R v Stevens

Case [2017] QCA 61

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

R v Stevens [2017] QCA 61

PARTIES:

R
v
STEVENS, Brett Raymond
(appellant/applicant)

FILE NO/S:

CA No 212 of 2015
CA No 305 of 2015
SC No 686 of 2015

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

Appeal against Conviction & Sentence

ORIGINATING COURT:

Supreme Court at Brisbane – Date of Conviction: 2 September 2015; Date of Sentence: 20 November 2015

DELIVERED ON:

11 April 2017

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

16 September 2016

JUDGES:

Morrison and McMurdo JJA and Atkinson J
Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court, each concurring as to the orders made

ORDERS:

1.   Appeal against conviction dismissed.

2.   Application for leave to appeal against sentence refused.

CATCHWORDS:

CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL AGAINST CONVICTION – VERDICT UNREASONABLE OR INSUPPORTABLE HAVING REGARD TO EVIDENCE – APPEAL DISMISSED – where the appellant was convicted of trafficking in a dangerous drug, producing a dangerous drug and supplying dangerous drugs after a 28 day trial – where the ground of appeal was that the jury’s verdict is unsupportable and against the weight of the evidence – where the appellant was producing, trafficking and supplying dangerous drugs with help from a number of persons – where the other persons gave evidence that the appellant owned a pill press and directed the drug operation – where one witness gave evidence to the Crime and Misconduct Commission – where the appellant argued that the witness’ evidence could not be accepted because the witness had reasons to reduce his own involvement in the trafficking scheme and his evidence was therefore incredible and unreliable – where the trial judge directed the jury that it would be dangerous to convict on the evidence of that person alone unless the jury found that it was supported by other independent evidence – where other evidence included cash, drugs and things used to produce drugs seized by police, recorded conversations and text messages – whether the verdicts were supported by other evidence – whether it was open to the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt, that the appellant was guilty

CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE – GROUNDS FOR INTERFERENCE – SENTENCE MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE – where the applicant was sentenced to 13 years imprisonment for carrying on the business of unlawfully trafficking dangerous drugs – where a conviction was recorded but there was no further punishment for the count of producing a dangerous drug – where the applicant submitted that the sentence is manifestly excessive when compared to sentences imposed on co-offenders, related offenders and in similar cases – where the applicant did not complain about the facts considered by the sentencing judge but contended that the sentencing judge erred in their application of the parity principle – where the respondent submitted that the applicant was higher in the organisational chain than related offenders – where the court should only interfere with a sentence where there has been a departure of principle…

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Details
AGLC
R v Stevens [2017] QCA 61
Case
[2017] QCA 61
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In R v Stevens, the appellant was convicted of trafficking in a dangerous drug, producing a dangerous drug, and supplying dangerous drugs following a 28-day trial. The central issues were whether the jury’s verdict was unreasonable or against the weight of the evidence and if the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive. The appellant argued that the jury’s conviction was flawed as it relied heavily on the testimony of a witness with potential self-interest. The witness, YBS, had provided evidence to the Crime and Misconduct Commission and implicated the appellant in drug trafficking activities, including owning a pill press and directing the operation. The trial judge instructed the jury that it would be dangerous to convict solely on YBS’s testimony unless supported by other independent evidence. The court had to determine if the jury’s verdict was supported by other evidence, including cash, drugs, and equipment seized by police, recorded conversations, and text messages.

The reasoning of the court focused on the reliability and corroboration of YBS’s testimony. The court concluded that YBS’s evidence, while potentially self-serving, was sufficiently corroborated by other evidence, including physical evidence and other witness testimonies. The jury was properly directed on the need for independent corroboration, and the evidence supported the conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Regarding the sentence, the court noted that while the appellant claimed the sentence was manifestly excessive, the sentencing judge had considered mitigating factors, including the absence of further offending and the appellant’s health conditions. However, the primary considerations were deterrence and the substantial punishment needed for such serious offences. The parity principle was also examined, and the court found no marked disparity that would justify a reduction in the sentence.

The court dismissed the appeal against conviction and refused the application for leave to appeal against the sentence. This decision reinforces the importance of corroborating evidence in criminal trials and the substantial penalties for drug trafficking offences.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Appeal against conviction dismissed.

