7298

159. I am also satisfied that a gap at the bottom of a hinged window of the kind in the Kingdom Hall in 1985 which was at least 30cm would be more than sufficient for an adult male of average size to climb through.

160. The storage areas at the rear of the Hall were used, on the evidence, for a range of different purposes. No doubt that reflected the activities that occurred in the Hall from time to time. However, one regular use of the storage areas was to keep cardboard boxes which had been used to transport books and publications from the central offices of the Jehovah’s Witnesses at Ingleburn to the Kingdom Hall at Casula for distribution to, and use by, the members of the various congregations which used the Kingdom Hall. [31] Once the boxes were unpacked, the publications were kept in a room at the front (i.e. the western end) of the Kingdom Hall. The boxes were flattened and put into one or other or both of the storage areas. At intervals, usually monthly, the boxes were taken out by one of the members of a congregation to be burnt in an incinerator, which was located at the back of the Kingdom Hall in the carpark area. [32]

     31. T.1077.10-.20

     32. T.968

Tests carried out by an expert, Professor Charles Sorrell, found that there was “… non-overlap of the standard deviations in the data for the weights, bulk densities, [chemical levels], alkali levels and alkaline earth levels” between the bricks found tied to Mr Blanchard and the bricks taken in 2016 from 25 Tallowood Avenue, Casula. However, Professor Sorrell considered that these discrepancies might be explained by the effects of leaching arising from the fact that the 11 bricks recovered from Cowan Creek had been in the saltwater for a number of days. [1252] Ultimately, he expressed the possibility that the bricks retrieved from Cowan Creek came from the same production run as the bricks retrieved from the Accused’s former home (though he was unable to draw this conclusion definitively). [1253] If the bricks came from the same production run, typically that would have been a run of about 750,000 bricks. These typically would have been used in 75 to 95 houses built mainly of brick; [1254]

5. during the execution of a search warrant at the Accused’s home on the day of his arrest on 29 July 2015, a brown leather satchel was discovered in the garage. [1255] A pamphlet entitled “National Parks of NSW” was found in that satchel. Enquiries at the State Library suggest that it was printed in about 1969. [1256] It included reference to the Ku‑ring‑gai Chase National Park; [1257]

6. by 29 July 2015, the Accused owned a boat which was stored on a trailer on his property at Douglas Park. [1258] There was no evidence that the Accused had owned a boat in 1980. It was noted by the Crown that there were organisations in the Cowan Creek and Hawkesbury River areas which hired boats to members of the public. Enquiries were made by the Police with these organisations. However these inquiries did not identify that the Accused had ever hired a boat from any of these organisations; [1259]

7. the evidence of Mr Clifford MacKechnie, who was a close friend of Mr Blanchard, was that Mr Blanchard was a person who “did not have an enemy in the world”. [1260] Mr MacKechnie knew of no-one who would have wanted to hurt Mr Blanchard. [1261] Mr David Shaw, who had spent considerable time together with Mr Blanchard in the Lennox Head area, did not know of any enemies that Stephen might have had. He described his as a “peace loving guy”. [1262] Both said that Stephen was not a person associated with drugs. I accept that they gave their impressions of their friend honestly and accurately;

8. the Occurrence Books at the Fairfield Fire Station, where the Accused worked in 1980, show that the Accused was off-duty for the period from 21 February 1980 to 23 February 1980. He returned to duty on 24 February 1980. [1263]

   1252. Exh.420 [5.3]-[5.5]

   1253. Exh.420 [5.9]

   1254. Exh.420 [Q.7.4]

   1255. T.6183-T.6184

   1256. T.6185-T.6186

   1257. Exh.358

   1258. T.6634

   1259. Exh.286; T.5076-T.5078

   1260. T.5127.1

   1261. T.5127.12-.15

   1262. T.6217.4-.10

   1263. Exh.571

2236. I accept the evidence which establishes each of the matters of fact and circumstances set out above. I am satisfied that the Crown has proved those facts.

Drug Dealing

2237. I have earlier said that I accept the honesty and accuracy of the evidence of Mr MacKechnie and Mr David Shaw, each of whom gave evidence in the trial.

2238. The Accused submitted that the evidence in fact demonstrated that Mr Blanchard was a drug dealer who had accumulated significant cash savings which could only be explained by drug dealing activities. The Accused supported this submission by way of evidence of an anonymous tip contained in a police running sheet, which was not corroborated by any other evidence in the trial, and by the tender of a newspaper article which stated that the murder of Mr Blanchard had the hallmarks of a drug‑related murder.

