R v Kristy Louise McGuckin (No 3)
[2015] ACTSC 5
•22 January 2015
SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
Case Title: | R v Kristy Louise McGuckin (No 3) |
Citation: | [2015] ACTSC 5 |
Hearing Date(s): | 22 January 2015 |
DecisionDate: | 22 January 2015 |
Reasons Date: | 28 January 2015 |
Before: | Refshauge ACJ |
Decision: | 1. The Court notes that it is not necessary to make any further orders. 2. The Court declines to make any order. 3. The Court encourages Ms McGuckin to continue to engage with mental health services of her choosing. |
Category: | Principal Judgment |
Catchwords: | CRIMINAL LAW – Jurisdiction, Practice and Procedure – Judgment and Punishment – Finding of not guilty by reason of mental impairment – Recommendation from the ACAT – Whether ACAT must make a mental health order – Legislative issues relating to procedural matters for defendants found not guilty by reason of mental impairment STATUTES – Operation and Effect of Statutes – Law Reform – Need for Bail for Persons referred to the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal – Need for clear meaning to wide orders – need for monitoring regime for persons released. |
Legislation Cited: | Crimes Act 1900 (ACT), ss 318, 319, 328 |
Text Cited: | Explanatory Memorandum to the Crimes (Amendment) Bill 1994 (ACT) ACT Mental Health Review Committee, Balancing Rights, A Review of Mental Health Legislation in the ACT (1990, ACT; Canberra). |
Cases Cited: | In the matter of an application for bail byPikula [2015] ACTSC 3 |
Parties: | The Queen (Crown) Kristy Louise McGuckin (Accused) |
Representation: | Counsel Ms S Gul (Crown) Mr A Doig (Accused) |
| Solicitors ACT Director of Public Prosecutions (Crown) Legal Aid (ACT) (Accused) | |
File Number(s): | SCC 204 of 2013 SCC 175 of 2014 |
Refshauge ACJ:
It is well-known that many persons with mental impairment or mental dysfunction become caught up in the criminal justice system. Their disability often leads them to act in ways that constitute a breach of the physical acts that are part of some offences. It can then become difficult to ascertain whether there is a fault element involved, which is necessary for criminal culpability.
If there is no fault element found, because of the mental impairment, then a person is not guilty of the offence charged but the community may be entitled to take action to protect itself or its members from further physical acts that would, with the relevant fault element, constitute an offence.
Thus, on 18 September 2014, I found the accused, Kristy Louise McGuckin, not guilty by reason of mental impairment of four offences, being an offence of aggravated robbery, two offences of assault occasioning actual bodily harm and an offence of recklessly causing damage to property. See R v McGuckin [2014] ACTSC 242.
For three of these offences, which were serious offences as defined in the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT), I ordered, under s 319 of that Act, that Ms McGuckin submit to the jurisdiction of the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal (the ACAT) to enable it to make a mental health order. In the case of damaging property, which I held was not a serious offence as defined, I ordered, under s 318 of the Crimes Act, that Ms McGuckin submit to the jurisdiction of the ACAT to allow the ACAT to make recommendations as to how she should be dealt with.
Subsequently, I was asked to deal with twelve other offences which had been transferred to this Court under s 90B of the Magistrates Court Act 1930 (ACT) to be dealt with under Pt 8 of the Supreme Court Act 1933 (ACT). I found that, in relation to four charges, Ms McGuckin was not guilty of them by reason of mental impairment. In respect of the remaining eight charges, I proceeded, under s 334 of the Magistrates Court Act, to dismiss one of them unconditionally (one charge) and to dismiss the other charges and require Ms McGuckin to submit to the jurisdiction of the ACAT to enable the ACAT to make a mental health order (seven charges).
In respect of the first-mentioned four transferred charges, I made an order under s 329 of the Crimes Act in respect of one of them, as it was a serious charge as defined, that Ms McGuckin submit to the jurisdiction of the ACAT to enable the ACAT to make a mental health order, and for the remaining three charges under s 328 of the Crimes Act, on the basis that they were non-serious charges as defined, that she submit to the jurisdiction of the ACAT to enable the ACAT to make recommendations as to how I should deal with her. See R v McGuckin (No 2) [2014] ACTSC 365.
I now have the decision from the ACAT together with its recommendation, to which I will refer below (at [15]).
