PARTIES: R
v
STOCKS, Michael Keith
and
THORLEY, Geoffrey Ian
TITLE OF COURT: SUPREME COURT OF TASMANIA
JURISDICTION: CRIMINAL
FILE NO/S: 120/1997
DELIVERED: 22 April 1999
HEARING DATE/S: 20 April 1999
RULING OF: Slicer J
Edited edition of reasons for ruling delivered orally.
REPRESENTATION:
Counsel:
Prosecution: J N Perks and M P Shirley
First Accused: W M Hodgman QC and W E Hodgman
Second Accused: G L Sealy and P A Warmbrunn
Solicitors:
Prosecution: Director of Public Prosecutions
First Accused: Wallace Wilkinson and Webster
Second Accused: Piggott Wood and Baker
Judgment category classification:
Judgment ID Number: [1999] TASSC 44
Number of pages: 6
Serial No 44/1999
File No 120/1997
THE QUEEN v MICHAEL KEITH STOCKS and
GEOFFREY IAN THORLEY
REASONS FOR RULING SLICER J
DELIVERED ORALLY 22 April 1999
Applications are made by both accused for their trials to be held separately. They are jointly charged with the crime of trafficking in a prohibited substance contrary to the Poisons Act 1971. On its face, the terms of the indictment would require there to be a joint trial. However, particulars provided by the Crown in accordance with the Criminal Code, s314, show the question to be more complex. The particulars, as originally provided, define the case against each accused in different terms. In essence, both accused are said to have profited from enterprises conducted either by themselves or others. However, profit was derived from enterprises, some of which were separately conducted and did not involve the accused.
Thorley
The particulars provided in relation to the case brought against each accused can be compared in the following manner:
STOCKS THORLEY (1) Between 20 January 1995 and 17 February 1997, he trafficked in Indian hemp which he, in company with Thorley and Ewings, had grown and cultivated at 55 Wellington Street, Hobart.
(1) Between 22 January 1995 and 17 February 1997, he trafficked in Indian hemp which he, in company with Stocks and Ewings, had grown and cultivated at 55 Wellington Street, Hobart. (2) Between 20 January 1995 and 17 February 1997, he trafficked in Indian hemp which he, Thorley, Ewings and Smith had grown and cultivated at 97 Charles Street, Moonah.
(2) Between 22 January 1995 and 17 February 1997, he trafficked in Indian hemp which he, Stocks, Ewings and Smith had grown and cultivated at 97 Charles Street, Moonah. (3) Between 20 January 1995 and 17 February 1997, he trafficked in Indian hemp which Ewings had grown at Charlotte Street, New Norfolk.
(3) No particulars were provided and no allegation made. (4) Between 20 January 1995 and 17 February 1997, he trafficked in Indian hemp which he and Stocks had grown and cultivated at Argyle Street, Hobart. (4) No particulars were provided and no allegation made.
At the conclusion of submissions made by the respective parties, the Crown amended the particulars so as to remove from its case any allegation and evidence concerning conduct involving the premises at Charlotte and Argyle Streets. The withdrawal of those particulars…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read R v Thorley, Geoffrey Ian and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [1999] TASSC 45
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the principles governing joint trials, recognising that while some evidence might be admissible against one accused and not the other, this alone does not necessitate separate trials. However, the court also acknowledged the potential prejudice arising from a joint trial, particularly in cases relying heavily on circumstantial evidence. The court had to balance the complexity of the evidence and the potential for prejudice against the efficiency of a joint trial. In the end, the court found that the complexity of the circumstantial evidence and the distinct particulars against each accused warranted separate trials for Thorley, to ensure his case was properly considered without undue prejudice from the evidence admissible against Stocks.
The court ruled that the application for a separate trial by Stocks was to be refused, but granted Thorley's application for a separate trial. This decision was based on the need to avoid prejudice and to allow Thorley's case to be assessed on its own merits, separate from the distinct and partly shared evidence against Stocks. The court's ruling highlighted the difficulties inherent in joint trials involving circumstantial evidence and the importance of ensuring that each accused has a fair opportunity to defend themselves against the specific evidence adduced against them.
Background
Background to the litigation
The case of R v Thorley, Geoffrey Ian and Michael Keith Stocks commenced in the Supreme Court of Tasmania as a joint criminal trial concerning charges of trafficking in a prohibited substance under the Poisons Act 1971. Both accused, Thorley and Stocks, applied for their trials to be held separately, a request which was considered by Slicer J. The particulars provided by the Crown revealed differences in the details of the alleged conduct against each accused, complicating the potential for a joint trial. Initially, the particulars indicated separate and distinct involvement in the trafficking enterprise, which raised concerns about the admissibility of evidence and potential prejudice. Following submissions from the parties, the Crown amended the particulars, withdrawing allegations concerning certain premises. Despite this amendment, the court found that the remaining evidence still presented significant challenges for a joint trial, particularly in ensuring that each accused received a fair assessment of the evidence pertinent to their individual involvement. The court ruled that while Stocks' application for a separate trial was refused, Thorley's application was granted due to the complexities and potential for prejudice in a joint trial setting.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the court should grant an application for a separate trial to the accused Thorley.
