R v Kidd

[2002] QCA 433

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

R v Kidd [2002] QCA 433

PARTIES:

R
v
KIDD, Jason Lester
(appellant)

FILE NO/S:

CA No 171 of 2002
SC No 243 of 2002

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

Appeal against Conviction

ORIGINATING COURT:

Supreme Court at Brisbane

DELIVERED EXTEMPORE ON:

16 October 2002

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

16 October 2002

JUDGES:

McMurdo P, Davies JA and Cullinane J
Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court;  each concurring as to the order made

ORDER:

Appeal against conviction dismissed

CATCHWORDS:

CRIMINAL LAW - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL AND INQUIRY AFTER CONVICTION - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - PARTICULAR GROUNDS - MISDIRECTION AND NON-DIRECTION - GENERAL MATTERS - CONSIDERATION OF SUMMING UP AS A WHOLE - where appellant convicted of manslaughter - where in the summing-up the learned trial judge referred to community standards in the concept of the standard of proof - whether the learned trial judge misdirected the jury as to the standard of proof

Dawson v The Queen (1961) 106 CLR 1, considered

R v Irlam;  Ex parte Attorney-General [2002] QCA 235; CA No 157 of 2002 and CA No 173 of 2002, 28 June 2002, considered

R v Punj [2002] QCA 333; CA No 331 of 2001, 3 September 2002, considered

COUNSEL:

A J Rafter for appellant
M J Copley for respondent

SOLICITORS:

Legal Aid Queensland for appellant
Director of Public Prosecutions (Queensland) for respondent

DAVIES JA:  The appellant was convicted after a trial on
27 April 2002 of manslaughter on or about 17 February 2000.  He appeals against that conviction.  It is not contended by Mr Rafter on his behalf that it was not open to the jury to infer from the evidence before it the facts sufficient to satisfy them beyond reasonable doubt of the appellant's guilt of that offence.  However he contends that there was a miscarriage of justice in consequence of a misdirection by the learned trial judge on the standard of proof.  All other grounds of appeal were abandoned.

The case against the appellant was a circumstantial one.  It could not have been disputed that the appellant and the deceased had been for some time drinking together in the appellant's flat, the deceased having been a friend of the appellant, working with him at the same place of employment and having a flat in the same building.

Some time after 11 p.m. on the night in question an off-duty police officer who resided in the same block of flats heard a sound similar to a breaking bottle emanating from the direction of the appellant's flat.  Another witness who resided in the next door block of flats heard glass smashing and arguing coming from the appellant's flat at about 11.50 p.m.  The argument, however, appeared to involve only a male and a female voice.  The appellant's de facto wife also resided in the flat with him.

Shortly before midnight the police answered an emergency call, apparently made by the appellant.  When…