On 22 January 2015, I heard counsel, received evidence, considered the ACAT decisions and made my decisions. I then said
I have read the Decision and the Recommendations of the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal. I have heard evidence from the Court Liaison Officer for Forensic Mental Health of ACT Health about Ms McGuckin and her current engagement with the Tuggeranong Mental Health Team.
I have given careful thought to the options that are available to me. I have heard counsel for Ms McGuckin and for the Crown. The submissions were thoughtful, helpful and cogent. In particular, the Crown made no submissions contrary to those made by Mr A Doig, counsel for Ms McGuckin.
I have regard to the circumstances and to the material available to me.
In my view, I should make no further order. I shall urge Ms McGuckin to continue to co-operate with Mental Health Services of her choosing.
I shall give reasons for the orders I make in due course. When I do, it is not necessary for Ms McGuckin to be present, though she is welcome if she wishes to be present.
I then made the orders I had foreshadowed. These are the reasons for those orders.
In the document I received from the ACAT, it reported on its processes. In particular, it explained that it arranged under s 16 of the Mental Health (Treatment and Care) Act 1994 (ACT) for Ms McGuckin to be assessed under an assessment order. Ms McGuckin did not co-operate with the process and had to be brought before the assessing medical practitioner by the ACAT making an order addressed to the police. Ms McGuckin then did not appear at any of the hearings the ACAT conducted in relation to this matter.
This is a further instance of a problem I had pointed out in R v Fisher (No 2) [2011] ACTSC 100 at [68] and again in R v Smith (2012) 269 FLR 233 at 244; [63] that there is no mechanism to ensure that Ms McGuckin attends on the ACAT such as by being bailed to appear before it. Whether she then participates is, of course, a matter for her.
The report received from the assessing medical practitioner, Dr E K Rodrigo, following his assessment, expressed the following opinions:
· “the current assessment does not indicate any acute depression nor anxiety or psychotic disorder”;
· “I did not think she posed a significant risk to self or others at present”;
· “I did not think an admission to hospital was indicated”;
· “It is my opinion that Ms Mcguckin [sic] has the capacity to consent to treatment and she agreed to continue with therapy at the [Tuggeranong Mental Health Team]”.
The ACAT had made mental health orders for Ms McGuckin before but, more recently, psychiatrists from the Tuggeranong Mental Health Team had provided the ACAT with reports expressing the opinion that a mental health order was not, or no longer, warranted. For example, in a report dated 30 April 2013, Dr Bree Wyeth, Consultant Psychiatrist, had said
I do not feel that the use of a Psychiatric Treatment Order is warranted. I do not believe that Ms McGuckin meets criteria for involuntary treatment. Her primary diagnoses are of personality disorder and substance abuse. The best evidenced treatments for both require the fostering of insight and motivation to change for the individual affected. This treatment could and should be offered on a voluntary basis.
I do not know whether the forensic mental health reports available to me were available to Dr Wyeth, as they show a different diagnosis. In any event, the approach and recommendation is clear.
In its decision, the ACAT has advised the Court that Ms McGuckin is not a person in relation to whom a mental health order can be made and so it has made no order. Given the criteria for making a mental health order (see Pt 4 of the Mental Health (Treatment and Care) Act), the fact that I found that Ms McGuckin suffers from Paranoid Schizophrenia (R v McGuckin at [106]) and did so at the time she committed the acts that were the physical elements of the offences with which she was charged, does not, of course, necessarily mean that she must be subject to a mental health order.
It seems to me that, once the ACAT has either made a mental health order or decided not to do so, there is nothing more for the Court to do in respect of those matters. The matter is now in the mental health jurisdiction and beyond the criminal justice jurisdiction. No submissions to the contrary were made to me.
Mr A Doig, counsel for Ms McGuckin, raised with me, however, whether the ACAT had complied with the legislation. He referred to the terms of ss 318, 319 and 329 of the Crimes Act, where the form of the order for a person to submit to the jurisdiction of the ACAT was, in each case, “to enable the ACAT to make a mental health order”.
I understood his submission was that the legislation effectively required the ACAT to make a mental health order. If that was not what was intended, then it would have been simple for the legislation to make that clear by adding a qualifier such as “if appropriate” or “if it considers it proper to do so” or similar.
