R v Clark

Case [2016] QCA 173


SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

R v Clark [2016] QCA 173

PARTIES:

R
v
CLARK, Aimee Eileen
(applicant)

FILE NO/S:

CA No 292 of 2015
SC No 68 of 2015
SC No 74 of 2015

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

Sentence Application

ORIGINATING COURT:

Supreme Court at Rockhampton – Date of Sentence: 19 November 2015

DELIVERED ON:

24 June 2016

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

3 June 2016

JUDGES:

Margaret McMurdo P and Morrison JA and North J
Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court, each concurring as to the order made

ORDER:

The application for leave to appeal is refused.

CATCHWORDS:

CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE – GROUNDS FOR INTERFERENCE – SENTENCE MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE OR INADEQUATE – where the applicant pleaded guilty to one count of trafficking in a dangerous drug, and to two summary charges of possessing a dangerous drug, and possessing a pipe that was used in the connection with the use of a dangerous drug – where the applicant was sentenced to three years imprisonment and, pursuant to s 5(2) of the Drugs Misuse Act 1986 (Qld), was ordered to serve a minimum of 80 per cent of that term – where the summary charges attracted a sentence of one month imprisonment each, to be served concurrently with the trafficking sentence – where the applicant was identified through a covert police operation that brought to light that the applicant was dealing in methylamphetamine at a street level – where the applicant has two children and a good work history – where the applicant had a clean criminal history until 2013 when she was charged with the possession of dangerous drugs and was further charged over the following two years with drug related charges – where the applicant alleges that she started using drugs as a result of the death of her infant child to sudden infant death syndrome – where the applicant had previously performed “unsatisfactorily” as described in a probation report, by failing to attend counselling and using drugs whilst on probation – where the learned sentencing judge concluded that the applicant’s prospects of rehabilitation were low – where the applicant contends that the learned sentencing judge should have ordered a partially suspended sentence – where the applicant contends that the learned sentencing judge should have set the head sentence at three years, suspended after 12 months, with an operational period of three years – whether the sentence was manifestly excessive

Drugs Misuse Act 1986 (Qld), s 5, s 5(2), s 5(3)(b)
Justice and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2013 (Qld), s 68B
Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld), s 9(2), s 13, s 112, s 144

Markarian v The Queen (2005) 228 CLR 357; [2005] HCA 25, cited
Nguyen v The Queen (2016) 90 ALJR 595; [2016] HCA 17, cited
R v BCX[2015] QCA 188, cited
R v Challacombe[2009] QCA 314, considered
R v Connolly[2016] QCA 132

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R v Clark [2016] QCA 173
Case
[2016] QCA 173
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of R v Clark involves an appellant who pleaded guilty to trafficking in a dangerous drug, and to two summary charges of possessing a dangerous drug and a pipe used in connection with drug use. The sentencing court ordered a three-year imprisonment term for the trafficking charge, with a requirement to serve 80 per cent of the term under section 5(2) of the Drugs Misuse Act 1986 (Qld). The summary charges attracted a sentence of one month imprisonment each, to be served concurrently. The appellant was identified during a covert police operation and had a history of drug-related charges beginning in 2013. She has two children and a previously clean criminal record, with her drug use reportedly stemming from the death of her infant child.

The legal issues in the case centred on whether the sentence was manifestly excessive or inadequate. The appellant argued that the sentencing judge should have imposed a partially suspended sentence, setting the head sentence at three years, suspended after 12 months, with an operational period of three years. She contended that her prospects of rehabilitation were not as low as the sentencing judge had concluded, and that she had not had a fair opportunity to demonstrate rehabilitation due to delays in the legal proceedings.

The court examined the circumstances surrounding the appellant's offending and rehabilitation prospects, considering her personal history, the nature of the offences, and the sentencing principles. The court noted the appellant's failure to attend counselling and continued drug use while on probation as indicators of her unsatisfactory performance in rehabilitation efforts. Despite the appellant's argument that she had not had a fair opportunity to demonstrate rehabilitation, the court found that the sentencing judge had appropriately considered the appellant's history and prospects for rehabilitation. The court held that the sentence was not manifestly excessive, given the seriousness of the offences and the appellant's history.

The final orders of the court were to refuse the application for leave to appeal against the sentence. The reasoning provided by the court underscored the importance of adhering to the sentencing principles and the judge's assessment of the appellant's rehabilitation prospects. The refusal of leave to appeal upheld the original sentence imposed by the lower court.

Orders

Orders of the court

The application for leave to appeal is refused.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

However, if the offender’s legal representatives bring about, participate in, or encourage, such delay, it may be a breach of their duty to the court. Then again, if the court enforced that duty in a way that unfairly deprived an offender of the chance to demonstrate sufficient rehabilitation such as to deny the engagement of s 5(2), there is a risk that the Court will be seen as an arm of the legislature’s policy. Policy matters such as that reflected in s 5(2) are not matters for the court.Conclusion For the reasons expressed above I would refuse leave to appeal. I propose the following order:The application for leave to appeal is refused. NORTH J: I have read the reasons for judgment of Morrison JA. I agree with the order proposed by his Honour for the reasons given by his Honour.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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