2239. The starting point of the Accused’s submission was the contents of a running sheet authored by Detective Bartlett. [1264] The running sheet was admitted on a limited basis, namely that the contents of the first paragraph were not admitted as evidence of the truth of the facts contained in it, but only as evidence of what was told to the investigating police. It is necessary to bear this limitation on use in mind. The running sheet records that on 7 March 1980, a Detective Donovan of the Revesby Drug & Vice Squad, received information from an unnamed source which suggested that Mr Blanchard was a heavy dealer in cannabis (specifically “Indian hemp”) at a motel in Bass Hill. Detective Donovan passed that information on to Detective Bartlett.

      1264. Exh.252

2240. Leaving aside for a moment the limitation on use of this exhibit (as did the Accused in the making of his submissions), I make the following observations about this information. First, the original source of the information is unknown and the reliability of that information from the unnamed informant cannot be known or assessed. The original source material may well be rumour or speculation. Secondly, there was no comment made about that information by Detective Donovan, a member of the Revesby Drug Squad, regarding his knowledge (if any) of the unnamed informant and the value or reliability of the informant or their information. Thirdly, Detective Donovan made no comment suggesting that the Revesby Drug Squad itself knew that Mr Blanchard was a drug dealer or that the motel in Bass Hill was known as a location from which cannabis, if not other drugs, was being dealt. Fourthly, as Detective Bartlett indicated, a search made of Mr Blanchard’s bedroom, bags and motor vehicle did not disclose anything connected with drug dealing or with the possession of cannabis.

2241. If one factors all these elements into the consideration of this running sheet, it becomes apparent that the Accused’s submissions are not well-founded. There is simply no evidence coming from this document that Mr Blanchard was a drug dealer. This conclusion, although standing alone, is confirmed by the evidentiary ruling that the information was not admitted as evidence of the truth of it, which has the result that there is no evidence from the document which suggests, let alone proves, that Mr Blanchard was a drug dealer.

2242. There is some evidence that on some social occasions, Mr Blanchard used cannabis for recreational purposes. [1265] This does not without more point to, much less establish, that he was a drug dealer.

      1265. Exh.293 [14]; Exh.295 [13]

2243. The Accused’s submissions sought to place a great deal of emphasis on an article published in the Daily Mirror on 28 February 1980. [1266] In particular, the article was said to be evidence of the fact that the Police had concluded that Mr Blanchard was the victim of a “drug execution”. There are some significant difficulties with that approach, and I reject any submissions that rely exclusively on this article as an evidentiary basis. The reasons for this are as follows.

      1266. Exh.251

2244. First, no journalist was identified as being the author of the article. For this reason, the article could be an accurate representation of the events, or could easily have been the creation of a member of the editorial staff. With no author listed, there is no way of verifying the information. Secondly, no police officer was identified as the source of the information, either by position (i.e. officer in charge), by rank or by name. There was no material to suggest that whoever was the source of the information was even one of the investigating police. Accordingly, the accuracy or reliability of the source of the police information is unable to be assessed. Thirdly, while a number of the features of the article were reasonably factually correct (11 house bricks, being shot in the head and that the body had been in the water for some days), there is no identifiable factual basis for the assertion in the article that Mr Blanchard’s death was the result of a drug execution. This is particularly so given the article announces that the deceased (as at that time unidentified) was not known to the Police and did not have a police record. Fourthly, it does not appear from any other evidence that any journalist was even present at the wharf.

2245. Shortly put, I am entirely unable to rely on a short article published in the Daily Mirror, written by an unknown person based on an unnamed source or sources, as being reliable or worthy of any weight whatsoever.

2246. I reject the Accused’s submission that Mr Blanchard was a drug dealer. There are five reasons for this. First, the information that he was a drug dealer was not admitted as evidence of the truth of it, and, in any event, it cannot be assessed as reliable and of any weight. Secondly, his friends denied that he was known to be a drug dealer and gave evidence that being a drug dealer was inconsistent with the person whom they knew well. Thirdly, there were no indicia ever identified which pointed to him being engaged as a drug dealer. The evidence about a significant monetary deposit is not, without more, demonstrative of his being a drug dealer. An accumulation of money was more consistent with his stated aim of building a garage on a block of land he owned on the North Coast. Fourthly, the fact that he was an occasional recreational drug user does not mean that he was a drug dealer. Fifthly, he was not identified by Detective Donovan of the Revesby Drug Squad as being known to them as a drug dealer. The fact that Detective Donovan simply passed on the information he had received without comment suggests to me that, in fact, Mr Blanchard was not known to them as a drug dealer.

