R v Bosworth, Gibbins, Nance & Richards

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Court of Criminal Appeal)

R v BOSWORTH, GIBBINS, NANCE & RICHARDS

[2007] SASC 150

Judgment of The Court of Criminal Appeal

(The Honourable Justice Duggan, The Honourable Justice Gray and The Honourable Justice White)

4 May 2007

CRIMINAL LAW - GENERAL MATTERS - ANCILLARY LIABILITY - COMPLICITY

Appellants found guilty of murder of one victim and causing grievous bodily harm with intent to do grievous bodily harm to another victim - alleged that the appellants attacked the occupants of a vehicle after a car chase in which the appellants' vehicle was pursued by the victims and their associates - alleged that murder victim killed by knife wound inflicted by one appellant and that other appellants liable in accordance with principles of joint liability.

Trial judge directed jury that mental element for murder would be established against secondary parties if they intended to cause grievous bodily harm or "anticipated that the infliction of grievous bodily harm was a possible incidence of the carrying out of the joint venture" - held that it was not made sufficiently clear to the jury that it was necessary to find that the secondary parties had foreseen that a co-accused might act with intent to inflict really serious injury as opposed to simply foreseeing that such injury might be caused.

Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 s 15; s 15(1); s 15(2); s 15(4); s 15(4)(a) & (b), referred to.
McAuliffe v The Queen (1995) 183 CLR 108; Gillard v The Queen (2003) 219 CLR 1; R v Sharah (1992) 30 NSWLR 292; R v Dang [2001] NSWCCA 321; Chan Wing-Sui v The Queen [1985] AC 168; R v Hartwick and Clayton (2005) 159 A Crim R 1, applied.

CRIMINAL LAW - GENERAL MATTERS - ANCILLARY LIABILITY - COMPLICITY

Use of knife by co-accused to inflict fatal wound - whether trial judge adequately related principles of joint enterprise to facts by instructing jury on significance of knowledge or otherwise of principal offender's possession of knife - held that directions were required concerning the knowledge or otherwise of each secondary party as to the principal offender's possession of the knife in order to determine whether it had been established that grievous bodily harm was intended or contemplated as a possible incident of joint enterprise. Held further that the directions on this issue were inadequate.

Directions on this topic were also necessary in relation to the alternative offence of manslaughter.

Woolley, Woolley, Whitney & Rayment (1989) 42 A Crim R 418; Chan Wing-Siu v The Queen [1985] AC 168; Duong, Lu, Do & Tran (1992) 61 A Crim R 140; R v Cozzi (1999) 73 SASR 374, applied.

CRIMINAL LAW - GENERAL MATTERS - CRIMINAL LIABILITY AND CAPACITY - DEFENCE MATTERS - SELF-DEFENCE AND OTHER FORMS OF DEFENCE

Whether directions were requried in relation to -

(a)  the relevance of intoxication to the principal offender's claim of self-defence and

(b) s 15(4) of the Criminal Law Consolidation…

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Details
Case
[2007] SASC 150
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of R v Bosworth, Gibbins, Nance & Richards, the appellants were found guilty of the murder of one victim and causing grievous bodily harm with intent to another victim. The dispute centred on a violent altercation that occurred after a car chase involving the appellants and the victims. The appellants contested their liability under the principles of joint liability for the murder and grievous bodily harm caused. The trial judge directed the jury on the mental element required for murder against secondary parties, stating that it would be established if the secondary parties intended to cause grievous bodily harm or anticipated that the infliction of grievous bodily harm was a possible outcome of the joint venture. The court of appeal was tasked with determining whether the trial judge's direction to the jury was sufficient.

The legal issues before the court involved the interpretation of the trial judge's direction to the jury regarding the mental element for murder in the context of joint liability. The court needed to assess whether the trial judge had made it sufficiently clear to the jury that it was necessary to find that the secondary parties had foreseen that a co-accused might act with intent to inflict really serious injury, as opposed to simply foreseeing that such injury might be caused. The court also needed to consider whether the trial judge's direction had adequately conveyed the necessary mental element for complicity in murder.

The court of appeal found that the trial judge had not made it sufficiently clear to the jury that it was necessary to find that the secondary parties had foreseen that a co-accused might act with intent to inflict really serious injury. The court held that the trial judge's direction had not adequately conveyed the necessary mental element for complicity in murder, as it had not sufficiently distinguished between the foresight of grievous bodily harm as a possible outcome and the foresight of a co-accused's intent to inflict such harm. Consequently, the convictions of the appellants were quashed, and a new trial was ordered. The court emphasised the importance of clearly distinguishing the required mental element for complicity in murder, particularly in cases involving joint liability.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

DUGGAN J WHITE J

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: DUGGAN J, WHITE J

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