FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Doyle on behalf of the Iman People #2 v State of Queensland [2016] FCA 13
File number: QUD 6162 of 1998 Judge: REEVES J Date of judgment: 22 January 2016 Catchwords: NATIVE TITLE – hearing of separate questions under r 30.01 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) – whether a grant, and grants and conversions, comprise a previous exclusive possession act within s 23B of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) – whether land duly dedicated and established as a public road – consideration of the presumption of regularity – whether various past acts are valid within the terms of s 23B of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) – consideration of the meaning and operation of the decision in University of Wollongong v Metwally (1984) 158 CLR 447 Legislation: Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW)
Brigalow and Other Lands Development Acts 1962-1965 (Qld)
Constitution
Crown Lands Act 1884 (Qld)
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth)
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth)
Land Act 1897 (Qld)
Land Act 1962-1975 (Qld)
Land Act 1962-1984 (Qld)
Land Act Amendment Act 1984 (Qld)
Land Acts 1962-1968 (Qld)
Land Acts 1962-1981 (Qld)
Land Surveyors Act 1908 (Qld)
Native Title (Queensland) Act 1993 (Qld)
Native Title Act 1993 (Cth)
Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth)
Racial Discrimination Amendment Act 1983 (Cth)
Cases cited: Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd (2007) 230 CLR 89; [2007] HCA 22
Fourmile v Selpam Pty Ltd (1998) 80 FCR 151
Minister for Natural Resources v New South Wales Aboriginal Land Council (1987) 9 NSWLR 154
University of Wollongong v Metwally (1984) 158 CLR 447
Viskauskas v Niland (1983) 153 CLR 280
Dates of hearing: 4 and 15 June 2015 Registry: Queensland Division: General Division National Practice Area: Native Title Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 77 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr D Yarrow Solicitor for the Applicant: Just Us Lawyers Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms S Brownhill Solicitor for the First Respondent: Crown Law Counsel for the Second to Eighth Respondents: The Second to Eighth Respondents did not appear Solicitor for the Ninth Respondent: Mr B Zillman of Allens Counsel for the Tenth to Fourteenth Respondents: The Tenth to Fourteenth Respondents did not appear Solicitor for the Fifteenth to Twenty-Ninth Respondents: Mr M Boge of Thynne & Macartney ORDERS
QUD 6162 of 1998 BETWEEN: RICHARD DOYLE & ORS ON BEHALF OF THE IMAN PEOPLE #2
ApplicantAND: STATE OF QUEENSLAND (and others named in the Schedule)
First RespondentJUDGE:
REEVES J
DATE OF ORDER:
22 JANUARY 2016
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.Each of the following comprises a previous exclusive possession act within s 23B of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth):
(a)The grant of:
(i)Grazing Homestead Perpetual Lease 36/7570 on 2 March 1978 pursuant to s 169B of the Land Act 1962-1975 (Qld) over Lot 1 on Plan AB94 which ceased to have effect prior to 28 November…
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- AGLC
- Queensland [2016] FCA 13
- Case
- [2016] FCA 13
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were multifaceted. First, it had to determine whether the land grants and conversions constituted previous exclusive possession acts. Second, it had to decide whether the land in question had been duly dedicated and established as a public road. Third, the court examined the applicability of the presumption of regularity to infer certain official actions, such as the declaration of land for selection, and whether the lack of explicit evidence could be overcome by this presumption. Finally, the court needed to interpret the decision in University of Wollongong v Metwally and its relevance to the validation of past acts under the Native Title Act.
The court found that the land grants and conversions did indeed constitute previous exclusive possession acts under the Native Title Act. It further determined that the depiction of an area as a road on a particular plan was sufficient evidence to conclude that the land had been dedicated as a public road. The presumption of regularity was deemed applicable to infer that the requisite official actions were taken, despite the absence of explicit documentary evidence. Finally, the court concluded that the Queensland legislation, once in effect, validated the past acts and extinguished the native title from that point forward, in line with the principles established in Metwally.
