Pye v Registrar, Domestic Animals Act 2000

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SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY

Case Title:

Pye v Registrar, Domestic Animals Act 2000

Citation: 

[2023] ACTSC 247

Hearing Date: 

14 August 2023

Decision Date: 

7 September 2023

Before:

Curtin AJ

Decision: 

(1)     Order 1 of the Appeal Tribunal made on 30 November 2022 is set aside.

(2)     Order 2 of the Appeal Tribunal made on 30 November 2022 is set aside.

(3)     In lieu of Order 2 of the Appeal Tribunal made on 30 November 2022 I order that Order 1 made by the Tribunal in AT 7/2022 and AT 8/2022 on 10 May 2022 is confirmed.

(4)     The proceedings are remitted to the Appeal Tribunal for a rehearing limited to the question whether the dog “Buddha” should be euthanised or whether some other orders should be made.

(5)     The appellant is granted leave to adduce further evidence on that rehearing.

Catchwords: 

APPEAL – ACT CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL – Appeal Division – Domestic Animals Act 2000 – decision to destroy dangerous dog confirmed by original and appeal tribunal – whether appeal tribunal erred in deciding to hear appeal as a review – whether there was jurisdictional error – procedural unfairness – whether the procedural unfairness was material – appeal upheld in part

Legislation Cited: 

ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT), ss 7, 82, 86

Court Procedures Rules 2006 (ACT), r 5052

Domestic Animals Act 2000 (ACT), ss 36, 53C, 68A, 74

Cases Cited: 

BVD17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] HCA 34; 268 CLR 29
Dranichnikov v Minister for Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] HCA 26; 77 ALJR 1088
EB & Ors v Guardianship Tribunal & Ors [2011] NSWSC 767
Goodwin v Amelie Housing ACN 103 181 700 (Appeal) [2023] ACAT 10
Mansour v Dangar [2017] ACAT 49
MZAPC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection & Anor [2019] FCA 2024
Nathanson v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] HCA 26; 96 ALJR 737
Pye v Registrar, Domestic Animals Act 2000 (Appeal) [2022] ACAT 102
Stead v State Government Insurance Commission (1986) 161 CLR 141

Parties: 

Lisa Jane Pye ( Appellant)

Registrar, Domestic Animals Act 2000 ( Respondent)

Representation: 

Counsel

B Nolan ( Appellant)

A Costin ( Respondent)

Solicitors

Animal Defender’s Office ( Appellant)

ACT Government Solicitor ( Respondent)

File Number:

SCA 3 of 2023

Decision Under Appeal: 

Court/Tribunal:           ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal

Before:  President Neate AM; Member Delahunt

Date of Decision:       30 November 2022

Case Title:                  Pye v Registrar, Domestic Animals Act

               2000 (Appeal)

Citation: [2022] ACAT 102

Court File Number:     AA 12/2022

CURTIN AJ:

Introduction

1․This is an appeal from a decision of the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal (ACAT), Appeal Tribunal (the Appeal Tribunal) dismissing an appeal from a decision of the Tribunal (the Original Tribunal) that the appellant’s dog named Buddha be euthanised and that the appellant’s special licences which allowed her to keep two declared dangerous dogs be cancelled.

2․In its simplest terms, the appellant says she was denied procedural…

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Details
Case
[2023] ACTSC 247
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In this appeal, Lisa Jane Pye, the appellant, sought to challenge a decision of the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal (ACAT) to euthanise her dog, Buddha, and to cancel her special licences that allowed her to keep two declared dangerous dogs. The Registrar of the Domestic Animals Act 2000 (ACT), the respondent, defended the decision. The appellant argued that she was denied procedural fairness at the initial hearing before the Original Tribunal and that the denial of procedural fairness was not cured on appeal to the Appeal Tribunal. The court had to determine whether the appellant was denied procedural fairness at the initial hearing and, if so, whether that denial was cured on appeal. The court found that the appellant was indeed denied procedural fairness before the Original Tribunal because she was unable to obtain a full behavioural assessment of Buddha due to restrictions imposed by Domestic Animal Services (DAS). This denial of procedural fairness was not cured before the Appeal Tribunal, which should have addressed and determined this issue. The court held that the Appeal Tribunal's failure to do so was an error, as it failed to address and determine a live and substantive issue on the appeal. The court further found that the denial of procedural fairness was material as it could possibly have altered the result of the appeal. Consequently, the appeal was upheld only in relation to the order to euthanise Buddha. The court set aside the Appeal Tribunal's orders, confirmed the Original Tribunal's decision to cancel the appellant's special licence, and remitted the proceedings to the Appeal Tribunal for a rehearing limited to the question of whether Buddha should be euthanised or whether some other orders should be made. The appellant was granted leave to adduce further evidence on that rehearing.

