R v Taylor

[2025] QCA 141

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

R v Taylor [2025] QCA 141

PARTIES:

R
v
TAYLOR, Declan Jay
(applicant)

FILE NO/S:

CA No 239 of 2024
DC No 348 of 2024
DC No 1096 of 2024

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

Sentence Application

ORIGINATING COURT:

District Court at Brisbane – Date of Sentence: 10 October 2024 (Farr SC DCJ)

DELIVERED ON:

1 August 2025

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

22 July 2025

JUDGES:

Mullins P, Brown JA and Bradley JA

ORDER:

Leave to appeal sentence is refused.

CATCHWORDS:

CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE – GROUNDS FOR INTERFERENCE – SENTENCE MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE OR INADEQUATE – where the applicant pleaded guilty to five counts across two indictments – where the applicant will serve eight years’ imprisonment for that offending – where the applicant must serve seven years’ imprisonment for attempted armed robbery in company, concurrently with seven years for grievous bodily harm and 18 months for unlawful entry of a motor vehicle at night with violence – where the applicant must then serve, cumulatively on those seven years, another 12 months’ imprisonment for threatening violence at night, while concurrently serving nine months for wilful damage – where the sentencing judge declared the two offences to be serious violent offences – where it was declared that the 1,094 days in pre-sentence custody be deemed time already served under the sentences – whether the sentence imposed is manifestly excessive

Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld), s 156, s 161B

R v Bennett[2016] QCA 31, considered
R v Bryan; Ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) (2003) 137 A Crim R 489; [2003] QCA 18, considered
R v Free; Ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) (2020) 4 QR 80; [2020] QCA 58, considered
R v Gadd[2013] QCA 242, considered
R v Sellies-Cullen[2023] QCA 247, considered

COUNSEL:

D M Caruana for the applicant
M A Gawrych for the respondent

SOLICITORS:

Guest Lawyers for the applicant
Director of Public Prosecutions (Queensland) for the respondent

1. MULLINS P:  I agree with Bradley JA.

2. BROWN JA:  I agree with Bradley JA.

3. BRADLEY JA:  The applicant seeks leave to appeal a sentence imposed on 10 October 2024 in the District Court in respect of five counts across two indictments.

   The sentence

4. The effect of the sentence is that the applicant will serve a total of eight years’ imprisonment and will be in custody for five years and 11 months before he will be eligible to apply for a parole order.  The sentence has this effect due to its components and the parole eligibility date.

5. The applicant must serve seven years’ imprisonment for attempted armed robbery in company, concurrently with seven years for grievous bodily harm and 18 months for unlawful entry of a motor vehicle at night with violence.  He committed these three offences on 10 October 2021.  The sentencing judge declared each of the first two of the 10 October 2021 offences to be a serious violent offence.[1]  Cumulatively on those seven years,[2] the applicant must then serve another 12 months’ imprisonment for threatening violence at night, while concurrently serving nine months for wilful damage.  He committed these two offences very early on 9 October 2021.

   [1]Pursuant to Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) (PSA), s 161B(3).

   [2]This is the effect of the sentencing judge’s direction pursuant to PSA, s 156(1).

6. The applicant had spent 1,094 days in pre-sentence custody.[3]  The sentencing judge declared this period of almost three years to be imprisonment already served under the sentence imposed.[4]  His Honour fixed 12 September 2027 as the date the applicant would be eligible for parole.  His Honour explained this date was four months after the date when the applicant will have served 80 per cent of the seven-year concurrent sentences for the two serious violent offences.

   [3]From 12 October 2021 to 9 October 2024.

   [4]Pursuant to PSA, s 159A(3)(c).

   The proposed ground of appeal

7. If granted leave, the applicant would pursue his appeal on the ground that the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive.

8. For the applicant, two alternative approaches were argued.  First, the applicant contended that the serious violent offence declarations rendered the sentence manifestly excessive, due to the consequence that he must serve 80 per cent of the seven-year terms in custody before he will be eligible for parole.  In the alternative, he contended that the extension of his parole eligibility date beyond 12 May 2027 to 12 September 2027, rendered the sentence manifestly excessive.  These identified aspects of the sentence, one or other of which it is said rendered it manifestly excessive, are the applicant’s alternative proposals for the Court to adopt, were it to set aside the sentence imposed and resentence the applicant afresh.

   The sentence in the relevant circumstances

9. The sentencing judge made the serious violent offence declarations about the applicant’s two most serious offences.

10. The applicant committed them at about 11.00 pm on 10 October 2021, during an attack, in company on people in their home.  It was premeditated.  The applicant was the prime mover.  He had organised a team of co-offenders, as well as transport for him to collect the weapon and arrive with the co-offenders at the scene.