2. Application for leave to appeal against sentence refused.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The trafficking charge related to a period between 1 August 2007 and 4 February 2009. The direct evidence for the first part of the period (from August 2007 to March 2008) came from the witness YBS. It is therefore appropriate to commence with his evidence.YBS’s evidenceFirst trip to Sydney YBS met Stevens in June or July 2007. He described the first time he was asked by Stevens to do a trip for drugs. Stevens invited him to Sydney, to a race meeting and asked him if he could deliver something to his home address at Burpengary, saying it was just car parts. He described the arrangement: “I was to meet someone … across the road from Eastern Creek Raceway, outside the front of the pub. Someone was going to give me a box, and … I was to drive it back and leave it on the table or on the verandah of his house and … He asked me if could pick up the box of parts off someone and drop it back to his house in Burpengary ... and leave it on … the back porch.”[5][5]AB 370-371. The box weighed about a kilogram, and was about the same size as a sports-shoe box. It was sealed with tape around it. YBS believed he was taking car parts back to Brisbane. He delivered them to Stevens’ house and left them on the back verandah.Second trip to Sydney YBS went to Sydney a second time. Stevens asked him to pick up a backpack from a man who was going to meet him at a particular location on Parramatta Road, near a kebab shop. YBS was then to drive back to Brisbane to deliver it. He drove down to Sydney, picked it up and drove it home. It weighed about two kilograms.[6][6]AB 372-373. YBS explained why he did it: “At the start of our conversations I thought I might be able to work with his race team”.[7][7]AB 373. Stevens asked him if he could sell some ecstasy pills. He told Stevens that he had a friend (Kieran Brown) who could move large quantities of ecstasy pills. Stevens wanted to meet Brown, so he introduced them.[8][8]AB 486.The pill press Stevens spoke about bringing a pill press up from Sydney, to make more tablets.[9] YBS saw it when it arrived on the back of a ute. He described calls he received from Stevens about the pill press:“The only phone call I got between when I actually saw the pill press and the conversation when [Brown], [Stevens] and myself were at [Stevens’] house at Burpengary, [Stevens] rang me to say that … the ute that was bringing the pill press up … was out of registration and the police had pulled it over and the pill press was on the back and he was getting quite abusive at me because the car was out of registration because I’d borrowed it a couple of days prior before the pill press was coming up. … I think it was around Newcastle …[10] Then he said the car couldn’t be moved from the location on the side of the road until it was registered, and then the next thing … he rang me to say that the car had then been registered and they were allowed to move the car and the girl continued driving up towards Queensland”.[11][9]AB 374.[10]AB 375.[11]AB 375.

Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The applicant had a number of factors which were taken into account in mitigating his sentence. The first was the absence of any offending since his arrest in February 2009. As a result of the publicity of his arrest, loans were called in and that resulted in the sale of assets with losses that might not otherwise have occurred. The applicant was unable to proceed with the production of a television show which he had commenced prior to his arrest. He had written a letter to the judge referring to the hardships his family had suffered and would suffer. However his Honour opined that that could not weigh greatly in determining the sentence. The learned sentencing judge also referred to evidence suggesting that he may have some health conditions including bipolar affective disorder and depression. His Honour said the major consideration in offending like this is the need for deterrence and the need to demonstrate that people who engage in trafficking activities will face very substantial terms of imprisonment.Parity considerations The leading High Court authority on the parity principle is Lowe v The Queen.[369] The basis for the principle is set out in the judgment of Mason J:[370]“Just as consistency in punishment – a reflection of the notion of equal justice – is a fundamental element in any rational and fair system of criminal justice, so inconsistency in punishment, because it is regarded as a badge of unfairness and unequal treatment under the law, is calculated to lead to an erosion of public confidence in the integrity of the administration of justice. It is for this reason that the avoidance and elimination of unjustifiable discrepancy in sentencing is a matter of abiding importance to the administration of justice and to the community.”[369](1984) 154 CLR 606; [1984] HCA 46.[370]At 610-611. The effect of this principle on sentence appeals was set out by Mason J at 613-614:“… a court of appeal is entitled to intervene when there is a manifest discrepancy such as to engender a justifiable sense of grievance, by reducing a sentence, which is not excessive or inappropriate considered apart from the discrepancy, to the point where it might be regarded as inadequate.” The parity principle was further explained by the High Court in Postiglione v The Queen[371] where Dawson and Gaudron JJ held:[372]“The parity principle … is an aspect of equal justice. Equal justice requires that like should be treated alike but that, if there are relevant differences, due allowances should be made for them. In the case of co-offenders, different sentences may reflect different degrees of culpability or their different circumstances. If so, the notion of equal justice is not violated. On some occasions, different sentences may indicate that one or other of them is infected with error. Ordinarily, correction of the error will result in there being a due proportion between the sentences and there will then be equal justice. However, the parity principle, as identified and expounded in Lowe v The Queen, recognises that equal justice requires that, as between co-offenders, there should not be a marked disparity which gives rise to ‘a justifiable sense of grievance’. If there is, the sentence in issue shall be reduced, notwithstanding that it is otherwise appropriate and within the permissible range of sentencing options.Discrepancy or disparity is not simply a question of the imposition of different sentences for the same offence. Rather, it is a question of due proportion between those sentences, that being a matter to be determined having regard to the different circumstances of the co-offenders in question and their different degrees of criminality.” (citations omitted)[373][371](1997) 189 CLR 295; [1997] HCA 26.[372]At 301-302.[373]See also Green v The Queen (2011) 244 CLR 462.