In summary, the court held that the land grants and conversions were valid previous exclusive possession acts, the land was properly dedicated as a public road, and the presumption of regularity supported the inference of official actions. The validation and extinguishment of native title took effect from the date the Queensland legislation came into force.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Each of the following comprises a previous exclusive possession act within s 23B of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth):
(a) The grant of:
(i) Grazing Homestead Perpetual Lease 36/7570 on 2 March 1978 pursuant to s 169B of the Land Act 1962-1975 (Qld) over Lot 1 on Plan AB94 which ceased to have effect prior to 28 November 1994;
(ii) Grazing Homestead Perpetual Lease 36/7569 on 4 May 1978 pursuant to s 169B of the Land Act 1962-1975 (Qld) over Lot 1 on Plan AB74 which ceased to have effect prior to 28 November 1994; and
(iii) Grazing Homestead Perpetual Lease 36/7571 on 18 May 1978 pursuant to s 169B of the Land Act 1962-1975 (Qld) over Lot 2 on Plan AB148 which ceased to have effect prior to 28 November 1994,
which comprise area 226, being Lot 62 on FTY1809.
(b) The conversion, pursuant to s 61 of the Land Act Amendment Act 1984 (Qld), of the following to Grazing Homestead Perpetual Leases under s 131 of the Land Act 1962-1984 (Qld) on 15 May 1984:
(i) Grazing Homestead Lease 40/1789 granted on 19 September 1968 over Lot 2 on Plan LE297 (comprising part of area 224, being Lot 52 on FTY1364); and
(ii) Grazing Farm Lease 40/1824 granted on 15 April 1982 over Lot 1 on LE271 (comprising area 73, being Lot 3 on LE289).
(c) The depiction on Plan LE9 of an area running north south on the western boundary of Portion 26 identified as road (comprising area 33, including Lot 1 on AP3608).
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
On the road boundary issue, the State submitted the explanation given by Mr McClelland in his evidence established that stations 111, 110a, 110 and 109 on Plan LE9 were all marked on the ground by the surveyor and provided clear evidence of the location of the eastern boundary of the road. I note, in passing, that, ultimately, the applicant did not dispute this contention. As for the western boundary of the road, the State submitted that, while Mr McClelland’s evidence was to the effect that stations 109a and 111a were not marked on the ground, the contents of Plans LAB4012 and LE9, when considered together, showed that that boundary had been surveyed in accordance with s 77 and was located as shown on both of those plans. I take this to mean along the western boundary of Portion 11v on the former, and of Portion 26 on the latter.The declaration in relation to Portions 26–28 can be inferred The road dedication issue essentially reduces to the question whether the presumption of regularity can be relied upon by the State to overcome the absence of any evidence to show that Portions 26–28 on Plan LE9 had been declared open for selection in accordance with s 75 of the Land Act 1897. The applicant claims that the State cannot rely upon the presumption of regularity because it only applies to the prerequisites that are anterior to the exercise of a statutory power. To advance this contention, it relied on the judgment of McHugh JA in Aboriginal Land Council. In that case, a question arose as to whether the Secretary of the Western Lands Commission, who had purported to grant permissive occupancy of certain land, was acting pursuant to a delegation made by the Minister for Natural Resources. McHugh JA (with whom Kirby P agreed at 157) concluded (at 164) that the presumption (or legal maxim) of regularity could be used to infer that the Secretary had the requisite authority to make the grants. In reaching that conclusion, his Honour made the following observations (at 164):The natural home of the maxim is public law. Where a public official or authority purports to exercise a power or to do an act in the course of his or its duties, a presumption arises that all conditions necessary to the exercise of that power or the doing of that act have been fulfilled. Thus a person who acts in a public office is presumed to have been validly appointed to that office: M'Gahey v Alston (1836) 2 M & W 206 at 211150 ER 731 at 733; R v Brewer (1942) 66 CLR 535 at 548; ; Hardess v Beaumont [1953] VLR 315 at 318-319.…A particular application of the maxim which is relevant to this case is stated in Broom’s Legal Maxims, 10th ed (1939) at 642 as follows:“… where acts are of an official nature, or require the concurrence of official persons, a presumption arises in favour of their due execution. In these cases the ordinary rule is omnia praesumuntur rite et solenniter esse acta donec probetur in contrarium — everything is presumed to be rightly and duly performed until the contrary is shown.”