Quintano v Minister for Finance and Deregulation

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Quintano v Minister for Finance and Deregulation [2014] FCAFC 159

Citation: Quintano v Minister For Finance And Deregulation [2014] FCAFC 159
Appeal from: Quintano v Minister for Finance and Deregulation [2014] FCA 531
Parties: LUKE QUINTANO v MINISTER FOR FINANCE AND DEREGULATION
File number: NSD 589 of 2014
Judge: EDMONDS, MCKERRACHER & KATZMANN JJ
Date of judgment: 25 November 2014
Catchwords:

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – appellant seriously injured in fight at nightclub – appellant obtained award of damages against negligent nightclub owner – nightclub owner and its insurer insolvent – appellant applied for act of grace payment under s 33 of the Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997 (Cth) – application refused – whether primary judge failed to deal with appellant’s argument that Minister’s decision was legally unreasonable – whether Minister erred by inflexibly applying a policy in refusing the application – whether there was evidence to support primary judge’s finding that Minister considered whether there was a moral obligation to authorise an act of grace payment

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – whether appellant should be permitted to argue on appeal matters not pleaded in originating application

Legislation: Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) s 5
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority Act 1988 (Cth) s 58
Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997 (Cth) s 33 (see now Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (Cth), s 65)
Cases cited: Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v International Unity Insurance Pty Ltd [2004] FCA 1059
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v International Unity Insurance (General) Limited [2004] FCA 1060
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611
Quintano v B W Rose Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 446
Re Drake and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (No 2) (1979) 1979) 2 ALD 634
Surinakova v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1991) 33 FCR 87
Toomer v Slipper [2001] FCA 981
Water Board v Moustakas (1988) 180 CLR 491
Date of hearing: 3 November 2014
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 68
Counsel for the Appellant: Ms C Novak
Solicitor for the Appellant: Thomas Booler & Co
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr S Free
Solicitor for the Respondent: Sparke Helmore

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 589 of 2014

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

LUKE QUINTANO
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR FINANCE AND DEREGULATION
Respondent

JUDGES:

EDMONDS, MCKERRACHER & KATZMANN JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

25 NOVEMBER 2014

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the respondent’s costs.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 589…

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Details
Case
[2014] FCAFC 159
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Quintano v Minister for Finance and Deregulation, the appellant sought an act of grace payment under section 33 of the Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997 (Cth) following a nightclub incident that resulted in serious injury. The nightclub owner, who was found to be negligent, was insolvent, and the appellant's application for a payment was denied. The appellant argued on appeal that the Minister's decision was legally unreasonable and that the Minister had inflexibly applied policy in refusing the application. Additionally, the appellant sought to argue matters not pleaded in the originating application.

The court examined whether the primary judge failed to address the appellant's claim that the Minister's decision was unreasonable or irrational, whether the Minister erred by inflexibly applying policy, and whether there was evidence to support the primary judge's finding that the Minister considered the moral obligation to authorise a payment. The court also considered whether the appellant should be permitted to argue matters not pleaded in the originating application.

The court concluded that the primary judge did not consider whether the Minister's decision was unreasonable or irrational because it was not suggested that the Minister's decision was unreasonable in the legal sense. The court found no error in this regard. The court further determined that the Minister did not inflexibly apply policy in refusing the application, as the Minister recognised that there was no legal liability but did not consider the appellant's circumstances to be special or sufficiently special to warrant the exercise of his discretion. The court found that there was evidence to support the primary judge's conclusion that the Minister considered the moral obligation to authorise a payment. The court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the appellant pay the respondent's costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Third, in any event, the Minister considered whether he ought to have modified the policy. Furthermore, he considered whether there was merit in this particular case. That was the focus of paras 11 and 12 of his reasons.Was there evidence to support the primary judge’s finding that the Minister considered whether there was a moral obligation to authorise an act of grace payment? Despite the way in which this question was raised in the amended notice of appeal, Mr Quintano’s submission was to the effect that, in the “glaring” absence of any express reference in the Minister’s reasons to “moral considerations”, the primary judge’s finding was based on inference and the inference was not open. Mr Quintano contended that the Minister merely reasoned that, because there was no legal liability, he should not approve the payment. We reject the submission. The Minister said he had considered the Finance Circular. Paragraph 6 of Attachment B of the Circular states that one of the key features of the act of grace mechanism is that “it is appropriate in cases where there is a moral, rather than legal, obligation to the person or body concerned”. In these circumstances, there is no reason to conclude that the Minister did not consider whether there was a moral obligation to Mr Quintano. True it is, the Minister did not use the expression “moral obligation”. But, as the Minister submitted, there is no particular magic in those words. As we have already observed, the matters raised in paras 6, 11 and 12 of the Minister’s statement of reasons relate to that very question. It follows that we are satisfied that there was evidence to support the primary judge’s conclusion.Conclusion None of the grounds of appeal is made out. The question the Minister was required to answer was whether, absent legal liability, he considered it appropriate to authorise the making of a payment because of special circumstances. It is clear that he recognised that there was no legal liability but that he did not consider Mr Quintano’s circumstances to have been special or sufficiently special to warrant the exercise of his discretion to authorise the payment. In coming to that conclusion he did not err in law. The appeal must therefore be dismissed. There is no reason why costs should not follow the event. There will be orders accordingly.

