Queensland Racing Integrity Commission v Vale

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CITATION: Queensland Racing Integrity Commission v Vale [2017] QCATA 110
PARTIES: Queensland Racing Integrity Commission
(Applicant/Appellant)
v

Ricky Vale
(Respondent)

APPLICATION NUMBER: APL213-16
MATTER TYPE: Application and Appeals
HEARING DATE: On the papers
HEARD AT: Brisbane
DECISION OF: Justice Carmody
DELIVERED ON: 10 October 2017
DELIVERED AT: Brisbane
ORDERS MADE:

THE APPEAL TRIBUNAL ORDERS THAT:

The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to the appeal proceedings within 30 days, to be agreed, or failing agreement to be assessed on the standard basis.

CATCHWORDS:

PROCEDURE – COSTS – DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS – where the respondent was successful on appeal – whether the presumptive position in s 100 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act is displaced because the interests of justice call for costs to be ordered against a wholly unsuccessful applicant – where the applicant was a publicly-funded regulatory body – where such a body is not immune from an adverse costs order – where consideration given to factors listed is s 102(3) of the Act

Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) s 100, 102

Ascot v Nursing & Midwifery Board of Australia [2010] QCAT 364
AT v Commissioner of Police, NSW
[2010] NSWCA 131
Baxendale-Walker v The Law Society [2007] EWCA Civ 233, [2007] 3 All ER 330
Beasley v Department of Education and Training [2006] VCAT 2044
Bode v Queensland All Codes Racing Industry Board (No. 2) [2017] QCAT 84

Delekta v Moorabool SC & Ors [2003] VCAT 30

Dennis Family Corporation Pty Ltd v Casey CC (Red Dot) [2008] VCAT 691
Fast Access Finance (Beaudesert) Pty Ltd and Anor v Charter and Anor (No. 2) [2012] QCAT 172
Filippou Management Pty Ltd v MREEF Project Company No. 11 Pty Ltd & Ors [2010] VCAT 1261
Frugtniet v Law Institute of Victoria Ltd [2012] VSCA 178

Hili v The Queen (2010) 242 CLR 520

Kapadia Pty Ltd v Trust Company of Australia Ltd [2012] QCAT 194
Lacey v Attorney-General (Qld) (2011) 242 CLR 573
Latoudis v Casey (1990) 170 CLR 534
Lewis Constructions Pty Ltd v Pollock and Anor (No. 2) [2012] QCAT 398
Mahanthirarasa v State Rail Authority of New South Wales (2008) 72 NSWLR 273
Maylor (No 2) v Mid North Coast Area Health Service [2001] NSWADT 118
McEwen v Barker Builders Pty Ltd [2010] QCATA 49

Medical Board of Australia v Wong
[2017] QCA 42

Oshlack v Richmond River Council
(1998) 193 CLR 72
Nikolic v Racing Victoria Ltd [2012] VCAT 1954
Queensland All Codes Racing Industry Board v Abbott [2015] QCATA 92
Queensland All Codes Racing Industry Board v Abbott (No. 2) [2016] QCATA 49
Queensland Racing Integrity Commission v Vale [2017] QCATA 46
R v Pham (2015) 256 CLR 550
Ralacom Pty Ltd v Body Corporate for Paradise Island Apartments (No. 2) [2010] QCAT 412
Solid Investments Australia Pty Ltd v Greater Geelong CC [2005] VCAT 244
Sweetvale Pty Ltd v Minister for Planning [2004] VCAT 2000
Tamawood Ltd & Anor v Paans
[2005] 2 Qd R…

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Details
Case
[2017] QCATA 110
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Queensland Racing Integrity Commission v Vale, the Court of Appeal considered the issue of costs in relation to an appeal brought by the Queensland Racing Integrity Commission (QRIC) against a decision of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal (QCAT). The appeal concerned the imposition of penalties on a participant in racing activities. The QRIC, a publicly-funded regulatory body, sought to appeal a QCAT decision which reduced the penalty imposed on the respondent, Vale. The Court of Appeal found in favour of the respondent, Vale, and determined the issue of costs.

The primary legal issue before the Court of Appeal was whether the presumptive position in section 100 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (QCAT Act) was displaced because the interests of justice called for costs to be ordered against the wholly unsuccessful applicant, QRIC. The Court considered various factors in determining whether to order costs against QRIC, including the public funding of QRIC, the nature of the appeal, and the relative merits of the parties' cases.

The Court of Appeal held that the interests of justice did require costs to be ordered against QRIC. The Court found that the appeal proceedings were not worth pursuing in light of the limited prospects of success, the likely cost to both sides, the lack of any important question of principle, and the overreliance on a previous case as a yardstick. The Court also considered the public funding of QRIC and its role as a regulator, but ultimately found that these considerations were outweighed by the relative weakness of QRIC's appeal case. The Court ordered QRIC to pay Vale's costs of and incidental to the appeal proceedings within 30 days, to be agreed or, failing agreement, to be assessed on the standard basis.

In summary, the Court of Appeal found that the interests of justice required costs to be ordered against the wholly unsuccessful applicant, QRIC, in this case. The Court considered a range of factors in reaching this decision, including the public funding of QRIC, its role as a regulator, and the relative merits of the parties' cases. The Court ordered QRIC to pay Vale's costs of and incidental to the appeal proceedings.

