R v CBN

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

R v CBN [2015] QCA 224

PARTIES:

R
v
CBN
(appellant)

FILE NO/S:

CA No 268 of 2014
DC No 147 of 2014

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

Appeal against Conviction

ORIGINATING COURT:


District Court at Southport

DELIVERED ON:

13 November 2015

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

4 June 2015

JUDGES:

Morrison JA and Mullins and Burns JJ
Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court, each concurring as to the order made

ORDER:

Appeal dismissed.

CATCHWORDS:

CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – VERDICT UNREASONABLE OR INSUPPORTABLE HAVING REGARD TO EVIDENCE – APPEAL DISMISSED – where the appellant was charged on indictment with one count of indecent treatment of a child under 16, under care, and two counts of rape – where the complainant was the niece of the appellant – where the complainant gave evidence about a separate and uncharged act of indecent treatment by the appellant – where one count of rape was discontinued on the third day of trial – where the discontinued count and the uncharged act were relied on by the Crown as evidence of other discreditable conduct – where there were features of the complainant’s evidence which compelled the giving of a Robinson direction to the jury – where the appellant was convicted of one count of indecent treatment of a child under 16, under care, and one count of rape – where the appellant appealed against conviction on the basis that the verdicts were unreasonable or insupportable having regard to the evidence – whether it was open to the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the appellant

CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – PARTICULAR GROUNDS OF APPEAL – MISDIRECTION AND NON-DIRECTION – PARTICULAR CASES – WHERE APPEAL DISMISSED – where the appellant also appealed on the ground that the jury was misdirected as to the standard of proof required before they could act upon evidence of “other discreditable conduct” – where there was no application for redirections at the conclusion of the summing-up – whether there was any error in the directions given to the jury

Criminal Code (Qld), s 210(1)(a), s 210(4), s 349, s 668E(1)

Dhanhoa v The Queen (2003) 217 CLR 1, [2003] HCA 40, cited
HML v The Queen (2008) 235 CLR 334; [2008] HCA 16, cited
M v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 487; [1994] HCA 63, cited
MFA v The Queen (2002) 213 CLR 606; [2002] HCA 53, cited
Simic v The Queen (1980) 144 CLR 319; [1980] HCA 25, cited
SKA v The Queen (2011) 243 CLR 400; [2011] HCA 13, cited

COUNSEL:

M Johnson for the appellant
M B Lehane for the respondent

SOLICITORS:

Legal Aid Queensland for the appellant
Director of Public Prosecutions (Queensland) for the respondent

  1. MORRISON JA:  I agree with the order proposed by Burns J and with the reasons given by his Honour.

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Details
Case
[2015] QCA 224
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of R v CBN involved an appeal by the appellant against his convictions for indecent treatment of a child under 16, under care, and rape. The appellant was the uncle of the complainant. The appeal hinged on the argument that the verdicts were unreasonable or insupportable in light of the evidence. The complainant had given evidence about separate and uncharged acts of indecent treatment by the appellant, which were relied upon by the Crown as evidence of other discreditable conduct. The jury was also required to consider the evidence of the complainant's grandmother and sister, as well as a statement made to a school guidance officer.

The legal issues before the court included whether the verdicts were unreasonable or insupportable having regard to the evidence, and whether there was any error in the directions given to the jury regarding the standard of proof required before they could act upon evidence of "other discreditable conduct". The court was required to conduct its own independent assessment of the evidence to determine if it was open to the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the appellant's guilt.

The court found that the evidence provided by the complainant regarding the counts on which the appellant was convicted was consistent and supported by other evidence, including complaints made to the complainant's grandmother, sister, and school guidance officer. The court held that the appellant's arguments regarding the inconsistencies in the evidence relating to the discontinued count and the uncharged act did not undermine the evidence on which the appellant was convicted. The court further found that there was no error in the directions given to the jury regarding the standard of proof required before they could act upon evidence of "other discreditable conduct".

The appeal was dismissed, and the convictions were upheld. The court concluded that it was open to the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the appellant's guilt based on the evidence presented.

