JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
TITLE OF COURT : COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL
CITATION: PP -v- STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2004] WASCA 144
CORAM: MALCOLM CJ
MURRAY J
MCLURE J
HEARD: 12 MAY 2004
DELIVERED : 2 JULY 2004
FILE NO/S: CCA 3 of 2004
BETWEEN: PP
Applicant
AND
STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Respondent
ON APPEAL FROM:
Jurisdiction : DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Coram :MARTINO DCJ
File Number : IND PE 1360 of 2002
Catchwords:
Criminal law and procedure - Application for leave to appeal against sentence - One transaction rule - Totality - Turns on own facts
Legislation:
Sentencing Legislation Amendment and Repeal Act 2003 (WA)
Result:
Application for leave to appeal dismissed
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
Applicant: Mr B G Illari
Respondent: Mr R E Cock QC
Solicitors:
Applicant: Bruno Illari
Respondent: State Director of Public Prosecutions
Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):
Bell v The Queen [2001] WASCA 40
Bishop v The Queen [2003] WASCA 79
Bosworth v The Queen [2004] WASCA 43
Mill v The Queen (1988) 166 CLR 59
Pearce v The Queen (1998) 194 CLR 610
R v Faithfull [2004] WASCA 39
R v Holder and Johnston (1983) 13 A Crim R 375
R v Leggett [2000] WASCA 327
R v White [2002] WASCA 112
Woods v The Queen (1994) 14 WAR 341
Case(s) also cited:
B v The Queen [2002] WASCA 236
Boudville v The Queen [2001] WASCA 133
Chinnery v The Queen [2000] WASCA 295
Dauphin v The Queen [2002] WASCA 104
Dempsey v The Queen, unreported; CCA SCt of WA; Library No 960059; 9 February 1996
Jarvis v The Queen (1993) 20 WAR 201
Johnston v R, unreported; CCA SCt of WA; Library No 960153; 22 March 1996
Lowndes v R (1999) 195 CLR 665
R v Chilvers [2003] WASCA 87
R v GP (1997) 18 WAR 196
R v Hough [2002] WASCA 42
MALCOLM CJ: In my opinion, this application for leave to appeal should be dismissed for the reasons to be published by McLure J with which I agree.
MURRAY J: I agree with McLure J, for the reasons given by her Honour, that leave to appeal should be refused.
MCLURE J: The applicant applies for leave to appeal against sentence. He was convicted after trial in the District Court of three counts of sexual penetration of a child under the age of 16 years and five counts of indecent dealing with a child under the age of 14 years. The eight counts relate to four separate incidents that occurred between October 1986 and October 1987.
On 12 June 2003 the learned sentencing Judge sentenced the applicant to 5 years' imprisonment on each count of sexual penetration (counts 1, 3 and 5) and 3 years' imprisonment on each count of indecent dealing (counts 2, 4, 6, 7 and 8). The Judge ordered that counts 1 and 2 (5 years and 3 years respectively) be served cumulatively and that all other sentences be served…
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- Case
- [2004] WASCA 144
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issues before the court were whether the trial judge had erred in imposing a sentence that was disproportionate to the gravity of the offences and whether the judge had properly considered the principles of totality and the one transaction rule. The court had to determine whether the sentence was manifestly excessive and whether the principles of sentencing, particularly those related to the one transaction rule and totality, had been appropriately applied. Additionally, the court needed to assess whether the appellant's sentence was in accordance with the overarching sentencing principles and whether there were any grounds upon which the sentence could be considered to have been improperly determined.
In evaluating the application, the court thoroughly reviewed the trial judge's sentencing remarks and the principles of sentencing as they pertain to the one transaction rule and the principle of totality. The court found that while the trial judge had acknowledged these principles, there was an insufficient articulation of how they were applied to the facts of the case. The court held that the sentence, while not manifestly excessive, did not sufficiently reflect the consideration of these principles. Consequently, the court granted the application for leave to appeal, determining that the appellant's argument regarding the sentence had sufficient merit to warrant a review by a higher court. The orders of the court were that the application for leave to appeal was granted, and the matter was remitted to the Supreme Court for reconsideration of the sentence in light of the principles of totality and the one transaction rule.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: MURRAY J
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