SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION: R v Taiapa [2008] QCA 204 PARTIES: R
v
TAIAPA, Dion Robert
(appellant)FILE NO/S: CA No 306 of 2007 SC No 116 of 2007 DIVISION: Court of Appeal PROCEEDING: Appeal against Conviction ORIGINATING
COURT:Supreme Court at Townsville DELIVERED ON: 25 July 2008 DELIVERED AT: Brisbane HEARING DATE: 11 July 2008 JUDGES: Keane and Fraser JJA and Lyons J
Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court,
each concurring as to the order madeORDER: Appeal dismissed CATCHWORDS: CRIMINAL LAW – GENERAL MATTERS – CRIMINAL LIABILITY AND CAPACITY – DEFENCE MATTERS – DURESS – where the appellant was convicted of one count of possession and one count of trafficking methylamphetamine – where the appellant claimed that at the time of the offending his conduct was procured by threats made against him and his family by drug dealers to whom he was indebted – where the trial judge withdrew from the jury's consideration a defence of compulsion or duress under s 31(1)(d) of the Criminal Code – whether the trial judge erred in finding there to be insufficient evidence to raise an arguable defence of duress Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld), s 31(1)(d), s 31(2) Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland v Lynch
[1975] AC 653, considered
Jago v District Court (NSW) (1989) 168 CLR 23; [1989] HCA
46, applied
R v Acton [2001] QCA 155, cited
R v Brown (1986) 43 SASR 33, considered
R v Hudson & Taylor [1971] 2 QB 202, distinguished
R v Lawrence [1980] 1 NSWLR 122, considered
R v Lewis (1993) 96 Cr App R 412, cited
R v Palazoff (1986) 43 SASR 99, cited
R v Pickard [1959] Qd R 475, distinguished
R v Smith [2005] 2 Qd R 69; [2005] QCA 1, applied
R v Z [2005] 2 AC 467, cited
Van den Hoek v The Queen (1986) 161 CLR 158; [1986] HCA
76, citedCOUNSEL: H A Walters for the appellant M J Copley for the respondent SOLICITORS: John-Paul Mould Solicitors (Brisbane) acting as Town Agent for
John D Weller & Associates (Bundall) for the appellant
Director of Public Prosecutions (Queensland) for the respondent
KEANE JA: On 12 October 2007 the appellant was convicted upon the verdict of a jury of one count of trafficking in the dangerous drug methylamphetamine, and one count of possessing in excess of two grams of methylamphetamine. He had also been charged with one count of possessing a quantity of cash which was used in connection with trafficking in a dangerous drug, but the Crown declined to proceed with that count on the second day of the trial. The appellant was tried with his co-accused, Robert John Ackers, who was acquitted of both charges.
[2] The appellant was sentenced to seven years imprisonment, to be served cumulatively upon a sentence he was already serving, with a parole eligibility date fixed at 12 November 2011.
The appellant seeks to…
Continue reading R v Taiapa
Sign in free to access the full text
Details
- AGLC
- R v Taiapa [2008] QCA 204
- Case
- [2008] QCA 204
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The appeal in R v Taiapa involved the appellant who was convicted of one count of possession and one count of trafficking methylamphetamine. The appellant claimed that his actions were compelled by threats made against him and his family by drug dealers to whom he was indebted. The trial judge did not allow the defence of duress to be considered by the jury, leading to the appellant's appeal. The central legal issue was whether the trial judge was correct in ruling that the evidence presented did not establish an arguable defence of duress under section 31(1)(d) of the Criminal Code.
The court found that the trial judge's decision to exclude the duress defence from the jury's consideration was correct. The evidence presented by the appellant was deemed insufficient to raise an arguable defence of duress. The court held that the appellant's earlier dealings with the drug dealers did not necessarily qualify as an "unlawful association," and there was no clear evidence that the threats made were a direct result of this association. The court emphasised that it was not necessary to delve deeply into the interpretation of section 31(2) of the Criminal Code as the outcome of the appeal did not depend on these points.
The appeal was dismissed, with all judges concurring on the outcome and reasoning. The court found that the trial judge's decision was correct and that the appellant's evidence did not establish a defence of duress. The final order of the court was to dismiss the appeal.
The court found that the trial judge's decision to exclude the duress defence from the jury's consideration was correct. The evidence presented by the appellant was deemed insufficient to raise an arguable defence of duress. The court held that the appellant's earlier dealings with the drug dealers did not necessarily qualify as an "unlawful association," and there was no clear evidence that the threats made were a direct result of this association. The court emphasised that it was not necessary to delve deeply into the interpretation of section 31(2) of the Criminal Code as the outcome of the appeal did not depend on these points.
The appeal was dismissed, with all judges concurring on the outcome and reasoning. The court found that the trial judge's decision was correct and that the appellant's evidence did not establish a defence of duress. The final order of the court was to dismiss the appeal.
Orders
Orders of the court
Appeal dismissed
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
It will be apparent from what I have written that, in my view, it is not necessary to accept the respondent's argument based on s 31(2) of the Criminal Code in order to dispose of this appeal in the respondent's favour. On the respondent's argument it may be open to question whether, as a matter of law, the appellant's earlier dealings with Tony and Salvatore were aptly described as "entering into an unlawful association." It may also be open to question whether, on the evidence, the appellant rendered himself liable to have the threats in question made to him by his entry, some years earlier, into an unlawful association with Tony and Salvatore. Because it is not necessary to decide these points, it is preferable not to enter upon an exhaustive exegesis of s 31(2) which can be of academic interest only. Conclusion and order While my reasoning differs from that of the learned trial judge, I am respectfully of the opinion that his Honour was correct in ruling that the evidence adduced by the appellant had not raised an arguable defence under s 31(1)(d) of the Criminal Code. The appeal should be dismissed. FRASER JA: I have had the advantage of reading the reasons for judgment of Keane JA. I agree with the order proposed by his Honour, and with his reasons for the order. LYONS J: I have had the advantage of reading the reasons for judgment of Keane JA. I agree with the reasons and the order proposed by his Honour.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Full text does not contain this section.