SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
R v OAC [2024] QCA 52
PARTIES:
R
v
OAC
(applicant)FILE NO/S:
CA No 40 of 2023
DC No 1509 of 2021
DC No 2375 of 2021
DC No 116 of 2023
DC No 199 of 2023DIVISION:
Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING:
Sentence Application
ORIGINATING COURT:
District Court at Brisbane – Date of Sentence: 15 February 2023 (Kent KC DCJ)
DELIVERED ON:
9 April 2024
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
20 March 2024
JUDGES:
Mullins P, Morrison JA and Brown J
ORDERS:
1. Application for leave to appeal refused.
2. The Registrar of the Court of Appeal is directed to amend the District Court order sheet by adding in respect of Counts 19 and 20 the words “Serious Violent Offence Declaration s 161A, s 161B Penalties and Sentences Act 1992” and “Declare the conviction on each of counts 19 and 20 to be a conviction of a serious violent offence”: and this amendment is to be reflected in the verdict and judgment record issued consequent upon this appeal.
CATCHWORDS:
CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE – GROUNDS FOR INTERFERENCE – SENTENCE MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE OR INADEQUATE – where the applicant pleaded guilty to 32 counts on three separate indictments, and a summary charge sheet – where the bulk of the offences related to physical domestic violence perpetrated against the applicant’s partner, including rape, strangulation in a domestic setting and torture – where the applicant was sentenced to a head sentence of nine years imprisonment for the offence of rape, with lesser concurrent terms of imprisonment for the remaining counts – where serious violent offence declarations were made in respect of the rape and torture offences – whether the judge erred by impermissibly taking into account uncharged acts – whether the sentence was manifestly excessive
R v Free; Ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) (2020) 4 QR 80; [2020] QCA 58, cited
R v Nagy [2004] 1 Qd R 63; [2003] QCA 175, cited
R v Neumann; Ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) [2007] 1 Qd R 53; [2005] QCA 362, cited
R v Pham (2015) 256 CLR 550; [2015] HCA 39, citedCOUNSEL:
M J Hynes for the applicant
C W Wallis for the respondentSOLICITORS:
Gatenby Criminal Lawyers for the applicant
Director of Public Prosecutions (Queensland) for the respondent
MULLINS P: I agree with Morrison JA.
MORRISON JA: The applicant pleaded guilty to 32 counts on three separate indictments, and a summary charge sheet. The bulk of the offences related to physical domestic violence perpetrated against the applicant’s partner between January and August 2019. The most serious counts, 13 in total, occurred within a window of 16 hours over two days. The applicant tortured his partner by assaulting, choking, and raping her.
The first indictment (1509/21) concerned 21 counts, all but two of which were charged as domestic violence offences. Those counts may be summarised as follows:[1]
[1]Those counts which were domestic violence offences are marked…
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- R v Oac [2024] QCA 52
- Case
- [2024] QCA 52
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court held that the sentencing judge did not improperly consider uncharged acts. The facts in question were part of the background information provided to the court, and the sentencing judge had clearly distinguished between those facts and those relevant to the specific counts being sentenced. Furthermore, the court noted that the sentencing judge did not reference those facts when determining the sentences, suggesting they had no impact on the outcome. The court also found that the sentence was not manifestly excessive, as it reflected the severity of the applicant's crimes and was consistent with sentences imposed in similar cases.
The court refused the application for leave to appeal and directed the Registrar of the Court of Appeal to amend the District Court order sheet and the verdict and judgment record to correctly reflect that counts 19 and 20 were declared as serious violent offences. The court's decision was based on the reasoning that there was no realistic prospect that the sentencing judge had misapplied the principles of sentencing, and thus no grounds for appellate intervention existed.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Application for leave to appeal refused.
2. The Registrar of the Court of Appeal is directed to amend the District Court order sheet by adding in respect of Counts 19 and 20 the words “Serious Violent Offence Declaration s 161A, s 161B Penalties and Sentences Act 1992” and “Declare the conviction on each of counts 19 and 20 to be a conviction of a serious violent offence”: and this amendment is to be reflected in the verdict and judgment record issued consequent upon this appeal.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Fourthly, when the sentencing judge then dealt with each count, the count number was used as a point of reference; as in “count 1”, “count 2” and so forth. Nothing more was said as to the period or conduct in the impugned passage.Consideration For several reasons I am unable to accept the applicant’s submissions on the ground. First, the impugned facts were simply part of the background, and expressly confined as such by the Crown. The statement that “that information is just by way of background” expresses the limitation. Then, the statement, “The offending for which he is to be sentenced is from paragraph 19 of the statement of facts”, makes it plain what facts are relevant, and what are not. They provided a context to the making of the temporary protection Orders, and the applicant’s convictions for contravention of those orders. At no time did the Crown suggest that they were relevant to the offending conduct on each count. Secondly, the defence did not object to the presence of those facts in the schedules, either at the point of tender, or later. Indeed, the defence provided the schedules to Dr Ellis-Smith for the purpose of compiling a pre-sentence report,[39] the report recorded the applicant’s agreement to the facts in the schedules,[40] and referred to some of the 2013/2014 history.[41] Thus the defence made use of the full schedules for their own forensic purposes.[39]AB 147, paragraph 2.3.[40]Paragraph 5.1.[41]Paragraphs 4.1 and 6.4-6.5. Thirdly, in my view, the sentencing judge indicated that he understood that the impugned passage was not part of the facts relevant to sentencing for the specific counts. His Honour referred to the applicant’s and complainant’s cohabitation in 2013 and noted that the description of the applicant’s controlling, abusive and violent behaviour, and use of drugs, in that period were what “the complainant says”. That marked a distinction between those matters and those relevant to the actual offending. Fourthly, after the impugned passage nothing more was said by the sentencing judge as to those facts when assessing the offending conduct and the appropriate sentences. If they had an impact at all one would have expected to see some reference to them. That, in my view, suggests that they had no impact on the sentences. Fifthly, the facts in the impugned passage provided context. These were domestic violence offences and that rendered the background relevant.[42] For the reasons expressed above there is no basis to think that the matters in that passage were taken into account in the sentencing.[43][42]R v CCU [2022] QCA 92, [47]-[49].[43]R v Tahir; Ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) [2013] QCA 294, [15]. I do not consider there is a realistic prospect that the impugned passage was taken into account, or that it may have led to the imposition of a higher sentence.[44][44]R v Stable (a pseudonym) (2020) 6 QR 617, [22]. This ground fails.Ground 2 - sentence manifestly excessive In R v Pham[45] French CJ, Keane and Nettle JJ said:“Appellate intervention on the ground of manifest excessiveness or inadequacy is not warranted unless, having regard to all of the relevant sentencing factors, including the degree to which the impugned sentence differs from sentences that have been imposed in comparable cases, the appellate court is driven to conclude that there must have been some misapplication of principle.”[45](2015) 256 CLR 550, at [28]. (Citations omitted).Approach of the learned sentencing judge