Orders

Orders of the court

THE APPEAL TRIBUNAL ORDERS THAT:

The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to the appeal proceedings within 30 days, to be agreed, or failing agreement to be assessed on the standard basis.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

As Thomas J found the circumstances in Nikolic were much more severe than the current case and no mitigating factors were relevant.[68] Even so, Nikolic’s two year disqualification for his threatening behaviour was later halved on appeal to VCAT on 19 February 2013.[69][68]Queensland Racing Integrity Commission v Vale [2017] QCATA 46, [34]-[37]. [69]Brendan Cormick, ‘Danny Nikolic ban cut to 12 months’, Sport, The Australian, 19 February 2013. Conclusion Previous penalty decisions do not give rise to binding precedent, but may be followed by tribunals deciding factually similar cases, unless plainly wrong.[70][70]Lacey v Attorney-General (Qld) (2011) 242 CLR 573, 596. The point of having regard to what was done in past comparable cases is to ensure that similar principles are consistently applied, so as a matter of systemic fairness[71] like cases are predictably treated alike, and different cases are distinguished. Past decisions merely serve to illustrate but not define patterns, trends or upper and lower limits as a yardstick for the purpose of comparing and contrasting prosed penalties with.[72] They help parties predict a penalty range when deciding whether to defend or plead.[71]Wong v The Queen (2001) 207 CLR 584, 591.[72]Hili v The Queen (2010) 242 CLR 520, 537. The penalisation assessment process is much more sophisticated and inevitably more complex than simply correlating variables. Consistency and parity are achieved by taking account of the multitude of conflicting and contradictory aggravating and mitigating features not found in graphs or the statistical details of penalty outcomes in other cases.[73][73]R v Pham (2015) 256 CLR 550, 559. In my opinion, the nature and outcome of the appeal, in conjunction with the remarks of Justice Thomas in dismissing the appeal, suggest that the appeal proceeding was not worth the candle and, on balance, should not have been pursued in light of the limited prospects of success, the likely cost to both sides, the lack of any important question of principle, and the overreliance on Nikolic as a yardstick. The respondent’s submissions, therefore, should be accepted. The “contra-indication” that the no cost presumption should not be applied to deny the successful respondent the cost he expended to uphold the QRBD’s decision is strong enough. The overall interests of justice require him to have his costs of the proceedings to be paid by the QRIC. The applicant quantifies his reasonable actual costs as $21,705.21 for solicitor’s charges and $3,740.00 for counsel’s fees but there is nothing on the file to substantiate that the claimed costs were actually incurred or for what itemised particulars.[74] [74]Respondent’s submissions (on costs), 23 May 2016, [11]. In these circumstances, the applicant is ordered to pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to the appeal proceedings within 30 days, to be agreed, or failing agreement to be assessed on the standard basis.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Of course, the publicly-funded protective role the QRIC has been assigned also plays in its favour. Nevertheless, even where the anti-cost rule prevails it may be relevant to consider the practical justice of depriving a poor respondent of the costs of successfully defending his position from attack by a publicly-funded regulator.Other relevant considerations While the conduct of the successful party is the most relevant cost consideration in regular court cases, the reasonableness of the unsuccessful party may be more pertinent as to whether costs of tribunal proceedings will be granted. Generally speaking, a finding that the opposing party acted unreasonably in bringing or prosecuting a defended claim, or conducted the proceeding vexatiously or in a way that unnecessarily disadvantaged the applicant, will imply that a compensatory order for costs is called for. There was no suggestion that the QRIC acted capriciously, arbitrarily or unnecessarily to disadvantage the applicant in appealing.[55][55]QCAT Act s 102(3)(a). However, it may also be sufficient if the losing party pressed a clearly implausible, manifestly weak or incredible case.[56][56]Delekta v Moorabool SC & Ors [2003] VCAT 30, [12]. The liability of regulatory bodies for costs is governed by the same rules as apply to all other parties to tribunal proceedings. Their public functions are relevant under s 102(3)(e), and it would be an error not to give due recognition to this factor. For example, in Medical Board of Australia v Wong, the mandatory nature of the Board’s statutory referral obligation was relevant to the question of whether judicial proceedings had been properly brought, where there was no finding that the characterisation of the conduct in issue as professional misconduct was not only wrong, but unreasonable.[57] [57]Medical Board of Australia v Wong [2017] QCA 42. A regulator is expected to be a ‘model litigant’ in dealing with the profession it oversights.[58] Like any other administrative body, it is obliged to try to avoid rather than pursue litigation wherever possible. The expectation is that it will err on the side of caution when reviewing penalty discretions exercised by its own experts, and give proper consideration to whether the grounds of an appeal have substantial, not barely arguable, merit. That is not to say that QRIC is not entitled to maintain parity or argue for stiffer penalties in appropriate cases, but failure in a marginal case is a relevant costs factor against applying s 100 QCAT Act.[58]Mahanthirarasa v State Rail Authority of New South Wales (2008) 72 NSWLR 273. QRIC’s statutory responsibility for the protection of the public means the tribunal should not unreasonably (or unjustly) burden it with an order for costs. In principle, it will not usually be ordered to pay the costs of another party unless it has been unreasonable in performing its roles and functions.[59] While the role and responsibilities of QRIC are plainly relevant under s 102(3)(b) and (f), these considerations are offset by the argument that its losing appeal case was a relatively weak one, and meeting it put the applicant to ultimately needless time and financial costs.[59]Bode v Queensland All Codes Racing Industry Board (No. 2) [2017] QCAT 84.