R v Hoskin - [2020] QCA 10

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

R v Hoskin [2020] QCA 10

PARTIES:

R
v
HOSKIN, Samantha Jane
(applicant)

FILE NO/S:

CA No 311 of 2019
SC No 87 of 2018

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

Sentence Application

ORIGINATING COURT:

Supreme Court at Rockhampton – Date of Sentence: 11 November 2019 (Crow J)

DELIVERED EX TEMPORE ON:

6 February 2020

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

6 February 2020

JUDGES:

Fraser and Morrison JJA and Boddice J

ORDERS:

1.   Allow the application for leave to appeal.

2.   Allow the appeal.

3.   Set aside the orders made on 11 November 2019.

4.   Sentence the applicant to 18 months’ imprisonment.

5.   Declare the 87 days already served as time served under the sentence.

6.   The applicant be released on parole as from 6 February 2020.

CATCHWORDS:

CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE – GROUNDS FOR INTERFERENCE – SENTENCE MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE OR INADEQUATE – where the applicant was sentenced, on her own plea of guilty, on one count of supplying a dangerous drug, methylamphetamine, with a circumstance of aggravation – where the aggravating circumstance was that the drug was administered to a girl, MEB, only 16 years old – where the sentence imposed was two years’ imprisonment, with a parole release date set after serving eight months – whether the sentence is manifestly excessive

CRIMINAL LAW – SENTENCE – SENTENCING PROCEDURE – FACTUAL BASIS FOR SENTENCE – GENERALLY – where the learned sentencing judge erred in his understanding of the applicant’s past criminal history – where that led to the misunderstanding that the earliest offences occurred when the applicant was 19, and leniency was extended because of her youth – where it is difficult to conclude that the error might not have had an influence on the way the offending conduct was characterised

CRIMINAL LAW – SENTENCE – SENTENCING PROCEDURE – FACTUAL BASIS FOR SENTENCE – GENERALLY – where there was a mischaracterisation of the factual basis for sentencing, insofar as it was said that: “when the child said no, she did not want to be injected, you honestly but unreasonably believed that the child wanted the drug but could not inject it herself because of her … phobia” – where the agreed schedule of facts makes it plain that MEB did not wish to be injected at all

CRIMINAL LAW – SENTENCE – SENTENCING PROCEDURE – APPROACH TO SENTENCING PROCESS – GENERALLY – where the learned sentencing judge’s approach treated the applicant’s response to the probation order, and its requirement to address drug-related problems, as separate from efforts to deal with the applicant’s psychiatric condition – where the psychiatric report makes it plain that the applicant’s psychiatric conditions impacted upon her ability to respond to efforts to deal with her drug addiction

CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE – GROUNDS FOR INTERFERENCE – SENTENCE MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE OR INADEQUATE – where the foregoing is sufficient to demonstrate that the sentencing discretion was affected by errors,…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v Hoskin

Details

AGLC: R v Hoskin [2020] QCA 10
Case: [2020] QCA 10
Decision Date: 6 February 2020

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of R v Hoskin, the applicant appealed against her sentence for supplying methylamphetamine to a minor. The applicant pleaded guilty to the charge, which included an aggravating circumstance as the drug was administered to a 16-year-old girl. The sentencing judge imposed a sentence of two years' imprisonment, with parole eligibility after eight months. The applicant contended that the sentence was manifestly excessive. The appeal raised issues about whether the sentence was influenced by errors in the sentencing judge's understanding of the applicant's criminal history, mischaracterisation of the facts, and a failure to properly consider the applicant's psychiatric condition in the sentencing process.

The court examined whether the sentence was manifestly excessive or inadequate, considering the applicant's psychiatric condition and the effects of her substance abuse, which lessened the value of the sentence for general and personal deterrence. Additionally, the court assessed whether the sentencing judge's approach to sentencing, which treated the applicant's response to a probation order and her psychiatric condition separately, was flawed. The court found that the sentencing judge's errors likely influenced the characterisation of the offending conduct, and therefore the sentencing discretion was affected by these errors.

The court allowed the appeal, set aside the original sentence, and resentenced the applicant to 18 months’ imprisonment, declaring the 87 days already served as time served under the new sentence. The court ordered the applicant to be released on parole from 6 February 2020. This decision recognised the applicant's efforts towards rehabilitation and her willingness to address her psychiatric condition, aligning the new sentence with precedents where similar offences involved willing participation by the minor and steps towards rehabilitation, without elements of corruption.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Allow the application for leave to appeal.

2. Allow the appeal.

3. Set aside the orders made on 11 November 2019.

4. Sentence the applicant to 18 months’ imprisonment.

5. Declare the 87 days already served as time served under the sentence.

6. The applicant be released on parole as from 6 February 2020.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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CITATION:	R v Hoskin [2020] QCA 10
PARTIES:	R v HOSKIN, Samantha Jane (applicant)
FILE NO/S:	CA No 311 of 2019 SC No 87 of 2018
DIVISION:	Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING:	Sentence Application
ORIGINATING COURT:	Supreme Court at Rockhampton – Date of Sentence: 11 November 2019 (Crow J)
DELIVERED EX TEMPORE ON:	6 February 2020
DELIVERED AT:	Brisbane
HEARING DATE:	6 February 2020
JUDGES:	Fraser and Morrison JJA and Boddice J
ORDERS:	1. Allow the application for leave to appeal. 2. Allow the appeal. 3. Set aside the orders made on 11 November 2019. 4. Sentence the applicant to 18 months’ imprisonment. 5. Declare the 87 days already served as time served under the sentence. 6. The applicant be released on parole as from 6 February 2020.
CATCHWORDS:	CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE – GROUNDS FOR INTERFERENCE – SENTENCE MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE OR INADEQUATE – where the applicant was sentenced, on her own plea of guilty, on one count of supplying a dangerous drug, methylamphetamine, with a circumstance of aggravation – where the aggravating circumstance was that the drug was administered to a girl, MEB, only 16 years old – where the sentence imposed was two years’ imprisonment, with a parole release date set after serving eight months – whether the sentence is manifestly excessive CRIMINAL LAW – SENTENCE – SENTENCING PROCEDURE – FACTUAL BASIS FOR SENTENCE – GENERALLY – where the learned sentencing judge erred in his understanding of the applicant’s past criminal history – where that led to the misunderstanding that the earliest offences occurred when the applicant was 19, and leniency was extended because of her youth – where it is difficult to conclude that the error might not have had an influence on the way the offending conduct was characterised CRIMINAL LAW – SENTENCE – SENTENCING PROCEDURE – FACTUAL BASIS FOR SENTENCE – GENERALLY – where there was a mischaracterisation of the factual basis for sentencing, insofar as it was said that: “when the child said no, she did not want to be injected, you honestly but unreasonably believed that the child wanted the drug but could not inject it herself because of her … phobia” – where the agreed schedule of facts makes it plain that MEB did not wish to be injected at all CRIMINAL LAW – SENTENCE – SENTENCING PROCEDURE – APPROACH TO SENTENCING PROCESS – GENERALLY – where the learned sentencing judge’s approach treated the applicant’s response to the probation order, and its requirement to address drug-related problems, as separate from efforts to deal with the applicant’s psychiatric condition – where the psychiatric report makes it plain that the applicant’s psychiatric conditions impacted upon her ability to respond to efforts to deal with her drug addiction CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE – GROUNDS FOR INTERFERENCE – SENTENCE MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE OR INADEQUATE – where the foregoing is sufficient to demonstrate that the sentencing discretion was affected by errors,…