There is a certain attraction to that approach, for the person has been found to have committed acts that, were the relevant fault elements present, would have been criminal offences and this behaviour does not justify any criminal sanction only because of the person’s mental impairment, though the acts can still be a danger to the community or its members. That mental impairment leads to, or fails to prevent, such behaviour and so should arguably be the subject of attention by mental health services of an appropriate kind to minimise repetition.
Thus the argument seemed to go. It has a certain persuasiveness, both as to statutory construction and from a policy perspective, where the objective of the Territory set out in the Mental Health (Treatment and Care) Act include the establishment of services that both
(i)... provide a strong and viable system of treatment and care and a full range of services and facilities, for mentally dysfunctional or mentally ill persons; and
...
(iii)... minimise the adverse effects of mental dysfunction or mental illness in the community ...
Nevertheless, I am not satisfied that the sections of the Crimes Act require the ACAT to make a mental health order just because the Court has made the order of the kind I made.
I have considered the Explanatory Memorandum to the Crimes (Amendment) Bill 1994 (ACT) which introduced the provision, but it was of no assistance on this issue. It did point out, however, that the provision was introduced to implement recommendations from ACT Mental Health Review Committee, Balancing Rights, A Review of Mental Health Legislation in the ACT (1990, ACT; Canberra). The comments in that Report, however, discussed a much wide range of options for the disposition of those acquitted on the grounds of mental impairment. The Committee stated at p 120
These options should include (i) the release of the person back into the community on a community treatment order with or without supervision (ii) the committal of the person to a local facility for treatment once the treating unit has agreed (iii) the sending of a person to a facility in NSW or (iv) the conditional release of the person. In addition, the Committee acknowledged the need for such persons to be monitored and felt that this role should be fulfilled by the Mental Health Review Tribunal and the office of the Community Advocate.
As can be seen, regrettably, not all of these options were introduced in the legislation, which only has two, though the second is wide. There is, however, nothing to suggest that there was an intention that, in the absence of detention, there was to be a mandatory requirement for a mental health order.
Were such orders to encompass other options than those mandated, such as conditional release which would also, no doubt, include the acknowledged need for monitoring and with a regime to implement it, then I may have come to a different conclusion, but that is not the legislated response.
I have also had regard to the requirements for mental health orders: these are set out in ss 28 (Psychiatric treatment orders) and 36 (Community care orders). I do not need to set them out. They are quite restrictive and, in particular, require the ACAT to be satisfied, inter alia, of the likelihood that the person will “do serious harm to himself, herself or someone else ... unless subject to involuntary” intervention; that intervention being, in the case of a psychiatric treatment order, “involuntary treatment”, and in the case of a community care order, “involuntary treatment, care and support”.
It is also important to recognise the context of the disposition. The person will have committed acts which result in an arrest or summons to bring them before the courts. There will have been a committal and a trial. All this takes time. In this case, the acts which drew Ms McGuckin to the notice of the police were committed by her as long ago as July 2012.
There will be cases – and this is one – where mental health intervention has occurred between the commission of these acts and the disposition of the proceedings. That intervention and lapse of time may well have obviated the need for intervention.
To make an order which does not otherwise meet the requirements of the pre-conditions for its making, or which is no longer necessary, does not seem to me to be in the contemplation of the legislation.
I do not consider that, if it considered it was not appropriate to do so, the ACAT was nevertheless required to make a mental health order.
The four matters for which I sought recommendations, however, stand in a different category. Section 328 of the Crimes Act provides
(1) If an accused has been charged with an offence other than a serious offence and is found not guilty because of mental impairment, the Magistrates Court may—
(a) make an order requiring the accused to submit to the jurisdiction of the ACAT to enable the ACAT to make recommendations as to how he or she should be dealt with; or
(b) make any other orders it considers appropriate.
(2) If—
(a) the Magistrates Court makes an order under subsection (1) (a); and
(b) the ACAT notifies the Magistrates Court of its recommendations;
the Magistrates Court shall, in consideration of the ACAT’s recommendations, make any further orders it considers appropriate.
(3) The orders the Magistrates Court may make under subsections (1) and (2) include the following:
(a) that the accused be detained in custody until the ACAT orders otherwise;
(b) that the accused submit to the jurisdiction of the ACAT to enable the ACAT to make a mental health order.
Similarly, s 318 of the Crimes Act also provides that the Supreme Court may make “the orders that it considers appropriate”.
