SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
R v TAY [2023] QCA 5
PARTIES:
R
v
TAY
(appellant)FILE NO/S:
CA No 270 of 2021
DC No 86 of 2021DIVISION:
Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING:
Appeal against Conviction
ORIGINATING COURT:
District Court at Bundaberg – Date of Conviction: 28 September 2021 (Allen KC DCJ)
DELIVERED ON:
3 February 2023
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
7 September 2022
JUDGES:
Mullins P and Morrison JA and Williams J
ORDER:
Appeal dismissed.
CATCHWORDS:
CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE – PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCES AMOUNTING TO MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE – IMPROPER ADMISSION OR REJECTION OF EVIDENCE – where the appellant was convicted on 10 counts of sexual offences against two complainants – where the appellant submitted that there was a miscarriage of justice because the appellant was denied a fair trial by reason of the Crown’s failure to disclose the Victim Impact Statement of the complainant, SIS, before her evidence – where the trial ran over seven days to 28 September 2021 – where the Victim Impact Statement was dated 16 September and was disclosed after closing addresses and during the summing up – where the prosecutor received it on 27 September and provided it to defence counsel that day – where defence counsel applied for a mistrial and discharge of the jury on the basis that the statement bolstered an argument that there was collusion, an issue central to the defence case – where the application was refused – whether there has been a miscarriage of justice
CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – VERDICT UNREASONABLE OR INSUPPORTABLE HAVING REGARD TO EVIDENCE – TEST TO BE APPLIED – APPEAL DISMISSED – where the legal principles applicable with the ground that the verdict was unreasonable are well known, and were recently restated in Dansie v The Queen (2022) 96 ALJR 728, which reaffirmed the approach set out in M v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 487 – where the suggested weaknesses in the evidence have not been demonstrated to have reduced the probative value of the evidence in such a way that this Court ought to conclude, even making full allowance for the advantages enjoyed by the jury, there is a significant possibility that an innocent person has been convicted
Dansie v The Queen (2022) 96 ALJR 728; [2022] HCA 25, cited
M v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 487; [1994] HCA 63, cited
Pell v The Queen (2020) 268 CLR 123; [2020] HCA 12, cited
R v Miller (2021) 8 QR 221; [2021] QCA 126, citedCOUNSEL:
A I O’Brien and I J MacNicol for the appellant (pro bono)
D Nardone for the respondentSOLICITORS:
No appearance for the appellant
Director of Public Prosecutions (Queensland) for the respondent
MULLINS P: I agree with Morrison JA.
MORRISON JA: The appellant was convicted on 10 counts of sexual offences against two complainants.[1] The offences were:
[1]In order to distinguish between them I…
Continue reading R v Tay
Sign in free to access the full text
- AGLC
- R v Tay [2023] QCA 5
- Case
- [2023] QCA 5
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court had to determine if the suggested weaknesses in the evidence were significant enough to conclude that there was a significant possibility that an innocent person had been convicted. The court applied the principles established in Dansie v The Queen, reaffirming the approach in M v The Queen, to assess whether the verdict was unreasonable. The court found that the evidence provided was sufficient to support the conviction, and the non-disclosure of the Victim Impact Statement did not undermine the probative value of the evidence to the extent that it would suggest an innocent person had been convicted.
The court concluded that all grounds of appeal had failed, and the appeal should be dismissed. The reasoning was that the evidence provided was robust and the non-disclosure of the Victim Impact Statement did not create a significant possibility that an innocent person had been convicted. The court ordered that the appeal be dismissed.
Orders
Orders of the court
Appeal dismissed.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
It was submitted that the court could not ignore even a relatively slim possibility that the defence had been forensically disadvantaged by the non-disclosure of the statement. It was enough that the opportunity which the defence was denied could have made a difference to the verdict.[98][98]Relying on R v HAU [2009] QCA 165 at [40], referring to R v Spizzirri [2001] 2 Qd R 686 at 694.Consideration – Ground 1 It is convenient to consider the four aspects set out in paragraph [60] above separately.Paragraph 8(a) – 1999 Disclosures The proposition at the heart of this aspect of the case is that SIS made sexual abuse disclosures in 1999, and if the statement was true, it casts doubt on the truthfulness of those disclosures. This is said to be triggered by that part of the statement in which SIS said it was not until she was in high school that she realised what the appellant was doing was wrong. The evidence from SIS was that in 1999 she told her father and his partner, and then went to the police. She was then 10 years old.[99] Four years later, when she ran away, she told TAF about the sexual offending.[100][99]AB 190 line 2.[100]AB 193 line 32. Cross-examination covered the following points:(a)SIS told police in March 1999;[101](b)she was cross-examined about what she said as to the good and bad things about where she lived;[102](c)the interview also contained sexual abuse allegations;[103](d)what SIS said then mirrored her evidence at trial;[104] and(e)she said, “I didn’t want to … have to live in a house where I was getting abused”.[105][101]AB 196 line 23; AB 197 line 20.[102]AB 198 – AB 201.[103]AB 200 line 29; AB 201 line 31.[104]AB 201 line 31.[105]AB 201 line 46. SIS said she withdrew the complaint made in 1999 because she missed her siblings.[106][106]AB 202 line 1. SIS was cross-examined extensively with the assistance of records obtained from Juvenile Aid, Child Safety, Police and others. In the course of that cross-examination, SIS was questioned about the complaints of sexual abuse she made against the appellant in 2003, the withdrawal of that complaint, and it was put to her that in 2003 those accusations were being made she was making false accusations of sexual assault. The essence of that cross-examination is set out below.“Put: in 2003 SIS made a complaint of sexual abuse against the appellant:[107][107]AB 216 lines 7-16.“All right. Now, you had a conversation with the Bundaberg Juvenile Aid Bureau as well as Child Safety and you made another complaint about [the appellant] sexually assaulting you; do you recall making a complaint at about that time?---No.And when I say ‘sexual assault’ I’m using that as a shorthand, it’s about sexual offences you said [the appellant] had committed on you?---Yes.So do you recall telling police and Child Safety about - - -?---Yes, I do.Okay. You do. But not the other things?---No.Not about being struck by [the appellant], not about the police being called?---No.And not about the accusations of drugs?---No.”Put: in 2003, aged 14, SIS withdrew the complaint about the appellant:[108]“All right. Now, you then told the – and I don’t know whether I’ve got the sequence right, and perhaps I’ll do it in reverse. In 2003 you withdrew any complaint of a sexual nature against [the appellant]?---I cannot remember.That’s a conversation you had with the police officer about the complaints you’d made about his behaviour and you withdrew that complaint in 2003?---Okay.All right. Do you recall withdrawing a complaint at all at that time?---No.”Put: in 2003 SIS was making false accusations of sexual assault:[109]“I suggested to you that you were making false statements of sexual abuse in order to remove yourself from living with [the appellant]? And you’ll just have to answer in words. You did - - -?---That it wasn’t true.”[108]AB 216 lines 29-38.[109]AB 218 lines 24-26.