2247. I am satisfied on the evidence in the trial that Mr Blanchard was not a drug dealer. I am also satisfied that his recreational use of drugs at occasional social gatherings was not connected in any way with his death.

Opportunity and Qualities

2248. The Accused was not rostered on duty for a shift at the Fairfield Fire Station on the evening of 21 February 1980, nor at any time on 22 and 23 February 1980. He was therefore not prevented by his work from carrying out the murder of Mr Blanchard. [1267]

      1267. Exh.571; Exh.572

2249. The Accused was experienced in the handling and use of firearms and he owned a number of .22 calibre weapons.

2250. The Crown submitted that the offender would be someone who knew the layout of the Blanchard house at Revesby. It submitted that the Accused was familiar with the inside of the house. According to Ms Blanchard in her evidence, which I accept, the Accused had visited the Blanchard home on several occasions before they were married in 1974. [1268] On one occasion in 1975, when the Accused and Ms Blanchard were temporarily separated and Ms Blanchard had moved back to her family home at Revesby, the Accused entered the Revesby house through an open window in the kitchen. [1269] He was found inside the house. In an affidavit he swore in the Family Court proceedings on 4 May 1979, the Accused admitted that he had climbed into the house. [1270] The Accused was also present in Court on 4 May 1979 when Ms Blanchard was asked about the number of rooms, including bedrooms, in her father’s house. If he did not know those details before that time, he certainly knew it after that time. [1271]

      1268. T.387.44

      1269. T.342.37

      1270. Exh.2 p.77

      1271. Exh.2 pp.55-56

2251. So far as Ms Blanchard knew, the Accused had never been inside Stephen Blanchard’s bedroom. However, the house was a small one consisting only of three bedrooms. The Accused knew which bedroom Ms Blanchard slept in and which bedroom her father slept in. He could easily have worked out which was Stephen Blanchard’s bedroom (if he did not already know). [1272]

      1272. T.387.50-T.388.8

2252. The Crown also noted that, as a consequence of his training as a fireman, the Accused was familiar with the use of ropes and the tying of knots.

Family Court Proceedings

2253. By the time Mr Blanchard was murdered, the family law proceedings had been in progress for a relatively short time – less than a year.

2254. On 30 April 1979, an order was made by consent which permitted the Accused to have reasonable access to Trudi, who was then about 10 months old. Reasonable access was defined as “two days per week from 9am to 5pm”. [1273] This access was to be supervised by a Court counsellor for six months. [1274]

      1273. Exh.2 p.7; p.168

      1274. Exh.2 p.168

2255. On 6 December 1979, the proceedings were again before the Family Court. In the part of this judgment concerning Event 2, I have previously set out in detail the circumstances and events leading up to this date, including what occurred in the Courtroom. [1275] It is unnecessary to repeat those details here. The Crown relies here upon the fact that during the hearing of 6 December 1979, it was made plain to the Accused that his ongoing access to Trudi was to be continually reviewed and might be adversely affected by his behaviour. An application to restrict access had been foreshadowed by Ms Blanchard’s lawyer. [1276]

      1275. [1208]-[1215]

      1276. Exh.2 p.118

2256. Mr Blanchard, on the Crown case, became directly involved in events relating to the family law proceedings on only one occasion: 19 December 1979. On that day, the Accused had exercised access to Trudi. He sought Ms Blanchard’s consent to continue the access after 5pm, including overnight. This was beyond the time limit set by the Court order (the limit being 5pm). Ms Blanchard refused to consent to Trudi remaining with the Accused past 5pm. The Accused then did not return Trudi in accordance with the Court’s order. [1277] Mr Blanchard drove his sister to collect Trudi from the Accused, who was then living at the former matrimonial home at Casula.

