R v Beaumont

Case [2023] SASCA 128


SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Court of Appeal: Criminal)

R v BEAUMONT

[2023] SASCA 128

Judgment of the Court of Appeal  

(The Honourable President Livesey, the Honourable Justice Lovell and the Honourable Justice Bleby)

30 November 2023

CRIMINAL LAW - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE - APPEALS BY CROWN - PRINCIPLES APPLIED BY APPELLATE COURT TO CROWN APPEALS

Crown appeal against sentence.

The respondent pleaded guilty to three counts of indecent assault and two counts of aggravated indecent assault which had occurred in 2019 and 2020. The maximum penalty for the indecent assault offending was imprisonment for eight years, and for the aggravated indecent assault offending, imprisonment for 10 years (as one complainant was under 14 years).  At the time of sentencing, the respondent was 77 years.

The sentencing judge imposed a conviction on all counts but otherwise discharged the respondent without imposing any other penalty on condition that he enter into a bond in the sum of $1,000 to be of good behaviour for three years where the first year was to be subject to supervision by a community corrections officer. 

An intervention order was made prohibiting contact by the respondent with the complainants, their elder sister and mother.

The Director appealed against sentence on the basis that the sentence imposed was manifestly inadequate.

The Court held (refusing permission to appeal against sentence):

1.Whilst the sentence imposed by the sentencing judge was too low this is not an appropriate case in which to grant permission to appeal. 

2.The respondent ought not be twice vexed where, before the sentencing judge, counsel for the Director conceded that imposing a bond was within the judge’s sentencing discretion.  This and the respondent’s age weigh against a grant of permission.

Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 56; Criminal Procedure Act 1921 (SA) ss 150 and 157; Sentencing Act 2017 (SA) ss 3, 4, 11, 40, 71 and 96; Statutes Amendment (Child Sex Offences) Act 2022 (SA), referred to.
Adams (A pseudonym) v The Queen (2022) 141 SASR 204; CMB v Attorney-General (NSW) (2015) 256 CLR 346; Cumberland v The Queen (2020) 94 ALJR 656; Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) (SA) v Jones [2021] SASCA 114; Everett v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 295; Gassy v The Queen [2023] SASCA 90; Green v The Queen; Quinn v The Queen (2011) 244 CLR 462; House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; Klosowski v The Queen [2021] SASCA 85; Kuchar v The Queen (2019) 135 SASR 185; Lacey v Attorney-General (Qld) (2011) 242 CLR 573; Lee v Western Australia [2022] WASCA 137; Malvaso v The Queen (1989) 168 CLR 227; Munda v Western Australia (2013) 249 CLR 600; R v Butler (A pseudonym) [2022] SASCA 112; R v Buttigieg (2020) FLR 170; R v D (1997) 69 SASR 413; R v Doolan [2017] SASCFC 80; R v Dyett [2023] SASCA 41; R v…

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R v Beaumont [2023] SASCA 128
Case
[2023] SASCA 128
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an application by the Director of Public Prosecutions for leave to appeal against the sentence imposed on the respondent, R v Beaumont, in the Supreme Court of South Australia. The Director contended that the sentence was manifestly inadequate.

The central legal issue before the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia was whether to grant the Director leave to appeal the sentence. This required the Court to consider the principles governing Crown appeals against sentence, particularly in circumstances where the respondent was elderly and the Director's approach had shifted from that taken at the original sentencing hearing.

The Court noted that while the sentence imposed was indeed manifestly inadequate, it was not so low as to warrant intervention, especially when weighed against the principle of double jeopardy and the respondent's advanced age of nearly 78 years. The Court also found it relevant that the Director's current stance represented a significant departure from the position adopted before the sentencing judge. Consequently, the Court concluded that it was not appropriate to grant leave to appeal for the purpose of imposing immediate imprisonment.

The application for permission to appeal sentence was dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

As well, though the intimation of the prosecutor did not bind the sentencing court, and though it was submitted that incarceration was required, it was never suggested that a bond for this 77-year-old respondent went beyond the proper scope of the judge’s sentencing discretion. It is in these circumstances clear that the approach now taken by the Director on this application for permission to appeal sentence represents a marked shift from that which was taken before the sentencing judge. That shift is relevant to whether permission should be granted. It is an important factor weighing against the grant of permission to appeal.Conclusion In the particular circumstances of this case, the Director has not demonstrated that it is necessary for this Court to intervene. Whilst the sentence is manifestly inadequate, it is not so low as to justify intervention and outweigh considerations associated with double jeopardy. The respondent is now nearly 78 years. It is not appropriate to grant permission to appeal sentence for the purpose of exposing him to immediate imprisonment. The application for permission to appeal should be dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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