R v Quach

Case [2002] NSWCCA 519


NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL

CITATION:     REGINA v QUACH [2002]  NSWCCA 519

FILE NUMBER(S):
60311/02

HEARING DATE(S):    29/11/02

JUDGMENT DATE:      20/12/2002

PARTIES:
Regina
Tan Gai Quach

JUDGMENT OF:        Spigelman CJ Sully J James J   

LOWER COURT JURISDICTION:       District Court

LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S):     01/11/0930

LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER:   Andrew DCJ

COUNSEL:
A J Bellanto QC / P Byrne SC (Appellant)
D M L Woodburne (Crown)

SOLICITORS:
Borak & Co (Appellant)
S E O'Connor (Crown)

CATCHWORDS:
CRIMINAL LAW
EVIDENCE
Admissibility of evidence of prior criminal conduct where not adduced for tendency purpose
Relationship between propensity evidence at common law and tendency evidence under Evidence Act 1995
Where accused was subject of telephone intercepts said to reveal prior heroin supplies
Where accused charged with supplying heroin
CRIMINAL LAW
DIRECTIONS TO JURY
Whether directions to jury about evidence of prior criminal conduct were adequate to prevent tendency reasoning
Where directions were given in terms requested by accused's counsel
CRIMINAL LAW
EVIDENCE
Improperly obtained admissions
Discretion  to admit ERISP
Where answers obtained after accused claimed right to silence
Where caution not given until part way through interview
Whether cause to believe truth of answers adversely affected

LEGISLATION CITED:
Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act 1985
Evidence Act 1995

DECISION:
Appeal dismissed

JUDGMENT:

- 42 -

IN THE COURT OF
CRIMINAL APPEAL

60311/02

SPIGELMAN CJ
SULLY J
JAMES J

Friday 20 December 2002

REGINA  v  Tan Gia QUACH

Judgment

  1. SPIGELMAN CJ:  I have had the benefit of reading the judgment of Sully J in draft. I agree generally with his Honour’s reasons but wish to add some observations on the admissibility of the intercepted telephone calls. The submissions in this respect were expressed in terms of “tendency reasoning”, invoking s97 of the Evidence Act 1995. A parallel submission could perhaps have been based on “coincidence”, invoking s98. Nothing turns on the distinction and I will focus on s97 as the submissions did.

  2. The Appellant’s submissions proceeded on the basis that the intercepts were only admissible as “contextual background” to prove an association between the Appellant and Phuong Tan Le.  It was submitted to this Court, but not to the trial judge, that for that purpose parts of the conversations could have been admitted without any reference to drugs.  A distinction was suggested between the use of the tapes to establish the fact and frequency of conversations between Le and the Respondent, the relevance of which was conceded, and the content of the conversations.

  3. The trial judge was not invited to undertake any such task of editing.  Nor were the individual conversations analysed separately with a view to a separate decision being made on each of them for any purpose including, for example, the separate application to each of s135 or s137 of the Evidence Act 1995. Experienced counsel objected to the entirety of the tapes, including the evidence of voice identification.

  4. The more refined analysis suggested, but not developed, in submissions to this Court was never attempted below.  In any event, there are parts…

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Details
AGLC
R v Quach [2002] NSWCCA 519
Case
[2002] NSWCCA 519
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of R v Quach involved the appellant, who was charged with supplying heroin. The primary dispute was the admissibility of certain evidence, including telephone intercepts revealing prior heroin supplies and admissions made during an interview with the police. The High Court of Australia reviewed the decisions of the lower courts to determine whether the evidence was properly admitted.

The legal issues before the court included whether the evidence of prior criminal conduct was admissible when not adduced for a tendency purpose and how the common law regarding propensity evidence related to tendency evidence under the Evidence Act 1995. Another issue was whether the interview evidence was improperly obtained, particularly as it was obtained after the appellant claimed his right to silence and was not fully cautioned until partway through the interview. The court also needed to decide whether the trial judge's directions to the jury about the evidence of prior criminal conduct were adequate to prevent any tendency reasoning.

The High Court found that the trial judge was entitled to conclude that the evidence was not unfairly obtained and that there was no impropriety which would outweigh its admissibility. The court held that the trial judge’s directions to the jury were sufficient to prevent any tendency reasoning. The court reasoned that despite the delay in giving the caution, the appellant understood that his answers could be used in court and had acknowledged that his responses were given of his own free will. Therefore, the evidence was properly admitted, and the appellant's challenge to the admissibility of the evidence was dismissed.

The High Court upheld the conviction, confirming that the evidence in question was properly admitted and that the trial judge's directions to the jury were adequate. The court found no basis to order a new trial or to quash the conviction.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The learned trial Judge, in ruling upon the objections to the admissibility of evidence of this particular interview with the appellant, adverted to sections 85, 90 and 138 of the Evidence Act and concluded:“In the circumstances in which these admissions were obtained, I am not satisfied that it would be unfair to the accused to use that evidence (section 90), and I am not satisfied that there was impropriety which would outweigh the desirability of admitting the evidence. I am not satisfied of any impropriety or unfairness such that it was likely that the truth of the admissions was adversely affected.” When the principles which I have previously extracted from the decisions in Plevac and in Clarke are applied fairly to the whole of the relevant circumstances as I have previously canvassed them, then, in my opinion, it was well open to the trial Judge to reach the conclusions which I have quoted from his Honour’s relevant ruling. In my opinion Ground 3 has not been established.Ground 4 The ground is:“The learned trial judge erred in admitting the ERISP interview of 13 July 2000 at Balmain Police Station.” It is convenient to begin by quoting the relevant ruling of the trial Judge:“The accused was interviewed at the Balmain Police Station on 13 July 2000 ……………….. . Objection is taken to its admission on the basis that it was not obtained in the exercise of a free will to speak or remain silent. That objection is based on the following:‘Q.46 Just, um, we’ve just realised because of the confusion of the allegation when we started the interview, I didn’t give you your official caution, and I must give that. So in relation to the questions I ask you, you’re not obliged to say anything unless you wish to do so, but whatever you say or do will be recorded on this device and may later be used in evidence. Do you understand that?A. Yes, that’s correct. I had to tell you from the beginning to the end what has happened.’The accused agreed that he had previously been cautioned in the interview of 2 May 2000, and he was advised that because he had been asked questions prior to the caution at question 46, and it was put to him if those questions could be re-asked now that he had been cautioned, and he said that he had answered those questions and he understood that they could be used in court.The accused was subsequently cautioned throughout the interview. At the end of the interview he declined to answer anymore questions. He acknowledged that the answers were given of his own free will and he said that the two police officers were very kind and very gentle. I think that the absence of a caution at the beginning of the record of interview was remedied by what transpired at question 46 and the answer thereafter, that is, that the caution was given and the offer made to go through the earlier questions again, which the accused declined to do.I do not think that this interview was unfairly obtained (section 90); I do not find any circumstances which would suggest that there was any conduct such as to make it likely that the truth of the admissions was adversely affected (section 85). I think the questions asked about the money located at his house were relevant, as were the questions in relation to various phone calls. I think that that is relevant evidence which should properly go to the jury.”

Decision

Reasons for decision

SPIGELMAN CJ SULLY J

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: SPIGELMAN CJ SULLY J

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