R v Courtney, Lomas and Duggan

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127/1998

PARTIES:  R
  v
  COURTNEY, Gary William

LOMAS, Jeffrey Joseph
DUGGAN, John Frederick

TITLE OF COURT:  SUPREME COURT OF TASMANIA
JURISDICTION:  ORIGINAL
FILE NO/S:  C177/1998
DELIVERED:  15 October 1998
HEARING DATE/S:  12, 13 October 1998
JUDGMENT OF:  Underwood J

CATCHWORDS:

Criminal Law - Jurisdiction practice and procedure - Information, indictment or presentment - Joinder - Joint or separate trials - Generally - Discretion of trial judge to make orders - Factors relevant to the exercise of the discretion.

Criminal Code 1924 (Tas), s363.

Leaman v R 9/1987; R v Darby (1981 - 1982) 148 CLR 668, applied.
Aust Dig Criminal Law [725]

REPRESENTATION:

Counsel:
             Crown:  D J Coates and M P Bugg
             Accused Courtney:  J W Avery
             Accused Lomas:  W M Hodgman QC and G D Meyer
             Accused Duggan:  K B Procter
Solicitors:
             Crown:  Director of Public Prosecutions
             Accused Courtney:  Avery Keal
             Accused Lomas:  Milton & Meyer
             Accused Duggan:  Murdoch Clarke

Judgment category classification:
Court Computer Code:  
Judgment ID Number:  127/1998
Number of pages:  6

Serial No 127/1998
File No C177/1998      

THE QUEEN v GARY WILLIAM COURTNEY,
JEFFREY JOSEPH LOMAS AND JOHN FREDERICK DUGGAN

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT  UNDERWOOD J

15 October 1998

Introduction

Gary William Courtney ("Courtney"), Jeffrey Joseph Lomas ("Lomas") and John Frederick Duggan ("Duggan") have pleaded not guilty to the murder of Leo John Rogers at Glenorchy on 6 May 1995.  Lomas and Duggan have made an application before the jury has been empanelled (Criminal Code, s361A) for an order that they be tried separately from Courtney.

The Crown case against each accused is that he either:

  1. struck the fatal blow or blows with the requisite guilty state of mind;

  2. aided and/or abetted the others, or one of the others, to commit the crime charged; or

  3. formed a common intention with the others, or one of the others, to prosecute an unlawful purpose and the murder was a probable consequence of such prosecution.

There will be forensic evidence from which the jury might conclude that the deceased was stabbed sixty-six times with two weapons.  The deceased was related to Courtney.  The Crown case is that between about 7.30pm and 10.50pm on 6 May 1995, the three accused went to the home of the deceased and there each committed the crime charged in one of the three ways set out above.  The Crown case is that Courtney's young son was the victim of sexual abuse at the hands of one Jed Thurley and that Courtney was enraged, not only about the attack on his son, but also about paedophiles generally.  The Crown contends that the evidence it proposes to lead will enable the jury to conclude that on the evening of 6 May 1995, Courtney was with the other two accused and that all three were affected by drugs that they had consumed that evening.  The Crown further contends that the jury could conclude that Courtney believed that the deceased was a paedophile and, in an intoxicated rage, the three accused went to the deceased's home…

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Details
Case
[1998] TASSC 127
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Supreme Court of Tasmania was tasked with deciding whether Jeffrey Joseph Lomas and John Frederick Duggan should be tried separately from Gary William Courtney, who were all charged with the murder of Leo John Rogers. Lomas and Duggan applied for a separate trial prior to the jury being empanelled, citing potential prejudice due to the admission of evidence that would be inadmissible on their individual trials. The court had to determine whether a joint trial would deprive any of the accused of a fair trial, considering the principles laid out in previous cases like Leaman v R and R v Darby.

The court examined the evidence that was to be admitted against Courtney but not against Lomas and Duggan, which included statements made by Courtney to the police regarding the actions and words of Lomas and Duggan. The court assessed the prejudicial effect of this evidence on Lomas and Duggan, considering whether the jury could reasonably be expected to disregard the inadmissible evidence and whether the prejudice was so great that it would deny them a fair trial. The court found that the Crown's case would include evidence negating any prejudicial effect of Courtney's statements, and that appropriate jury directions would mitigate any remaining prejudice.

