Quanta Software International Pty Ltd v Quanta Systems Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Quanta Software International Pty Ltd v Quanta Systems Ltd

[2004] FCA 1182

ESTOPPEL – reliance on assumed state of facts – permissibility of subsequent reliance on inconsistent facts – relevance of context to interpreting language founding estoppel claim – precise and unambiguous language – detriment or material disadvantage

Grundt v Great Boulder Pty Gold Mines Limited (1937) 59 CLR 641 referred to
Verschures Creameries v Hull &  Netherlands Steamship Co [1921] 2 KB 608 referred to
Thompson v Palmer (1933) 49 CLR 507 referred to
Low v Bouverie [1891] 3 Ch D 82 followed
GEC Marconi Systems Pty Limited v BHP Information Technology Pty Limited (2003) 128 FCR 1 followed
Waltons Stores (Interstate) Limited v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387 referred to
National Westminster Finance New Zealand Limited v National Bank of New Zealand Limited [1961] 1 NZLR 548 referred to

QUANTA SOFTWARE INTERNATIONAL PTY LIMITED v QUANTA SYSTEMS LIMITED
N 1193 OF 2003

BEAUMONT J
SYDNEY
10 SEPTEMBER 2004


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 1193 OF 2003

BETWEEN:

QUANTA SOFTWARE INTERNATIONAL PTY LIMITED
APPLICANT

AND:

QUANTA SYSTEMS LIMITED
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

BEAUMONT J

DATE OF ORDER:

10 SEPTEMBER 2004

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

The Amended Application be dismissed, with costs.

Note:   Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 1193 OF 2003

BETWEEN:

QUANTA SOFTWARE INTERNATIONAL PTY LIMITED
APPLICANT

AND:

QUANTA SYSTEMS LIMITED
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

BEAUMONT J

DATE:

10 SEPTEMBER 2004

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

The applicant’s Statement of Claim

  1. By its Further Amended Statement of Claim (‘the Claim’) the applicant (Quanta Software International Pty Limited) claims the following against the respondent (Quanta Systems Limited):

    ·Copyright subsists in the ‘Eunice’ software (‘Eunice’) created in 1980 by Michael Harvey and Michael Green and others, employees of the respondent (formerly Quanta Holdings Limited), a New Zealand corporation.

    ·By a written Licence, dated 2 February 1991, the respondent granted to the applicant an exclusive perpetual licence to use, copy, publish, translate and sub-licence rights to Eunice with respect to all countries except New Zealand (par [4]).

    ·The Licence provides (relevantly, for immediate purposes) as follows:

    ·The respondent granted to the applicant an exclusive perpetual licence to use copy, publish, translate and sub-licence rights to Eunice (with respect to all countries except New Zealand) its ‘software system’ (ie, Eunice), including certain integrated modules (cl 1 of the Licence).

    ·The applicant agreed to pay the respondent certain amounts in certain events.

    ·Provision was made for maintenance.

    ·The Licence was conditional upon the execution of a Shareholder’s Deed.

    ·The Licence ‘shall be effective in perpetuity’, with provision for termination for cause or for force majeure.

    ·It was an express term and condition of the Licence that the respondent would not use, copy, publish, translate and sub-licence rights to Eunice in any country except New Zealand (see cl 1) (par [5A]).

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Details
Case
[2004] FCA 1182
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Quanta Software International Pty Ltd (the Applicant) brought proceedings against Quanta Systems Ltd (the Respondent) in the Federal Court of Australia. The Applicant sought a declaration that certain conduct by the Respondent in relation to software licensing constituted copyright infringement and sought injunctive relief, damages, and an account of profits. The Respondent argued that the Applicant was estopped from denying the validity of a settlement deed that purportedly extinguished the licence under which the Applicant claimed to operate.

The primary legal issue before the Court was whether the Applicant was estopped from denying the validity of the settlement deed and thus the Applicant's right to operate under the software licence. The Court needed to determine if the Respondent's conduct, particularly their failure to pursue payments and rights under the licence after receiving the Applicant's letter dated 1 December 1994, constituted a detriment or material disadvantage that could give rise to an estoppel. Another issue was whether an implied term could be inserted into the licence agreement to address the Applicant's claims of copyright infringement.

The Court found in favour of the Respondent on the estoppel claim. The Court held that the Applicant's letter dated 1 December 1994, which claimed that the settlement deed extinguished the licence, constituted a representation on which the Respondent relied to their detriment. The Respondent's decision not to pursue payments and rights under the licence after receiving the letter was considered a material disadvantage, sufficient to give rise to an estoppel. The Court rejected the Applicant's claim for an implied term in the licence agreement, finding that such a term was not necessary to give business efficacy, was not obvious, and was inconsistent with the express terms of the agreement.