Accordingly, once I have the recommendations from the ACAT, I can, it seems to me, make “any other orders [I consider] appropriate”.
The ACAT’s recommendation was:
The Tribunal recommends that if it is possible for the Court to do so, an order be made which requires Ms McGuckin to maintain regular contact with ACT Mental Health Services and to undertake any counselling, therapeutic, rehabilitation or training program recommended by the Chief Psychiatrist, his delegate or a mental health officer.
The background to this recommendation is as follows. The ACAT was advised that after Ms McGuckin’s “agreement” with Dr Rodrigo to continue therapy with the Tuggeranong Mental Health Team as noted above (at [12]), she later declined to undertake any such program.
The ACAT also noted Ms McGuckin’s failure to comply voluntarily with the assessment order it made, or participate in the ACAT hearings of which she had been notified.
This concern was re-inforced by the following comments by Dr Wyeth in the report earlier mentioned (at [13]) which the ACAT attached to its Report. In that Report, Dr Wyeth stated
Treatment with the community team has been hampered by irregular attendance for reviews and time spent in custody. During her time in the ACT prison Ms McGuckin was reviewed by the prison mental health services. She was not observed to be displaying signs of psychosis but was frequently involved in disruptive and aggressive behaviour requiring intensive management by the prison staff and review by the mental health clinicians. More recently she did not attend an appointment made for her with Professor Henderson ...
The ACAT concluded that it “had no confidence that Ms McGuckin will continue contact with Mental Health Services or participate in any recommended treatment, including therapy, unless she is mandated to do so”.
The concern is heightened, it seems to me, from the following comments made by Dr Wyeth. She wrote
Ms McGuckin has a history of significant self harm and para-suicidal behaviour, from her own report from review of her file it appears that this has not been a prominent feature of her presentation in the last 12-18 months or more ...
Ms McGuckin has a long history of violence ... She described a frequent pattern of antagonism and violence with police and felt that she had been pushed to the point where there was little other option. She reported that her previous attempts to address inappropriately heavy handed treatment by police when in custody was unsuccessful and she cited this as further disincentive to refrain from violence towards police. She has a history of substance abuse and continues to use currently. It is my opinion that the risk factors to violence in Ms McGuckin’s case are similar to those of many violent offenders, namely substance abuse, impulsiveness and cognitive biases that reinforce violent behaviour.
Her report, made on 30 April 2013, is, however, somewhat dated now.
The question, then, is what I need to do in consequence of the recommendation of the ACAT. Clearly, I have power to act under ss 318 or 328 of the Crimes Act and make the “orders [the court] considers appropriate”. This is, at first sight, a very wide and plenary power.
I have discussed this power and the complexity of understanding what it allows in R v Fisher (No 2) at [55]-[61].
In that decision, I said
55.In this regard, I am not at all sure what is intended by s 318(2), where it provides that the court ‘may make the orders that it considers appropriate.’ It cannot include any order under the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT), for they all depend upon an offender being ‘convicted or found guilty of an offence’. See, for example, in relation to a good behaviour order, s 13(1) of that Act.
56.There are similar pre-conditions expressed in ss 10(1), 14(1), 16(1), 17(1), 19(1) and 27(1)(a) of that Act before the orders provided for in it can be made.
57.Similarly, the imposition of a common law bond depends on conviction. The common law bond was defined by Jacobs J in Griffiths v The Queen (1977) 137 CLR 293 (at 319) as follows:
where a convicted person is bound over to be of good behaviour for a certain period and to come up for sentence if called upon during that period in the event of a breach of the condition for good behaviour.
58.A power that judges of the Supreme Court have is to bind over a person to keep the peace. See Forbutt v Blake (1981) 51 FLR 465 (at 474) per Connor ACJ. That power, however, is directed to persons who are suspected of a breach of the peace, or who are thought likely to cause a breach of the peace. See R v County of London Quarter Sessions Appeal Committee; Ex parte Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1948] 1 KB 670 (at 673). This hardly applies here.
59.It does not seem to me that a provision that permits a court to make “the orders it considers appropriate” is a grant of unlimited power but must refer to an order that is otherwise within the power of the court to make.
