R v Hronopoulos

Case [2017] SASCFC 143


SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Court of Criminal Appeal)

R v HRONOPOULOS

[2017] SASCFC 143

Judgment of The Court of Criminal Appeal

(The Honourable Justice Blue, The Honourable Justice Stanley and The Honourable Justice Hinton)

30 October 2017

CRIMINAL LAW - SENTENCE - RELEVANT FACTORS  - NATURE AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF OFFENDER - MENTAL DISORDER

CRIMINAL LAW - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE - GROUNDS FOR INTERFERENCE  - SENTENCE MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE OR INADEQUATE

Application for permission to appeal against sentence for one count of aggravated threatening to cause harm contrary to s 19(2) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA). The offending was aggravated by virtue of the threatened use of a firearm. The applicant was sentenced to imprisonment for eight weeks after a reduction of two weeks to take account of time spent in custody. The sentence was suspended upon the applicant entering into a bond to be of good behaviour for three years.

At issue on appeal was, inter alia, the contention that the sentencing judge had insufficient regard for the mental disorder which the applicant was suffering, namely bipolar disorder, and that the sentence was, in all the circumstances, manifestly excessive.

Held per Stanley J (with Blue and Hinton JJ agreeing): Permission to appeal refused on all grounds.

1.  The judge clearly had regard to whether there was an alternative to the imposition of a sentence of imprisonment (at [39]).

2.  The judge considered that the applicant’s mental illness diminished his responsibility for the offending which he plainly took into account.  It is however important to recognise that the applicant’s psychiatric condition diminished his moral culpability only to the limited extent that his lack of empathy resulted in him not appreciating the extent of the fear the threat he made might arouse.  None of that detracts from the fact that the applicant was aware of the nature and gravity of the act charged and knew that what he was doing was wrong (at [45]).

3.  No irrelevant matters were taken into account (at [53]).

4.  The evidence supported the Judge’s findings (at [57]).

5.  The sentence is not manifestly excessive.  There is much to be said for the imposition of a bond subject to conditions that would encourage the applicant to seek assistance for his psychiatric issues and to deter him from similar conduct in the future (at [64]-[65]).

Per Hinton J:  Within the bounds of proportionality, a sentence is to be fashioned having regard to the protection of the community and the purposes of punishment that fits the offending and the offender.  Within that framework the question of how a particular mental illness influences the sentencing outcome will be a product of its symptoms and consequences for the defendant and the bearing that such symptoms and consequences have on achieving the purposes of the sentencing task.  Critical to the task will be the exposure of a link grounded in the evidence before the sentencing court between the illness and any of the purposes…

Continue reading R v Hronopoulos

Sign in free to access the full text

Details
AGLC
R v Hronopoulos [2017] SASCFC 143
Case
[2017] SASCFC 143
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an appeal against sentence brought by the applicant, R v Hronopoulos, before the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia, comprising Blue, Stanley and Hinton JJ. The specific grounds of appeal were not detailed in the provided text, but the court was required to consider the applicant's submissions regarding the sentencing decision.

The central legal issue before the court was the proper consideration of mental illness, falling short of legal incompetence, in the determination of a criminal sentence. The applicant appeared to argue that the presence of mental illness should significantly diminish or negate the importance of general deterrence in sentencing. The court was therefore tasked with determining how to balance the principles of sentencing, including protection of society, deterrence, retribution, and reform, when an offender suffers from a mental disorder.

Hinton J, in agreeing with Stanley J, refused permission to appeal on all grounds. His Honour elaborated on the second ground of appeal, referencing *R v Wiskich* and the judgment of Martin J. The court affirmed that a mental illness does not automatically preclude the application of general deterrence. Instead, judicial officers must undertake a sensitive discretionary assessment, considering the specific symptoms and consequences of the illness in light of the established purposes of sentencing. These purposes, as outlined in *Veen (No 2)*, include the protection of society, deterrence of the offender and others, retribution, and reform. The court emphasised that sentencing is a complex exercise where different considerations may point in different directions, requiring a nuanced approach rather than the application of automatic consequences based on the presence of a particular factual circumstance.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

I would refuse permission to appeal on this ground.Conclusion I would refuse permission to appeal on all grounds. HINTON J: I have had the benefit of reading the judgment of Stanley J in draft. I would refuse permission to appeal on all grounds for the reasons his Honour provides. With respect to the second ground, I add the following remarks. The relevance of mental illness falling short of mental incompetence to the determination of sentence was dealt with comprehensively by Martin J, with whom Prior and Williams JJ agreed, in R v Wiskich.[33] As Martin J shows it is not appropriate to simply fasten on to the fact that the offender suffers a mental illness and then, without regard to the symptoms and consequences of the illness, contend that general deterrence has no part to play in the sentencing process. That at times appeared to be the applicant’s approach on the hearing of this appeal.[33] (2000) 207 LSJS 431. Martin J quoted with approval from the judgment of Gleeson CJ in R v Engert (Engert). Gleeson CJ said:[34]Persons suffering from mental disorders frequently come into collision with the criminal justice system. Sentencing such persons commonly confronts judicial officers with the need to make a sensitive discretionary decision. Sentencing is essentially a discretionary exercise requiring consideration of the extremely variable facts and circumstances of individual cases and the application of those facts and circumstances to the principles laid down by statute or established by the common law. The principles to be applied in sentencing are in turn developed by reference to the purposes of criminal punishment. Those purposes were set by the High Court in Veen (No 2) as follows: “...protection of society, deterrence of the offender and of others who might be tempted to offend, retribution and reform.” A moment’s consideration will show that the interplay of the considerations relevant to sentencing may be complex and on occasion even intricate. In a given case, facts which point in one direction in relation to one of the considerations to be taken into account may point in a different direction in relation to some other consideration. For example, in the case of a particular offender, an aspect of the case which might mean that deterrence of others is of lesser importance, might, at the same time, mean that the protection of society is of greater importance. That was the particular problem being examined by the court in the case of Veen (No 2). Again, in a particular case, a feature which lessens what might otherwise be the importance of general deterrence, might, at the same time increase the importance of deterrence of the offender. It is therefore erroneous in principle to approach the law of sentencing as though automatic consequences follow from the presence or absence of particular factual circumstances. In every case, what is called for is the making of a discretionary decision in the light of the circumstances of the individual case, and in the light of the purposes to be served by the sentencing exercise.(citation omitted.)[34] (1995) 84 A Crim R 67 at 68.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.