SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Court of Criminal Appeal)
R v CLIFFORD
[2010] SASCFC 10
Judgment of The Court of Criminal Appeal
(The Honourable Justice Duggan, The Honourable Justice Anderson and The Honourable Justice David)
2 August 2010
CRIMINAL LAW - SENTENCE - RELEVANT FACTORS - NATURE AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF OFFENDER - INTELLECTUALLY HANDICAPPED OFFENDER
CRIMINAL LAW - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE - GROUNDS FOR INTERFERENCE - SENTENCE MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE OR INADEQUATE
CRIMINAL LAW - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE - GROUNDS FOR INTERFERENCE - OTHER MATTERS
Appeal against sentence – appellant pleaded guilty to trafficking in a controlled drug – sentencing judge imposed three years' imprisonment with non-parole period of 12 months – whether sentencing judge erred in failing to suspend the sentence – whether sentencing judge placed excessive reliance on general deterrence in light of appellant's mental impairment – whether personal factors so substantial in cumulative effect that decision not to suspend was unjust.
HELD: appeal dismissed – sentencing judge correctly applied two step approach when considering length of sentence and whether to suspend – factors personal to the appellant properly taken into account – cumulative effect of personal factors not so significant that failure to suspend was unjust – in considering the impact of the mental impairment on the appellant's thought processes and capacity to appreciate significance of offending, the decision not to suspend was not unjust – the sentencing Judge gave effect to matters personal to appellant by fixing low non-parole period – no error in the sentencing process established.
Controlled Substances Act 1984 (SA) s 32(3); Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) s 38(1), referred to.
R v Wiskich (2000) 207 LSJS 431; Mason-Stuart v The Queen (1993) 61 SASR 204; Hansen v R [1995] SASC 4984; Dinsdale v The Queen (2000) 202 CLR 321, discussed.
R v CLIFFORD
[2010] SASCFC 10Court of Criminal Appeal: Duggan, Anderson and David JJ
DUGGAN J: The appellant pleaded guilty to trafficking in a controlled drug contrary to s 32(3) of the Controlled Substances Act 1984 (SA) (“the CSA”). He was sentenced to imprisonment for three years with a non‑parole period of 12 months. Permission to appeal against the sentence was granted by a single Judge of this Court.
The sole ground of appeal asserts that the sentencing Judge erred in failing to suspend the sentence. The argument put forward on the hearing of the appeal was that, given the personal circumstances of the appellant, the sentencing Judge placed too much reliance on general deterrence when considering whether to suspend the sentence.
The circumstances of the offence are not in dispute. The appellant came under the notice of a security officer at a nightclub in Hindley Street in the early hours of 16 February 2008 when he was observed receiving money from another patron. When searched, the appellant was found to be in possession of 74 tablets containing the drug methylenedioxymethamphetamine (“MDMA”) commonly known as ecstasy. Most…
Continue reading R v Clifford
Sign in free to access the full text
- AGLC
- R v Clifford [2010] SASCFC 10
- Case
- [2010] SASCFC 10
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issues before the appellate court were whether the sentencing judge had erred in failing to suspend the sentence, whether excessive reliance had been placed on the principle of general deterrence given the appellant's mental impairment, and whether the cumulative effect of the appellant's personal factors was so substantial as to render the decision not to suspend the sentence unjust.
The appellate court dismissed the appeal, finding that the sentencing judge had correctly applied the two-step approach to sentencing, first determining the appropriate length of the sentence and then considering whether to suspend it. The court held that the sentencing judge had properly taken into account the personal factors relating to the appellant, including his mental impairment. The cumulative effect of these personal factors was not considered significant enough to make the decision not to suspend unjust. The court further found that the sentencing judge had given effect to the personal circumstances of the appellant by fixing a low non-parole period, and that no error in the sentencing process had been established.
Orders
Orders of the court
Full text does not contain this section.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Full text does not contain this section.