MZAPC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

MZAPC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 2024

Appeal from: MZAPC v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2016] FCCA 1414
File number: VID 605 of 2016
Judge: MORTIMER J
Date of judgment: 4 December 2019
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal – notification issued in respect of appellant under s 438 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – a denial of procedural fairness conceded by first respondent – whether Tribunal in fact took s 438 notification information into account in conducting review – whether denial of opportunity to appellant to make submissions about s 438 notification information could realistically have led to a different outcome on the review – consideration of approach to materiality by majority in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA [2019] HCA 3; 264 CLR 421 –denial of procedural fairness did not result in jurisdictional error – appeal dismissed
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 438

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 4.12, 36.57

Cases cited:

BEG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 198; 253 FCR 36

Huang v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2019 FC 1366

Kallab v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2019 FC 706

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v CQZ15 [2017] FCAFC 194; 253 FCR 1

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA [2019] HCA 3; 264 CLR 421

MZAOL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 68

MZAPC v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2016] FCCA 1414

Santos v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2004 FC 937

SZMTA v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 1055; 255 FCR 215

Zaiter v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2019 FC 908

Date of hearing: 15 November 2019
Registry: Victoria
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 59
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr J Bayly (Pro Bono)
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr M Hosking
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Clayton Utz
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent filed a submitting notice, save as to costs

ORDERS

VID 605 of 2016
BETWEEN:

MZAPC

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

MORTIMER J

DATE OF ORDER:

4 DECEMBER 2019

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appellant have leave to rely on the amended notice of appeal filed on 15 October 2019.

2.The appeal be dismissed.

3.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal, to be fixed by way of a lump sum.

4.On or before 4 pm on 18 December 2019, the parties file any agreed minute of orders fixing a lump sum in relation to the first respondent’s costs.

5.In the absence of any agreement having been reached, the matter of an appropriate lump sum figure for the first respondent’s costs be referred to a Registrar for determination.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 2024
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal in MZAPC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection involves the appellant, a citizen of India, who arrived in Australia in 2006 and applied for a student visa which was refused. The appellant then applied for a protection visa twice, both of which were also refused. The Refugee Review Tribunal upheld the decision of the Minister’s delegate not to grant the appellant a protection visa, rejecting his claims of past persecution and future fear of persecution if returned to India. The appellant sought judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision, arguing that the Tribunal had not properly considered information provided under section 438 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), leading to a denial of procedural fairness.

The central legal issue before the court was whether the Tribunal had in fact taken into account the section 438 notification information in conducting its review and if the denial of opportunity for the appellant to make submissions about this information could realistically have led to a different outcome. The court considered the approach to materiality outlined by the High Court in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA, concluding that the denial of procedural fairness did not result in a jurisdictional error. The court found that there was no evidence that the Tribunal considered the section 438 information, and even if it had, it was unlikely to have led to a different outcome given the Tribunal's largely accepting stance towards the appellant's narrative.

The court dismissed the appeal, noting that the Tribunal's reasons did not indicate any clear opinion that the appellant had lied. The court also highlighted that the appellant had not discharged the burden of proving that the Tribunal’s failure to consider the section 438 information was material to the outcome of the review. The final orders included granting the appellant leave to rely on an amended notice of appeal, dismissing the appeal, and directing the appellant to pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal, with specific timelines and procedures outlined for determining the lump sum figure for those costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appellant have leave to rely on the amended notice of appeal filed on 15 October 2019.

2. The appeal be dismissed.

3. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal, to be fixed by way of a lump sum.

4. On or before 4 pm on 18 December 2019, the parties file any agreed minute of orders fixing a lump sum in relation to the first respondent’s costs.

