SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
R v Cane [2023] QCA 199
PARTIES:
R
v
CANE, Mark
(applicant)FILE NO/S:
CA No 199 of 2022
DC No 555 of 2020DIVISION:
Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING:
Sentence Application
ORIGINATING COURT:
District Court at Cairns – Date of Sentence: 30 May 2022 (Fantin DCJ)
DELIVERED ON:
4 October 2023
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
24 August 2023
JUDGES:
Mullins P and Boddice JA and Cooper J
ORDERS:
1. Leave to appeal be granted.
2. The appeal against sentence be allowed.
3. The sentence below for the offence of kidnapping for ransom imposed on 30 May 2022 be varied by substituting “five years” for “six years”.
4. All other orders made by the sentencing judge are confirmed.
CATCHWORDS:
CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE – GROUNDS FOR INTERFERENCE – JUDGE ACTED ON WRONG PRINCIPLE – where the applicant pleaded guilty to one count of kidnapping for ransom and one count of making a false declaration – where the sentence application only concerns the sentence imposed for the kidnapping for ransom count – where the applicant was sentenced in respect of that count to six years imprisonment with an immediate parole eligibility date, to be served cumulatively on any other term of imprisonment he was liable to serve – where the kidnapping for ransom count was contained on a three count indictment which included a count of common assault and a count of assault occasioning bodily harm, in company, alleged to have been inflicted upon the complainant during the commission of the kidnapping for ransom – where the Crown entered a nolle prosequi in respect of the two latter counts on the basis the agreed statement of facts on sentence would refer to acts of violence inflicted upon the complainant – where the applicant was sentenced on the kidnapping for ransom count on the basis he had committed those acts of violence – whether the sentencing judge erred in sentencing the applicant on the basis of uncharged acts
STATUTES – ACTS OF PARLIAMENT – INTERPRETATION – GENERAL APPROACHES TO INTERPRETATION – where the sentence hearing was complicated by the proper construction of the words “any other term of imprisonment the offender is liable to serve” in s 156A(2) of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) – where the applicant committed the kidnapping for ransom whilst on parole for possessing dangerous drugs and related offending – where the applicant also committed an offence of dangerous operation of a motor vehicle after the kidnapping for ransom – where that offence was dealt with in the Magistrates Court prior to the sentence the subject of appeal – where the applicant submits the triggering event to activate the mandatory cumulative term of imprisonment under s 156A was the commission of a schedule 1 offence whilst on parole and that the words “liable to serve” relate to the liability to serve the sentence that is the triggering event – whether, on a re-exercise of…
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- AGLC
- R v Cane [2023] QCA 199
- Case
- [2023] QCA 199
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were whether the sentencing judge erred in sentencing the applicant based on uncharged acts and whether the sentencing judge correctly interpreted the phrase "any other term of imprisonment the offender is liable to serve". The court considered whether the sentencing judge should have taken into account the uncharged acts of violence against the complainant and whether the mandatory cumulative term of imprisonment under s 156A was correctly applied.
The court found that the sentencing judge did err in sentencing the applicant on the basis of uncharged acts. The court held that a judge cannot take into account circumstances of aggravation which would have warranted a conviction for a more serious offence. The court also found that the phrase "any other term of imprisonment the offender is liable to serve" in s 156A(2) of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) should be interpreted to mean the triggering event to activate the mandatory cumulative term of imprisonment was the commission of a schedule 1 offence whilst on parole. The court held that the applicant should serve the kidnapping for ransom sentence cumulatively with the sentences imposed for both the dangerous operation of a motor vehicle and possessing dangerous drugs.
The court granted leave to appeal, allowed the appeal against sentence and varied the sentence below for the offence of kidnapping for ransom imposed on 30 May 2022 by substituting "five years" for "six years". All other orders made by the sentencing judge were confirmed.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Leave to appeal be granted.
2. The appeal against sentence be allowed.
3. The sentence below for the offence of kidnapping for ransom imposed on 30 May 2022 be varied by substituting “five years” for “six years”.
4. All other orders made by the sentencing judge are confirmed.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The sentencing judge concluded:“The Crown submitted for a head sentence of six years and six months on the kidnapping offence, after moderation down to reflect the significant period you’ve spent in custody that is not declarable and to take into account considerations of totality, having regard to what you may have received if you had been sentenced at the same time as the dangerous operation of a motor vehicle offence. The Crown also submitted you should receive an immediate parole eligibility date and the Court should declare 68 days of presentence custody as time served under the sentence.Your barrister’s submissions were not, in the end, a significant distance apart. However it was submitted that the Court could moderate your sentence down to one of five to five years and six months imprisonment with an immediate parole eligibility date. He accepted that the Court could only declare 68 days of pre-sentence custody as time served under the sentence.The Crown also submitted that the sentence for the second offence of making a false declaration should be one of three months imprisonment to be served concurrently with all of that time declared as time served. So, in effect, the sentence for the making of the false declaration will be subsumed in the head sentence on the kidnapping.The sentencing exercise is not one of mathematical precision. In my view, your sentence would ordinarily be higher than your co-offenders for the reasons identified. On the other hand, it must be moderated down to take into account the long period you’ve served in custody that is not declarable and for considerations of totality. There would ordinarily be some elevation in it, however, to reflect the false declaration offence. I’m doing the best I can to balance those considerations which pull in different directions. I intend to fix a sentence of six years imprisonment on the kidnapping and set your parole eligibility date at tomorrow, which is 31 May 2022. You will be able to apply for parole immediately. When you will ultimately be released on parole will be up to the parole board.”Consideration As to the first ground of appeal, the applicant submits the sentencing judge erred in sentencing him on the basis of uncharged acts, being acts of violence against the complainant. In R v De Simoni (1981) 147 CLR 383, Gibbs CJ observed at [8]:“At first sight it might seem unlikely that the framers of the Code intended that an offender should be sentenced on the fictitious basis that no circumstances of aggravation existed when it is found by the trial judge that such a circumstance did exist, particularly when such a finding is based upon an unchallenged statement of facts made by the prosecutor after the offender has pleaded guilty. However, the general principle that the sentence imposed on an offender should take account of all of the circumstances of the offence is subject to a more fundamental and important principle, that no one should be punished for an offence of which he has not been convicted. Section 582 reflects this principle. The combined effect of the two principles, so far as it is relevant for present purposes, is that a judge, in imposing sentence, is entitled to consider all the conduct of the accused, including that which would aggravate the offence, but cannot take into account circumstances of aggravation which would have warranted a conviction for a more serious offence.”