Background

Background to the litigation

Lisa Jane Pye was the owner of two male Pitbull cross-breed dogs, "Buddha" and "Tonner." Buddha and Tonner were involved in a fight on 3 March 2020, resulting in injuries that required treatment at the RSPCA. The dogs were not de-sexed as required by the Domestic Animals Act 2000 (ACT), and the Registrar issued multiple Notices to Comply for this breach. On 4 February 2021, the dogs were seized and impounded by Domestic Animals Services ACT (DAS). Mr. Bruno Grutzner of the Balanced Dog Academy assessed Buddha and opined that he should be euthanised due to being unsuitable for public exposure. On 21 April 2021, the Registrar decided to euthanise both dogs under s 68A of the DA Act.

Ms. Pye applied to the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal (ACAT) for a merits review of the Registrar's decision. On 20 August 2021, ACAT set aside the decision to euthanise both dogs and declared them to be dangerous dogs under the DA Act. The dogs were de-sexed on 23 August 2021, and Ms. Pye was issued with dangerous dog licences for Buddha and Tonner on 9 September 2021. On 24 November 2021, Buddha bit Mr. Yipu Li in an unprovoked attack, leading to his seizure by DAS rangers on 26 November 2021. Mr. Grutzner assessed Buddha again and concluded that he should be euthanised due to his unpredictable and dangerous behaviour. On 6 January 2022, the Registrar decided to cancel Ms. Pye's dangerous dog licences and to euthanise Buddha.

Ms. Pye applied to ACAT for a merits review of the Registrar's decision. However, DAS refused to allow Ms. Pye to attend the premises when a professional dog trainer, Ms. Eleni Butler, assessed Buddha, preventing her from performing a full assessment. Ms. Butler found that Buddha could be retrained and was safe to be out in public if properly handled. The ACAT Original Tribunal dismissed Ms. Pye's appeal and confirmed the Registrar's decision to cancel the special licences and to euthanise Buddha. Ms. Pye appealed to the ACAT Appeal Tribunal, which dismissed her appeal and confirmed the Original Tribunal's decision. Ms. Pye then sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory, which was granted.

This matter came before the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) as an appeal from a decision of the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal (ACAT). The appellant, Ms Lisa Jane Pye, sought to appeal a decision of the ACAT Appeal Tribunal, which had dismissed her appeal from an earlier decision of the ACAT Tribunal. The earlier decision involved the euthanasia of Ms Pye’s dog, Buddha, and the cancellation of her special licences to keep dangerous dogs. The appeal before the Supreme Court centred on whether Ms Pye was denied procedural fairness during the initial hearing before the ACAT Tribunal and whether that denial was cured on appeal to the ACAT Appeal Tribunal. Ms Pye argued that the denial of procedural fairness was not remedied on appeal, resulting in an unfair outcome. The Supreme Court found that while Ms Pye was indeed denied procedural fairness at the initial hearing, the ACAT Appeal Tribunal failed to address this issue adequately on appeal, thus not curing the procedural unfairness. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside certain orders of the ACAT Appeal Tribunal, confirmed the cancellation of Ms Pye’s special licences, and remitted the question of whether Buddha should be euthanised or if alternative orders should be made back to the ACAT Appeal Tribunal for a rehearing, allowing Ms Pye to adduce further evidence.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Was the appellant denied procedural fairness in the original tribunal's decision to euthanise Buddha?
2. Did the appeal tribunal err in not addressing the appellant's claim of procedural unfairness in the original tribunal's decision?
3. Was the procedural unfairness material in relation to the decision to euthanise Buddha?
4. Should the appeal tribunal have allowed the appellant to present further evidence on the appeal?
5. Was there any error in the appeal tribunal's decision to dismiss the appellant's appeal regarding the cancellation of her special licence?

