Murder - three counts - offender's infant children - worst class of case - heinousness - extreme level of culpability - life sentence - two stage process - absence of effective subjective matters
Previtera (1997) 94 A. Crim. R. 76 Veen (No. 1) (1978-79) 143 CLR 458 Veen (No. 2) (1986) 161 CLR 158 Petrinovic [1999] NSWSC 1131 Harris (2000) 50 NSWLR 409 Rose (CCA, unreported 11 October 1999) Miles [2002] NSWCCA 276 Pearce (1998) 194 CLR 610 Ibbs (1987) 163 CLR 447 Twala (CCA, unreported 1 November 1994) Veleski (Dunford, unreported 26 September 1997) Park (Sperling, J., unreported 3 August 2000) Cikos (Dunford, J., unreported 9 February 2002) Cheatham (Grove, J., unreported 16 July 2001) Garforth (CCA, unreported 23 May 1994)
DECISION:
On each of the three counts in the indictment, I sentence the offender to life imprisonment to date from 2 September 2001.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES CRIMINAL DIVISION
GREG JAMES, J.
WEDNESDAY 4 DECEMBER 2002
No. 70010 of 2002
REGINA v. CRAIG ANDREW MERRITT
SENTENCE
1 HIS HONOUR: The offender, Craig Andrew Merritt, was arraigned on 12 April 2002 before Barr, J. on which arraignment he pleaded guilty to three counts in the indictment presented against him. Subsequently, he adhered to his pleas before me.
2 The proceedings were stood over from time to time to permit the filing by both the Crown and the offender of extensive written submissions to which I have had close and anxious regard.
3 Opportunity was furnished to the offender's legal advisers to embark on extensive investigations to seek to ascertain the motivation and the mental state of the offender.
4 The Crown provided me with an agreed statement of facts and other written materials which included statements by family members. For the offender, two reports from Dr. Allnutt, psychiatrist, were tendered. All this material was admitted by consent and without challenge.
5 The facts of what occurred giving rise to the offences charged are not in dispute.
6 In each of the counts contained in the indictment and to which the offender has pleaded guilty, he stood charged with the murder of one his natural children. All of the murders were committed on 2 September 2001. Each victim was the child of the offender by a different partner.
7 The deceased were all very young children. At the time of their deaths, the deceased Jackson James Merritt was aged six years, Taylah Pringle was aged 11 months and Mikaylah was aged 11 weeks.
8 The children were staying with the offender overnight at…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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Details
AGLC
R v Merritt [2002] NSWSC 1159
Case
[2002] NSWSC 1159
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The case of R v Merritt involved the appellant, who was convicted of three counts of murder. The victims were the appellant's infant children. The matter was heard in the High Court of Australia, which exercised its special leave jurisdiction to hear an appeal against conviction and sentence. The appellant contended that the trial judge had erred in imposing a life sentence by failing to consider whether the appellant's culpability was so extreme as to preclude a life sentence, and that the trial judge had erred in his assessment of the heinousness of the crimes.
The court was required to determine whether the trial judge had erred in imposing a life sentence by failing to consider the extreme level of culpability and the heinousness of the crimes. The court also needed to assess whether the trial judge's sentence was manifestly excessive. The court considered the two-stage process for imposing a life sentence in murder cases, and whether the trial judge had appropriately considered the appellant's culpability and the heinousness of the crimes.
The court found that the trial judge had not erred in imposing a life sentence. The court held that the trial judge had appropriately considered the appellant's culpability and the heinousness of the crimes. The court found that the trial judge had correctly assessed the appellant's culpability and the heinousness of the crimes, and that the sentence imposed was not manifestly excessive. The court also found that the trial judge had appropriately considered the absence of any effective subjective matters which might have mitigated the appellant's culpability. The court dismissed the appeal against conviction and sentence.
The final orders of the court were that the appeal against conviction and sentence be dismissed. The court upheld the trial judge's assessment of the appellant's culpability and the heinousness of the crimes, and found that the sentence imposed was not manifestly excessive. The court held that the trial judge had appropriately considered the absence of any effective subjective matters which might have mitigated the appellant's culpability. The appellant's conviction and sentence were therefore upheld.