The court concluded that the case at hand was distinguishable from previous cases like Leaman and Piller, where the prejudicial effect was significantly greater. While the Crown's case against Courtney was stronger, the court did not find that Lomas and Duggan would be denied a fair trial if tried jointly with Courtney. The application for separate trials was dismissed, and the trial proceeded with all three accused jointly.

Background

Background to the litigation

Gary William Courtney, Jeffrey Joseph Lomas, and John Frederick Duggan are charged with the murder of Leo John Rogers, which occurred on 6 May 1995 at Glenorchy. The Crown's case against the accused rests heavily on circumstantial evidence, suggesting that the three men went to Rogers' home with the intent to commit murder, either by directly striking fatal blows, aiding and abetting the act, or forming a common intention to prosecute an unlawful purpose resulting in the murder. The Crown intends to present forensic evidence indicating that Rogers was stabbed sixty-six times with two weapons. The accused have pleaded not guilty, and the trial is expected to last eight weeks with over 100 witnesses called by the Crown. Lomas and Duggan have applied for separate trials from Courtney, citing the potential for a miscarriage of justice if prejudicial evidence admissible only against Courtney is presented.

The case against the accused hinges on statements made by Courtney to the police, which are not admissible against Lomas and Duggan. This evidence includes Courtney's claims about the accused's character, their activities on the night of the murder, and allegations that hint at Lomas and Duggan's involvement in the killing without providing explicit details. The Crown contends that much of what Courtney told the police is false and that the accused concocted a story together after the murder to cover their tracks. The prejudicial value of Courtney's statements, according to the Crown, is mitigated by other admissible evidence and appropriate jury directions. Lomas and Duggan's counsel argue that the inadmissible evidence will irreparably prejudice their clients' right to a fair trial. The Crown, however, maintains that any potential prejudice can be neutralized by jury instructions, and the trial judge is not persuaded that separate trials are necessary to ensure a fair trial for all accused.

The case of R v Courtney, Lomas and Duggan came before the Supreme Court of Tasmania in an original jurisdiction matter. The accused, Gary William Courtney, Jeffrey Joseph Lomas, and John Frederick Duggan, pleaded not guilty to the murder of Leo John Rogers, which allegedly occurred on 6 May 1995. Prior to the jury being empanelled, Lomas and Duggan applied for separate trials from Courtney under section 363 of the Criminal Code. They argued that a joint trial would result in a miscarriage of justice due to the admission of prejudicial evidence that would be admissible only on the trial of Courtney. The Crown, represented by D J Coates and M P Bugg, opposed the application, maintaining that the prejudicial effect of the inadmissible evidence could be neutralised by appropriate jury directions. The case was heard over two days, on 12 and 13 October 1998, and judgment was delivered by Underwood J on 15 October 1998. The court considered the principles applicable to the exercise of the discretion under section 363, drawing from the High Court decision in R v Darby and the Tasmanian Court of Criminal Appeal decision in Leaman v R. The court found that while the Crown case against Courtney was stronger, the prejudicial effect of the inadmissible evidence could be managed through jury directions, and therefore dismissed the application for separate trials.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the trial judge has the discretion to order separate trials for the accused persons under section 363 of the Criminal Code 1924 (Tas).

2. Whether the prejudicial effect of inadmissible evidence on one accused person can be adequately neutralised by appropriate jury instructions to ensure a fair trial for all accused persons.

3. Whether the Crown's case against each accused person is significantly weaker or different, such that a joint trial would cause an injustice.

4. Whether the evidence against an applicant for a separate trial is significantly weaker and different to that admissible against a joint accused, and if so, whether this persuades the court to order separate trials.

5. Whether the Crown's evidence against Courtney is stronger than against Lomas and Duggan, and if so, whether this fact alone or in conjunction with other matters persuades the court to order separate trials.

6. Whether the direction a trial judge would have to give in a conspiracy trial involving only two persons, where the evidence against one accused is significantly different from the evidence against the other, would result in injustice to one accused.

