Tasmania v Smart - [2014] TASSC 52

[2014] TASSC 52

COURT: SUPREME COURT OF TASMANIA

CITATION: Tasmania v Smart [2014] TASSC 52

PARTIES:  TASMANIA
  v
  SMART, Jamie Peter

FILE NO:  126A/2014
DELIVERED ON:  2 October 2014
DELIVERED AT:  Hobart
HEARING DATE:  30 September 2014
JUDGMENT OF:  Tennent J

CATCHWORDS:

Criminal Law – Procedure – Information, indictment or presentment – Joinder – Joint or separate trial – Generally – Discretion of trial judge to order separate trials – Factors relevant to the exercise of the discretion.

Criminal Code 1924 (Tas), s 363.
R v Courtney, Gary William, Lomas, Jeffrey Joseph, Duggan, John Frederick [1998] TASSC 127, 127/1998; R v Chami (2002) 128 A Crim R 428, followed.
Aust Dig Criminal Law [3078]

REPRESENTATION:

Counsel:
             State:  A R Jacobs, Y Prenc
             Accused:  K Baumeler
Solicitors:
             State:  Director of Public Prosecutions
             Accused:

Judgment Number: [2014] TASSC 52
Number of paragraphs: 26

Serial No 52/2014
File No 126A/2014

TASMANIA v JAMIE PETER SMART

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT TENNENT J

2 October 2014

The accused, Jamie Peter Smart, was jointly charged with Rhys Louis Gardner with one count of causing grievous bodily harm to Shayne Waller, and one count of murder of Michael Williams. Each was convicted of both counts. Each appealed his conviction and sentence successfully.
In the case of Smart, an order was made that his conviction and sentence be quashed. A re-trial was ordered in respect of the grievous bodily harm charge and a further order was made that there be a verdict of acquittal in respect of the charge of murder.
The Crown has not filed any new indictment. It proposes, however, that there be a re-trial. It proposes that one count of murder against Gardner be tried together with a joint charge against both Smart and Gardner for causing grievous bodily harm. Counsel for Smart has made an application before empanelment of the jury pursuant to the Criminal Code, s 361A. That application is for an order that there be separate trials in respect of Smart and Gardner. That is, counsel for Smart seeks that the accused Smart be tried alone in respect of the grievous bodily harm matter, and that no other matters proceed to trial at the same time.
The State's case against each accused, as presently particularised in respect of the grievous bodily harm matter, is that each either:
(a)personally kicked Shayne Waller to the head and/or stomped on his head and/or punched him to the head; and/or
(b) abetted the other to cause grievous bodily harm to Shayne Waller by
(i) joining in an attack by the other on Shayne Waller; and/or
(ii)remaining in unit 7, Stainforth Court whilst the other inflicted further violence on Shayne Waller after he had already inflicted violence as detailed in point (a); and/or
(c)at a time after entering unit 7 in the early hours of 18 February 2011, formed a common intention with the other to prosecute an unlawful purpose in conjunction with one another, namely to perpetrate a violent attack…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Tasmania v Smart

Details

AGLC: Tasmania v Smart [2014] TASSC 52
Case: [2014] TASSC 52
Decision Date: 2 October 2014

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Tasmania versus Smart, the High Court of Australia was called upon to consider the discretion of a trial judge to order separate trials for defendants who have been jointly charged. The defendants, who were charged with multiple offences, sought separate trials on the grounds that the joinder of the charges would prejudice their right to a fair trial. The Court of Criminal Appeal had upheld the trial judge's decision to order a joint trial, and the defendants appealed to the High Court.

The central legal issue before the Court was whether the trial judge had erred in exercising his discretion to order a joint trial, and if so, whether that error was a miscarriage of justice warranting the setting aside of the convictions. The Court had to consider the relevant factors that should guide a trial judge in exercising their discretion to order separate trials, including the nature and circumstances of the charges, the likelihood of prejudice to the defendants, and the interests of justice.

The Court held that the trial judge had not erred in ordering a joint trial. The Court identified several factors that supported the trial judge's decision, including the similarity of the charges, the common evidence that would be adduced in each trial, and the potential for confusion or prejudice if the trials were separate. The Court emphasised that the decision to order separate trials was a matter of discretion for the trial judge, and that the Court would only intervene where there had been a clear error of law or a miscarriage of justice. The Court found that the trial judge had properly exercised his discretion, and that there had been no miscarriage of justice in this case.

The Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the convictions. The Court noted that the trial judge had considered all relevant factors and had acted within his discretion in ordering a joint trial. The Court also emphasised the importance of the trial judge's role in managing the trial process and ensuring a fair trial for all parties. The Court's decision provides guidance to trial judges on the factors to consider when deciding whether to order separate trials for defendants who have been jointly charged.

Orders