SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
R v Ngwira [2017] QCA 294
PARTIES:
R
v
NGWIRA, Musa Brandon
(appellant)FILE NO/S:
CA No 257 of 2016
SC No 92 of 2016DIVISION:
Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING:
Appeal against Conviction
ORIGINATING COURT:
Supreme Court at Cairns – Date of Conviction: 7 September 2016 (Henry J)
DELIVERED ON:
1 December 2017
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
25 August 2017
JUDGES:
Sofronoff P and Philippides JA and Flanagan J
ORDER:
Appeal dismissed.
CATCHWORDS:
CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – PARTICULAR GROUNDS OF APPEAL – MISDIRECTION AND NON-DIRECTION – EFFECT OF MISDIRECTION OR NON-DIRECTION – where the appellant was found guilty by a jury of one count of rape and one count of murder – where the trial judge directed the jury in relation to accident, and in particular s 23(1A) of the Criminal Code – where accident was raised and the death did not result because of defect, weakness or abnormality – where counsel for the defendant at trial did not seek redirections at trial – whether the direction on accident given by the learned trial judge in the summing up was an error
CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – VERDICT UNREASONABLE OR INSUPPORTABLE HAVING REGARD TO EVIDENCE – APPEAL DISMISSED – where the prosecution case in respect of the rape charge was circumstantial – where forensic and other circumstantial evidence was presented – where the appellant contended that the circumstantial case of rape was answered by direct evidence of the appellant – whether it was reasonably open to the jury on the whole of the evidence to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant had raped the deceased – whether it was reasonably open to the jury to be satisfied that penetration for the rape charge had occurred prior to the deceased’s death – whether time of death could be resolved on the evidence – whether the evidence could sufficiently establish that penetration occurred and that it occurred while the deceased was still alive
CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – PARTICULAR GROUNDS OF APPEAL – MISDIRECTION AND NON-DIRECTION – CONSIDERATION OF SUMMING UP AS A WHOLE – where the learned trial judge did not direct the jury that they must consider each count separately and consider only the evidence on each count in relation to that count – where the appellant contends that the learned trial judge erred in failing to give a separate consideration warning – where counsel for the appellant did not seek redirections at trial – where the elements of the offences are different – whether there was a substantial miscarriage of justice – whether there was a risk that the jury would use a conviction on one count to impermissibly reason guilt on the other – whether the direction was given in essence by the trial judge – whether the judge established that the verdicts of the jury did not need to be the same
Criminal Code (Qld), s 23(1A), s 668E(1)
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- R v Ngwira [2017] QCA 294
- Case
- [2017] QCA 294
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the first ground of appeal, whether the trial judge's direction on accident was an error. The court held that the direction was not an error, as the judge's summing up as a whole did not result in a substantial miscarriage of justice. The court also considered the second ground of appeal, whether the jury's verdict on the charge of rape was unreasonable. The court held that the jury's verdict was open to them on the whole of the evidence, as the prosecution's case in respect of the rape charge was circumstantial, and it was reasonably open to the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant had raped the deceased. The court also considered the third ground of appeal, whether the trial judge failed to give a separate consideration warning to the jury. The court held that the trial judge did not err in failing to give a separate consideration warning, as the judge had directed the jury to consider each count separately and consider only the evidence on each count in relation to that count.
In conclusion, the appeal was dismissed. The court held that the trial judge's direction on accident was not an error, the jury's verdict on the charge of rape was open to them on the whole of the evidence, and the trial judge did not err in failing to give a separate consideration warning to the jury.
Orders
Orders of the court
Appeal dismissed.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The learned trial judge summarised the defence contentions as follows:“Even before you get to Mr Ngwira’s account of events, on the prosecution’s own case you should have some doubts about whether or not the rectal swab was actually detecting a DNA inside the rectum, or just DNA innocuously outside. You should have regard, also, to the limitations of the evidence in being able to establish beyond reasonable doubt whether she was alive or dead at the time the event happened, if it did happen, and over and above all that, the defence say, in any event you would either accept what Mr Ngwira says happened, which plainly was not rape or indecent interference with a corpse, or at least would be left in a state of reasonable doubt either way on the topic.”[100][100]AB 582.17-25.Consideration of ground 2 The appellant submits that the only evidence in relation to the rape was the presence of his DNA (with spermatozoa fraction) in the rectum of the deceased. The appellant submits that such circumstantial evidence is not sufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant penetrated the deceased’s anus with his penis or another object at any time.[101][101]Appellant’s Outline, [32]. The appellant acknowledges that “there was a powerful circumstantial Crown case for murder” but “the circumstantial case (for) rape was much less strong and was ‘answered by direct evidence from the appellant’”.[102][102]T1-2, lines 19-32. The appellant submits that the DNA fraction found in the deceased could have occurred by transfer when he “manhandled” the deceased into the shower to stage her suicide.[103] In the appellant’s submission, that possible transfer “wasn’t a circumstance that could be rejected on the state of the evidence”.[104] These submissions should not be accepted. They are difficult to reconcile with the appellant’s own evidence at trial that there was nothing which he did to the deceased that could have resulted in the transfer of his spermatozoa to her rectum.[105] Further the appellant’s spermatozoa was found in the deceased’s rectum but not in her vagina. As a result it was open to the jury to reject the suggestion that the appellant’s spermatozoa came to be in the rectum of the deceased as a result of transfer by operation of water from the shower. The prosecution’s version of events was the more likely given that on the appellant’s version he ejaculated into his underpants and never took them off. Further at the time of ejaculation, on the appellant’s version, the deceased was also still wearing her underwear.[103]T1-6, line 32.[104]T1-6, lines 37-38.[105]AB 437.46. As outlined in [26] above, the appellant conducted a Google search on 22 April 2014 for “how long does it take to get forensic DNA results in Australia”. The inference capable of being drawn from this Google search is that the appellant knew he had transferred some of his DNA to the deceased sufficient for it to be found. I accept the submission of the respondent that the jury were entitled, in considering the circumstantial case, to reasonably infer that the appellant’s semen was in the rectum of the deceased due to penetration and not by innocent transfer. Even on the appellant’s own version there had been sexual activity between him and the deceased, who did not scream until after that sexual activity occurred.[106] It was open to the jury not to accept the appellant’s evidence of consensual sexual activity. Such activity was inconsistent with the statements of the deceased to both Mr Daniel and Mr Bertucci to the effect that she found the appellant “creepy”. The fact that the deceased screamed is also inconsistent with consensual sexual activity.[106]Respondent’s Outline, [13(b)].