      1277. Exh.2 pp.126-128; T.376.45ff

2257. Taking the Crown’s case at its highest, there was a verbal confrontation between the Accused and Ms Blanchard at that address about Trudi’s return. Mr Blanchard was present and was said to be clearly supporting his sister as she sought the return of Trudi. [1278]

      1278. T.378.7; T.379.20-.31

2258. But there was other relevant evidence in this trial which needs to be considered before reaching any conclusion about whether to accept the Crown’s case about Mr Blanchard’s role in the events of 19 December 1979. I have discussed this evidence, which surrounds the incident and other contemporaneous events, earlier in this judgment. [1279]

      1279. [1092]-[1103]

2259. Having considered all of that evidence, I earlier reached the conclusion that Mr Blanchard had only a very minor role in the events of the evening of 19 December 1979. Namely, I am satisfied that Mr Blanchard drove his sister to Casula on that evening. He may have seen what happened, but he was not involved in any active role. [1280]

      1280. [1107]

2260. I have also concluded (and here repeat) that the Accused told Ms Edwards, the Court counsellor, on 20 December 1979 (the following day) that he had kept Trudi overnight. He said he had Ms Blanchard’s agreement to do this. [1281]

      1281. [1108]

2261. By that time, there was no need for there to be any independent verification by Mr Blanchard as to what happened if this incident was ever relied upon in the family law proceedings. [1282] I am satisfied this would have was clear to all involved, including the Accused. The sole issue was whether the Accused had the consent of Ms Blanchard to keep Trudi. Mr Stephen Blanchard on the evidence had no independent knowledge of whether there was such an agreement or not.

      1282. [1109]

2262. Put differently, as at February 1980, Mr Blanchard was not involved (and was not likely to be involved) in the family law proceedings between Ms Blanchard and the Accused.

2263. I am not satisfied that Mr Blanchard had any connection of any relevance or significance to the Accused’s family law proceedings. I reject the Crown’s submission that Mr Blanchard was in any way relevantly connected to those proceedings. There is no basis for a finding of any motive on the part of the Accused to murder Mr Blanchard on the basis of, or arising out of events in, the family law proceedings.

Family Relations

2264. The Accused told the Family Court in an affidavit sworn on 4 May 1979, that:

“I have not got on well with certain members of [Ms Blanchard]’s family and prefer not to have much to do with them in a personal sense.” [1283]

1283. Exh.2 p.77

2265. The Accused accepted that Ms Blanchard knew that he did not get on well with members of her family. [1284] The family members referred to in that affidavit were not specifically identified. It is not at all clear whether the reference by the Accused was intended to include Mr Blanchard.

      1284. Exh.2 p.78

2266. Ms Blanchard gave evidence on 4 May 1979, in the presence of the Accused, that Trudi was fascinated by Mr Blanchard. Trudi was at that time a little over 10 months old. [1285] Ms Blanchard also said at that time that Mr Blanchard was working often and did not spend much time at home when he was not at work. Obviously, the opportunities for interaction between Mr Blanchard and Trudi were limited. I can see no basis for finding that this may have caused any jealousy on the part of the Accused towards Mr Blanchard.

      1285. Exh.2 p. 49

2267. The only evidence of a direct contact between the Accused and Mr Blanchard was on the occasion of a telephone call which apparently occurred sometime after the 19 December 1979 incident. On this occasion, Ms Blanchard heard Mr Blanchard say to the Accused something like “You are only being stupid”. [1286] There was no context provided in the evidence within which the remark was made. I am unable to find that the Accused would have taken any serious or lasting offence from Mr Blanchard making that comment, particularly in the absence of context.

      1286. T.379

2268. I am satisfied that when Ms Blanchard conveyed to Detective Hagan on 28 February 1980, that there was no ill-feeling between the Accused and her brother, [1287] that was the true position concerning the relationship and interactions between the Accused and Mr Blanchard.

      1287. Exh.17 40/19146 [2]

2269. Finally, I note that the Crown has drawn attention to a remark made by Mr Blanchard to Mr David Shaw at a time which was probably in the first half of 1979, but certainly before November 1979. [1288] Mr Blanchard is said to have described the Accused as a “really heavy guy” who had warned him not to get in the way. [1289]

      1288. T.6218.43-.48

      1289. T.6221.10-.31

2270. Accepting for the moment that Mr Shaw accurately recounted the conversation, I am not satisfied this evidence is of any real weight. It is certainly insufficient to detract from the conclusion that I have just reached about the absence of ill-feeling. There are number of reasons for this. First, the timing of the conversation suggests that it was probably more than six months before Mr Blanchard’s murder. It is therefore unlikely to accurately represent the position of events as at February 1980. Secondly, it is quite unclear what Mr Blanchard meant when he used the description “really heavy”. It may have meant that the Accused was stridently pursuing access to Trudi, as the evidence shows. It does not necessarily mean anything sinister. Thirdly, the Accused giving a warning to Ms Blanchard’s brother to stay out of a dispute between the Accused and Ms Blanchard is not an unusual occurrence for a family dispute. It is a very common, and rarely sinister, statement made in the context of a family dispute.

