SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
R v CBN [2015] QCA 224
PARTIES:
R
v
CBN
(appellant)FILE NO/S:
CA No 268 of 2014
DC No 147 of 2014DIVISION:
Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING:
Appeal against Conviction
ORIGINATING COURT:
District Court at SouthportDELIVERED ON:
13 November 2015
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
4 June 2015
JUDGES:
Morrison JA and Mullins and Burns JJ
Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court, each concurring as to the order madeORDER:
Appeal dismissed.
CATCHWORDS:
CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – VERDICT UNREASONABLE OR INSUPPORTABLE HAVING REGARD TO EVIDENCE – APPEAL DISMISSED – where the appellant was charged on indictment with one count of indecent treatment of a child under 16, under care, and two counts of rape – where the complainant was the niece of the appellant – where the complainant gave evidence about a separate and uncharged act of indecent treatment by the appellant – where one count of rape was discontinued on the third day of trial – where the discontinued count and the uncharged act were relied on by the Crown as evidence of other discreditable conduct – where there were features of the complainant’s evidence which compelled the giving of a Robinson direction to the jury – where the appellant was convicted of one count of indecent treatment of a child under 16, under care, and one count of rape – where the appellant appealed against conviction on the basis that the verdicts were unreasonable or insupportable having regard to the evidence – whether it was open to the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the appellant
CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – PARTICULAR GROUNDS OF APPEAL – MISDIRECTION AND NON-DIRECTION – PARTICULAR CASES – WHERE APPEAL DISMISSED – where the appellant also appealed on the ground that the jury was misdirected as to the standard of proof required before they could act upon evidence of “other discreditable conduct” – where there was no application for redirections at the conclusion of the summing-up – whether there was any error in the directions given to the jury
Criminal Code (Qld), s 210(1)(a), s 210(4), s 349, s 668E(1)
Dhanhoa v The Queen (2003) 217 CLR 1, [2003] HCA 40, cited
HML v The Queen (2008) 235 CLR 334; [2008] HCA 16, cited
M v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 487; [1994] HCA 63, cited
MFA v The Queen (2002) 213 CLR 606; [2002] HCA 53, cited
Simic v The Queen (1980) 144 CLR 319; [1980] HCA 25, cited
SKA v The Queen (2011) 243 CLR 400; [2011] HCA 13, citedCOUNSEL:
M Johnson for the appellant
M B Lehane for the respondentSOLICITORS:
Legal Aid Queensland for the appellant
Director of Public Prosecutions (Queensland) for the respondent
MORRISON JA: I agree with the order proposed by Burns J and with the reasons given by his Honour.
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- Case
- [2015] QCA 224
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court included whether the verdicts were unreasonable or insupportable having regard to the evidence, and whether there was any error in the directions given to the jury regarding the standard of proof required before they could act upon evidence of "other discreditable conduct". The court was required to conduct its own independent assessment of the evidence to determine if it was open to the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the appellant's guilt.
The court found that the evidence provided by the complainant regarding the counts on which the appellant was convicted was consistent and supported by other evidence, including complaints made to the complainant's grandmother, sister, and school guidance officer. The court held that the appellant's arguments regarding the inconsistencies in the evidence relating to the discontinued count and the uncharged act did not undermine the evidence on which the appellant was convicted. The court further found that there was no error in the directions given to the jury regarding the standard of proof required before they could act upon evidence of "other discreditable conduct".
The appeal was dismissed, and the convictions were upheld. The court concluded that it was open to the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the appellant's guilt based on the evidence presented.
Orders
Orders of the court
Appeal dismissed.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The only other evidence of relevance for present purposes came in the form of an admission by the Crown to the effect that the complainant was medically examined on 18 December 2012, but that it was “not possible to say from the examination of her genitals whether her vagina has been penetrated sexually or not”.[52][52]AR 149.Consideration Where a ground of appeal challenges a verdict of guilt as unreasonable or insupportable, s 668E(1) of the Criminal Code (Qld) is engaged. In any such case, it is necessary to consider whether, upon the whole of the evidence, it was open to the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant was guilty and, in order to do so, the Court must make its own independent assessment of the evidence.[53][53]M v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 487 at 493-494 per Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson and Toohey JJ; MFA v The Queen (2002) 213 CLR 606 at 615 per Gleeson CJ, Hayne and Callinan JJ, 622-624 per McHugh, Gummow and Kirby JJ; SKA v The Queen (2011) 243 CLR 400 at 409 per French CJ, Gummow and Kiefel JJ. Here, there were obviously features of the evidence making up the prosecution case that warranted close scrutiny. First, what was said by the complainant to her grandmother in the aftermath of the incident relied on by the Crown to support count 1 required careful attention. Secondly, there was the feature that the evidence which the complainant gave in support of the discontinued count and the uncharged act was different in a number of respects to the contents of her police statement and what had been opened by the Crown prosecutor to the jury. Thirdly, the evidence given by the complainant, her mother and the guidance officer regarding what was discussed at the March 2012 meeting, as well as associated matters, needed to be carefully considered. For the appellant, it was argued that the aggregation of these features ought to have given rise to a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jurors as to the appellant’s guilt. It was submitted that this should have been especially so where, as here, the complainant’s account was not supported by any independent medical or other evidence. The Court’s attention was particularly directed to the evidence of the complainant’s grandmother which, if accepted by the jury, meant that the complainant had retracted her allegations concerning count 1 almost as soon as she had made them and, furthermore, had admitted to lying to cause trouble to the appellant. It was also submitted that the evidence which the complainant gave as to the place where the uncharged act occurred (at the home of the appellant’s girlfriend in Logan) was concerning because, not only was that different to the place opened by the Crown prosecutor (in New South Wales), but the complainant’s police statement expressly disavowed that anything untoward had occurred there. One difficulty with the appellant’s arguments in support of this ground is that the evidence which the complainant gave in relation to the counts which were left to the jury for their consideration, and on which the appellant was convicted (counts 1 and 2), was not capable of being criticised for the sorts of inconsistencies or contradictions which were said to affect the evidence which she gave in relation to the discontinued count or the uncharged act. Indeed, the appellant’s counsel accepted as much.[54] Her evidence was also supported by the complaints made to her grandmother (on two separate occasions), to her sister and, if the complainant’s evidence as to what she told her school guidance officer was accepted,[55] to the guidance officer. In the case of the complaint made to her sister, the complainant said that she had been raped at her home on the Gold Coast and been “touched … in the private area” at her grandmother’s house in Townsville when she was 12. Those statements could only have been referable to counts 1 and 2 respectively and, as such, their making was alone enough to distinguish those counts from the discontinued count and the uncharged act.[54]Paragraph 23.9 of the outline of submissions on behalf of the appellant (where it was submitted that the “evidence in respect of counts 1 and 2 … was not greatly damaged or inconsistent”); T. 1-3 (where it was submitted that the complainant’s “evidence about the two counts upon which convictions were recorded was reasonably consistent”).[55]That she had been raped by her uncle.