SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
R v McClintock [2009] QCA 175
PARTIES:
R
v
McCLINTOCK, Rebecca Lynette
(appellant/applicant)FILE NO/S:
CA No 275 of 2008
SC No 84 of 2008DIVISION:
Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING:
Appeal against Conviction & Sentence
ORIGINATING COURT:
Supreme Court at Townsville
DELIVERED ON:
19 June 2009
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
8 May 2009
JUDGES:
Keane, Fraser and Chesterman JJA
Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court, each concurring as to the orders madeORDERS:
1. Appeal against conviction is dismissed.
2. Application for leave to appeal against sentence is refused.
CATCHWORDS:
CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – PARTICULAR GROUNDS OF APPEAL – MISDIRECTION AND NON-DIRECTION – EFFECT OF MISDIRECTION OR NON-DIRECTION – where trial judge gave a majority verdict direction to the jury – where appellant was found guilty of malicious wounding by way of a majority verdict – whether the trial judge failed to properly consider the prescribed matters for making a majority verdict direction under s 59A of the Jury Act 1995 (Qld)
CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE – GROUNDS FOR INTERFERENCE – SENTENCE MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE OR INADEQUATE – where appellant was convicted of malicious wounding and sentenced to six years imprisonment – whether sentence was manifestly excessive
Jury Act 1995 (Qld), s 59A
Black v The Queen (1993) 179 CLR 44; [1993] HCA 71, cited
Hanna v The Queen [2008] NSWCCA 173, distinguished
R v Young[2005] QCA 32, considered
RJS v The Queen (2007) 173 A Crim R 100; [2007] NSWCCA 241, distinguishedCOUNSEL:
J M Sharp for the appellant/applicant
M B Lehane for the respondentSOLICITORS:
Legal Aid Queensland for the appellant/applicant
Director of Public Prosecutions (Queensland) for the respondent
KEANE JA: I have had the advantage of reading the reasons for judgment prepared by Chesterman JA. I agree with those reasons and with the orders proposed by his Honour.
FRASER JA: I agree with the reasons of Chesterman JA and with the orders proposed by his Honour.
CHESTERMAN JA: The appellant was tried on an indictment which charged her with:
1. Wilfully damaging property;
2. Entering a dwelling with intent to commit an indictable offence at night using actual violence while armed with a dangerous instrument;
3. Assaulting Peter McClintock who was confined to a wheelchair;
4. Attempting unlawfully to kill Peter McClintock: alternatively;
5. Unlawfully wounding Peter McClintock with intent to do him some grievous bodily harm;
6. Unlawfully assaulting Mary Nagy.
On 29 September 2008 the appellant pleaded guilty to the charges contained in counts 1 and 3, wilfully damaging property and the serious assault of Peter McClintock. After a trial spanning three days the jury, on 1 October 2008 delivered verdicts on the other counts. The appellant was convicted of count 2, burglary, but acquitted of count 6, common assault. Those verdicts were unanimous. The jury, by majority, acquitted the appellant of attempted murder (count 4) but…
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- AGLC
- R v McClintock [2009] QCA 175
- Case
- [2009] QCA 175
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined whether the trial judge correctly applied the criteria for giving a majority verdict direction, as outlined in the Jury Act. The court reviewed the trial judge's instructions to the jury to determine if the judge had adequately considered the prescribed matters. Furthermore, the court assessed the severity of the sentence in the context of the offence and the circumstances surrounding it. The court also considered the principles of proportionality and the totality of the circumstances in determining whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
In dismissing the appeal against conviction, the court found that the trial judge had properly considered the prescribed matters for making a majority verdict direction and thus did not err in law. The court held that the trial judge's direction to the jury was correct and did not prejudice McClintock's right to a fair trial. Regarding the sentence, the court concluded that it was not manifestly excessive. The sentence imposed was considered appropriate in light of the gravity of the offence and the circumstances of the case. Therefore, the appeal against sentence was also dismissed, and the application for leave to appeal against sentence was refused.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Appeal against conviction is dismissed.
2. Application for leave to appeal against sentence is refused.
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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