SUSAN JOY DOOLEY (applicant/respondent) v THOMAS DARRYL WARD (respondent/appellant)
FILE NO/S:
Appeal No 8093 of 2000 DC No 389 of 2000
DIVISION:
Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING:
General Civil Appeal
ORIGINATING COURT:
District Court at Brisbane
DELIVERED ON:
1 December 2000
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
10 November 2000
JUDGES
Pincus JA, Byrne and Cullinane JJ Judgment of the Court
ORDER:
Appeal allowed with costs and amount of compensation awarded reduced to $15,750.
CATCHWORDS:
CRIMINAL LAW – JURISDICTION, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – JUDGMENT AND PUNISHMENT – ORDERS FOR COMPENSATION, REPARATION, RESTITUTION, FORFEITURE AND OTHER MATTERS RELATING TO THE DISPOSAL OF PROPERTY – COMPENSATION – QUEENSLAND – appellant ordered to pay compensation to respondent on account of various injuries suffered from assault occasioning bodily harm – compensation table in Schedule 1 of Criminal Offence Victims Act 1995 gave range of percentages of scheme maximum for each type of injury suffered – s 22(4) provided that "maximum amount of compensation" be reserved for most serious cases – whether "maximum amount of compensation" referred to scheme maximum or to highest percentage provided in range for particular type of injury – whether trial judge's assessment of compensation excessive
A J Rafter for the appellant R M Bourke for the respondent
SOLICITORS:
Dearden Lawyers for the appellant Goodfellow & Scott for the respondent
THE COURT: This is an appeal by leave from an order made in the District Court on 25 August 2000. Under the Criminal Offence Victims Act 1995 the appellant was ordered to pay the sum of $30,000 compensation for injuries caused to Susan Joy Dooley, following from the conviction of the appellant on a charge of having assaulted her, occasioning her bodily harm. There were three components of the award:
Bruising and laceration $ 3,750 Neck, back, chest injury $ 7,500 Mental or nervous shock $18,750
It emerged during the argument on the application for leave, conducted by Mr Rafter on behalf of the appellant and Mr Bourke for the respondent, that disposition of the case might depend upon the meaning of s 22(4) of the Act:
"The maximum amount of compensation provided under this part is reserved for the most serious cases and the amounts provided in other cases are intended to be scaled according to their seriousness".
The expression "maximum amount of compensation" in s 22(4) could possibly have the same meaning as "scheme maximum" referred to in s 25(2), quoted below. On the other hand, it might be intended to refer instead to the various maxima expressed in terms of percentages in the compensation table mentioned in s 25(4).
Section 25 reads, in full, as follows:
"(1) In making a compensation order, a…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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Details
AGLC
R v Ward; ex parte Dooley [2000] QCA 493
Case
[2000] QCA 493
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
In the case of R v Ward; ex parte Dooley, the appellant, Ward, was ordered to pay compensation to the respondent, Dooley, for injuries sustained from an assault occasioning bodily harm. The dispute arose under the provisions of the Criminal Offence Victims Act 1995, specifically concerning the interpretation of the compensation table and the meaning of "maximum amount of compensation." The matter was brought before the Queensland Court of Appeal.
The central legal issues were whether the term "maximum amount of compensation" in section 22(4) of the Act referred to the scheme maximum or the highest percentage provided in the range for each type of injury, and whether the trial judge had erred in assessing the amount of compensation awarded. The respondent argued that the maximum amount should correspond to the highest percentage in the compensation table, while the appellant contended that it referred to the scheme maximum.
The Court of Appeal held that the term "maximum amount of compensation" referred to the scheme maximum rather than the highest percentage provided in the range for a particular type of injury. The court found that the trial judge had assessed the compensation amount correctly but had erred in the total compensation awarded, deeming it excessive. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the amount of compensation was reduced to $15,750.
The final order of the court was to allow the appeal with costs and to reduce the amount of compensation awarded to the respondent to $15,750. This decision clarified the interpretation of the compensation provisions in the Act and provided guidance on the application of the compensation table.
Orders
Orders of the court
Appeal allowed with costs and amount of compensation awarded reduced to $15,750.