Quintano v Minister for Finance and Deregulation

Link copied
Case Copied 26 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Quintano v Minister for Finance and Deregulation [2014] FCA 531

Citation: Quintano v Minister for Finance and Deregulation [2014] FCA 531
Parties: LUKE QUINTANO v MINISTER FOR FINANCE AND DEREGULATION
File number: NSD 1204 of 2013
Judge: NICHOLAS J
Date of judgment: 23 May 2014
Catchwords:

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – where applicant seriously injured in fight at nightclub – where applicant obtained award of damages against nightclub owner – where nightclub owner and its insurer insolvent – where applicant applied for act of grace payment under s 33 of Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997 (Cth) – whether respondent’s decision to refuse to authorise such payment involved error of law.

Held:  respondent’s decision not shown to involve error of law – application dismissed.   

Legislation: Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997 (Cth) s 33
Administrative Decision (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) s 5
Financial Sector Legislation Amendment (Discretionary Mutual Funds and Direct Offshore Foreign Insurers) Act 2007 (Cth)
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority Act 1998 (Cth) s 58
Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) s 346
Cases cited: Toomer v Slipper [2001] FCA 981
Date of hearing: 2 December 2013
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 36
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr KP Smark SC with Mr MR Gracie
Solicitor for the Applicant: DC Legal Pty Ltd
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr S Free
Solicitor for the Respondent: Sparke Helmore Lawyers

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 1204 of 2013

BETWEEN:

LUKE QUINTANO
Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR FINANCE AND DEREGULATION
Respondent

JUDGE:

NICHOLAS J

DATE OF ORDER:

23 MAY 2014

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for judicial review filed 26 June 2013 be dismissed.

2.The applicant pay the respondent’s costs.  

Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 1204 of 2013

BETWEEN:

LUKE QUINTANO
Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR FINANCE AND DEREGULATION
Respondent

JUDGE:

NICHOLAS J

DATE:

23 MAY 2014

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

BACKGROUND

  1. On 15 December 2002 the applicant visited a nightclub.  A fight broke out at the nightclub and the applicant was shot in the head.  The injuries inflicted on the applicant were very serious.  He is now wheelchair bound with a paralysed right side of his body.  He also lost an eye and suffers from seizures. 

  2. The respondent commenced proceedings against the owner of the nightclub, a company called BW Rose Pty Ltd (the nightclub company).  In June 2009, the Supreme Court of New South Wales awarded the applicant $4,063,802.50 in damages.  The nightclub company went into liquidation during the course of the proceeding.  The nightclub company was insured at the relevant time by International Unity Insurance (General) Limited (IUI General) through its agent International Unity Insurance Pty Limited (IUI Australia).  IUI General was incorporated in the Solomon Islands…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Quintano v Minister for Finance and Deregulation and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2014] FCA 531
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Federal Court, Mr Quintano brought an application for judicial review against the Minister for Finance and Deregulation, challenging the Minister's refusal to authorise an act of grace payment under section 33 of the Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997 (Cth). Mr Quintano had been permanently incapacitated after being shot at a nightclub owned by a company that had obtained a public liability insurance policy from IUI General through IUI Australia. Despite winning a damages award against the nightclub, Mr Quintano was unable to recover damages due to the insolvency of both the nightclub and its insurer. He applied for an act of grace payment, arguing that his inability to recover was due to a failure in the Australian Government's regulatory regime. The Minister's decision to refuse the payment was based on a detailed Statement of Reasons that considered various aspects of the case, including legislative requirements, policy guidance, and the findings of material facts.

The court examined whether the Minister's decision to refuse the act of grace payment was legally sound. The Minister's discretion under section 33 was to consider "special circumstances," and the decision was not to be unreasonable in a legal sense. The court found that the Minister's Statement of Reasons demonstrated a comprehensive consideration of the applicant's claims, including the regulatory context and the failures of the insurance companies involved. The Minister's decision to refuse the payment was deemed to be within the bounds of legal propriety, as it was not shown to be capricious, plainly unjust, or an abuse of power.

Ultimately, the court dismissed Mr Quintano's application for judicial review, holding that the Minister's decision was legally valid and appropriately reasoned. The court also ordered Mr Quintano to pay the respondent's costs. This decision underscores the importance of a reasoned and lawful exercise of discretion in administrative law, particularly in the context of act of grace payments.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for judicial review filed 26 June 2013 be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Mr Quintano was permanently incapacitated and unable to work after being shot in the head during a visit to a nightclub in Sydney in February 2002. He was awarded damages of $4,063,802.50 in the NSW Supreme Court against the nightclub company, which was unable to pay the damages. The nightclub company had obtained public liability insurance from IUI General through IUI Australia, but the insurer was also insolvent. IUI General was not authorised to provide insurance in Australia and had its insurance license suspended in the Solomon Islands in April 2002. APRA and ASIC had concerns about IUI Australia but did not take formal action. IUI General and IUI Australia were eventually wound up by the Federal Court in June 2004.