11. This offending involved the applicant smashing a window, to draw attention, and discharging a shotgun into the home to strike fear and intimidate the occupants and persons connected to the occupants.  He fired the shotgun in front of a woman who lived in the home with her daughter.  He did so without care for persons out of sight who might be seriously injured.

12. When he discharged the shotgun, the applicant caused grievous bodily harm to a young woman who happened to be at home.  She was struck, through a wall, by the shrapnel the applicant discharged into the house when he fired the shotgun.  But for surgical intervention, she would have died.  She has long-term disabilities.  She is unable to work.  She suffers from anxiety, depression and lasting consequences of the injury.  Her mother, before whom the applicant discharged the shotgun, is required to act as a full-time carer for her daughter.

13. It was the applicant’s second such attack over consecutive nights.  All those offences were before the sentencing judge.  Each was committed in an attack in the middle of the night on people in their home, involving the applicant firing a shotgun.

14. The applicant committed all these offences about two weeks into a probation order, which had been made in respect of his persistent and prolific property offending involving breaking into multiple homes and stealing, including ten homes while on bail for earlier house breaking, and a “ram raid” on a pharmacy to steal medication and money.  He had spent 120 days on remand before the probation order was made.

    The formulation of the sentence

15. The sentencing judge identified the above relevant facts and circumstances of the applicant’s offending.

16. His Honour then identified the mitigating factors.  These included the applicant’s very early guilty plea, and his youth at 19 years old.  The applicant did not intend the discharge of the shotgun to injure someone.  He caused the injuries by “criminal negligence”.  The applicant had no prior convictions for violent offences.  He had a prejudicial and dysfunctional upbringing, involving exposure to serious family violence at an early age, limited education, not having completed primary school, and substance abuse.

17. It is clear from the sentencing remarks that the sentencing judge took due account of all those relevant factors, conflicting and contradictory as they were, and arrived at a single result.

    Was the sentence manifestly excessive?

18. The circumstances of the applicant’s offending suggested he posed an ongoing risk to the community.  It was a risk that, when realised, had resulted in the catastrophic injuries to a young woman.  He had not been deterred by four months on remand or by a lenient probation order.  Rather, his offending had become more serious.  These facts suggested adequate punishment and the protection of the public required the applicant to serve a longer period in actual custody before eligibility for parole than would otherwise be required.  The sentencing judge’s decision to declare the two serious violent offences was consistent with the approach explained by the Court in R v Free; Ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) [2020] QCA 58 at [53].

19. The Crown Prosecutor referred the sentencing judge to the sentences upheld or imposed by this Court in R vBryan; Ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) [2003] QCA 18, R v Gadd [2013] QCA 242, R v Bennett [2016] QCA 31, and R v Sellies-Cullen [2023] QCA 247. Each involved a guilty plea to one or more offences declared to be serious violent offences.

20. In Bryan, the Court set aside a more lenient sentence[5] for grievous bodily harm, and substituted a sentence of six years’ imprisonment.  The Court agreed a serious violent offence declaration was warranted, but no declaration had been sought by the Attorney-General.  The applicant was 21 years old at the time of the offending.

    [5]Four years’ imprisonment suspended after 12 months, with an operational period of five years.

21. In Gadd, the Court upheld a sentence of eight years’ imprisonment with a serious violent offence declaration for burglary by breaking with violence while armed and in company, malicious act with intent, and armed robbery in company with wounding.  The applicant was 43 years old when he was sentenced by the primary judge.

22. In Bennett, the Court upheld an effective sentence of eight years’ imprisonment for attempted armed robbery with personal violence and grievous bodily harm, with a parole eligibility date fixed after serving six years’ imprisonment.  The applicant was 28 years old at the time of the offending.

23. In Sellies-Cullen, the Court refused leave to appeal against a sentence of six years’ imprisonment, with a serious violent offence declaration, for grievous bodily harm.  The applicant was 18 years old at the time of the offending.

24. In this context, the sentence of seven years for the applicant’s serious violent offences, and 12 months for the previous night’s offending, with a parole eligibility date after five years and 11 months in custody, does not suggest a misapplication of principle.  The sentencing judge’s decision, including the declarations and the eligibility date as elements of the whole sentence, was within sound sentencing discretion.  It could not be described as unreasonable or unjust.

25. In the circumstances, the sentence imposed was not manifestly excessive.

26. I would order:

    1.   Leave to appeal sentence is refused.