2271. I remain of the opinion that, on all of the evidence, I am satisfied that there was no ill-will between Mr Blanchard and the Accused as at February 1980.

Conclusions

2272. There are certainly some features which considered on their own may suggest that the Accused was guilty of the murder of Mr Blanchard.

2273. The Accused was familiar with .22 calibre firearms. He knew the layout of the Blanchard house and had been inside it on a number of occasions. He was resisting any attempts to do anything to reduce his access to his daughter. He did not like members of the Blanchard family. He was familiar with the use of ropes and the tying of knots. He had access to a supply of loose bricks under the former matrimonial home which were of a kind that could have been used to weigh down Mr Blanchard’s body in Cowan Creek. He was not at work at the time Mr Blanchard was taken from the family home and his body dumped in Cowan Creek.

2272. As well, the Accused has been shown to be a man who had the two tendencies described earlier in this judgment. However, I note that these relate directly to individuals interfering with the Accused’s access to his daughter. I am persuaded that Mr Stephen Blanchard does not fall within this description.

2273. On the other hand, there is considerable material pointing against the Accused being involved in Mr Blanchard’s murder. He did not own a boat at the time and did not have ready access to a boat from a friend or member of his family. Cowan Creek is a significant distance from where Mr Blanchard and the Accused lived. It is notable that there were other waterways much closer.

2274. The Crown case is that Mr Blanchard was shot in his bedroom. It would have been extraordinarily difficult for one person to successfully remove Mr Blanchard’s body from the house and transport it into a vehicle without waking the other inhabitants of the house at Revesby. If Mr Blanchard was killed in the house, it is more likely that two people were involved. The loading of a body and 11 house bricks into a boat also suggests the need for more than one person, as does the depositing of a body tied with 11 house bricks into the water from a boat.

2275. There was no evidence in any of the events that the Accused had a close relationship with any other person which would be sufficient to involve that other person in the disposal of Mr Blanchard’s body.

2276. The existence of a motive is not a necessary element for the finding of guilt of an offence. However, the fact that there is no established motive and no ill‑will between Mr Blanchard and the Accused makes it far less likely that the Accused would have committed the offence.

2277. Finally, as is clear from the evidence, there is nothing which specifically links the Accused to this murder. No one saw him do it. There is no DNA or other trace evidence which connects the Accused to the murder. There is no circumstance identified by the Crown which directly connects the Accused to the murder.

2278. I am obliged in considering whether the Crown has proved its case, to keep in mind that the Crown bears the onus of proving the guilt of the Accused beyond reasonable doubt. Were the onus to be different and a lesser standard imposed, a different conclusion may have been reached.

2279. The Crown has failed to persuade me beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused is guilty of the murder of Mr Stephen Blanchard. A verdict of not guilty to Count 1 on the Indictment must be returned.

RETURN OF VERDICTS

2282. It is now time for me to formally return my verdicts with respect to each of the Counts upon the Indictment.

2283. My verdicts are as follows:

CHARGE:

VERDICT:

LEONARD JOHN WARWICK

1.   Between 21 February 1980 and 28 February 1980 at Sydney in the State of New South Wales, did murder Stephen Blanchard.

S 18(1)(a) Crimes Act 1900 Law part code 2

NOT GUILTY

AND the Director of Public Prosecutions FURTHER CHARGES that

LEONARD JOHN WARWICK

2.   On 23 June 1980 at Woollahra in the State of New South Wales, did murder David Opas.

S 18(1)(a) Crimes Act 1900 Law part code 2

GUILTY

AND the Director of Public Prosecutions FURTHER CHARGES that

LEONARD JOHN WARWICK

3.   On 6 March 1984 at Belrose in the State of New South Wales, did by the explosion of an explosive substance destroy a building at 42 Neridah Avenue with intent to murder Richard Gee.

S 18(1)(a) Crimes Act 1900 Law part code 16

GUILTY

AND the Director of Public Prosecutions FURTHER CHARGES in the ALTERNATIVE to count 3 that

LEONARD JOHN WARWICK

4.   On 6 March 1984 at Belrose in the State of New South Wales maliciously caused an explosive substance to explode with intent to do grievous bodily harm to Richard Gee.