Orders

Orders of the court

Appeal dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

When the police officer responsible for taking the statement gave evidence, she confirmed that its contents reflected what she had been told by the complainant. She also said that the statement was 140 paragraphs in length and that it had been taken over the space of two days, with a number of hours each day devoted to the exercise. The police officer confirmed that the complainant was at times “reluctant to speak and explain things” and had “difficulty trying to formulate the words” for the events in question.[39][39]AR 146.Other evidence Mention has already been made of the evidence from the complainant’s grandmother regarding what occurred, and was said, in the immediate aftermath of the incident relied on by the Crown to support count 1. The complainant’s grandmother also recalled another trip that the complainant made to visit her in Townsville. This occurred in November 2012. After collecting the complainant from the airport, the complainant announced that “she wanted it to stop”.[40] The complainant then elaborated, telling her grandmother that the appellant “was having sex with her”.[41] Her grandmother did not want “to get involved”,[42] but she told the complainant to telephone her sister.[40]AR 139.[41]Ibid.[42]Ibid. When the complainant’s sister gave evidence, she recalled receiving a text message from the complainant in late 2012 which prompted her to call. The complainant was crying. She told her sister that the appellant had raped her.[43] In a second telephone call between them on the same day, the complainant told her sister that this happened “at home” and that, afterwards, the appellant “got up and went for a shower”.[44] The complainant also told her sister that the appellant had “touched her once before” by grabbing “her in the private area”.[45] She said this happened at her grandmother’s house in Townsville when she was 12. The complainant was told by her sister to go to the police to “make sure that it didn’t happen again and wouldn’t happen to anyone else”.[46] In the event, it was the complainant’s sister who rang the police. They, in turn, made contact with the complainant’s grandmother and arrangements were then made for police to speak to the complainant.[43]AR 111.[44]AR 112.[45]Ibid.[46]Ibid. The complainant’s school guidance officer gave evidence about a meeting she had with the complainant and her mother in March 2012. According to the guidance officer, at this meeting, the complainant said that a male student had inserted his fingers in her vagina and that he had assaulted two other girls in the same manner. On another occasion, she told the guidance officer that her mother’s boyfriend had raped her. The guidance officer agreed that it “took a while to get to the issues”,[47] and that the complainant was reluctant to discuss the allegations.[47]AR 135. The complainant’s mother had earlier confirmed in the evidence she gave at trial that she was at this meeting with the guidance officer and the complainant, however, her recollection was of the complainant saying that a male student had “stuck his hand up her dress” as opposed to her vagina having been actually penetrated by his fingers.[48] She was asked about the suggestion that her boyfriend had raped the complainant and said, “What boyfriend? I don’t even have a boyfriend, and I didn’t then either”.[49] She agreed that she had attended the school on another occasion because of problems with the complainant’s behaviour and that the complainant had been attention-seeking, but she denied saying to the guidance officer or anyone else at the school that the complainant makes up stories.[48]AR 121. [49]Ibid.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The only other evidence of relevance for present purposes came in the form of an admission by the Crown to the effect that the complainant was medically examined on 18 December 2012, but that it was “not possible to say from the examination of her genitals whether her vagina has been penetrated sexually or not”.[52][52]AR 149.Consideration Where a ground of appeal challenges a verdict of guilt as unreasonable or insupportable, s 668E(1) of the Criminal Code (Qld) is engaged. In any such case, it is necessary to consider whether, upon the whole of the evidence, it was open to the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant was guilty and, in order to do so, the Court must make its own independent assessment of the evidence.[53][53]M v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 487 at 493-494 per Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson and Toohey JJ; MFA v The Queen (2002) 213 CLR 606 at 615 per Gleeson CJ, Hayne and Callinan JJ, 622-624 per McHugh, Gummow and Kirby JJ; SKA v The Queen (2011) 243 CLR 400 at 409 per French CJ, Gummow and Kiefel JJ. Here, there were obviously features of the evidence making up the prosecution case that warranted close scrutiny. First, what was said by the complainant to her grandmother in the aftermath of the incident relied on by the Crown to support count 1 required careful attention. Secondly, there was the feature that the evidence which the complainant gave in support of the discontinued count and the uncharged act was different in a number of respects to the contents of her police statement and what had been opened by the Crown prosecutor to the jury. Thirdly, the evidence given by the complainant, her mother and the guidance officer regarding what was discussed at the March 2012 meeting, as well as associated matters, needed to be carefully considered. For the appellant, it was argued that the aggregation of these features ought to have given rise to a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jurors as to the appellant’s guilt. It was submitted that this should have been especially so where, as here, the complainant’s account was not supported by any independent medical or other evidence. The Court’s attention was particularly directed to the evidence of the complainant’s grandmother which, if accepted by the jury, meant that the complainant had retracted her allegations concerning count 1 almost as soon as she had made them and, furthermore, had admitted to lying to cause trouble to the appellant. It was also submitted that the evidence which the complainant gave as to the place where the uncharged act occurred (at the home of the appellant’s girlfriend in Logan) was concerning because, not only was that different to the place opened by the Crown prosecutor (in New South Wales), but the complainant’s police statement expressly disavowed that anything untoward had occurred there. One difficulty with the appellant’s arguments in support of this ground is that the evidence which the complainant gave in relation to the counts which were left to the jury for their consideration, and on which the appellant was convicted (counts 1 and 2), was not capable of being criticised for the sorts of inconsistencies or contradictions which were said to affect the evidence which she gave in relation to the discontinued count or the uncharged act. Indeed, the appellant’s counsel accepted as much.[54] Her evidence was also supported by the complaints made to her grandmother (on two separate occasions), to her sister and, if the complainant’s evidence as to what she told her school guidance officer was accepted,[55] to the guidance officer. In the case of the complaint made to her sister, the complainant said that she had been raped at her home on the Gold Coast and been “touched … in the private area” at her grandmother’s house in Townsville when she was 12. Those statements could only have been referable to counts 1 and 2 respectively and, as such, their making was alone enough to distinguish those counts from the discontinued count and the uncharged act.[54]Paragraph 23.9 of the outline of submissions on behalf of the appellant (where it was submitted that the “evidence in respect of counts 1 and 2 … was not greatly damaged or inconsistent”); T. 1-3 (where it was submitted that the complainant’s “evidence about the two counts upon which convictions were recorded was reasonably consistent”).[55]That she had been raped by her uncle.