60.In this case, no other orders are specified in the Crimes Act than those set out in s 318. The Explanatory Statement for the Bill, the Crimes (Amendment) Bill 1994 (ACT) which inserted the provision, then numbered s 428L, suggests that the section should be given a wide interpretation, for it states in this section (at 6):
New section 428L gives the Court great flexibility in deciding what is the most appropriate disposition option if a person has not committed a serious offence.
61. As I have not heard full argument, I simply raise these issues for further consideration.
I note that there is a similar provision in New South Wales. Section 39 of the Mental Health (Forensic Provisions) Act 1990 (NSW) has been, since 8 July 2003, in the following terms
39(1) If, on the trial of a person charged with an offence, the jury returns a special verdict that the accused person is not guilty by reason of mental illness, the Court may order that the person be detained in such place and in such manner as the Court thinks fit until released by due process of law or may make such other order (including an order releasing the person from custody, either unconditionally or subject to conditions) as the Court considers appropriate.
(2)The Court is not to make an order under this section for the release of a person from custody unless it is satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the safety of the person or any member of the public will not be seriously endangered by the person’s release.
(3)As soon as practicable after the making of an order under this section, the Registrar of the Court is to notify the Minister for Health and the Tribunal of the terms of the order.
The provision had not originally made such wide provision; indeed, it was, as enacted, as follows:
If, on the trial of a person charged with an offence, the jury returns a special verdict that the accused person is not guilty by reason of mental illness, the Court must order that the person be detained in such place and in such manner as the Court thinks fit until released by due process of law.
In this form, it attracted judicial criticism in R v Stephens [1999] NSWSC 811 at [35]-[38] and was then amended to its present form.
As can be expected, the decided NSW cases are, so far as I can tell, concerned with conditional release. So far as the Supreme Court of New South Wales is concerned, that is understandable, given the jurisdiction of that Court, which deals only with the most serious offences, especially the offence of murder, where a custodial disposition would most likely be made or at least considered. See, for example, R v Line [2004] NSWSC 1148; R v Xu (No 2) [2005] NSWSC 70; and R v Reis [2005] NSWSC 707. Regrettably, there is no discussion in any of these cases of the phrase in s 39 of the Mental Health (Forensic Provisions) Act of the phrase “such other order ... as the Court considers appropriate”.
The District Court of New South Wales also makes orders under that provision, but the offences with which it deals include some for which it might be expected that conditional release would not be the only option. So far as I can ascertain, however, that is the most frequently used alternative to detaining the person in custody and other orders do not seem to feature in any of the cases I have been able to access. Again, that is understandable because it is the most obvious and convenient disposition in the circumstances, including because of the regime for managing such releases thereafter.
I do note that the conditional release from custody is the order used even when the offender has earlier been released into the community pending the making of final orders. This happened, for example, in R v Crispe (No 4) [2014] NSWDC 211. This would, of course, be on the basis that the re-appearance of a person before the court in criminal proceedings amounts to a surrender into the custody of the court. See, for example, In the matter of an application for bail by Pikula [2015] ACTSC 3 at [26].
Nevertheless, this consideration is not of much help to me in this case for two reasons. In the first place, ss 318 and 328 of the Crimes Act are in different terms to the New South Wales legislation and do not refer to release, either conditionally or unconditionally. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the New South Wales legislation establishes an appropriate regime around the conditional release of the subject person. Thus, ss 81 and 82 of the Mental Health (Forensic Provisions) Act requires the Mental Health Review Tribunal to review such a person’s case as soon as practicable after conditional release and, in appropriate cases, continue to review the position at regular six-monthly intervals. Thus, for example, any conditions about treatment can be appropriately structured to be monitored and, if appropriate, changed or terminated as in R v Xu (No 2) at [71] (10). There is no such regime in this Territory. Perhaps there should be.
The questions are, then, whether I have power to make the order recommended by the ACAT and, if so, whether I should do so, including whether I should do so in the terms recommended.
Included in considerations of the latter question is for what period such an order should be made and how should it be monitored. Courts such as this one are not equipped to engage in appropriate monitoring as are different agencies, such as Drug Courts or mental health tribunals, such as the ACAT.
Indeed, the order seems to be in the nature of a mental health order but without the constraints that are set by the legislation on the making, review and duration of such an order.
