Plum v Commonwealth Bank of Australia

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Plum v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2005] FCA 790

TRADE PRACTICES – Fair trading – Negligence – Alleged misleading conduct – Loans by a bank to enable borrower to purchase properties for residential unit development – Bank subsequently refused an application for development finance – Development finance not able to be obtained and properties sold at a loss –Whether bank officer was negligent in relation to giving information or advice – Whether bank officer misled borrower concerning availability of development finance – Whether bank engaged in deceptive or misleading conduct.

Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) ss 51A, 52

Fair Trading Act 1987 (NSW) ss 41, 42

Australian Securities and Investment Commission Act 2001 (Cth) ss 12BB, 12DA

PETER WILLIAM PLUM v COMMONWEALTH BANK OF AUSTRALIA and MICHAEL QUIRK

NSD 983 of 2003

COMMONWEALTH BANK OF AUSTRALIA v PETER WILLIAM PLUM

NSD 1714 of 2003

WILCOX J
15 JUNE 2005
SYDNEY

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD 983 of 2003

BETWEEN:

PETER WILLIAM PLUM
APPLICANT

AND:

COMMONWEALTH BANK OF AUSTRALIA
FIRST RESPONDENT

MICHAEL QUIRK
SECOND RESPONDENT
  NSD 1714 of 2003

BETWEEN:

COMMONWEALTH BANK OF AUSTRALIA
APPLICANT

AND:

PETER WILLIAM PLUM
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

WILCOX J

DATE:

15 JUNE 2005

PLACE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.        It be declared that:

(a)the State Bank of New South Wales, trading as ‘Colonial State Bank’, engaged in misleading or deceptive conduct in relation to the applicant, Peter William Plum, on 28 February 1997, in contravention of s 52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) and s 42 of the Fair Trading Act 1987 (NSW); and

(b)the second respondent, Michael Quirk, was involved in the said contravention, within the meaning of s 75B of the Trade Practices Act and s 61 of the Fair Trading Act.

2.All issues of damages, other relief and costs be reserved for consideration at a further hearing on a date to be appointed.

3.The matter be listed for further directions at 9.30am on Thursday, 28 July 2005.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD 983 of 2003

BETWEEN:

PETER WILLIAM PLUM
APPLICANT

AND:

COMMONWEALTH BANK OF AUSTRALIA
FIRST RESPONDENT

MICHAEL QUIRK
SECOND RESPONDENT

NSD 1714 of 2003

BETWEEN:

COMMONWEALTH BANK OF AUSTRALIA
APPLICANT

AND:

PETER WILLIAM PLUM
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

WILCOX J

DATE:

15 JUNE 2005

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

WILCOX J:

  1. Two associated claims have been heard together.  They both concern dealings between officers of the State Bank of New South Wales, then trading as ‘Colonial State Bank’ (‘CSB’), and Peter William Plum.

  2. The Commonwealth Bank of Australia (‘the Commonwealth Bank’) is the statutory successor to CSB.  It is common ground between the parties that the Commonwealth Bank has all the rights, and is subject to all the liabilities, in relation to its dealings with Mr Plum, that CSB would have had if it had remained…

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Details
Case
[2005] FCA 790
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Plum v Commonwealth Bank of Australia, the primary concern was whether the bank, through its representative Michael Quirk, engaged in misleading or deceptive conduct during a meeting with the applicant, Peter William Plum, on 28 February 1997. The dispute centred on the content of the conversation between Plum and Quirk regarding a loan application for a property development project. The Federal Court was tasked with determining whether Quirk's advice to Plum constituted misleading or deceptive conduct, which would contravene sections 52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) and 42 of the Fair Trading Act 1987 (NSW).

The central legal issue was whether Quirk's statements and advice during the meeting implied that Plum would be guaranteed a development loan for the construction costs of the project, despite no such guarantee being made explicitly. Plum argued that he relied on Quirk's advice and proceeded with the loan application under the impression that the development loan would be approved, which it was not. The court had to assess the credibility of both Plum's and Quirk's accounts of the conversation and determine the objective implications of their discussion.

After considering the evidence, the court concluded that Mr. Plum's account of the conversation was more likely to reflect its substance and purport. The court found that while Plum believed he was guaranteed the development loan, an objective observer would not have inferred such a guarantee from Quirk's advice. The court held that Quirk's failure to correct this misimpression and clarify the uncertain nature of the development loan approval process constituted misleading or deceptive conduct. Consequently, the court declared that the bank and Quirk had engaged in misleading or deceptive conduct as alleged.

The court also ordered that all issues of damages, other relief, and costs be reserved for a further hearing. This decision highlights the importance of clear and accurate communication in financial advice to avoid misleading or deceptive conduct.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. It be declared that:

(a) the State Bank of New South Wales, trading as ‘Colonial State Bank’, engaged in misleading or deceptive conduct in relation to the applicant, Peter William Plum, on 28 February 1997, in contravention of s 52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) and s 42 of the Fair Trading Act 1987 (NSW); and

(b) the second respondent, Michael Quirk, was involved in the said contravention, within the meaning of s 75B of the Trade Practices Act and s 61 of the Fair Trading Act.

