R v Miller

Case [2016] QCA 69

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

R v Miller [2016] QCA 69

PARTIES:

R
v
MILLER, David Jeffrey
(applicant)

FILE NO/S:

CA No 163 of 2012
DC No 3 of 2010

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

Appeal against Conviction

ORIGINATING COURT:


Supreme Court at Brisbane – Date of Conviction: 16 May 2012

DELIVERED ON:

24 March 2016

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

5 February 2016

JUDGES:

Holmes CJ and Morrison and Philip McMurdo JJA
Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court, each concurring as to the orders made

ORDER:

The appeal is dismissed.

CATCHWORDS:

CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – VERDICT UNREASONABLE OR INSUPPORTABLE HAVING REGARD TO EVIDENCE – APPEAL DISMISSED – where the appellant pleaded guilty at trial to manslaughter – where the plea was not accepted by the prosecutor – where the appellant was found guilty by a jury of murder – where in the early hours of 8 June 2008 the appellant went into the bedroom where his wife was sleeping and hit her on the head three times with a three kilogram log splitter, killing her – where the appellant intended to kill his wife – where the appellant and his wife had been convicted of drug possession and production and were facing jail time – where the appellant and his wife were greatly distressed at the prospect of being sent to prison – where the appellant alleged at trial that he and his wife had discussed ending their lives, and methods of doing so – where the appellant alleged at trial that whilst he intended to kill his wife, he did so as part of a suicide pact – where the appellant raised one issue at trial, namely that he suffered diminished responsibility when he killed his wife, due to his mental health – where three psychiatrists gave expert evidence at trial – where two of the experts found the appellant did not suffer diminished responsibility, and the third did – where the appellant challenges the conviction on the basis that it was not open to the jury to have accepted the evidence of the two psychiatrists who found he did not suffer diminished responsibility – whether the verdict was unreasonable or insupportable having regard to the evidence

Criminal Code (Qld), s 304A

Chayna v R (1993) 66 A Crim R 178, cited
M v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 487; [1994] HCA 63, followed
MFA v The Queen (2002) 213 CLR 606; [2002] HCA 53, followed
Morris v The Queen (1987) 163 CLR 454; [1987] HCA 50, followed
R v Biess [1967] Qd R 470
SKA v The Queen (2011) 243 CLR 400; [2011] HCA 13, followed

COUNSEL:

A J Glynn QC for the appellant (pro bono)
G J Cummings for the respondent

SOLICITORS:

No appearance for the appellant
Director of Public Prosecutions (Queensland) for the respondent

  1. HOLMES CJ:  I agree with the reasons of Morrison JA and the order he proposes.

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Details
AGLC
R v Miller [2016] QCA 69
Case
[2016] QCA 69
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of R v Miller, the appellant, who had been found guilty of murder, appealed against the conviction on the basis that the verdict was unreasonable or insupportable in light of the evidence presented. The appellant had pleaded guilty to manslaughter, which was not accepted by the prosecutor, leading to a jury trial where he was ultimately found guilty of murder. The incident in question involved the appellant fatally striking his sleeping wife with a log splitter. The appellant argued that he intended to kill his wife as part of a suicide pact and that he suffered from diminished responsibility due to his mental health.

The legal issues central to the appeal were whether the verdict was unreasonable or insupportable given the evidence, and specifically, whether it was open to the jury to reject the appellant's claim of diminished responsibility. The crux of the appeal hinged on the differing opinions of three expert psychiatrists who testified regarding the appellant's mental state. Two psychiatrists concluded that the appellant did not suffer from diminished responsibility, while the third psychiatrist opined that he did. The appellant contended that the jury should have been bound by the evidence of the psychiatrist who found he did suffer from diminished responsibility.

The court, however, held that it was within the jury's purview to weigh the evidence of all three psychiatrists and to accept the opinions of the two who found no diminished responsibility. The court assessed the entire body of evidence and determined that it was reasonable for the jury to conclude that the appellant was not suffering from diminished responsibility at the time of the offence. The court further noted that the jury was entitled to reject the appellant's version of events, particularly where it conflicted with his prior statements. Given the evidence, the court found that the conviction of murder was supported and that the verdict was not unreasonable or insupportable.

In conclusion, the appeal was dismissed, and the conviction of murder was upheld. The court's reasoning was grounded in the assessment that the jury was entitled to consider and weigh the conflicting expert opinions and that the evidence supported the conclusion that the appellant did not suffer from diminished responsibility.

