R v Rahme

Case [2004] NSWCCA 233


NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL

CITATION:      Regina v Charbel Rahme [2004]  NSWCCA 233 revised - 28/07/2004

FILE NUMBER(S):
60364/03

HEARING DATE(S):               16 April 2004

JUDGMENT DATE: 14/07/2004

PARTIES:
Regina
Charbel Rahme

JUDGMENT OF:       Sully J James J Hulme J   

LOWER COURT JURISDICTION: District Court

LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S):          02 /11/ 0426

LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER:     Woods DCJ

COUNSEL:
P. Ingram - Crown
P. Byrne SC/G. Brady - Appellant

SOLICITORS:
S. Kavanagh - Crown
Phillip Stewart - Appellant

CATCHWORDS:
Sexual intercourse with child - child  prostitution - detaining for advantage - unreasonable verdicts - inconsistent verdicts - evidence of previous sexual experience or activity of complainant -  Criminal Procedure Act s 105 (now s 293) - probative value of evidence

LEGISLATION CITED:
Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW)
Crimes Act 1900 (NSW)
Evidence Act 1995 (NSW)

DECISION:

  1. Appeals against the appellant's convictions on counts 1, 3 and 7 allowed, the convictions on those counts set aside and quashed and verdicts of acquittal entered
    (2)  Appeals against the appellant's convictions on counts 4 and 5 allowed, the convictions on those counts set aside but there be a new trial of the appellant on counts 4 and 5.

JUDGMENT:

IN THE COURT OF
CRIMINAL APPEAL

60364/03

SULLY J
JAMES J
HULME J

14 July 2004

REGINA   v   CHARBEL RAHME

Judgment

SULLY J:

Introduction

  1. In March 2003 the appellant, Mr. Rahme, stood trial in the District Court at Sydney before his Honour Judge Woods QC and a jury. He was presented for trial upon an indictment containing seven counts.

  2. Count 1 charged that between about 4 January 2001 and 8 April 2001 he had sexual intercourse with a named complainant N, a child then between the ages of 10 years and 16 years, namely of the age of 15 years. Count 2 charged that between the same dates he had supplied a prohibited drug, namely cocaine, to the same complainant. Count 3 charged that between the same dates he coerced N, being then aged 15 years, to participate in an act of child prostitution with a person whose name is unknown. Count 4 charged that between the same dates he received certain money knowing that it was derived from an act of child prostitution. Count 5 charged that between the same dates he was a person capable of exercising lawful control over certain premises at Rockdale in which the complainant N, then being aged 15 years, participated in an act of child prostitution. Count 6 charged that between the same dates he assaulted the complainant N occasioning to her actual bodily harm. Count 7 charged that between the same dates he detained the complainant N with intent to hold her for his advantage.

  3. The offence charged in Count 1 attracted upon conviction a statutory maximum penalty of imprisonment for 8 years. The offences charged in Counts 2, 3 and 4 each attracted upon conviction a statutory maximum penalty of imprisonment for 10 years. The offence charged in Count 5 attracted upon conviction a…

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AGLC
R v Rahme [2004] NSWCCA 233
Case
[2004] NSWCCA 233
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of R v Rahme, the appellant was convicted on multiple counts related to child prostitution, drug supply, and detaining a person for advantage. The Court of Appeal was tasked with examining the appellant's claims that the verdicts were unreasonable and inconsistent. The appellant argued that the verdicts on counts 1, 3, 4, 5, and 7 were unreasonable and unsupported by the evidence, and that the verdicts on counts 3 and 7 were inconsistent with the not guilty verdicts on counts 2 and 6, respectively.

The court considered whether the verdicts were unreasonable and if there were any inconsistencies within the verdicts. Counsel for the appellant contended that the verdicts of guilt on all counts except count 2 and count 6 were unreasonable, as there was insufficient evidence to support them. The court also needed to determine if the guilty verdict on count 3 was inconsistent with the not guilty verdict on count 2, and whether the guilty verdict on count 7 was inconsistent with the not guilty verdict on count 6.

The court found that the appellant's convictions on counts 1, 3, 4, and 5 were quashed and a new trial ordered for those counts. The conviction on count 7 was also quashed, and a judgment of acquittal was entered in its place. The court concluded that the verdicts on counts 1, 3, 4, and 5 were unreasonable and that the verdict on count 7 was inconsistent with the verdict on count 6. As a result, the court quashed the convictions on counts 1, 3, 4, and 5 and ordered a new trial. The conviction on count 7 was quashed and a judgment of acquittal was entered in its place.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

SULLY J
Having regard to the conclusions to which I have come on the conviction appeals, I do not think that it would be appropriate to make any particular examination of these grounds.Conclusions and Orders I am of the opinion that the Court should make the following orders:[1]That the appellant’s conviction upon Count 7 of the indictment and the sentence passed pursuant to such conviction be quashed; and that in lieu there be entered judgment of acquittal on that count.[2]That the appeals against the appellant’s convictions on Counts 1, 3, 4 and 5 of the indictment be allowed; that those convictions be quashed and the sentences passed pursuant respectively to them be set aside; and that there be an order for a new trial of the appellant upon those counts JAMES J: I have had the advantage of reading in draft the judgment of Sully J. I agree with much of what his Honour has written but there are parts of his Honour’s judgment with which I am, respectfully, unable to agree. His Honour’s judgment relieves me of the need to set out in this judgment many matters which are fully and appropriately dealt with in his Honour’s judgment and I can turn immediately to the grounds of appeal against conviction.1.That the verdicts of guilty were unreasonable and unsupportable by the evidence.2.That the verdict of guilty in relation to count 3 was inconsistent with a verdict of not guilty on count 2.3.That the verdict of guilty in relation to count 7 was inconsistent with a verdict of not guilty on count 6.4. That the verdicts of guilty were inconsistent. These four grounds of appeal are interrelated and a number of the submissions which were made on the hearing of the appeal related to both the first ground of appeal and to one or more of the second, third and fourth grounds of appeal. The various counts in the indictment are summarised in Sully J’s judgment. I will simply note that count 1 in the indictment was a charge of sexual intercourse with a child between the ages of ten and sixteen, count 2 in the indictment was a charge of supplying a prohibited drug (cocaine), count 3 in the indictment was a charge under s 91D of the Crimes Act of causing a child to participate in an act of child prostitution, count 4 in the indictment was a charge under s 91E of the Crimes Act of receiving money knowing that it was derived from an act of child prostitution, count 5 in the indictment was a charge under s 91F of the Crimes Act of being a person capable of exercising lawful control over premises in which a child participated in an act of child prostitution, count 6 in the indictment was a charge of assault occasioning actual bodily harm and count 7 was a charge under s 90A of the Crimes Act (since repealed) of detaining a person with intent to hold her for advantage. It was submitted by counsel for the appellant that the verdicts of guilty on all of the counts on which the appellant was found guilty, that is counts 1, 3, 4, 5 and 7, were unreasonable and could not be supported having regard to the evidence. Alternatively, it was submitted that the verdicts of guilty on all of counts 1, 3 and 7 were unreasonable and unsupportable. In accordance with the second ground of appeal, it was submitted that the verdict of guilty on count 3 was inconsistent with the verdict of not guilty on count 2 and, in accordance with the third ground of appeal, that the verdict of guilty on count 7 was inconsistent with the verdict of not guilty on count 6.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: SULLY J

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