Pratten v Commissioner of Taxation

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Pratten v Commissioner of Taxation [2015] FCA 1357

Citation: Pratten v Commissioner of Taxation [2015] FCA 1357
Parties: TIMOTHY CHARLES PRATTEN v FEDERAL COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION
File number: NSD 403 of 2015
Judge: ROBERTSON J
Date of judgment: 4 December 2015
Catchwords:

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – tax appeals pending in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal – availability of remedies under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) to set aside assessments – whether denial of procedural fairness in process of assessment an available ground – whether denial of procedural fairness made out on the facts – whether acting unreasonably an available ground – whether acting unreasonably made out on the facts – whether recklessness made out on the facts – whether genuine attempt to assess the taxable income of the applicant – whether relief should be withheld on discretionary grounds

TAXATION – tax appeals pending in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal – availability of remedies under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 to set aside assessments – whether denial of procedural fairness in process of assessment an available ground – whether denial of procedural fairness made out on the facts – whether acting unreasonably an available ground – whether acting unreasonably made out on the facts – whether recklessness made out on the facts – whether genuine attempt to assess the taxable income of the applicant – whether relief should be withheld on discretionary grounds

Legislation: Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 135
Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) ss 166, 167, 175, 177, 264
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B
Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) Pt IVC, ss 14ZZK(b)(i), 14ZZO
Cases cited:

Denlay v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [2011] FCAFC 63; 193 FCR 412

Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Chemical Trustee Ltd [2010] FCA 1297; 81 ATR 237
Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Hua Wang Bank Berhad (No 2) [2010] FCA 1296; 81 ATR 40

Donoghue v Commissioner of Taxation [2015] FCA 235; 323 ALR 337
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Dalco [1990] HCA 3; 168 CLR 614
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Futuris Corporation Ltd [2008] HCA 32; 237 CLR 146
McAndrew v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1956] HCA 62; 98 CLR 263

Marijancevic v Mann [2008] FCAFC 161; 73 ATR 709
Mount Pritchard & District Community Club Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [2011] FCAFC 129; 196 FCR 549
Roberts v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2013] FCA 1108; 228 FCR 280
Roberts v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2015] FCA 238
Trautwein v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1936) 56 CLR 63

Date of hearing: 13 October 2015
Date of last submissions: 19 October 2015
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 53
Counsel for the Applicant: The applicant appeared in person
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr D McGovern SC with Mr B Kasep
Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

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Details
Case
[2015] FCA 1357
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Federal Court of Australia, the case of Pratten v Commissioner of Taxation [2016] FCA 1603 involved the applicant, Mr Pratten, challenging the validity of amended tax assessments issued by the Commissioner of Taxation. The legal issues before the court included whether the denial of procedural fairness during the assessment process could be grounds for setting aside the assessments, whether acting unreasonably or recklessly was established, and whether the Commissioner made a genuine attempt to assess the applicant's taxable income. Additionally, the court had to consider whether relief should be withheld on discretionary grounds.

The court found that the Commissioner had not acted unreasonably, recklessly, or denied procedural fairness. The assessments were not made in bad faith or without a genuine attempt to assess the applicant's income. The court further held that the existence of administrative proceedings under the Taxation Administration Act provided an alternative remedy, leading to the conclusion that relief under section 39B of the Judiciary Act should be declined. The court also noted that even if the applicant had established grounds for review, it would have exercised its discretion to refuse relief.

In terms of evidence, the court ruled against the admission of certain transcript excerpts from the applicant's criminal trial, finding them either redundant or unclear. Consequently, the applicant's claims were dismissed, and the court ordered the applicant to pay the Commissioner's costs, including those from the final and interlocutory hearings and various directions hearings.

The court's decision underscores the importance of alternative administrative remedies and the discretion of the court in deciding whether to grant relief in tax assessment challenges. The dismissal of the application and the costs order reflect the court's stance on the matter.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs, as agreed or taxed, those costs to include the costs of the final hearing on 13 October 2015, the costs of the interlocutory hearing on 16 September 2015, and the costs of the directions hearings on 13 May 2015, 27 May 2015, 24 June 2015, 6 August 2015, 16 September 2015 and 23 September 2015.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The Commissioner submitted that if the applicant’s grounds prima facie afforded him the declaratory relief he sought, that relief ought to be declined on discretionary grounds. Reference was made to Futuris at [48] and to Mount Pritchard & District Community Club Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [2011] FCAFC 129; 196 FCR 549 at [63]. I have referred at [6] above to the relevant paragraphs in Futuris. I agree that the existence of the Pt IVC proceedings would normally mean that no declaratory relief should be made in relation to the Amended Assessments. In the present case, it remains open to the applicant to demonstrate in his Pt IVC proceedings that the Amended Assessments were “excessive”: s 14ZZK(b)(i) of the Taxation Administration Act. It is in those proceedings Mr Pratten should agitate, for example, whether fraud or evasion was made out: see McAndrew v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1956] HCA 62; 98 CLR 263 at 271, approved in Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Dalco [1990] HCA 3; 168 CLR 614 at 621-622. Although it may not be in every case that relief should be refused under s 39B in respect of a challenge to the validity of an assessment, Futuris establishes that relief should be refused at least where Pt IVC provides a remedy. Even if Mr Pratten had established one or more than one of the grounds of review on which he relied, I would have refused, in the exercise of the Court’s discretion, to grant relief under s 39B.Rulings on evidence Mr Pratten sought to tender transcript, pages 1587 and 1588, taken from his first criminal trial. The relevant parts, both of which were to be found on page 1587, were in the cross-examination of Mr Barns on 22 May 2012 and were, first, as to Mr Barns’ recollection of his evidence given the previous day as to his understanding of whether Mr Pratten remained silent in relation to the audit process and whether that was because he was exercising his right not to incriminate himself, and whether the ATO withdrew a s 264 notice it had previously issued to Mr Pratten. The Commissioner submitted that neither exchange had any probative value and, therefore, the transcript excerpts should not be received into evidence. As to the first excerpt, I would exclude it under s 135 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) as what Mr Barns’ evidence was on the previous day of the criminal trial is already in evidence in the present proceedings. As to the second excerpt, the part of the transcript dealing with the withdrawal of the s 264 notice, I would also exclude it under s 135 of the Evidence Act. The form of the question, and therefore the answer, was unclear and cannot qualify the contemporaneous documentary record as to the circumstances in which the s 264 notice was withdrawn.Conclusion For these reasons the applicant’s claims fail. The originating application will be dismissed, with costs. Those costs include the costs of the final hearing on 13 October 2015, the costs of the interlocutory hearing on 16 September 2015, and the costs of the directions hearings on 13 May 2015, 27 May 2015, 24 June 2015, 6 August 2015, 16 September 2015 and 23 September 2015. I see no reason to except from those orders the Commissioner’s application for summary judgment as it was overtaken by events in light of the early final hearing date.