Held
1. **Was the appellant denied procedural fairness in the original tribunal's decision to euthanise Buddha?**
The court concluded that the appellant was indeed denied procedural fairness in the original tribunal's decision to euthanise Buddha. This was due to the denial of the opportunity to obtain and present all desired evidence, particularly the full behavioural assessment by Ms Butler. Result: Appeal upheld on this issue.

2. **Did the appeal tribunal err in not addressing the appellant's claim of procedural unfairness in the original tribunal's decision?**
The court found that the appeal tribunal erred by not addressing the claim of procedural unfairness from the original tribunal's decision. The appeal tribunal should have determined this substantive issue but instead misapplied the law by deciding the appeal as a review. Result: Appeal upheld on this issue.

3. **Was the procedural unfairness material in relation to the decision to euthanise Buddha?**
The court concluded that the procedural unfairness was material as it could have possibly altered the outcome of the euthanasia decision. The appellant's denied evidence, if presented, could have provided a different perspective on Buddha’s temperament and trainability. Result: Appeal upheld on this issue.

4. **Should the appeal tribunal have allowed the appellant to present further evidence on the appeal?**
The court determined that the appeal tribunal should have considered allowing the appellant to present further evidence, particularly the full behavioural assessment by Ms Butler. The tribunal's refusal to consider additional evidence was a procedural error. Result: Appeal upheld on this issue.

5. **Was there any error in the appeal tribunal's decision to dismiss the appellant's appeal regarding the cancellation of her special licence?**
The court found no error in the appeal tribunal's decision to dismiss the appellant's appeal regarding the cancellation of her special licence. There were valid grounds for the cancellation, including the appellant's failure to comply with the Domestic Animals Act and her disregard for public safety. Result: Appeal dismissed on this issue.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Court began by addressing the issue of whether the appellant was denied procedural fairness in the original tribunal's decision to euthanise Buddha. The Court found that the appellant was indeed denied procedural fairness as she was not given the opportunity to obtain and present all the evidence she wished to present before the Original Tribunal, specifically the full behavioural assessment by Ms Eleni Butler. This finding was grounded in the principle that a decision-maker must give a person whose interests may be adversely affected by a decision an opportunity to present their case, including gathering evidence.

The Court then turned to the issue of whether the appeal tribunal erred in not addressing the appellant's claim of procedural unfairness in the original tribunal's decision. The Appeal Tribunal had indeed recognised the potential issue of procedural unfairness but failed to decide the appellant's first ground of appeal, which was the denial of procedural fairness. The Court held that the Appeal Tribunal was in error in saying that an appellant would need to establish that the denial of natural justice was of such magnitude that a de novo hearing was required to address that injustice. Instead, the Court held that the appellant was not required to articulate a specific course of action which could realistically have changed the result but only needed to show that the denial of natural justice deprived her of the possibility of a successful outcome.

The Court next examined whether the procedural unfairness was material in relation to the decision to euthanise Buddha. The Court held that the evidence identified by the appellant was material and could possibly have altered the result. Therefore, there should be a new hearing on that issue with the appellant being given a reasonable opportunity to obtain and present the evidence she wishes to adduce on the discretionary decision whether Buddha should be euthanised.

The Court also considered whether the appeal tribunal should have allowed the appellant to present further evidence on the appeal. The Court found that the Appeal Tribunal had correctly considered whether further evidence should be allowed on the appeal but had not addressed the issue of whether the appellant had been denied procedural fairness before the Original Tribunal. Therefore, the unfairness resulting from the original procedural unfairness could have been cured on the appeal but was not.

Lastly, the Court addressed whether there was any error in the appeal tribunal's decision to dismiss the appellant's appeal regarding the cancellation of her special licence. The Court found that there was no warrant to provide the appellant with a second hearing on the cancellation of her special licence as there were good grounds for that cancellation and no error had been alleged in relation to it.