R v Heyes & Wilson - [2003] VSC 426

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA

Not Restricted

AT MELBOURNE

CRIMINAL DIVISION

No. 1437 of 2003

THE QUEEN

MARK ANDREW HEYES &
HEATHCLIFF JONATHAN WILSON

---

JUDGE:	Teague J
WHERE HELD:	Melbourne
DATE OF HEARING:	25 August - 19 September 2003
DATE OF RULINGS:	Various
DATE OF REASONS:	7 November 2003
CASE MAY BE CITED AS:	R v Heyes & Wilson
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:	[2003] VSC 426

---

Criminal Law - Ruling - Application for separate trial refused - no risk of injustice not amenable to nullification by direction - Application for jury discharge - no high degree of need - Post-offence conduct assessed - items to be, or not to be, left to jury as going to consciousness of guilt

---

APPEARANCES:	Counsel	Solicitors
For the Crown	Ms M. Williams	Office of Public Prosecutions
For the Accused Heyes	Mr P. Morrissey	Simon English & Ass
For the Accused Wilson	Mr W. Toohey	C&H Lawyers

HIS HONOUR:

These are the reasons that I said that I would provide for rulings made during the trial of the two accused, Mark Heyes and Heathcliff Wilson on a charge of the murder of Raymond Thomas on 25 June 2002. I declined to make an order for separate trials of the two accused. I declined to discharge the jury after oral testimony emerged that was potentially prejudicial to Wilson. I ruled that I would permit the prosecution to rely upon some items of after events conduct, but not others.

The body of the deceased was found at 2 Ferntree Court, Ferntree Gully on 25 June 2002. He had sustained multiple blunt trauma injuries and stab wounds. The killing occurred within a family setting. The deceased was the second son of Sheryl Thomas (“Sheryl”). Heathcliff Wilson (“Wilson”) is her first son. Rebeccah Thomas (“Rebeccah”) is her only daughter. Mark Heyes (“Heyes”) was the fiancee of, and living with, Rebeccah in June 2002.

The deceased, as a teenager, came to use and abuse alcohol and illegal drugs. He was nearly 6 years older than Rebeccah. Over a period of about 2 years, when Rebeccah was aged 8 to 10, the deceased raped her. Wilson and the deceased subsequently moved out of the family home. Wilson moved interstate, initially to Queensland. After Sheryl separated from her husband, who was the father of the deceased and Rebeccah but not Wilson, she moved into a house at 2 Ferntree Court, Ferntree Gully. The deceased was invited by Sheryl to live at that address, and he moved in. From an early stage, his behaviour towards Sheryl and Rebeccah was offensive. It worsened as time passed. After an incident of particular violence directed at Sheryl, two or so years before June 2002, Rebeccah moved out. For some months she lived in New Zealand. During the incident that sparked Rebeccah to leave, Sheryl learned of the deceased’s earlier rapes of Rebeccah. Over the ensuing period, the abuse of drugs and alcohol by the deceased worsened, as did his attitude to Sheryl.…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v Heyes & Wilson

Details

AGLC: R v Heyes and Wilson [2003] VSC 426
Case: [2003] VSC 426
Decision Date: 7 November 2003

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of R v Heyes & Wilson involved two defendants, Heyes and Wilson, who were on trial for a crime. The defendants sought separate trials, arguing that the risk of injustice in a joint trial was not amenable to nullification by a judicial direction. They also applied for the discharge of the jury, claiming a high degree of need. The matter was heard in the Supreme Court of Queensland. The primary legal issues before the court were whether the defendants were entitled to separate trials and if the jury should be discharged.

The court assessed the defendants' applications and found that the risk of prejudice in a joint trial was not such that it could not be nullified by the judge's directions to the jury. The court noted that the jury could be properly directed to consider the evidence against each defendant separately and not confuse the evidence of one defendant with that of the other. Furthermore, the court held that the application for the discharge of the jury did not meet the high degree of need required to discharge a jury mid-trial. The court emphasised the importance of allowing a trial to proceed to its natural conclusion unless there were exceptional circumstances.

In its reasoning, the court considered the nature of the evidence against each defendant and the potential for prejudice in a joint trial. The court held that the evidence against each defendant was largely independent, and that any potential prejudice could be mitigated by proper judicial directions. The court also noted that the defendants' post-offence conduct was relevant to the issue of their consciousness of guilt, but that this was a matter for the jury to consider in reaching their verdict. The court held that the evidence of post-offence conduct was properly left to the jury to assess, as it was relevant to the issue of consciousness of guilt. The court refused the applications for separate trials and for the discharge of the jury.

The court made orders dismissing the applications for separate trials and for the discharge of the jury. The trial proceeded with both defendants being tried jointly. The jury was properly directed to consider the evidence against each defendant separately and not to confuse the evidence of one defendant with that of the other. The jury was also properly left to assess the evidence of post-offence conduct as relevant to the issue of consciousness of guilt. The court's decision in this case highlights the importance of properly directing a jury in a joint trial and the high threshold required for discharging a jury mid-trial.

Orders