The Court dismissed the Applicant's Amended Application, holding that the Applicant was estopped from denying the validity of the settlement deed. The Court ordered the Applicant to pay the Respondent's costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

The Amended Application be dismissed, with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

The Settlement Deed next dealt (cl 4) with Trilogy’s claim against Williams, alleging breaches of a certain Agreement for Sale and Purchase made in June 1991 as follows:‘4.1 BackgroundTrilogy has commenced proceedings against Zivenzia (previously called Southcorp Investments Limited) and Williams in the High Court of New Zealand, Auckland Registry, under CP No 77/92 (‘the Trilogy Proceedings’) alleging breaches of a certain Agreement for Sale and Purchase entered into on or about 7 June 1991 (‘the Agreement for Sale and Purchase’).4.2Settlement4.2.1Trilogy will forthwith discontinue the Trilogy Proceedings.4.2.2The Trilogy Group, Williams, the Zivenzia Group and the Trilogy Australia Group acknowledge that this Deed is in full and final satisfaction of all claims actual or potential claims which any of them have or may have against any other of them arising out of any events, acts or omissions which occurred prior to the date of this Deed including (but not limited to) all matters relating to the Agreement for Sale and Purchase and each of them hereby releases the others from all costs, claims, suits, demands and liabilities of whatsoever nature which have arisen or might but for this Deed have arisen including any costs, claims, suits, demands and liabilities which might be or have been assigned by the Trilogy Group, Williams, the Zivenzia Group or the Trilogy Australia Group to any other parties or which might be or have been assigned to the Trilogy Group, Williams, the Zivenzia Group or the Trilogy Australia Group whether before or after the execution of this Deed.4.2.3The Trilogy Group hereby agrees to allow the Trilogy Australia Group to use the name ‘Trilogy” in Australia.4.2.4Williams, the Zivenzia Group and the Trilogy Australia Group severally covenant and agree:(a)Not at any time, directly or indirectly, to trade or conduct any business in New Zealand or in relation to the New Zealand market under the ‘Trilogy’ name or any Trilogy logo or any combination thereof, or hold themselves out as being able to do so;(b)On the Settlement Date to deliver to the Trilogy Group notifications addressed to the Registrar of Trademarks abandoning irrevocably the Applications for Registration of Trademarks filed under numbers 213272 to 213275 (inclusive);(c)That no other application for registration of any trademark the same or similar to the ‘Trilogy’ name or logo has been or will be made in New Zealand by any of them and if after execution of this Deed it is discovered that any such application has been made, they will immediately upon request by Trilogy, provide an irrevocable abandonment of that application; and(d)On the Settlement Date to deliver to the Trilogy Group a withdrawal by Sussex Limited of its objection to the trademark applications lodged by Trilogy Business Systems Limited; and(e)Not at any time to make or lodge any objection to the registration by any member of the Trilogy Group of any trademark in New Zealand incorporating the word ‘Trilogy’ or the Trilogy logo or any combination.4.2.5The Trilogy Group covenants and agrees:(a)Not at any time, directly or indirectly, to trade or conduct any business in Australia or in relation to the Australian market under the ‘Trilogy’ name or any Trilogy logo or any combination thereof or hold themselves out as being able to do.(b)Not to apply for the registration of any trade mark the same or similar to the ‘Trilogy’ name or logo in Australia and if after execution of this Deed it is discovered that any such application has been made, the Trilogy Group will immediately upon request by the Trilogy Australia Group provide an irrevocable abandonment of that application; and(c)Not at any time to make or lodge any objection to the registration by any member of the Trilogy Australia Group of any trade mark in Australia incorporating the work ‘Trilogy’ or the Trilogy logo or any combination.’