5. In the absence of any agreement having been reached, the matter of an appropriate lump sum figure for the first respondent’s costs be referred to a Registrar for determination.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons set out below, the appeal will be dismissed.Relevant background The appellant is a citizen of India and arrived in Australia on 22 January 2006. At the time of his arrival the appellant held a student (Class TU subclass 572 Vocational Education and Training Sector) visa which ceased on 15 March 2008. The appellant applied for a student (Class DD subclass 880 Skilled – Independent Overseas Student) visa on 30 August 2007. The appellant’s student visa application was refused on 18 April 2012. The appellant sought review of this decision at the Migration Review Tribunal on 16 May 2012. The Migration Review Tribunal found that it had no jurisdiction to review the decision as the application was lodged out of time. The appellant sought judicial review of this decision and on 13 September 2013 the Federal Circuit Court dismissed his application. The appellant then lodged an application for a protection visa on 31 October 2013. He was notified on 13 December 2013 that his application was invalid as he did not provide personal identifiers within the required 14 days. On 21 January 2014, the appellant lodged a second protection visa application, which was refused in a decision made by a delegate of the Minister on 4 June 2014. On 27 June 2014, the appellant applied to the Refugee Review Tribunal for a review of this decision and appeared before the Tribunal on 15 October 2014. On 4 November 2014, the Tribunal affirmed the decision of the delegate of the Minister not to grant the appellant a protection visa. The appellant’s claims in support of his second protection visa application, as put to the delegate and to the Tribunal, were summarised at [8] of the Minister’s submissions filed on the appeal. The appellant did not contest this summary:In summary, he claimed that:8.1although he was born in India, he became stateless after his family disowned him;8.2his family had disowned him because of the society he was in, and because he had changed his religion by cutting his hair and acquired an Australian lifestyle;8.3there was a dispute concerning land between his father and uncle - his uncle threatened to kill him if the land went under his name;8.4in 2004, while on a trip to Punjab, he was kidnapped and his father was asked to sign papers putting the land under the kidnappers’ names - but, after the family got involved, his father paid the kidnappers a settlement amount and the appellant was released;8.5 if he were to return to India, his uncle would kill him for the land. The Tribunal rejected all of the appellant’s protection claims. There was only one aspect, central to the resolution of the appeal, where it might be said the Tribunal did not believe the appellant’s narrative of past events. On other aspects, it found that the appellant’s fears of persecution should he return to India were not well-founded, because of matters such as lapse of time, or the absence of country information indicating any particular risk of harm.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

I consider I am bound to apply that approach. For the reasons that follow, I do not consider the appellant has discharged that burden of proof.The s 438 notification information and the Tribunal’s decision in this case There is no reference in the Tribunal’s reasons, nor in any other evidence before the Court, that the Tribunal even turned its mind to the exercise of the powers under s 438(3). The absence of any such indication is significant, as I have explained. The “presumption” applies. Further, there being no disclosure of the s 438 information to the appellant, and no reference to the information in the Tribunal’s reasons, it is also difficult for the appellant to prove that the Tribunal positively determined to take the s 438 information into account and not disclose it to the appellant; as it would have needed, on the authority of MZAOL, to have “good reason” to do so. On this appeal, counsel for the appellant adopted an appropriately restrained approach to the potential relevance of the s 438 information, in his quest to persuade the Court that notwithstanding the absence of any reference to the s 438(3) discretion, the Tribunal had considered the s 438 notification information, and in particular the Victoria Police record. In his comprehensive and able submissions, counsel for the appellant clearly recognised the uphill battle facing him. The “State false name” offence was buried in the Victoria Police record along with all of the appellant’s other driving and alcohol-related offences. Whilst I accept it is an offence involving dishonesty, the context in which he committed the offence (when he was identified as driving while disqualified) might as much suggest panic and consciousness of guilt on the part of the appellant, as any deliberate plan to deceive. The objective characterisation of that offence is not inevitably one affecting the appellant’s honesty. More problematically, there is simply nothing in the impugned parts of the Tribunal’s reasons, nor anywhere else in those reasons for that matter, which suggests that this was a review where the Tribunal had formed a clear opinion the appellant had lied. This was a review where the Tribunal largely accepted the appellant’s narrative, and his claimed circumstances, but rejected the visa application because it was not satisfied the appellant’s fears were well-founded. When the Tribunal used “credible or plausible” in [23] of its reasons, it did not appear to me to display much consciousness about the substantive difference between the two phrases, nor to see any difference as especially material to its fact-finding. Those passages appear to me to be the Tribunal explaining that whether the appellant’s narrative made objective sense, or whether he might be embellishing or making up aspects of it, either way, it did not lead in the Tribunal’s opinion to an objective basis for his fear. Unlike many Tribunal decisions this Court sees on judicial review, this was not a clear and emphatic finding that the visa applicant was a liar. Further, the way the law has developed in Canada about the caution to be exercised by administrative decision-makers in making findings of implausibility is not a development which is yet visible in Australian law.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established