Putland v R[2003] NTCCA 3
PARTIES: ROBERT JOHN PUTLAND
v
THE QUEEN
TITLE OF COURT: COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY
JURISDICTION: CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT EXERCISING FEDERAL JURISDICTION
FILE NO:CA20 of 2001 (9923435)
DELIVERED: 15 April 2003
HEARING DATES: 19 and 20 March 2003
JUDGMENT OF: Martin CJ, Mildren & Riley JJ
CATCHWORDS:
REPRESENTATION:
Counsel:
Appellant:Mr D Grace QC
Respondent: Mr G Fisher,
Intervenor:Mr T Pauling QC with Ms S Brown-Hill for the Attorney General of the Northern Territory Intervening
Solicitors:
Appellant:Northern Territory Legal Aid Commission
Respondent: Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions
Intervenor:Solicitor General of the Northern Territory
Judgment category classification: A
Judgment ID Number:
Number of pages: 35
IN THE CRIMINAL COURT OF APPEAL
OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY
OF AUSTRALIA
AT DARWINPutland v R[2003] NTCCA 3
No. CA20 of 2001 (9923435)
BETWEEN:
ROBERT JOHN PUTLAND
Appellant
AND:
THE QUEEN
Respondent
CORAM: MARTIN CJ, MILDREN & RILEY JJ
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Delivered 15 April 2003)
THE COURT:
This is an appeal against sentence. The appellant pleaded guilty to two counts of defrauding the Commonwealth contrary to s 29D of the
Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) and two counts each of breaching s 266(1) and
s 269(1)(b) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth). The maximum penalty for each offence contrary to s 29D of the Crimes Act is ten years imprisonment and the maximum penalty for each bankruptcy offence is three years imprisonment.The learned sentencing judge imposed an aggregate sentence of four years imprisonment and ordered that the appellant be released after serving twelve months upon entering into a bond to be of good behaviour for three years.
The grounds of the appeal are that:
1.the aggregate term of imprisonment was manifestly excessive;
2.the unsuspended period was manifestly excessive;
3.the learned sentencing judge erred in failing to order the applicant’s immediate release; and
4.the learned sentencing judge did not have power to impose an aggregate term of imprisonment thereby making the order of imprisonment a nullity.
Before dealing with the other grounds of appeal, it is convenient to deal with ground 4.
Did the learned sentencing judge have power to impose an aggregate sentence?
The appellant argues that the learned sentencing judge had no power to impose an aggregate sentence for the following reasons:
1.Subject to the applicability of s 4K of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) (the Act) in relation to summary criminal proceedings, Part 1B of the Act impliedly excludes aggregate sentencing by superior courts upon conviction for two or more federal offences.
2.Alternatively, it was put that s 4K alone, or together with the provisions within Part 1B, as supplemented by Commonwealth common law, impliedly excludes aggregate sentencing by superior courts.
3.That s 52 of the Sentencing Act (NT) enabling an aggregate sentence to be imposed had no application because that provision was not "picked up" by s 68 or s 79 of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth).
4.Alternatively, it was argued that if s 52 of the Sentencing Act…
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- AGLC
- Putland v The Queen [2003] NTCCA 3
- Case
- [2003] NTCCA 3
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CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the Court of Appeal was whether the sentencing judge had erred in principle by failing to adequately take into account the appellant's bankruptcy and the subsequent actions of Ms Roberts in continuing the business. The court also considered whether the decision in *Jackson* was plainly wrong in relation to the principles of sentencing in such circumstances.
The Court of Appeal, in dismissing the appeal, reasoned that the appellant had continued to operate his transport business in substance, despite his bankruptcy and the nominal transfer of a business name to Ms Roberts. The court found that Ms Roberts was effectively operating the business as a trustee for the appellant, and that the appellant had not established that the majority decision in *Jackson* was plainly wrong. Therefore, the court followed the precedent set in *Jackson*, which held that a bankrupt continuing to trade could be sentenced as if they were still trading. The court concluded that the sentencing judge had not erred in principle and that the sentence imposed was appropriate.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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