Decision

Reasons for decision

It follows that we are satisfied that there was evidence to support the primary judge’s conclusion.Conclusion None of the grounds of appeal is made out. The question the Minister was required to answer was whether, absent legal liability, he considered it appropriate to authorise the making of a payment because of special circumstances. It is clear that he recognised that there was no legal liability but that he did not consider Mr Quintano’s circumstances to have been special or sufficiently special to warrant the exercise of his discretion to authorise the payment. In coming to that conclusion he did not err in law. The appeal must therefore be dismissed. There is no reason why costs should not follow the event. There will be orders accordingly.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Here, it is not suggested that the two arguments raised for the first time on appeal could possibly have been met by calling evidence below. No explanation was offered for the change of tack. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to infer that it is due to a change in legal representation. As the Minister did not object and as we have heard full argument, subject to ensuring that the Minister is protected in relation to costs thrown away as a result of the amendments, it is expedient and in the interests of justice to entertain the points.Did the primary judge fail to deal with Mr Quintano’s argument that the Minister’s decision was unreasonable or irrational? There can be no doubt that the primary judge did not consider whether or not the Minister’s decision was unreasonable or irrational. He did not do so because he did not understand such an allegation to have been made. At [8] of his reasons, having reflected on the breadth of the discretion given by s 33 of the FMA Act, his Honour observed in passing that in exercising the discretion “the Minister must not make a decision that is unreasonable in the legal sense”. He explained that by that he meant that the decision must not be “capricious, plainly unjust, or otherwise involve an abuse of power”. But in the present case, his Honour added, it was not suggested that the Minister’s decision was unreasonable in the legal sense. Accordingly, his Honour did not proceed to consider whether it was. We are not persuaded that his Honour erred in this respect. First, as we have already observed, the issue was not raised in the originating application. Ms Novak of counsel, who appeared for Mr Quintano on the appeal but not before the primary judge, submitted that, despite its omission from the originating application, the matter was “briefly touched on” in the written submissions below. She also submitted that the Minister briefly touched on the question in his written submissions. She said that she was instructed that the argument was principally addressed verbally. Mr Quintano’s written submissions below contain two scant references that could be relevant. The first appears at para 7 where Mr Quintano contended that in rejecting each of his submissions “the [Minister] erred in law by failing to exercise his discretion reasonably”. That proposition appears in some introductory remarks that precede the submissions on the grounds of appeal. Two references appear in the footnote to para 7: Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24 (“Peko-Wallsend”) esp at 39–40 (Mason J), Gibbs CJ and Dawson J agreeing at 30 and 71 respectively, and Toomer v Slipper [2001] FCA 981 at [31] (Weinberg J). The contention was not developed. No application was made to the primary judge to amend the originating application to advance an additional ground encapsulating the contention. The discussion by Mason J in Peko-Wallsend in the passage relied upon deals with the failure to take into account a relevant consideration as a ground of judicial review. The only reference in the judgment to a decision-maker acting unreasonably is at 41 where Mason J referred to the alternative ground of setting a decision aside as “manifestly unreasonable”. In that context, his Honour referred to Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223 at 228, 230, 233–4 in which Lord Greene MR said that this ground of review would only be made out if it were shown that the decision was so unreasonable that no reasonable person could have come to it (“Wednesbury unreasonableness”). Mason J noted the inclusion of a ground in those terms by ss 5(2)(g) and 6(2)(g) of the ADJR Act. But neither of these provisions was mentioned in either the originating application or the written submissions below. What is more, despite the argument put by Mr Quintano’s solicitor in written submissions in reply in this Court, Ms Novak eschewed reliance on Wednesbury unreasonableness.