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

It will be recalled that the Licence is expressed to exist in perpetuity. On behalf of the respondent, it is submitted that since its receipt of the Letter dated 1 December 1994 the respondent has not only engaged in separate development of its software, but it has sought to enter the Australian market. Moreover, after 1 December 1994 the respondent did not pursue payment of any amounts owed under the Licence or exercise its rights to require remedy of breaches of the Licence, or to terminate it. In my opinion, this is ‘detriment’ or a ‘material disadvantage’ for present purposes. In other words, whether the Deed of Settlement actually operated to extinguish the Licence, the applicant’s letter dated 1 December 1994 claimed that it did and the respondent acted upon that claim to its detriment. In my view, the applicant is now estopped from denying that the Licence is still on foot.The evidence of Mr Ghosh The applicant relies upon an affidavit (sworn 28 May 2004) of Ajoy Ghosh, an Unisearch Consultant, who has provided expert opinion evidence in relation to software licensing. In his affidavit, Mr Ghosh expresses opinions on the nature of ‘exclusive’ or ‘perpetual’ licences. In my opinion, evidence of this abstract kind cannot assist the Court on the estoppel point, or any of the other matters now before the Court. I reject the affidavit as irrelevant.The estoppel claimed by the applicant It will be recalled that by par [5] of its Reply the applicant alleges:5.In further reply to the whole of the Defence, the Applicant says that the Respondent represented to the Applicant that the Licence remained on foot and in particular that the Settlement Deed made on or around 24 December 1993 did not affect the Licence as follows:(a)By letter dated 7 March 1994 addressed to the applicant, the respondent requested a payment of $12,632,08 pursuant to the Licence (the ‘First Representation’).(b)By letter dated 4 May 1994 addressed to the applicant, the respondent requested a payment of $12,632.08 pursuant to the Licence (the ‘Second Representation’).(c)By letter dated 24 May 1994 addressed to the applicant, the respondent advised that it would pursue more vigorously debts incurred by the applicant, from 1991 to June 1993, which debts were pursuant to the Licence and in the main reimbursement for supplies of brochures, manuals and airfare costs (the ‘Third Representation’).(d)By letter dated 25 October 1994 addressed to the applicant, the respondent requested settlement of the debt referred to in its letter addressed to the applicant dated 24 May 1994 (the ‘Fourth Representation’).(e)By letter dated 21 November 1994 addressed to the applicant, the respondent requested a payment of $12,632.08 pursuant to the Licence (the ‘Fifth Representation’).’ In my opinion, these letters from the respondent dealing with monies owed in arrears before 1 December 1994, would not provide any answer to the estoppel I have found in favour of the respondent, which, as I have said, operated prospectively from 1 December 1994.

Decision

Reasons for decision

BEAUMONT J
As to the ‘implied’ term (applicant’s submissions, pars 36-37), the respondent contends:‘23.The term sought to be implied does not meet the necessary conditions identified in Codelfa Constructions Pty Limited v State Rail Authority of NSW (1982) 149 CLR 337. The term sought to be implied is not reasonable and equitable, necessary to give business efficacy, so obvious it goes without saying, is not capable of clear expression and is inconsistent with the express terms of the Licence given that:(a)the Licence clearly identifies the ‘software system’ the subject of the Licence in the Definition paragraph of the agreement, by name and by listing of modules;(b)the Definition does not extend to the system as may be developed in the future; rather the applicant is permitted by clause 4 to make its own adaptations and improvements, and warrants that those changes do not infringe third party rights. By clause 6, the respondent warrants that the ‘software system’ does not infringe any third party rights. The warranty does not mirror that of clause 4; in particular there is no reference to any changes the respondent may have made to the system;(c)clause 2 of the Licence imposes an express best endeavours restraint on the applicant dealing in New Zealand in the ‘software system under any name’ but does not impose any corresponding restraint on the respondent dealing outside New Zealand.(d)the applicant was not given any right under the written terms of the Licence to sue for infringement of copyright; and(e)the applicant could readily exploit the Licence and grant sub-licences without recourse to the term sought to be implied.24.Mr Williams’ self serving views as whether he would or would not have permitted the applicant to sign the Licence conveniently ignore the facts that at the time the Licence was entered into, the shareholder he purported to represent (but was not a director or shareholder of) was not a majority shareholder in the applicant, did not have a controlling interest and that he was never a director of the applicant and was not employed by the applicant. He had no control over the managing director of the applicant, Chris Collins and his assertions otherwise are unsubstantiated and contrary to the company records. Mr Williams’ oral evidence is that he does not consider himself a person to understand and comment on paragraphs of commercial agreements such as clause 9 of the Licence.’CONCLUSIONS ON THE SEPARATE QUESTION As has been seen, the parties’ written submissions raised a multiplicity of issues. These submissions were further explained in full oral argument on 2 September 2004. However, except where necessary, I do not otherwise propose to refer to the oral submissions as their respective positions appear adequately from their written argument. The multiplicity of issues raised by the parties includes some collateral issues, in particular, the true scope of the preliminary questions. It will be necessary to return to this later. However, both parties accept that the respondent’s claim of estoppel is within the scope of the preliminary questions. Accordingly, I turn to this question first.The respondent’s estoppel claim

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: BEAUMONT J

Full text does not contain this section.