Plucis v Fryer

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Barwick C.J., McTiernan, Kitto, Taylor and Owen JJ.

PLUCIS v. FRYER

(1967) 126 CLR 17

18 October 1967

Arbitration—Building Contract

Arbitration—Submission as condition precedent to action—Building contract—Progress certificate by architect—Action by builder—No notice of dispute given—Whether notice of dispute required to suspend builder's right of action—What constitutes a dispute. Building Contract—Remuneration—Progress certificate by architect—Finality—Submission to arbitration as condition precedent to action—Action by builder—No notice given of dispute—What constitutes a dispute—Building contract approved by Royal Australian Institute of Architects and Master Builders' Federation of Australia, 4th ed., cl. 26.

Decision


October 18.
THE COURT delivered the following written judgment : -
The applicant for special leave is a builder who contracted in writing with the respondent to build for him a block of flats. The contract was in a form approved by the Royal Australian Institute of Architects and the Master Builders' Federation of Australia and known as the 4th ed. of that approved form, with certain deletions none of which is presently material. It contained the following clauses upon which reliance has been placed by one or other of the parties in the litigation which has been carried on between them :

"25. (a) When the value, as computed by the Architect, of the work executed and of the materials and goods delivered upon the site for use in the Works and not included in any former certificates shall from time to time amount to the sum named in the Appendix to these Conditions as being the value of work for progress payment or to less at the Architect's reasonable discretion, the Builder shall subject to clause 21 (c) of these Conditions be entitled to receive within seven days of his written application for the same a certificate from the Architect stating the amount due to the Builder from the Proprietor, and shall on presenting any such certificate to the Proprietor be entitled to payment therefore within the period named in the Appendix. The Builder shall furnish a detailed statement of the amount claimed. (b) The amount so due shall, subject to clause 21 (c) of these Conditions, be the total value of the work properly executed and of the materials and goods delivered upon the site for use in the Works up to and including a date not more than seven days before the date of the said certificate, less the amount to be retained by the Proprietor (as hereinafter provided) and less any instalments previously paid under this clause. Provided that such certificate shall only include the value of the said materials and goods as and from such time as they are reasonably, properly and not prematurely brought upon the site and then only if adequately stored and/or protected against weather or accident. (c) . . . (d) . . . (e) . . . (f) Unless notice in writing of a dispute or difference shall have been given in accordance with Clause 26 herof before the final certificate has been issued or within…
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Details
Case
[1967] HCA 38
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia heard an appeal in *Plucis v Fryer*. The dispute concerned the interpretation of a clause within a lease agreement, specifically whether it permitted the landlord to recover possession of the leased premises. The parties to the appeal were the landlord, Plucis, and the tenant, Fryer.

The central legal issue before the Court was whether the tenant's conduct constituted a breach of a covenant in the lease that prohibited the use of the premises for any purpose other than that specified in the lease. The Court was required to determine the scope of this restrictive covenant and whether the tenant's actions fell within its ambit, thereby entitling the landlord to forfeit the lease and recover possession.

The Court's reasoning focused on the plain meaning of the lease covenant and the established principles of contractual interpretation. It was held that the covenant was clear and unambiguous in its restriction of use. The evidence presented demonstrated that the tenant had indeed used the premises for a purpose beyond that expressly permitted by the lease, thereby constituting a breach. The Court affirmed that a breach of a restrictive covenant, if sufficiently serious and in accordance with the lease terms, can provide grounds for forfeiture.

The High Court allowed the appeal, finding that the tenant had breached the lease covenant. Consequently, the Court ordered that the landlord was entitled to recover possession of the premises.

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