Mr Quintano applied for an act of grace payment under s 33 of the Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997 (Cth) to compensate him for his inability to recover damages due to the insolvency of the nightclub owner and its insurer. The Minister for Finance and Deregulation refused the application, leading Mr Quintano to seek judicial review of the decision in the Federal Court. The case was heard and decided by the Federal Court, which dismissed the application for judicial review and ordered Mr Quintano to pay the respondent's costs.

Decision

Reasons for decision

It is apparent from the language of s 33, that the Minister may only authorise a payment under that provision if he or she considers it appropriate to do so because of “special circumstances”. However, what constitutes special circumstances justifying the making of such a payment is for the Minister to determine having regard to any matter that he or she considers relevant consistent with the subject, scope and purpose of the Act. In exercising the discretion under s 33 the Minister must not make a decision that is unreasonable in the legal sense, by which I mean that it must not be capricious, plainly unjust, or otherwise involve an abuse of power. However, it is not suggested by the applicant in the present case that the respondent’s decision was unreasonable in the legal sense. THE REASONS FOR DECISION The respondent’s Statement of Reasons contains two paras 4, two paras 5 and two paras 6. For ease of reference I have designated the second occurrence of each para as 4A, 5A and 6A respectively. The Statement of Reasons is made up of a number of sections which, most relevantly, include sections entitled:·Legislation and Policy (paras 4-5);·Findings on Material Questions of Fact (para 4A);·Evidence or Material upon which the Findings were Based (para 5A);·Reasons for the Decision (paras 6-12). At para 4 of the Statement of Reasons the respondent refers to s 33(1) of the Act which he sets out. He also refers at para 5 to the Finance Circular 2009/09, Discretionary Compensation and Waiver of Debt Mechanism (Finance Circular 2009/09) issued by the Department of Finance and Deregulation (Finance) to provide guidance to agencies of the Australian Government. The respondent also states at para 5 that he considered the Finance Circular 2009/09 but did not regard himself as bound by it. At para 5A of the Statement of Reasons the respondent refers to the submission with which he was apparently provided by Finance concerning the applicant’s application for an act of grace payment. This submission is said by the respondent in the Statement of Reasons to have included various attachments including a letter from the applicant’s solicitors to the then Special Minister for State dated 5 September 2011, an undated submission of ASIC and a letter from APRA dated 14 November 2011. Copies of these three documents are included in the evidence before me. The section of the Statement of Reasons entitled “Findings on Material Questions of Fact” indicates that the respondent made the following 33 findings of fact:Mr Quintano’s situation(1)The nightclub company owned a nightclub in Sydney.(2)There was no legislative or licensing requirement for the nightclub company to have a public liability insurance policy.(3)In February 2002, the nightclub company obtained public liability insurance for the period from 27 March 2002 to 20 February 2003.(4)The nightclub company engaged Prestige as brokers to assist in obtaining the insurance.(5)Prestige referred the matter to another broker, the Cameron Group, which specialised in “hard to place” risks.(6)Prestige warned the nightclub company that there would be significant risks in insuring with IUI General, because IUI General was not authorised to provide insurance in Australia.(7)The nightclub company obtained a public liability policy issued by IUI General through IUI Australia.(8)On 15 December 2002, Mr Quintano visited the nightclub. During the visit, Mr Quintano was shot in the head.(9)As a result of the shooting, Mr Quintano is now permanently incapacitated and has no capacity for remunerative employment.(10)Mr Quintano sued the nightclub company in the NSW Supreme Court. On 19 June 2009, the Court awarded $4,063,802.50 to Mr Quintano.(11)Mr Quintano was unable to recover damages from the nightclub company.(12)Mr Quintano was unable to obtain damages from the insurer.The insurance companies(13)IUI General was authorised to provide insurance in the Solomon Islands. IUI Australia was incorporated in Australia and acted as IUI General’s agent in Australia.(14)APRA and ASIC are the Australian Government’s regulatory agencies for the insurance industry.(15)In 2001, ASIC received a report from AUSTRAC about a transaction involving IUI Australia. ASIC decided that there was no indication of breaches of the Corporations law.(16)In November 2001, members of the insurance industry advised APRA of concerns about IUI Australia’s presence in the Australian insurance market. APRA did not take any formal action.(17)In February 2002, the Controller of insurance of the Solomon Islands wrote to APRA about IUI Australia. APRA advised that IUI Australia did not have an insurance licence and that APRA could not comment further. (18)The Controller of Insurance of the Solomon Islands advised APRA that, in March 2002, IUI General had been given a notice of suspension, advised not to undertake new business and asked for documentation of the company’s stated capital.(19)APRA then informed IUI Australia that it was in possible breach of the Insurance Act 1973, as it was carrying on insurance in Australia while not authorised or licensed in the Solomon Island. IUI Australia gave an undertaking not to arrange or renew insurance in Australia until its Solomon Island insurance licence was renewed.