In New South Wales, the conditions imposed by the courts do not seem to have a time limit, even when they are made about matters that might be regularly seen in dispositions such as good behaviour orders. See, for example, R v Crispe (“[the person] engages in social occupational and vocational rehabilitation as deemed necessary by her case manager”); R v Gill [2009] NSWDC 229 (“[t]hat he not attend any licensed hotel at all, nor attend any licensed restaurant other than in the company of his family”) or R v Line (“she submit to such tests for the detection of the use or consumption of drugs and substances including alcohol”). While those acquitted of serious charges such as murder, because of mental impairment, might expect to be monitored for a very long time, perhaps for life, it seems that some of the conditions are not ones that would immediately be seen as necessarily appropriate for imposition without any duration. Such life-long conditions could not be imposed on those who are convicted of offences and released conditionally into the community.
In this case, most of the offences in respect of which recommendations have been made are not regarded by the legislature as requiring serious intervention. For example, the unlawful possession of a knife carries a maximum penalty of ten penalty units (that is, a fine of $14,000), or imprisonment for six months, or both. It seems disproportionate to use an acquittal on this offence to make a lifetime order, especially when there is no disposition involving mental health intervention at all for the more serious offences.
There are, also, questions about review, monitoring, amendment and sanction. Perhaps these matters could be addressed in legislation.
To some extent, these matters can be managed. For example, the Mental Health Services will, no doubt be concerned to maximise the therapeutic benefit of therapy and its continued provision to Ms McGuckin and so, if she fails to engage, could report that to the Director of Public Prosecutions, who could commence proceedings for contempt of court. That is rather like a sledgehammer cracking a nut. As Mr Doig helpfully pointed out, the mental health authorities can just as easily and, indeed, perhaps more appropriately, seek a mental health order. There are serious problems with the proposed order.
I also heard evidence, however, from Jessica Minchin, Court Liaison Officer for Forensic Mental Health. She informed me that Ms McGuckin was a current consumer of the Tuggeranong Mental Health Team. She was attending voluntarily and was not subject to a psychiatric treatment order. She was receiving a therapeutic intervention, even though she had declined to participate in certain of the therapy that had been offered. She was currently prescribed oral medication. She had recently had contact with her clinical manager. Appointments had been made and kept in the past and appointments were scheduled for the future.
Ms Minchin pointed out that this was the least intrusive intervention and that it seemed to be progressing satisfactorily. The least intrusive intervention was also, she pointed out, usually the most effective therapeutically.
I note that this approach is also in accordance with the objectives of the Mental Health (Treatment and Care) Act as set out in s 7.
Mr Doig, in his submissions, made three further important points. He pointed out that the recommendation of the ACAT was, in effect, a psychiatric treatment order (a mental health order) given that it was in terms of s 29(1)(b)(i) and (ii) of the Mental Health (Treatment and Care) Act, as I suggested earlier (at [51]). For the Court to make such an order when the ACAT declined to make such an order would be at least odd.
He next pointed out that I should not accept that, when the disposition on the more serious offences was effectively to take no action at all, since the ACAT, no doubt for proper reasons, declined to make a mental health order on them, I should proceed in accordance with its recommendation effectively to make such an order, unlimited as to time, on the less – and, in some cases, much less – serious offences.
Finally, he pointed out that the evidence before me showed that currently there was no need for an order of the kind recommended.
None of these were criticisms of the ACAT. It was acting in accordance with the legislation and on the evidence before it. Any criticism was of the legislation itself and how it did not appear to be based on an understanding of the practicalities of the procedures under which the Court must operate.
For the Court to make a seriously interventionist order on charges that were punishable by sentences of less than two years imprisonment when an offence punishable by twenty-five years imprisonment resulted in no action at all does not seem to accord with justice. In an appropriate case, it may, however, be justified. This is not one of them.
The evidence showed that Ms McGuckin was engaging with the Tuggeranong Mental Health Team, so there seemed to me no reason to make an order in the terms of the recommendation by the ACAT. Thus, it does not seem appropriate to make such an order.
For these reasons, I declined to make any further orders.
I note one matter of procedure which may usefully be addressed administratively. The Report of the ACAT is a report to the Court. The document received showed that it had been distributed by the ACAT to the parties as well as to other Mental Health agencies. While I can understand the helpful motivation for that, it seems to me that it is a report to the Court and it is for the Court to decide to whom it is to be distributed and not the ACAT.
| I certify that the preceding sixty-six [66] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of his Honour Acting Chief Justice Refshauge. Associate: Date: 28 January 2015 |
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