7. Whether the circumstances of this case bear resemblance to the circumstances which caused the High Court to make obiter dicta observations in R v Darby, such that the rationale for requiring separate trials in cases where the evidence against one accused is significantly different from the evidence against the other, is applicable.

Held
1. The trial judge has the discretion to order separate trials for the accused persons under section 363 of the Criminal Code 1924 (Tas). The court concluded that the exercise of this discretion should not be exercised in favor of the applicants, and the application was dismissed.

2. The prejudicial effect of inadmissible evidence on one accused person can be adequately neutralised by appropriate jury instructions to ensure a fair trial for all accused persons. The court found that an appropriate direction to the jury would cure any risk of prejudice.

3. The Crown's case against each accused person is not significantly weaker or different, such that a joint trial would cause an injustice. The court concluded that neither fact alone, nor that fact in conjunction with the matters referred to earlier in these reasons for judgment, persuades the court that either of the applicants will be denied a fair trial if they are tried jointly with Courtney.

4. The evidence against an applicant for a separate trial is not significantly weaker and different to that admissible against a joint accused, and this does not persuade the court to order separate trials. The court found that the evidence against Lomas and Duggan is not significantly weaker and different to that admissible against Courtney.

5. The Crown's evidence against Courtney is stronger than against Lomas and Duggan, but this fact alone or in conjunction with other matters does not persuade the court to order separate trials. The court concluded that neither that fact alone, nor that fact in conjunction with the matters referred to earlier in these reasons for judgment, persuades the court that either of the applicants will be denied a fair trial if they are tried jointly with Courtney.

6. The direction a trial judge would have to give in a conspiracy trial involving only two persons, where the evidence against one accused is significantly different from the evidence against the other, would not result in injustice to one accused in this case. The court concluded that the circumstances of this case do not resemble the circumstances which caused the High Court to make obiter dicta observations in R v Darby.

7. The circumstances of this case do not bear resemblance to the circumstances which caused the High Court to make obiter dicta observations in R v Darby, such that the rationale for requiring separate trials in cases where the evidence against one accused is significantly different from the evidence against the other, is not applicable. The court concluded that the circumstances of this case do not warrant the exercise of the discretion to order separate trials.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In considering whether the trial judge has the discretion to order separate trials for the accused persons under section 363 of the Criminal Code 1924 (Tas), the Supreme Court of Tasmania applied the principles set out in Leaman v R and R v Darby. The court held that while the prima facie rule is that accused persons engaged in a joint or common enterprise should be tried jointly, this principle is subject to the proviso that no accused person should be deprived of their right to a fair trial. The court found that the prejudicial effect of inadmissible evidence on one accused person could be adequately neutralised by appropriate jury instructions to ensure a fair trial for all accused persons. The court also held that a joint trial would not cause an injustice to Lomas and Duggan if they were tried jointly with Courtney, as the Crown's case against each accused person was not significantly weaker or different. In particular, the court found that the prejudicial effect of the inadmissible evidence relied upon by Lomas and Duggan was negligible, as there was other admissible evidence that would negate any prejudice. The court distinguished this case from the circumstances which caused the High Court to make obiter dicta observations in R v Darby, and held that the rationale for requiring separate trials in cases where the evidence against one accused is significantly different from the evidence against the other, is not applicable. Therefore, the trial judge did not have the discretion to order separate trials for the accused persons.

The ratio decidendi of this case is that while the prima facie rule is that accused persons engaged in a joint or common enterprise should be tried jointly, this principle is subject to the proviso that no accused person should be deprived of their right to a fair trial. The prejudicial effect of inadmissible evidence on one accused person can be adequately neutralised by appropriate jury instructions to ensure a fair trial for all accused persons. However, if the Crown's case against each accused person is not significantly weaker or different, and the prejudicial effect of inadmissible evidence can be negated by other admissible evidence, then a joint trial will not cause an injustice to any of the accused persons. The court distinguished this case from the circumstances which caused the High Court to make obiter dicta observations in R v Darby, and held that the rationale for requiring separate trials in cases where the evidence against one accused is significantly different from the evidence against the other, is not applicable.