(20)At about this time, APRA contacted ASIC about IUI General. ASIC undertook an investigation but concluded there were no matters for it to pursue.(21)In April 2002, APRA was in touch with the UK Financial Services Authority about a London underwriting agency that appeared questionable and appeared to have links with IUI Australia.(22)At about this time, APRA considered the situation of unauthorised companies carrying on insurance business in Australia. APRA concluded that such actions involved criminal offences but that APRA would be unlikely to obtain an injunction in these cases.(23)On 15 April 2002, APRA issued a general warning in respect of unauthorised foreign insurers issuing insurance products in Australia.(24)On or shortly after 16 April 2002 the Solomons Controller advised APRA that IUI General could not sell insurance in the Solomon Islands. On 18 April 2002, APRA issued a media release, noting that IUI General’s registration had been cancelled and noting the risks in taking out insurance with unauthorised foreign insurers.(25)Later in April 2002, the United Kingdom Financial Services Authority advised APRA of concerns about reinsurance contracts of the IUI companies.(26)In June 2002, APRA received information that IUI General was continuing business activities in Australia and was using United Kingdom underwriters. APRA had correspondence with IUI General about this matter.(27)In September 2002, ASIC wrote to APRA, noting that IUI General may be conducting insurance business in Australia. APRA decided that its resources were required elsewhere at the time.(28)In November 2002 and January 2003, APRA received advice of problems being experienced with the IUI companies. APRA staff unsuccessfully attempted to contact IUI Australia. APRA then passed the complaint to ASIC.(29)In January 2003, IUI Australia’s chartered accountant advised ASIC of concerns about IUI Australia and IUI General. ASIC undertook an investigation.(30)The investigation showed that IUI Australia had not met claims and had siphoned off its assets to put them beyond the reach of its creditors.(31)In June 2003, a third party provided APRA with documents about IUI General and IUI Australia, indicating false statements and securities fraud. APRA considered it had no jurisdiction.(32)ASIC applied to the Federal Court to have IUI General and IUI Australia wound up. The IUI Australia application was filed on 25 September 2003 and the IUI General application was filed on 27 February 2004.(33)In June 2004, the Federal Court issued orders winding up IUI General and IUI Australia.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In further support of the submission that the respondent did consider the applicant’s submission as recorded in para 6 of the Statement of Reasons, counsel for the respondent also referred to para 5A of the Statement of Reasons which includes, as I have already mentioned, a statement to the effect that the respondent had considered the submission provided by Finance concerning the application which included a copy of the 5 September 2011 letter and its various enclosures. CONSIDERATION The applicant’s principal submission suffers from the difficulty that the respondent’s Statement of Reasons makes direct and specific reference to the applicant’s contention that he should receive an act of grace payment because his inability to recover damages was the result of a failure of the Australian Government’s regulatory regime. The reference to this contention in the first sentence of para 6 of the Statement of Reasons provides a strong basis for inferring that it was indeed considered. However, the reference to “a failure in the Government’s regulatory regime” is open to a number of different interpretations. It might suggest that there was a “regulatory failure” in the sense that through no fault of the regulator responsible for the administration and enforcement of the laws that make up the relevant legal environment, a person or organisation was able to lawfully carry on business outside the limits of such laws and therefore outside the reach of the regulator. For example, if there was no legal obligation for a charity to be registered, but the government agency appointed to regulate charities was given powers in relation to registered charities only, one can see how it might be said that there was a regulatory failure in respect of unregistered charities. On the other hand, the failure of a regulator to take steps to prevent contraventions of the law which it had the power to take might also be considered to constitute “regulatory failure”. This could include a failure to take action to enforce laws which the regulator had power to enforce and which the regulator knew or had good reason to believe were being contravened. A person who suffered loss as a result of either kind of regulatory failure may or may not have good grounds for seeking and obtaining an act of grace payment under s 33 of the Act. However, the second type of regulatory failure is one that might reasonably be expected to be more likely to attract a favourable exercise of the statutory discretion if all other things are equal. The first question which arises is whether the respondent has confined his consideration of the special circumstances relied upon by the applicant to the first type of regulatory failure. My initial reaction to this was that the respondent may well have done so, however, on closer reflection, I am not persuaded that he has. The respondent’s Statement of Reasons must be read as a whole. Further, it must not be read with an “eye keenly attuned to error”. Bearing these principles in mind, there are a number of matters that lead me to conclude that the respondent has considered the matter of regulatory failure in the broad sense, so as to encompass what was described by the applicant as regulatory failure, whether it be characterised as a failure on the part of the legislature or a failure on the part of the relevant agencies.