SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Court of Appeal: Criminal)
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS (SA) v JONES
[2021] SASCA 114
Judgment of the Court of Appeal (ex tempore)
(The Honourable President Livesey, the Honourable Justice Doyle and the Honourable Justice Bleby)
13 October 2021
CRIMINAL LAW - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE - APPEALS BY CROWN - PRINCIPLES APPLIED BY APPELLATE COURT TO CROWN APPEALS
CRIMINAL LAW - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE - APPEALS BY CROWN - OTHER MATTERS
CRIMINAL LAW - PARTICULAR OFFENCES - OFFENCES AGAINST THE PERSON - ASSAULT - CIRCUMSTANCES OF AGGRAVATION AND AGGRAVATED ASSAULTS
On 5 May 2021, the respondent was found guilty of one count of aggravated cause harm with intent to cause harm. The features of aggravation were that the victim was only five years of age and the respondent was his guardian, acting as his father, at the time of the offending.
On 9 January 2019, the victim was playing with his pet dog when it became entangled in its leash and began choking. As punishment for choking the dog, the respondent placed the leash around the victim’s neck and hung him from a clothesline. When the victim’s eyes began to bulge, the respondent released him. The victim did not suffer any permanent injury.
The respondent was sentenced to a term of 12 months imprisonment with a non-parole period of six months, suspended upon entry into a good behaviour bond for 12 months in the sum of $100.
The Crown appeals against sentence on the basis that the sentence was manifestly inadequate.
Held (per the Court), refusing permission to appeal and dismissing the appeal:
1.Whilst the sentence, including the length of the good behaviour bond, is unquestionably lenient, it is not so lenient so as to warrant the intervention of this Court.
2.Although in many cases conduct of this kind might well warrant the imposition of a sentence and bond significantly longer than the length of the sentence and bond imposed in this case, the respondent’s intellectual disability makes his an inappropriate case through which to address general sentencing standards for an offence of this kind.
Sentencing Act 2017 (SA) ss 3, 4, referred to.
Birch v Fitzgerald (1975) 11 SASR 114; Everett v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 295; Muldrock v The Queen (2011) 244 CLR 120; R v Blackmore [2004] SASC 298; R v Cowe (2010) 108 SASR 225; R v Galffy [2009] SASC 261; R v Harradine [2012] SASCFC 103; R v Harris [2020] SASC 141; R v Marrone [2011] SASCFC 78; R v Monks (2019) 133 SASR 182; R v Mooney (unreported, Victorian Court of Appeal, 21 June 1978); R v Osenkowski (1982) 30 SASR 212; R v Partridge (2008) 102 SASR 233; Webb v O’Sullivan [1952] SASR 65; Yardley v Betts (1979) 22 SASR 108, discussed.
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS (SA) v JONES
[2021] SASCA 114Court of Appeal…
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- Case
- [2021] SASCA 114
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the Court was whether the sentence imposed on the respondent was so lenient as to warrant appellate intervention. This required the Court to consider the principles applicable to Crown appeals against sentence, particularly in circumstances where the offender has an intellectual disability.
The Court acknowledged that the sentence, including the duration of the good behaviour bond, was lenient. However, it held that the leniency was not so extreme as to justify the Court's intervention. The Court reasoned that while the conduct involved an overreaction and placed a vulnerable child at risk, the absence of lasting harm, the dislocation of a loving relationship, and the respondent's lack of future opportunity to offend were mitigating factors. Crucially, the Court found that the respondent's marked intellectual disability, with an IQ below 70, significantly lessened his moral culpability and made him an inappropriate vehicle for achieving general deterrence. The Court cited High Court authority for the proposition that intellectual disability can substantially reduce an offender's moral culpability and impact the appropriateness of general deterrence as a sentencing consideration.
Permission to appeal was refused, and the appeal was dismissed.
Orders
Orders of the court
Held (per the Court), refusing permission to appeal and dismissing the appeal:
1. Whilst the sentence, including the length of the good behaviour bond, is unquestionably lenient, it is not so lenient so as to warrant the intervention of this Court.
2. Although in many cases conduct of this kind might well warrant the imposition of a sentence and bond significantly longer than the length of the sentence and bond imposed in this case, the respondent’s intellectual disability makes his an inappropriate case through which to address general sentencing standards for an offence of this kind.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The community is entitled to look to the Courts to protect children and to expect that sentences will operate as an effective deterrent.[11] [11] R v Partridge (2008) 102 SASR 233, [7] (Gray, Sulan and David JJ).Sentencing considerations and intellectual disability The serious features of this offending include:1.The chastisement involved an unnecessarily violent overreaction to an accident involving a pet. 2.Although no serious lasting harm was caused, the young child was, in these circumstances, particularly vulnerable. 3.The respondent intended to cause harm and placed the victim at very serious risk of even greater harm. 4.The experience must have been terrifying for the victim. It resulted in him being removed from the only home he had known. As against these important, aggravating features, it must be acknowledged that:1.The incident was relatively brief and, in fact, involved no proved long term physical or psychological harm.2.As a result of the incident, the victim was removed from the care of the respondent, dislocating what was a loving relationship for them both. This must undoubtedly have been painful for the respondent. He is likely to still be experiencing the consequences of that separation.3.There is no prospect of any recurrence of similar behaviour to the victim or any other child. 4.The respondent has a marked intellectual disability with an IQ assessed as less than 70. His non-verbal abilities were equivalent to those of an average four-year-old and his verbal abilities were equivalent to those of an average nine-year old child. Accordingly, he may be regarded as less morally culpable than an offender who is not disabled, and “an inappropriate medium for achieving general deterrence”.[12] In Muldrock v The Queen, the High Court explained:[13] A question will often arise as to the causal relation, if any, between an offender’s mental illness and the commission of the offence. Such a question is less likely to arise in sentencing a mentally retarded offender because the lack of capacity to reason, as an ordinary person might, as to the wrongfulness of the conduct will, in most cases, substantially lessen the offender’s moral culpability for the offence.[12] R v Monks (2019) 133 SASR 182, [42] (Doyle J, with whom Peek and Parker JJ agreed), citing Muldrock v The Queen (2011) 244 CLR 120, [53]-[54] (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ); R v Hronopoulos [2017] SASCFC 143, [24] (Stanley J, Blue and Hinton JJ agreeing); Mason-Stuart v The Queen (1993) 61 SASR 204, 205-206 (King CJ, Millhouse and Olsson JJ agreeing).[13] Muldrock v The Queen (2011) 244 CLR 120, [54] (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ) The High Court cited with approval the following passage from the decision of Lush J in R v Mooney:[14][The] significance [of general deterrence] in a particular case will, however, at least usually be related to the kindred concept of retribution or punishment in which is involved an element of instinctive appreciation of the appropriateness of the sentence to the case. A sentence imposed with deterrence in view will not be acceptable if its retributive effect on the offender is felt to be inappropriate to his situation and the needs of the community.[14] R v Mooney (unreported, Victorian Court of Appeal, 21 June 1978); Muldrock v The Queen (2011) 244 CLR 120, [53] (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ).Permission refused