Decision

Reasons for decision

As to the first excerpt, I would exclude it under s 135 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) as what Mr Barns’ evidence was on the previous day of the criminal trial is already in evidence in the present proceedings. As to the second excerpt, the part of the transcript dealing with the withdrawal of the s 264 notice, I would also exclude it under s 135 of the Evidence Act. The form of the question, and therefore the answer, was unclear and cannot qualify the contemporaneous documentary record as to the circumstances in which the s 264 notice was withdrawn.Conclusion For these reasons the applicant’s claims fail. The originating application will be dismissed, with costs. Those costs include the costs of the final hearing on 13 October 2015, the costs of the interlocutory hearing on 16 September 2015, and the costs of the directions hearings on 13 May 2015, 27 May 2015, 24 June 2015, 6 August 2015, 16 September 2015 and 23 September 2015. I see no reason to except from those orders the Commissioner’s application for summary judgment as it was overtaken by events in light of the early final hearing date.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Merely because the applicant may have provided further information to the Commissioner at some point after the end of his criminal proceedings does not go anywhere near to establishing that the Amended Assessments were tentative or provisional or that the Commissioner made no genuine attempt to assess the relevant amount. The Amended Assessments were not an exercise unrelated to the applicant’s circumstances. There was neither “conscious maladministration” of the assessment process nor any deliberate failure to administer the ITAA 1936 according to its terms.General consideration The applicant referred in his submissions to the decision in Donoghue v Commissioner of Taxation [2015] FCA 235; 323 ALR 337. I see no analogy between that case, which concerned the Commissioner’s use of communications which were held to be subject to legal professional privilege, and the present case, where the applicant’s complaint is that the Commissioner should not have issued the Amended Assessments in light of the applicant’s claim to exercise a right to silence or privilege against self-incrimination in respect of the Position Paper and the objection decision. It is to be recalled that in Donoghue, at [145], Logan J held that the process of assessment included the tax officer acting in wilful disregard of a right which Mr Donoghue had to claim legal professional privilege in respect of the material supplied to the Australian Taxation Office by one Simeon Moore and which the tax officer always believed might be privileged. It was held that this was not a proper purpose. It was further held that the tax officer was reckless in the sense referred to in Futuris. There is nothing in the present case which could be characterised as recklessness on the part of the Commissioner or his officers. Contrary to Mr Pratten’s submissions to this Court, there has been no conscious maladministration of the ITAA 1936. I should add that I see no relevant analogy between s 264 of the ITAA 1936 as then in force, concerning a power to require the provision of information, the production of documents and to attend and give evidence, and the making of an assessment or an amended assessment under s 166 or s 167 of the ITAA 1936. In my opinion, nothing pointed to by the applicant establishes conscious maladministration apt to vitiate the Amended Assessments. As the Full Court pointed out in Denlay v Commissioner of Taxation [2011] FCAFC 63; 193 FCR 412 at [78], conscious maladministration, as explained in Futuris, involves actual bad faith on the part of the Commissioner or his officers. No such actual bad faith has been established.Discretion The Commissioner submitted that if the applicant’s grounds prima facie afforded him the declaratory relief he sought, that relief ought to be declined on discretionary grounds. Reference was made to Futuris at [48] and to Mount Pritchard & District Community Club Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [2011] FCAFC 129; 196 FCR 549 at [63]. I have referred at [6] above to the relevant paragraphs in Futuris. I agree that the existence of the Pt IVC proceedings would normally mean that no declaratory relief should be made in relation to the Amended Assessments. In the present case, it remains open to the applicant to demonstrate in his Pt IVC proceedings that the Amended Assessments were “excessive”: s 14ZZK(b)(i) of the Taxation Administration Act. It is in those proceedings Mr Pratten should agitate, for example, whether fraud or evasion was made out: see McAndrew v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1956] HCA 62; 98 CLR 263 at 271, approved in Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Dalco [1990] HCA 3; 168 CLR 614 at 621-622. Although it may not be in every case that relief should be refused under s 39B in respect of a challenge to the validity of an assessment, Futuris establishes that relief should be refused at least where Pt IVC provides a remedy. Even if Mr Pratten had established one or more than one of the grounds of review on which he relied, I would have refused, in the exercise of the Court’s discretion, to grant relief under s 39B.Rulings on evidence