R v Guise - [1998] QCA 158

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL	[1998] QCA 158
SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

C.A. No. 96 of 1998.

Brisbane

[R v. Guise]

T H E Q U E E N

DEBBIE MAREE GUISE

Appellant
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Pincus J.A. Ambrose J. Lee J.

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Judgment delivered 19 June 1998

Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court, each agreeing as to the orders made. ___________________________________________________________________________

APPEAL AGAINST CONVICTION ALLOWED, VERDICT OF MURDER SET ASIDE
AND A NEW TRIAL FOR MURDER ORDERED.

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CATCHWORDS: CRIMINAL LAW - Murder - appeal against conviction - whether the

trial judge should have left to the jury a defence of accident - appellant denied the existence of the intention necessary to constitute murder - appellant claimed she only intended to frighten the victim - where Crown’s manslaughter case rested on s. 289 Criminal Code - whether the trial judge was entitled to accept the appellant’s concession that the appellant was guilty of manslaughter - whether there was a miscarriage of justice - whether a verdict of manslaughter should be substituted.
Criminal Code ss. 23, 289
Callaghan (1952) 87 C.L.R. 115
Evgeniou (1964) 37 A.L.J.R. 508
Auld (C.A. No. 80 of 1997, 11 July 1997)
O’Halloran [1967] Qd.R. 1
Pemble (1971) 124 C.L.R. 107
Williamson (1996) 67 S.A.S.R. 428
Griffiths (1994) 69 A.L.J.R. 77

Counsel:	Mr C Chowdhury for the respondent. Mr A J Kimmins for the appellant.
Solicitors:	Director of Public Prosecutions (Queensland) for the respondent. Stockley Furlong for the appellant.
Hearing date:	3 June 1998.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT - PINCUS J.A.

Judgment delivered 19 June 1998

The appellant was convicted of murder in the Supreme Court at Rockhampton and appeals on the basis that the primary judge inadequately directed the jury. The only complaint made is that the judge should have left to the jury a defence of accident. The Crown case was that the appellant shot her mother, towards whom she had previously displayed some animosity, killing her. That was not disputed and the defence was that there was no adequate proof of the requisite intention to constitute murder, so that the appellant should be convicted of manslaughter only. The judge told the jury, in effect, that if they were not satisfied of the requisite intention they should find the appellant not guilty of murder and added "you will then be asked, do you find her guilty or not guilty of manslaughter, and you will on the evidence find her guilty of manslaughter".

There are passages in the appellant’s evidence, some aspects of which evidence seem very improbable, which amount to denials of the existence of the intention necessary to constitute murder; for example, the appellant said that she "just wanted to scare" her mother. When asked whether she aimed the gun at her mother, she answered, "No, my arm just come out".

Counsel for the appellant pointed out that in the course of the trial judge’s directions to the jury his Honour mentioned a prosecution submission that "there cannot be any…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v Guise

Details

AGLC: R v Guise [1998] QCA 158
Case: [1998] QCA 158
Decision Date: 19/06/1998

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of R v. Guise involved an appeal by the appellant, Debbie Maree Guise, against her conviction of murder in the Supreme Court at Rockhampton. The appellant claimed that the primary judge had inadequately directed the jury, particularly in not leaving to the jury a defence of accident. The Crown's case was that the appellant had shot her mother, towards whom she had previously displayed some animosity, killing her. The defence argued that there was no adequate proof of the requisite intention to constitute murder, and that the appellant should be convicted of manslaughter only. The trial judge had directed the jury that if they were not satisfied of the requisite intention, they should find the appellant not guilty of murder and consider a verdict of manslaughter.

The legal issues in this case focused on whether the trial judge should have left to the jury a defence of accident, and whether the judge was entitled to accept the appellant's concession that she was guilty of manslaughter. The court needed to consider the relevant statutory provisions, particularly sections 23 and 289 of the Criminal Code, and determine whether the trial judge's directions to the jury were adequate. The court also needed to assess whether there was a miscarriage of justice and whether a verdict of manslaughter should be substituted.

The court found that the trial judge did not adequately direct the jury on the issue of accident. The judge did not discuss section 23 of the Criminal Code, because the Crown's manslaughter case rested on section 289. However, the judge did not give directions under section 289 either, because it was common ground that the appellant was at least guilty of manslaughter. The court held that generally, if not universally, the trial judge is not entitled to accept a concession regarding the appellant's guilt of manslaughter and is obliged to explain to the jury the matters they must be satisfied in order to convict of manslaughter. In this case, the trial judge had not done so.

The court allowed the appeal, set aside the verdict of murder, and ordered a new trial for murder. The court noted that the evidence supporting the verdict of murder was very strong, but the case must be tried again due to the trial judge's inadequate directions to the jury.

Orders