S 47 Crimes Act 1900 Law part code 106

NO VERDICT ENTERED

AND the Director of Public Prosecutions FURTHER CHARGES that

LEONARD JOHN WARWICK

5.   On 15 April 1984 at Parramatta in the State of New South Wales maliciously placed an explosive substance near a building, namely the Family Law Court of Australia at 34-36 Charles Street, with intent to damage the said building.

S 204 Crimes Act 1900 Law part code 860

GUILTY

AND the Director of Public Prosecutions FURTHER CHARGES that

LEONARD JOHN WARWICK

6.   On 4 July 1984 at Greenwich in the State of New South Wales, did murder Pearl Watson.

S 18(1)(a) Crimes Act 1900 Law part code 2

GUILTY

AND the Director of Public Prosecutions FURTHER CHARGES that

LEONARD JOHN WARWICK

7.   On 4 July 1984 at Greenwich in the State of New South Wales, did by the explosion of an explosive substance, damage a building at 175 Greenwich Road, with intent to murder Raymond Watson.

S 28 Crimes Act 1900 Law part code 16

GUILTY

AND the Director of Public Prosecutions FURTHER CHARGES in the ALTERNATIVE to count 7 that

LEONARD JOHN WARWICK

8.   On 4 July 1984 at Greenwich in the State of New South Wales, maliciously caused an explosive substance to explode with intent to do grievous bodily harm to Raymond Watson.

S 47 Crimes Act 1900 Law part code 106

NO VERDICT ENTERED

AND the Director of Public Prosecutions FURTHER CHARGES that

LEONARD JOHN WARWICK

9.   On or about 10 February 1985 at Northmead in the State of New South Wales, placed an explosive substance into a vehicle parked at 12 Kira Avenue, with intent to commit murder.

S 30 Crimes Act 1900 Law part code 23

GUILTY

AND the Director of Public Prosecutions FURTHER CHARGES in the ALTERNATIVE to count 9 that

LEONARD JOHN WARWICK

10.   On or about 10 February 1985 at Northmead in the State of New South Wales, maliciously placed an explosive substance near a building at 12 Kira Avenue with intent to do bodily injury to a person.

S 48 Crimes Act 1900 Law part code 106

NO VERDICT ENTERED

AND the Director of Public Prosecutions FURTHER CHARGES that

LEONARD JOHN WARWICK

11.   On 21 July 1985 at Casula in the State of New South Wales, did murder Graham Wykes.

S 18(1)(a) Crimes Act 1900 Law part code 2

GUILTY

AND the Director of Public Prosecutions FURTHER CHARGES that

LEONARD JOHN WARWICK

12.   On 21 July 1985 at Casula in the State of New South Wales, maliciously by the explosion of Molanite, caused grievous bodily harm to Joy Wykes.

S 46 Crimes Act 1900 Law part code 92

GUILTY

AND the Director of Public Prosecutions FURTHER CHARGES that

LEONARD JOHN WARWICK

13.   On 21 July 1985 at Casula in the State of New South Wales, maliciously by the explosion of Molanite, caused grievous bodily harm to Miranda Wykes.

S 46 Crimes Act 1900 Law part code 92

GUILTY

AND the Director of Public Prosecutions FURTHER CHARGES that

LEONARD JOHN WARWICK

14.   On 21 July 1985 at Casula in the State of New South Wales, maliciously by the explosion of Molanite, caused grievous bodily harm to Alaine Wykes.

S 46 Crimes Act 1900 Law part code 92

GUILTY

AND the Director of Public Prosecutions FURTHER CHARGES that

LEONARD JOHN WARWICK

15.   On 21 July 1985 aqt Casula in the State of New South Wales, maliciously by the explosion of Molanite, caused grievous bodily harm to Sue Schultz.

S 46 Crimes Act 1900 Law part code 92

GUILTY

AND the Director of Public Prosecutions FURTHER CHARGES that

LEONARD JOHN WARWICK

16.   On 21 July 1985 at Casula in the State of New South Wales, maliciously by the explosion of Molanite, caused grievous bodily harm to Peter Schultz.

S 46 Crimes Act 190 Law part code 92

GUILTY

AND the Director of Public Prosecutions FURTHER CHARGES that

LEONARD JOHN WARWICK

17.   On 21 July 1985 at Casula in the State of New South Wales, maliciously by the explosion of Molanite, caused grievous bodily harm to Jodie Edwards.

