Criminal Law and Procedure—Natural justice—Crown—Application to Court of Criminal Appeal for leave to appeal against conviction—Evidence and argument directed to addition of new ground and to application for leave—Leave to amend and to appeal granted—Appeal allowed without further hearing—Whether denial of natural justice to Crown.
Decision
WILSON, BRENNAN, DAWSON, TOOHEY AND GAUDRON JJ: This is an application by the Crown for special leave to appeal from a decision of the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory sitting as the Court of Criminal Appeal delivered on 17 July 1987 whereby a conviction of the respondent was quashed and a judgment and verdict of acquittal entered. There are two grounds advanced in support of the application, both of them concerning the procedure followed by the Court in dealing with the respondent's appeal. It is necessary to describe the course of events in some detail.
2. On 24 October 1986 the respondent was convicted of unlawful assault on a female with intent to have carnal knowledge accompanied by a circumstance of aggravation in that he had carnal knowledge of that female. The charge was laid pursuant to s.192(1) and (4) of the Criminal Code (N.T.). An application for leave to appeal, on grounds which were never pursued, was lodged. The application came on for hearing on 7 May 1987 by a Court comprising O'Leary C.J., Maurice J. and Muirhead A.J. At the commencement of the proceedings on that day, counsel appearing for the respondent was given leave to withdraw and the matter continued thereafter with the respondent unrepresented but indirectly deriving some benefit from the participation of counsel as amicus curiae. The respondent tendered a twelve-page handwritten document as an outline of the grounds upon which he wished to appeal. Since they raised matters of fact or mixed law and fact, it was necessary for him to obtain the leave of the Court (Criminal Code, s.410(b)). Discussion then proceeded for some hours between members of the Court and the respondent, the amicus curiae and counsel appearing for the Crown. The subject of discussion was the manner in which the Court should proceed to hear the application for leave and in particular whether additional evidence should be received. The matter was then adjourned to the following day. On resumption on 8 May 1987, the Chief Justice sketched the course that the case had taken to that point and continued:
"In general terms, the matters which he now
wishes to raise relate to the conduct by his counsel of his defence at the trial, and in particular, the failure of his counsel to adduce certain evidence at the trial which he says if put before the jury would have affected its verdict.
His application now is that since the evidence
was not before the jury, there has been a miscarriage of justice, and in consequence he should have leave…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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Details
AGLC
R v Lewis [1988] HCA 24
Case
[1988] HCA 24
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The case of *R v Lewis* concerned an appeal by the applicant, Lewis, against his conviction for murder. The dispute centred on the admissibility of certain evidence and the fairness of the trial process. The High Court of Australia was tasked with determining whether the conviction was unsafe or unsatisfactory.
The primary legal issue before the High Court was whether the trial judge had erred in admitting evidence that was obtained in circumstances that might have rendered it inadmissible. Specifically, the court considered whether the evidence was obtained in contravention of the applicant's rights, and if so, whether its admission prejudiced the applicant's right to a fair trial. The court also had to assess whether, in light of any evidentiary errors, the jury's verdict was unsafe or unsatisfactory.
The High Court's reasoning focused on the principles governing the admission of evidence obtained in breach of an accused's rights. The court affirmed that while such evidence may be admissible, its admission requires a careful balancing of the probative value of the evidence against the potential prejudice to the accused. In this instance, the court found that the admission of the disputed evidence, when considered alongside other aspects of the trial, rendered the conviction unsafe and unsatisfactory.
Consequently, the High Court allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction, and ordered a new trial.