Orders

Orders of the court

The appeal is dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

In his police interview Mr Miller said that driving into that tree was an accident, in that he had not selected that tree and did not intentionally drive into it.[37] Nonetheless he intended to drive into a tree, and that remained his purpose.[38] He gave a contrary version at trial:(a)whilst he had previously seen the tree he ran into, it had no significance to him;[39](b)he deliberately drove into it;[40] and(c)the contrary version in the police record of interview was a lie.[41][37]AB 447, 456, 471, 479-480.[38]AB 446.[39]AB 213.[40]AB 212, 243-244.[41]AB 243.The psychiatrists’ evidence Three psychiatrists gave evidence, Dr Voita and Dr Grant for the prosecution, and Dr Arthur for the defence. All gave their expert opinion on the question of whether there was that degree of impairment that would qualify as diminished responsibility. As to that Dr Arthur concluded there was, and the other two concluded there was not. The history of Mr Miller’s treatment and admissions to hospital for psychiatric treatment revealed that he was diagnosed with alcohol induced schizophrenia in 1992,[42] had continued treatment over the next two years,[43] and diagnosed with a bi-polar affective disorder in 1999.[44] He was on lithium for many years after 1999, but did not require specialist treatment after 1999/2000.[42]AB 268; at which time he was exhibiting auditory hallucinations, disorganised behaviour and extreme mood swings. Dr Arthur said he disagreed with that diagnosis: AB 316-317. So, too, did Dr Grant: AB 341.[43]AB 272; during which time he exhibited hypomanic symptoms, including not sleeping, racing thoughts and physical agitation, mood elevation and grandiosity.[44]AB 274. Dr Arthur reviewed the history[45] and the evidence given at the trial. He concluded that Mr Miller’s abstinence from alcohol brought about the cessation in his psychotic symptoms and perturbations of mood. He considered the symptomology described by Mr Miller in the period leading up to 8 June 2008, and concluded that Mr Miller’s mood was starting to become unstable and he was suffering depression.[46] In cross-examination he described it as a “depressed phase of his bipolar disorder”.[47] He described Mr Miller’s condition:[48]“I think that his - his thinking shows that he really didn’t have a lot of ways of problem solving, and that he wasn’t able to sit down in a logical manner and think about the different ways that he may be able to cope with this situation or he and his wife may be able to cope. I think that - certainly his descriptions of - of his mood and the way that he was coping leading up to the offence, suggested that he was not in control of his mood, and he was not able to regulate that in a - in a reasonable way and so putting those things together I think that that’s, to my mind, that's indicative that - that he was actually quite unwell at that stage.”[45]The detail of which was much greater than the precise given above in paragraph [26].[46]AB 277.[47]AB 288.[48]AB 278.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Fourthly, having made an assessment of the whole of the evidence myself, I am of the view that it was open to the jury to accept the evidence of Dr Voita and Dr Grant, and reject the evidence of Mr Miller, and thus be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that Mr Miller was guilty of murder.[96][96]M v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 487, at 493; SKA v The Queen (2011) 243 CLR 400 at 405, [11] and [13].Conclusion For the reasons expressed above I would dismiss the appeal. I propose the following order:1.The appeal is dismissed. PHILIP McMURDO JA: The sole ground of appeal is that the verdict was unreasonable in that the jury was bound to find that the defence of diminished responsibility was proved. I agree with the judgment of Morrison JA on that question but wish to add something about the evidence of Dr Grant. Dr Grant accepted that the appellant was in a state of abnormality of mind which possibly impaired his capacity to know that he ought not to kill his wife. But Dr Grant said that this capacity was not substantially impaired. Rather it was a “mild” impairment or an impairment “to a small degree”. At another point (in a passage set out by Morrison JA) Dr Grant said that a person with a substantial impairment would “come close to not being able to understand his actions were wrong”. When reading this evidence, my concern was that Dr Grant had used an incorrect meaning of “substantially” in this context. The word “substantially”, like the word “substantial”, has more than one meaning.[97] But the meaning of “substantially” in s 304A of the Code is well established. In R v Biess[98] it was held that “substantially” refers to an impairment which is “something between trivial or minimal and total”.[99] Hart J there said that there could be no objection to a psychiatrist opining on the issue of whether a relevant capacity had been substantially impaired, as long as the meaning of the expression “had been legally interpreted for him and for the jury”.[100] Hart J said:[101]“The range of meaning of substantially was a question of law, and the asking of questions, without explanation, in terms of the section forced the doctor to indulge in legal interpretation.”[97]See e.g. Tillmanns Butcheries v Australasian Meat Industry Employees’ Union & Ors (1979) 27 ALR 367 at 382 per Deane J.[98][1967] Qd R 470.[99][1967] Qd R 470, 485 per Matthews J.[100][1967] Qd R 470, 477.[101]Ibid. Similarly, when sitting in the Court of Criminal Appeal of New South Wales in Chayna v R,[102] Gleeson CJ said that the weight of the evidence of psychiatrists who had given their conclusions on the ultimate issues in a case of diminished responsibility was less for the fact that this evidence necessarily involved, in part, the psychiatrists’ own opinions upon the meaning of the relevant provision of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). Gleeson CJ said that of more importance were the observations which the psychiatrists made about the appellant and their opinions on psychiatric matters.[102](1993) 66 A Crim R 178, 188.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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