2. Whether the court should grant an application for a separate trial to the accused Stocks.
3. Whether the particulars provided in relation to the case brought against each accused sufficiently identify the respective acts or course of conduct of each accused in the commission of the crime.
4. Whether the evidence of certain witnesses would be inadmissible on the trial of Thorley.
5. Whether the evidence of the presence of Indian hemp at Bathurst Street can be used by the jury in their consideration of the case against Thorley in relation to Wellington and Charles Streets.
6. Whether the jury can properly infer that Thorley is guilty of trafficking based on the circumstantial evidence presented.
Held
1. Whether the court should grant an application for a separate trial to the accused Thorley.
The court concluded that Thorley's application for a separate trial should be granted to ensure his case is properly considered, especially given the complexity of the circumstantial evidence.
2. Whether the court should grant an application for a separate trial to the accused Stocks.
The court concluded that Stocks' application for a separate trial should be refused as the evidence against him was sufficiently distinct from Thorley's case.
3. Whether the particulars provided in relation to the case brought against each accused sufficiently identify the respective acts or course of conduct of each accused in the commission of the crime.
The court concluded that the particulars provided were adequate to identify the respective acts and conduct of each accused, thus enabling the jury to determine their guilt based on the primary evidence.
4. Whether the evidence of certain witnesses would be inadmissible on the trial of Thorley.
The court concluded that while some evidence would be inadmissible on Thorley's trial, others might be relevant and admissible, and the parties should not assume the ruling determines the admissibility of such evidence.
5. Whether the evidence of the presence of Indian hemp at Bathurst Street can be used by the jury in their consideration of the case against Thorley in relation to Wellington and Charles Streets.
The court concluded that the evidence of the presence of Indian hemp at Bathurst Street could not be properly used by the jury in their consideration of the case against Thorley unless there was an evidentiary nexus between the presence of the plants and Thorley.
6. Whether the jury can properly infer that Thorley is guilty of trafficking based on the circumstantial evidence presented.
The court concluded that a finding by the jury that Indian hemp was cultivated at Wellington and Charles Streets did not necessarily permit a conclusion that Thorley was guilty of trafficking, as there was only indirect or circumstantial evidence linking him to further processing and distribution.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Court in R v Thorley, Geoffrey Ian deliberated on the applications for separate trials made by both accused, Thorley and Stocks, who were jointly charged with trafficking in a prohibited substance under the Poisons Act 1971. The Court noted that while the indictment suggested a joint trial, the particulars provided by the Crown under the Criminal Code, s314, complicated the matter. The particulars initially defined the case against each accused differently, suggesting that while both profited from enterprises, some of these did not involve the accused. However, the Crown later amended the particulars, removing allegations concerning certain premises, which somewhat alleviated the potential prejudice of verdict by association and the use of tainted evidence.
Regarding the applications for separate trials, the Court observed that while some evidence might be admissible against one accused and not the other, this alone is not a sufficient reason for separate trials. Instead, the remedy might lie in the exclusion of otherwise admissible evidence. The Court also considered the role of particulars, which govern the parameters of the case against each accused, permitting the determination of guilt based on the primary evidence adduced. The Court referred to previous cases such as James v R and Riseley v R to highlight the necessity of identifying and separating factual issues to ensure justice is served.
The Court then turned to the adequacy of the particulars provided in relation to each accused. The particulars were intended to identify the respective acts or course of conduct of each accused in the commission of the crime. For Stocks, the particulars defined his involvement with Thorley and others at Wellington and Charles Streets. For Thorley, the particulars defined his involvement with Stocks and others at Wellington and Charles Streets, but no particulars were provided concerning the Bathurst Street premises. The Court found that while the particulars against Stocks were clear and direct, those against Thorley were more ambiguous, particularly regarding the Bathurst Street premises.
The Court also considered whether the evidence of certain witnesses would be inadmissible on the trial of Thorley. It noted that while some evidence might be relevant and admissible against Stocks, it might not be admissible against Thorley. This was particularly relevant given the circumstantial nature of the case against Thorley, which relied on inferences and associations that might not be as clear or straightforward as those against Stocks.
The Court then addressed whether the evidence of the presence of Indian hemp at Bathurst Street could be used by the jury in their consideration of the case against Thorley in relation to Wellington and Charles Streets. The Court found that the only nexus between the evidence at Bathurst Street and Thorley's involvement was through Stocks. The Court concluded that requiring the jury to make proper inferences in this context would be difficult and might lead to unjust conclusions.
Finally, the Court considered whether the jury could properly infer that Thorley was guilty of trafficking based on the circumstantial evidence presented. The Court found that while the evidence permitted a conclusion that Thorley was involved in a commercial growing operation, it did not necessarily permit a conclusion that he was involved in trafficking. The evidence of further processing and distribution was a significant issue for the jury.
In summary, the Court granted Thorley's application for a separate trial due to the complexity of the circumstantial evidence and the difficulty in ensuring a fair trial in a joint proceeding. The Court denied Stocks' application for a separate trial, finding that the evidence against him was more direct and less likely to prejudice the trial of Thorley. The ratio decidendi of this case is that in cases involving joint trials and circumstantial evidence, the Court must carefully consider whether separate trials are necessary to ensure a fair and just determination of each accused's guilt or innocence.