2. All issues of damages, other relief and costs be reserved for consideration at a further hearing on a date to be appointed.

3.

Background

Background to the litigation

At the conclusion of the evidence, on 8 February 2005, counsel who had appeared for the Commonwealth Bank and Mr Quirk (Mr P J Dowdy) requested that submissions be put to the Court in writing. He said he wished to consider whether it was necessary or desirable, having regard to Mr Quirk’s cross-examination, that Mr Quirk should be separately represented, for the purpose of presenting submissions. There being no objection by Mr Wilson, I acceded to this request. Written submissions were first supplied on behalf of Mr Plum. Separate submissions were later supplied on behalf of both the Commonwealth Bank and Mr Quirk. Counsel for Mr Plum replied.Outline of the facts Mr Plum was born in 1950. He went to school in Wagga Wagga. He left school at the end of year 10, after having obtained his Intermediate Certificate. For some time, he worked as a shearer. He then bought a farm at Tarcutta, near Wagga Wagga. In 1989, Mr Plum commenced a carpenter’s apprenticeship and moved back to Wagga Wagga. Towards the end of his apprenticeship, his employer and he built a number of duplex units on land that he had purchased with the proceeds of sale of his farm. In 1993 or 1994, Mr Plum commenced to carry out building work on his own account. He purchased land at Kenneally Street, Wagga Wagga on which he built eight single storey villa units. For the purpose of this project, he borrowed money from Westpac Bank. He repaid the loan from the proceeds of sale of the units. In early 1997, Mr Plum became aware that three adjoining Wagga Wagga parcels of land were being put up for sale, in one line, at auction. The properties were known as 67 and 69 Crampton Street and 52 Travers Street. Each parcel of land contained an old house. The auction was to take place on Friday, 7 March 1997. The total area of the three properties was 7,588 square metres. Mr Plum conceived the idea of developing the whole site as a staged residential unit development. The site adjoined another property, 54 Travers Street, which also contained an old house. Mr Plum had dealt with CSB in 1996, when he had borrowed money to finance the purchase of a property that he later sold. He still held a line of credit with CSB, in the sum of $80,000. This was secured over another Wagga Wagga property. Mr Plum decided to approach CSB for finance to purchase the properties that were being offered at auction. He spoke to Mark Hately, a bank officer with whom he had previously dealt. Mr Hately referred him to Mr Quirk. At that time, Mr Quirk was employed by CSB as a Business Development Officer in the Small Business Department of its Wagga Wagga branch. Mr Plum met Mr Quirk, by appointment, on 28 February 1997, exactly one week before the auction. This was the first contact between the two men. There is dispute between them as to what was said at that meeting. In paras 13-15 of an affidavit made on 16 March 2004, Mr Plum gave this account of the conversation:‘Mr Quirk and I sat down and I came straight to the point and told him what I wanted. I said words to the effect:“I am looking to purchase the properties which are coming up for auction on 7 March at 67, 69 Crampton Street and 52 Travers Street, Wagga. I am very interested in it. I will be needing a loan to buy the land and a further loan to develop it to construct about 30 units on it. The idea is to take 12 months to get approvals and then build it over two-three years. I think it will go for around $550,000. I am looking for an interest only loan on the basis that I will pay off the debt from the profits of the development.”In response to my enquiry Mr Quirk said during the meeting words to the effect:“I think that you would be better served by taking out a housing loan to buy the properties. It will be quicker to obtain and at a cheaper rate of interest. You can later apply for a development loan to finance the actual construction of the townhouses”.Mr Quirk said words to the effect “we can apply for a development loan later” … Mr Quirk did not at this meeting or at any time say to me words to the effect:(a)the bank is unlikely to approve the development loan;(b)there are particular lending requirements in relation to development loans and this will depend upon the circumstances at the time of the loan application;(c)The bank would not permit a home loan to be paid out of the profits of the townhouse development.’