S 46 Crimes Act 1900 Law part code 92

GUILTY

AND the Director of Public Prosecutions FURTHER CHARGES that

LEONARD JOHN WARWICK

18.   On 21 July 1985 at Casula in the State of New South Wales, maliciously by the explosion of Molanite, caused grievous bodily harm to Jesse Mazzotta.

S 46 Crimes Act 1900 Law part code 92

GUILTY

AND the Director of Public Prosecutions FURTHER CHARGES that

LEONARD JOHN WARWICK

19.   On 21 July 1985 at Casula in the State of New South Wales, maliciously by the explosion of Molanite, caused grievous bodily harm to Susan Rushan.

S 46 Crimes Act 1900 Law part code 92

GUILTY

AND the Director of Public Prosecutions FURTHER CHARGES that

LEONARD JOHN WARWICK

20.   On 21 July 1985 at Casula in the State of New South Wales, maliciously by the explosion of Molanite, caused grievous bodily harm to Paul Hahn.

S 46 Crimes Act 1900 Law part code 92

GUILTY

AND the Director of Public Prosecutions FURTHER CHARGES that

LEONARD JOHN WARWICK

21.   On 21 July 1985 at Casula in the State of New South Wales, maliciously by the explosion of Molanite, caused grievous bodily harm to Rita Ridikas.

S 46 Crimes Act 1900 Law part code 92

GUILTY

AND the Director of Public Prosecutions FURTHER CHARGES that

LEONARD JOHN WARWICK

22.   On 21 July 1985 at Casula in the State of New South Wales, maliciously by the explosion of Molanite, caused grievous bodily harm to Ioan Toplicescu.

S 46 Crimes Act 1900 Law part code 92

GUILTY

AND the Director of Public Prosecutions FURTHER CHARGES that

LEONARD JOHN WARWICK

23.   On 21 July 1985 at Casula in the State of New South Wales, maliciously by the explosion of Molanite, caused grievous bodily harm to Lillian Hinds.

S 46 Crimes Act 1900 Law part code 92

GUILTY

AND the Director of Public Prosecutions FURTHER CHARGES that

LEONARD JOHN WARWICK

24.   On 21 July 1985 at Casula in the State of New South Wales, maliciously by the explosion of Molanite, caused grievous bodily harm to David Winder

S 46 Crimes Act 1900 Law part code 92

GUILTY

2284. The Accused is convicted of each of the offences in Counts 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, 11, and 12 to 24 inclusive.

**********

ANNEXURE A

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

AFP	Australian Federal Police
AVL	Audio Visual Link
DAL	Division of Analytical Laboratories
DFM	Department of Forensic Medicine
DSTO	Defence, Science & Technology Organisation
FASS	Forensic and Analytical Science Service
FAULT	Families Against Unnecessary Legal Trauma
FLAG	Family Law Action Group
HME	Home-made explosive
ICI	Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd
IED	Improvised Explosive Devices
IRS	Infrared Spectrographic Analysis
JBTF	Joint Bomb Task Force
MEPC	Metropolitan Exhibits and Property Centre
MRL	Material Research Laboratory
O-tol	O-tolidine
US	United States of America
VFS Laboratory	Victorian Forensic Science Laboratory
WODU	Weapons and Ordnance Disposal Unit
XRF	X-ray fluorescence

