MR T.I. PAULING, QC, Solicitor-General for the Northern Territory of Australia: I appear for the first respondent your Honour. (instructed by the Solicitor for the Northern Territory)

MR L.S. KATZ, SC, Solicitor-General for the State of New South Wales: I appear for the Attorney-General for New South Wales. (instructed by the Crown Solicitor for New South Wales)

HER HONOUR: Yes, is that in Darwin?

MR C.R. McDONALD, QC: Yes, your Honour, I continue to appear for the first respondent. (instructed by Chapman & Associates Pty Ltd).

HER HONOUR: Yes, thank you.

MR PAULING: Perhaps if I could go first, your Honour. New South Wales intervening and ourselves have each done our drafts, in Mr Katz’ case, his final submissions on the point. We need a timetable and may we suggest one: that the Commonwealth provide written submissions by Friday, 29 May; that the Northern Territory and New South Wales provide written submissions by 5 June, and that the respondent be allowed until 19 June to provide written submissions. May I additionally say that it is the view of those here in Canberra that this issue will not extend the hearing by any more than an hour.

HER HONOUR: So it would still be concluded in one day?

MR PAULING: Subject to those who are engaged in the other issues, and I do not want to be, yes, I think that is probably the case.

HER HONOUR: And no other Attorneys‑General have been spurred into action by the notices?

MR GRIFFITH: Your Honour, there is a possibility. South Australia is still thinking, but that is all we know from them.

HER HONOUR: Were the notices served on the ACT?

MR GRIFFITH: Yes, the full house, your Honour. Your Honour, the other matter: it would seem to the Commonwealth that it would be the same result, whether it was territory or federal jurisdiction. But I am not sure whether any party will seek to ‑ ‑ ‑

HER HONOUR: That may be right, but there may be quite different approaches to how you get there.

MR GRIFFITH: Of course, yes, your Honour. But if there were one might call the full monty approach, your Honour, of saying whether Chapter III applies to the territory power, that might be another day. But I do not think any of the parties are pushing for that.

HER HONOUR: I do not know. It depends what reliance is had on section 78.

MR GRIFFITH: Yes. We will be ready, your Honour, but ‑ ‑ ‑

HER HONOUR: And the respondent, I think, relied - well, made reference to it but did not rely on it.

MR GRIFFITH: Yes. If it ends up, your Honour, all the parties agree section 79 picks up the territory law, if it does not otherwise apply as a territory law, it might be that there is no real difference to the parties that gets one to the full Chapter III issue.

HER HONOUR: Yes, thank you.

MR GRIFFITH: As your Honour please.

HER HONOUR: Is that timetable acceptable to everyone?

MR GRIFFITH: I am sorry, your Honour, it is acceptable to us but it might be a bit related to expected date of hearing, your Honour, that it could perhaps go out another week if the hearing is not imminent.

HER HONOUR: As I understand it, there will be no hearing before August, and possibly not until September.

MR GRIFFITH: Perhaps we could go out another week for each of the dates then, your Honour.

HER HONOUR: I think it is probably sufficient to say that -I think New South Wales has already delivered new written submissions anyway.

MR KATZ: Yes, we have.

HER HONOUR: And you would not be wishing to provide further submissions?

MR KATZ: No, no thank you, your Honour.

HER HONOUR: It is perhaps sufficient, is it not, to say that the Commonwealth should provide its further submissions, if any, within three weeks of todays date and that all other parties and interveners should have 14 days within which to reply and to each other.

MR GRIFFITH: Thank you, your Honour.

HER HONOUR: Is there anything else that need be done on this occasion, other than to certify for the attendance of counsel?

MR GRIFFITH: And to thank your Honour for moving the date and coming so quickly, as the Court pleases.

HER HONOUR: Thank you. Is that satisfactory to you in Darwin, Mr McDonald?

MR McDONALD: Yes, your Honour. I might just say this, your Honour, in relation to the point that my learned friend, Dr Griffith, raised about the section 78 Chapter III point. There is tomorrow coming up on a special leave application the case of Wynbyne v Marshall where the applicant contends that Chapter III applies to the several courts of the Northern Territory. If special leave were granted in that matter, it might be a matter for consideration whether that case was heard sequentially with this.

HER HONOUR: Yes. We understand that. Thank you. If there is nothing further, I will simply leave it to the parties to file their written submissions in accordance with the procedure already outlined and certify for the attendance of counsel.

The Court will now adjourn.

AT 4.34 PM THE MATTER WAS CONCLUDED

Details

AGLC: Northern Territory of Australia v GPAO [1998] HCATrans 177
Case: [1998] HCATrans 177
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Northern Territory of Australia (the applicant) sought to appeal a decision of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory, which had dismissed its appeal against a judgment of Martin CJ. The dispute concerned the interpretation of a deed of settlement entered into between the applicant and GPAO (the respondent). The respondent had commenced proceedings against the applicant seeking damages for personal injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident. The deed of settlement, which was central to the proceedings, purported to release the applicant from all claims arising from the accident.

The primary legal issue before Gaudron J was whether the deed of settlement effectively released the applicant from all claims, including those for which the respondent had not yet made a claim at the time of settlement. Specifically, the court had to determine the scope of the release and whether it extended to unknown or unquantified future claims. This involved an analysis of the language used in the deed and the principles of contractual interpretation in the context of personal injury settlements.

Gaudron J considered the wording of the release clause within the deed, which stated that the respondent released the applicant from "all actions, suits, claims, demands, and liabilities whatsoever which the Respondent has had, now has or may hereafter have against the Applicant arising out of or in connection with the said accident." Her Honour concluded that the plain and ordinary meaning of this language indicated an intention to release the applicant from all present and future claims, regardless of whether they were known or quantified at the time of settlement. The principle applied was that clear and unambiguous contractual language should be given its ordinary meaning, and that a release of future claims is effective if clearly expressed.

The application for leave to appeal was dismissed.

Orders