JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CHAMBERS
CITATION: POLAND -v- HEDLEY [No 5] [2023] WASC 294
CORAM: TOTTLE J
HEARD: 4 APRIL 2023
DELIVERED : 8 AUGUST 2023
FILE NO/S: CIV 1370 of 2019
BETWEEN: GREGORY DAVID POLAND
Plaintiff
AND
KATE HEDLEY
First Defendant
FAIRFAX DIGITAL AUSTRALIA & NEW ZEALAND PTY LTD
Second Defendant
NATHAN JOHN HONDROS
Third Defendant
CLAIRE BRADLEY
Fourth Defendant
DAVID BIRCH
Fifth Defendant
ANDREW WILLIAM HASTIE
Sixth Defendant
ZAK RICHARD FRANCIS KIRKUP
Seventh Defendant
Catchwords:
Practice and procedure - Pleading - Defamation - Application to strike out paragraphs in the statement of claim - Whether pleas that the fourth to seventh defendants were publishers of defamatory articles by reason of the provision by them of material not itself defamatory subsequently included in the articles should be struck out - Whether pleas of unlawful means conspiracy should be struck out - Turns on own facts
Practice and procedure - Case management - Proportionality - Where economic loss of the subject of an unlawful means conspiracy is modest - Observations on the relevance of considerations of proportionality to any application for leave to replead conspiracy plea
Legislation:
Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA), O 1 r 4B, O 20 r 8(1), O 20 r 19(1), O 20 r 19(3)
Surveillance Devices Act 1998 (WA), s 9(1)
Result:
Application granted - paragraphs struck out
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
| Plaintiff | : | M L Bennett & A J Tharby |
| First Defendant | : | M C Goldblatt |
| Second Defendant | : | M C Goldblatt |
| Third Defendant | : | M C Goldblatt |
| Fourth Defendant | : | M C Goldblatt |
| Fifth Defendant | : | M C Goldblatt |
| Sixth Defendant | : | M C Goldblatt |
| Seventh Defendant | : | M C Goldblatt |
Solicitors:
| Plaintiff | : | Bennett |
| First Defendant | : | Banki Haddock Fiora |
| Second Defendant | : | Banki Haddock Fiora |
| Third Defendant | : | Banki Haddock Fiora |
| Fourth Defendant | : | Banki Haddock Fiora |
| Fifth Defendant | : | Banki Haddock Fiora |
| Sixth Defendant | : | Banki Haddock Fiora |
| Seventh Defendant | : | Banki Haddock Fiora |
Cases referred to in decision:
Armstrong v McIntosh [No 2] [2019] WASC 379
Bleyer v Google Inc [2014] NSWSC 897; (2014) 88 NSWLR 670
Bond Corporation Pty Ltd v Thiess Contractors Pty Ltd (1987) 14 FCR 215
CC Containers Pty Ltd v Lee [2011] VSC 537
Chong v CC Containers Pty Ltd [2015] VSCA 137; (2015) 49 VR 402
Dank v Cronulla Sutherland District Rugby League Football Club Ltd [2014] NSWCA 288
Dresna Pty Ltd v Misu Nominees Pty Ltd [2004] FCAFC 169
English v Vantage Holdings Group Pty Ltd [2021] WASCA 47
Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd v Voller [2021] HCA 27; (2021) 273 CLR 346
Fatimi Pty Ltd v Bryant [2004] NSWCA 140; (2004) 59 NSWLR 678
Gacic v John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 1210
Galland v Mineral Underwriters Ltd [1977] WAR 116
Griffith v Australian Broadcasting Corporation [2004] NSWSC 582
Kingsfield Holdings Pty Ltd v Sullivan Commercial Pty Ltd [2021] WASC 289
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- AGLC
- Poland v Hedley [No 5] [2023] WASC 294
- Case
- [2023] WASC 294
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In my view French J's remarks apply with equal force to an allegation of loss suffered as a result of an unlawful conspiracy particularly in a case where the causal connection is not immediately apparent. To paraphrase what was said by French J in a later paragraph of his reasons in Bond Corporation Pty Ltd v Thiess Contractors Pty Ltd, the plaintiff must plead facts and circumstances leading to a reasonable inference that the conduct and the damage stood to each other in the relation of cause and effect. I will strike out particulars (ii) and (iii) under par 23 on the grounds that they do not disclose a reasonable cause of action. As I have stated I do not accept that the plaintiff should be deprived of the further opportunity to plead an unlawful conspiracy claim. If the plaintiff wishes to amend the statement of claim then he must make an application to do so supported by a minute of the proposed re-amended statement of claim. In the course of oral submissions, in answer to a proposition put by me, the plaintiff's counsel made a submission to the effect that the court should not consider the conspiracy claim on the basis that the damages claimed are confined by the heads of loss set out in the particulars to par 23 and that the possibility that the plaintiff may have suffered further losses leading to an enlargement of the claim by the addition of other heads of damage in the future should not be discounted.[53] I accept the possibility that the economic loss claimed by the plaintiff seeks to recover by his conspiracy case may be enlarged by subsequent amendment. It is relevant to an assessment of that possibility, however, that the events giving rise to the claim occurred over four years ago and it is reasonable to infer that if the plaintiff had suffered other economic losses he would know about them by now.[53] ts 296. On the materials presently before the court I am concerned that the resources of both the court and the parties required to determine the conspiracy claim are wholly disproportionate to the amount claimed by the plaintiff. In Armstrong v McIntosh,[54] Le Miere J held that the court has jurisdiction to stay defamation proceedings where there is a lack of proportionality between the costs and resources involved in the determination of the matter and the significance of the subject matter such that the proceeding may amount to an abuse of process. In so holding his Honour was applying what he had referred to as the Bleyer proportionality principle, so named because the principle was expounded by McCallum J in Bleyer v Google Inc.[55] This is not the occasion on which to consider the ambit of that principle or whether it is to be applied to proceedings other than defamation proceedings. One of the reasons why this is not the occasion to undertake that consideration is because I have not had the benefit of submissions from the parties on this issue. The purpose of the observations made in this paragraph is to provide notice to the parties of the concern I have expressed and that the concern is a matter to which submissions and, perhaps, evidence should be directed if the plaintiff wishes to pursue an application for leave to amend by repleading a conspiracy claim.[54] Armstrong v McIntosh [No 2] [2019] WASC 379.[55] Bleyer v Google Inc [2014] NSWSC 897; (2014) 88 NSWLR 670.