ANNEXURE B

LIST OF ALL INTERLOCUTORY JUDGMENTS

R v Warwick [2017] NSWSC 1151

R v Warwick (No.2) [2017] NSWSC 1225

R v Warwick (No.3) [2017] NSWSC 1836

R v Warwick (No.4) [2018] NSWSC 69

R v Warwick (No.5) [2018] NSWSC 70

R v Warwick (No.6) [2018] NSWSC 234

R v Warwick (No.7) [2018] NSWSC 236

R v Warwick (No.8) [2018] NSWSC 354

R v Warwick (No.9) [2018] NSWSC 510

R v Warwick (No.10) [2018] NSWSC 511

R v Warwick (No.11) [2018] NSWSC 521

R v Warwick (No.12) [2018] NSWSC 522

R v Warwick (No.13) [2018] NSWSC 699

R v Warwick (No.14) [2018] NSWSC 635

R v Warwick (No.15) [2018] NSWSC 652

R v Warwick (No.16) [2018] NSWSC 733

R v Warwick (No.17) [2018] NSWSC 653

R v Warwick (No.18) [2018] NSWSC 659

R v Warwick (No.19) [2018] NSWSC 655

R v Warwick (No.20) [2018] NSWSC 656

R v Warwick (No.21) [2018] NSWSC 654

R v Warwick (No.22) [2018] NSWSC 696

R v Warwick (No.23) [2018] NSWSC 698

R v Warwick (No.24) [2018] NSWSC 691

R v Warwick (No.25) [2018] NSWSC 742

R v Warwick (No.26) [2018] NSWSC 1079

R v Warwick (No.27) [2018] NSWSC 753

R v Warwick (No.28) [2018] NSWSC 812

R v Warwick (No.29) [2018] NSWSC 901

R v Warwick (No.30) [2018] NSWSC 1051

R v Warwick (No.31) [2018] NSWSC 1091

R v Warwick (No.32) [2018] NSWSC 1105

R v Warwick (No.33) [2018] NSWSC 1219

R v Warwick (No.34) [2018] NSWSC 1242

R v Warwick (No.35) [2018] NSWSC 1263

R v Warwick (No.36) [2018] NSWSC 1264

R v Warwick (No.37) [2019] NSWSC 196

R v Warwick (No.38) [2018] NSWSC 1285

R v Warwick (No.39) [2018] NSWSC 1286

R v Warwick (No.40) [2018] NSWSC 1283

R v Warwick (No.41) [2018] NSWSC 1287

R v Warwick (No.42) [2018] NSWSC 1292

R v Warwick (No.43) [2018] NSWSC 1293

R v Warwick (No.44) [2018] NSWSC 1295

R v Warwick (No.45) [2018] NSWSC 1352

R v Warwick (No.46) [2018] NSWSC 1335

R v Warwick (No.47) [2018] NSWSC 1325

R v Warwick (No.48) [2019] NSWSC 206

R v Warwick (No.49) [2018] NSWSC 1557

R v Warwick (No.50) [2018] NSWSC 1554

R v Warwick (No.51) [2018] NSWSC 1555

R v Warwick (No.52) [2018] NSWSC 2034

R v Warwick (No.53) [2018] NSWSC 1714

R v Warwick (No.54) [2018] NSWSC 1716

R v Warwick (No.55) [2018] NSWSC 2011

R v Warwick (No.56) [2018] NSWSC 2015

R v Warwick (No.57) [2018] NSWSC 2018

R v Warwick (No.58) [2018] NSWSC 2016

R v Warwick (No.59) [2018] NSWSC 1825

R v Warwick (No.60) [2018] NSWSC 1875

R v Warwick (No.61) [2018] NSWSC 2017

R v Warwick (No.62) [2018] NSWSC 2028

R v Warwick (No.63) [2019] NSWSC 41

R v Warwick (No.64) [2019] NSWSC 163

R v Warwick (No.65) [2019] NSWSC 248

R v Warwick (No.66) [2019] NSWSC 317

R v Warwick (No.68) [2019] NSWSC 1525

R v Warwick (No.69) [2019] NSWSC 1059 (Fullerton J)

R v Warwick (No.70) [2019] NSWSC 1529

R v Warwick (No.71) [2019] NSWSC 1241

R v Warwick (No.72) [2019] NSWSC 1254

R v Warwick (No.73) [2019] NSWSC 1255

R v Warwick (No.74) [2019] NSWSC 1530

R v Warwick (No.75) [2019] NSWSC 1435

R v Warwick (No.76) [2019] NSWSC 1516

R v Warwick (No.77) [2019] NSWSC 1564

R v Warwick (No.78) [2019] NSWSC 1531

R v Warwick (No.79) [2019] NSWSC 1565

R v Warwick (No.80) [2020] NSWSC 115

R v Warwick (No.81) [2020] NSWSC 76

R v Warwick (No.82) [2019] NSWSC 1762

R v Warwick (No.83) [2019] NSWSC 1757

R v Warwick (No.84) [2019] NSWSC 1908

R v Warwick (No.85) [2019] NSWSC 1909

R v Warwick (No.86) [2020] NSWSC 31

R v Warwick (No.87) [2020] NSWSC 36

R v Warwick (No.88) [2020] NSWSC 37

R v Warwick (No.89) [2020] NSWSC 43

R v Warwick (No.90) [2020] NSWSC 70

R v Warwick (No.91) [2020] NSWSC 75

R v Warwick (No.92) [2020] NSWSC 78

**********

Endnotes

Amendments

21 August 2020 - [195](3) typographical error

Decision last updated: 21 August 2020