FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Quintano v Minister for Finance and Deregulation [2014] FCA 531
Citation: Quintano v Minister for Finance and Deregulation [2014] FCA 531 Parties: LUKE QUINTANO v MINISTER FOR FINANCE AND DEREGULATION File number: NSD 1204 of 2013 Judge: NICHOLAS J Date of judgment: 23 May 2014 Catchwords: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – where applicant seriously injured in fight at nightclub – where applicant obtained award of damages against nightclub owner – where nightclub owner and its insurer insolvent – where applicant applied for act of grace payment under s 33 of Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997 (Cth) – whether respondent’s decision to refuse to authorise such payment involved error of law.
Held: respondent’s decision not shown to involve error of law – application dismissed.
Legislation: Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997 (Cth) s 33
Administrative Decision (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) s 5
Financial Sector Legislation Amendment (Discretionary Mutual Funds and Direct Offshore Foreign Insurers) Act 2007 (Cth)
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority Act 1998 (Cth) s 58
Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) s 346Cases cited: Toomer v Slipper [2001] FCA 981 Date of hearing: 2 December 2013 Place: Sydney Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 36 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr KP Smark SC with Mr MR Gracie Solicitor for the Applicant: DC Legal Pty Ltd Counsel for the Respondent: Mr S Free Solicitor for the Respondent: Sparke Helmore Lawyers
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 1204 of 2013
BETWEEN: LUKE QUINTANO
ApplicantAND: MINISTER FOR FINANCE AND DEREGULATION
Respondent
JUDGE:
NICHOLAS J
DATE OF ORDER:
23 MAY 2014
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application for judicial review filed 26 June 2013 be dismissed.
2.The applicant pay the respondent’s costs.
Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 1204 of 2013
BETWEEN: LUKE QUINTANO
ApplicantAND: MINISTER FOR FINANCE AND DEREGULATION
Respondent
JUDGE:
NICHOLAS J
DATE:
23 MAY 2014
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
BACKGROUND
On 15 December 2002 the applicant visited a nightclub. A fight broke out at the nightclub and the applicant was shot in the head. The injuries inflicted on the applicant were very serious. He is now wheelchair bound with a paralysed right side of his body. He also lost an eye and suffers from seizures.
The respondent commenced proceedings against the owner of the nightclub, a company called BW Rose Pty Ltd (the nightclub company). In June 2009, the Supreme Court of New South Wales awarded the applicant $4,063,802.50 in damages. The nightclub company went into liquidation during the course of the proceeding. The nightclub company was insured at the relevant time by International Unity Insurance (General) Limited (IUI General) through its agent International Unity Insurance Pty Limited (IUI Australia). IUI General was incorporated in the Solomon Islands…
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- Case
- [2014] FCA 531
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined whether the Minister's decision to refuse the act of grace payment was legally sound. The Minister's discretion under section 33 was to consider "special circumstances," and the decision was not to be unreasonable in a legal sense. The court found that the Minister's Statement of Reasons demonstrated a comprehensive consideration of the applicant's claims, including the regulatory context and the failures of the insurance companies involved. The Minister's decision to refuse the payment was deemed to be within the bounds of legal propriety, as it was not shown to be capricious, plainly unjust, or an abuse of power.
Ultimately, the court dismissed Mr Quintano's application for judicial review, holding that the Minister's decision was legally valid and appropriately reasoned. The court also ordered Mr Quintano to pay the respondent's costs. This decision underscores the importance of a reasoned and lawful exercise of discretion in administrative law, particularly in the context of act of grace payments.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application for judicial review filed 26 June 2013 be dismissed.
2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Mr Quintano applied for an act of grace payment under s 33 of the Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997 (Cth) to compensate him for his inability to recover damages due to the insolvency of the nightclub owner and its insurer. The Minister for Finance and Deregulation refused the application, leading Mr Quintano to seek judicial review of the decision in the Federal Court. The case was heard and decided by the Federal Court, which dismissed the application for judicial review and ordered Mr Quintano to pay the respondent's costs.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In further support of the submission that the respondent did consider the applicant’s submission as recorded in para 6 of the Statement of Reasons, counsel for the respondent also referred to para 5A of the Statement of Reasons which includes, as I have already mentioned, a statement to the effect that the respondent had considered the submission provided by Finance concerning the application which included a copy of the 5 September 2011 letter and its various enclosures. CONSIDERATION The applicant’s principal submission suffers from the difficulty that the respondent’s Statement of Reasons makes direct and specific reference to the applicant’s contention that he should receive an act of grace payment because his inability to recover damages was the result of a failure of the Australian Government’s regulatory regime. The reference to this contention in the first sentence of para 6 of the Statement of Reasons provides a strong basis for inferring that it was indeed considered. However, the reference to “a failure in the Government’s regulatory regime” is open to a number of different interpretations. It might suggest that there was a “regulatory failure” in the sense that through no fault of the regulator responsible for the administration and enforcement of the laws that make up the relevant legal environment, a person or organisation was able to lawfully carry on business outside the limits of such laws and therefore outside the reach of the regulator. For example, if there was no legal obligation for a charity to be registered, but the government agency appointed to regulate charities was given powers in relation to registered charities only, one can see how it might be said that there was a regulatory failure in respect of unregistered charities. On the other hand, the failure of a regulator to take steps to prevent contraventions of the law which it had the power to take might also be considered to constitute “regulatory failure”. This could include a failure to take action to enforce laws which the regulator had power to enforce and which the regulator knew or had good reason to believe were being contravened. A person who suffered loss as a result of either kind of regulatory failure may or may not have good grounds for seeking and obtaining an act of grace payment under s 33 of the Act. However, the second type of regulatory failure is one that might reasonably be expected to be more likely to attract a favourable exercise of the statutory discretion if all other things are equal. The first question which arises is whether the respondent has confined his consideration of the special circumstances relied upon by the applicant to the first type of regulatory failure. My initial reaction to this was that the respondent may well have done so, however, on closer reflection, I am not persuaded that he has. The respondent’s Statement of Reasons must be read as a whole. Further, it must not be read with an “eye keenly attuned to error”. Bearing these principles in mind, there are a number of matters that lead me to conclude that the respondent has considered the matter of regulatory failure in the broad sense, so as to encompass what was described by the applicant as regulatory failure, whether it be characterised as a failure on the part of the legislature or a failure on the part of the relevant agencies.