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The only participants in the conversation were Mr Plum and Mr Quirk. Nobody else was present at any stage. Neither participant claimed to have made a contemporaneous record of what was said. So it is necessary for me to consider carefully what each man said about the meeting during cross-examination. It may be necessary to determine the witnesses’ respective credibility. It will be necessary for me to consider some evidence given by Mr Frost and Mr Traynor, relied on by Mr Plum, and certain bank documents that are argued to throw light on what occurred at the meeting.(ii) Mr Plum’s oral evidence In cross-examination, Mr Dowdy took Mr Plum to his earlier applications for finance. Mr Plum agreed that, although the bank officer who initially put together each of his earlier applications might have commented on its chance of success, he knew the final decision, in each case, was made by a higher bank officer. Mr Plum agreed that no architectural drawings or plans had been prepared by 28 February 1997. However, he disputed that he ‘had no real awareness’ of the likely cost of the development. He said he was able to form an idea of cost because of his earlier development projects. He thought the overall cost of the development, including purchase of the land, would be about $3,000,000. Mr Plum denied Mr Dowdy’s suggestions that he told Mr Quirk he would hold the properties for at least twelve months to assess their development potential and that he had spoken to Mr Quirk about assessing the effect of the new bridge. He agreed there had been discussion about the length of the loan and that it would be an interest-only loan. Mr Plum denied he would still have gone ahead with the loan application, if Mr Quirk had told him CSB could now only consider the application for money to purchase the properties and he could later apply for a development loan to cover construction costs. Mr Plum explained his denial by saying: ‘Well there’s no guarantee there of me getting the loan, is there?’ He insisted that he took Mr Quirk’s response on 28 February 1997 as meaning the bank guaranteed it would advance a development loan for the construction costs of the development. Mr Dowdy took Mr Plum to his affidavit statement about Mr Quirk saying he could later apply for a development loan to finance the construction of the town houses. The evidence went on:‘You, of course, knew and accepted in this meeting that at a later point of time, you would have to put in a development loan application to construct the buildings. Correct? --- Yes.But you say, do you, that was just an unnecessary formality because you were guaranteed the amount that you would require in any event. Is that what you say to the court? --- No, I understand that it should have been put in as one loan, the entirety of the loan, as I see it. Mr Quirk should have advised me that it should have been done in a development loan in the entirety of the purchase of the land and the actual development.I see, but the fact of the matter is, you accept that he made clear to you that a later development application by you would have to be put in? --- Yes.You've just told us that you were in effect, or you considered yourself to be guaranteed the full amount of the construction cost, haven't you? --- Yes, well the second - to put in the loan for the development I took as just a formality from being guaranteed the loan for the purchase of the land.And you assumed this from a man who [you] knew … couldn't even approve the loan of $550,000 you were asking. Is that right? --- Yes, but it had to go through bank channels to be approved. It's the same thing at the end of the day isn't it?Well, the only thing that Mr Quirk ever came back to tell you was that your loan of $520,000 had been approved. That's correct, isn't it? --- Yes.He never came back to you and said, well, the development loan has been approved for whatever this development cost, did he? --- But he didn't come back and say to me, it hasn't been, either.He never came back to you and said to you anything to the effect that any development loan application had been approved, did he? --- No.’

Decision

Reasons for decision

WILCOX J
Mr Wilson conceded that, although Mr Plum believed that, on 28 February 1997, a development loan had been guaranteed, an objective or reasonable observer would not think that had happened. He said:‘Plum’s case in misleading and deceptive conduct against the Bank … is that Quirk on 28 February 1997 gave the false impression that it was appropriate to apply for a housing loan in the first instance and that there was some prospect of development loan approval being granted in the future – because otherwise he would not have suggested that Plum apply later for a development loan.It was Quirk’s failure to correct this false impression by failing to advise Plum that development loan approval could not be predicted and that the housing loan ought properly be considered in the context of his construction plans by the larger business Banking area of the Bank which resulted in the loss. Had Quirk advised Plum that construction loan approval could not be predicted and that his application ought properly be considered by the larger business area of the Bank, Plum would not have proceeded to purchase the land.’Conclusions(i) The conversation of 28 February 1997 As I said earlier, the most important factual issue in this case concerns the content of the conversation of 28 February 1997 between Mr Plum and Mr Quirk. Mr Plum took no contemporaneous note of the conversation; neither, according to Mr Quirk’s evidence, did he. I am sceptical of the ability of any witness, however intelligent, honest and careful, accurately to recall the detail of any unrecorded conversation that occurred eight years earlier. Faced with conflicting versions of such a conversation, a tribunal of fact can only assess the probabilities about the content of such a conversation by reference to the surrounding circumstances, but taking into account the tribunal’s general impression of the personalities, character and credit-worthiness of the relevant witnesses. Taking this course, I have concluded that I should prefer Mr Plum’s account of the conversation to that of Mr Quirk. I do not suggest that Mr Plum has recounted the exact words used by him and Mr Quirk. However, I think Mr Plum’s evidence is likely more accurately to convey the substance and purport of the conversation, than that of Mr Quirk. The meeting of 28 February 1997 was more significant to Mr Plum than it was to Mr Quirk. Mr Plum was contemplating a project substantially larger than any he had previously undertaken. Although he held real estate assets, he lacked the necessary cash resources to carry out the development. He needed to borrow the whole of the money that was necessary even to purchase the land. Without generous financial support, the project was doomed from the start. From Mr Plum’s point of view, much turned on this interview. From Mr Quirk’s point of view, this was just another loan application interview. In this context, the detail of the conversation is likely to have been more memorable to Mr Plum than to Mr Quirk.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: WILCOX J