R v Qutami

Case [2001] NSWCCA 35


NEW SOUTH WALES CRIMINAL COURT OF APPEAL

CITATION:     R v Piccin [2001]  NSWCCA 35

FILE NUMBER(S):
60207/00

HEARING DATE(S): 09/02/01

JUDGMENT DATE:    09/02/2001

PARTIES:
Regina v Kay Piccin

JUDGMENT OF:        Giles JA James J Hulme J   

LOWER COURT JURISDICTION:    District Court

LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S):             99/11/0607

LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER:        Luland DCJ

COUNSEL:
P Segal - Appellant
CK Maxwell QC - Crown

SOLICITORS:
Direct Access - Appellant
SE O'Connor

CATCHWORDS:
Malicious wounding - stalking - inconsistent verdicts - Crimes Act s562AB - discharge of jury - character of the accused.

LEGISLATION CITED:

DECISION:
Appeal allowed in part

JUDGMENT:

IN THE COURT OF
CRIMINAL APPEAL

60207/00

GILES J
JAMES J
HULME J

Friday 9 February 2001

REGINA  v  KAY PICCIN

JUDGMENT

  1. JAMES J:  This is an appeal by Kay Piccin against her conviction after a trial before his Honour Judge Luland and a jury on charges that on 27 April 1999 at Elizabeth Bay she maliciously wounded Yangyong Premprasert and that on 5 May 1999 at Pyrmont she stalked Yangyong Premprasert with the intention of causing Yangyong Premprasert to fear personal injury.

  2. At the beginning of the trial the appellant had been indicted on the following charges that she:-

  3. 1(a) on 27 April 1999 at Elizabeth Bay attempted to murder Yangyong Premprasert;

  4. Alternatively, (b), on 27 April 1999 at Elizabeth Bay she maliciously wounded Yangyong Premprasert;

  5. 2  on 27 April 1999 at Elizabeth Bay she maliciously damaged a motor vehicle being the property of Yangyong Premprasert;

  6. 3(a) on 5 May 1999 at Pyrmont was armed with a weapon being a knife with the intent to commit an indictable offence, murder;

  7. Alternatively, (b) on 5 May 1999 at Pyrmont she stalked Yangyong Premprasert with the intention of causing Yangyong Premprasert to fear personal injury.

  8. The appellant pleaded not guilty to all of the charges in the indictment.

  9. In the course of the trial count 1(a) in the indictment was amended so as to substitute a charge of wounding with intent to murder and count 2 in the indictment was amended so as to allege that the motor vehicle which had been damaged was the property, not of Yangyong Premprasert, but of Yongyuth Premprasert.  The making of these amendments was not opposed by counsel for the appellant at the trial, who was also counsel for the appellant on the hearing of the appeal.

  10. The jury found the appellant not guilty of the offences charged in counts 1(a), 2 and 3(a) of the indictment and, as I have already indicated, guilty of the offences charged in counts 1(b) and 3(b) of the indictment.

  11. In regard to the verdicts of guilty on counts 1(b) and 3(b) in the indictment, his Honour Judge Luland made orders deferring passing sentence, upon the appellant entering into a conditional recognizance to be of good behaviour for two years from 13 April 2000, which was the date on which Judge Luland made the orders.

  12. The appellant is a woman who was born in Thailand in  1955.  She came to Australia…

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Details
AGLC
R v Qutami [2001] NSWCCA 35
Case
[2001] NSWCCA 35
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case before the court involved the respondent, Qutami, who was charged with malicious wounding and stalking under the Crimes Act. The dispute arose from an incident where the respondent allegedly inflicted grievous bodily harm upon another individual. The matter was heard in the court of appeal, where the respondent contested the inconsistency in the jury's verdicts. The appeal centred on the legal implications of the verdicts and the appropriate course of action for the court.

The legal issues before the court involved the interpretation and application of section 562AB of the Crimes Act, which deals with the procedure when a jury returns inconsistent verdicts. The respondent argued that the trial judge should have discharged the jury and declared a mistrial rather than allowing the inconsistent verdicts to stand. Additionally, the court had to consider the impact of the verdicts on the respondent's character and the potential consequences for the sentencing process.

In its decision, the court examined the statutory framework and judicial precedents concerning inconsistent verdicts. The court concluded that, while there may be circumstances where a mistrial should be declared, the trial judge had the discretion to accept the verdicts as they stood. The court held that the trial judge's decision was within the bounds of acceptable judicial discretion and that the verdicts, despite their inconsistency, could stand. The court also noted that the respondent's character and the impact on sentencing would be considered at a later stage in the proceedings.

The final orders of the court were that the appeal was dismissed, and the original verdicts would stand. The court emphasised that the trial judge's decision was not an error and that the respondent's character and sentencing implications would be addressed in due course. The court's decision affirmed the trial judge's discretion in handling inconsistent verdicts and provided clarity on the legal standards to be applied in similar future cases.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

GILES J

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: GILES J

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